Himachal Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this prelims mock with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a subject-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
150
Questions
19
Subjects
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
Where a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, his remedy to apply for setting aside the decree on showing that summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing lies under:
aOrder IX, Rule 13
bOrder IX, Rule 7
cOrder XLIII, Rule 1
dOrder IX, Rule 9
Answer: A
Order IX, Rule 13 enables a defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed to apply for setting it aside on proof of non-service of summons or sufficient cause for non-appearance; Order IX, Rule 9 deals with restoration where a plaintiff's suit is dismissed for default.
The power of the High Court or District Court to transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before any court subordinate to it, and to try or dispose of the same, is conferred by:
aSection 24
bSection 23
cSection 25
dSection 22
Answer: A
Section 24 confers general power on the High Court and the District Court to transfer and withdraw suits, appeals and other proceedings; Section 25 deals with the Supreme Court's power to transfer cases from one State to another.
The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order that the name of any party improperly joined be struck out, or that any person whose presence is necessary to enable the court to effectually adjudicate be added. This power to add or strike out parties is contained in:
aOrder II, Rule 3
bOrder I, Rule 10(2)
cOrder I, Rule 9
dOrder XXII, Rule 4
Answer: B
Order I, Rule 10(2) empowers the court at any stage to strike out parties improperly joined and to add any person whose presence is necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit.
Under Section 96(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal (except on a question of law) shall lie from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Cause, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed:
aTen thousand rupees
bThree thousand rupees
cFive thousand rupees
dTwenty-five thousand rupees
Answer: A
Section 96(4) bars a first appeal, save on a question of law, in small-cause-nature suits where the subject-matter does not exceed ten thousand rupees.
Under Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the defendant fails to file the written statement within thirty days from the date of service of summons, the Court may allow it to be filed on a later day for reasons recorded in writing, but not later than:
aSixty days from the date of service of summons
bNinety days from the date of service of summons
cForty-five days from the date of service of summons
dOne hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: B
The proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 caps the extension for filing a written statement at ninety days from the date of service of summons.
The right to lodge a caveat in a suit or proceeding instituted or about to be instituted is conferred by which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and for what maximum duration does such caveat remain in force?
aSection 148A; ninety days from the date of lodging
bSection 148A; thirty days from the date of lodging
cSection 148; sixty days from the date of lodging
dSection 151; one hundred and eighty days from the date of lodging
Answer: A
Section 148A provides the right to lodge a caveat, and under sub-section (5) it remains in force for ninety days from the date on which it was lodged.
An appeal lies to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, from a decree passed in appeal by a subordinate court only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aA question of fact of general public importance
bAn error apparent on the face of the record
cA misappreciation of oral evidence by the first appellate court
dA substantial question of law
Answer: D
A second appeal under Section 100 lies to the High Court only when the case involves a substantial question of law, which the memorandum must precisely state and the Court must formulate.
Under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, additional evidence may be produced in the appellate court. Which of the following is NOT a ground recognised by that Rule for admitting such evidence?
aThe evidence, despite due diligence, was not within the party's knowledge or could not be produced earlier
bThe appellate court requires a document or witness to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause
cA party wishes to fill up a lacuna in the evidence it led at the trial
dThe court appealed from refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted
Answer: C
Order XLI, Rule 27 permits additional evidence only on the three enumerated grounds; it cannot be used merely to fill a lacuna in a party's case, as courts have consistently held.
Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a plaint shall be rejected in which of the following situations?
aWhere the plaint does not disclose a cause of action
bAll of the above
cWhere the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the time fixed
dWhere the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law
Answer: B
Order VII, Rule 11 lists several grounds for rejection of a plaint, including non-disclosure of a cause of action, the suit being barred by law, and uncorrected undervaluation of relief.
The proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that no application for amendment of pleadings shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court concludes that:
aThe opposite party consents in writing to the amendment
bIn spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial
cThe amendment does not change the nature of the suit
dThe amendment is necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings
Answer: B
The 2002 proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 bars post-trial-commencement amendments unless the court is satisfied that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
Under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where a decree is varied or reversed in appeal, the court is empowered, on application, to grant restitution so as to:
aPlace the parties in the position they would have occupied but for the decree so varied or reversed
bDirect a fresh trial of the suit before another court
cPunish the party who obtained the original decree by way of costs only
dAward exemplary damages to the party in whose favour the decree was reversed
Answer: A
Section 144 embodies the doctrine of restitution: on reversal or variation of a decree the court restores the parties to the position they would have occupied but for that decree.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the expression "mesne profits" of property defined in Section 2(12) means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but excluding:
aProfits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession
bInterest on the profits at any rate
cProfits received by a bona fide transferee
dProfits accruing after the institution of the suit
Answer: A
Section 2(12) expressly excludes from mesne profits any profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession, while including interest on the profits.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the courts shall (subject to the provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature:
aExcepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
bOnly suits in which the right to property or to an office is contested
cExcepting all suits relating to religious rites or ceremonies
dOnly where the cause of action arises within their local limits
Answer: A
Section 9 confers jurisdiction over all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred; questions of property or office do not by themselves oust civil jurisdiction.
Under Order XXIII, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful:
aDoes not lie at all
bLies within three years of the decree
cLies only if the compromise was obtained by fraud
dLies only with the leave of the court that passed the decree
Answer: A
Order XXIII, Rule 3A expressly bars any separate suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the underlying compromise was not lawful; the remedy is to approach the same court under the proviso to Rule 3.
Under Section 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where a party obtains an adjournment and is ordered to pay costs to the other party, payment of such costs is:
aOptional and merely directory in nature
bA condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit or defence by that party
cPayable only if the suit is ultimately dismissed
dRecoverable only along with the final decree
Answer: B
Section 35B makes payment of the costs ordered for causing delay a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit by the plaintiff, or the further defence by the defendant, where such party was ordered to pay.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, a further appeal under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
aLies only where a substantial question of law is involved
bShall not lie, notwithstanding anything in the Letters Patent
cLies to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent
dLies only with a certificate of fitness
Answer: B
Section 100A, as substituted by Act 22 of 2002, provides that notwithstanding anything in any Letters Patent, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of a single Judge who has heard and decided such an appeal.
Under the proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for amendment of pleadings after the trial has commenced shall not be allowed unless the Court concludes that:
aThe opposite party consents to the amendment
bThe amendment does not change the nature of the suit
cIn spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial
dThe amendment is necessary to determine the real questions in controversy
Answer: C
The proviso added by the 2002 amendment bars amendment after commencement of trial unless the Court is satisfied that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
Under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, where the judgment-debtor has wilfully failed to obey it, may be enforced by:
aDetention in civil prison only
bDetention in civil prison or attachment, at the decree-holder's option
cBoth detention in civil prison and attachment of property
dAttachment of the property of the judgment-debtor
Answer: D
Order XXI, Rule 32 provides that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is enforced only by attachment of the judgment-debtor's property; detention in civil prison is available for decrees of specific performance or injunction, not restitution.
The power to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or other civil court in one State to a High Court or other civil court in another State is conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on:
aThe Supreme Court under Section 23
bThe High Court under Section 24
cThe District Court under Section 22
dThe Supreme Court under Section 25
Answer: D
Section 25 confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive power to direct inter-State transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceeding where it is satisfied that such order is expedient for the ends of justice.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of ‘sexual harassment’ against a woman is dealt with under:
aSection 74
bSection 79
cSection 75
dSection 77
Answer: C
Section 75 BNS deals with sexual harassment. Section 74 covers assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty, Section 77 voyeurism and Section 79 word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.
Assertion (A): Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly.
Reason (R): Common object under Section 190 and common intention under Section 3(5) of the BNS are identical in scope and require a prior meeting of minds in every case.
Choose the correct alternative:
aBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cA is true, but R is false
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: C
Section 190 BNS makes every member of an unlawful assembly liable for offences committed in prosecution of the common object (A is true). However, common object and common intention are not identical — common object does not require a prior meeting of minds, so R is false.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ‘criminal breach of trust’ and ‘cheating’ are respectively dealt with under:
aSections 303 and 308
bSections 314 and 319
cSections 318 and 316
dSections 316 and 318
Answer: D
Section 316 BNS deals with criminal breach of trust and Section 318 with cheating (Section 319 covers cheating by personation). Section 314 covers dishonest misappropriation of property.
Which one of the following statements regarding the scheme of homicide under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is NOT correct?
aPunishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder is provided in Section 106
bCulpable homicide is defined in Section 100
cMurder is defined in Section 101
dPunishment for murder is provided in Section 103
Answer: A
Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder is provided in Section 105 BNS; Section 106 deals with causing death by negligence. Sections 100, 101 and 103 are correctly stated.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offences of ‘criminal intimidation’ and ‘defamation’ are respectively contained in:
aSections 356 and 351
bSections 351 and 354
cSections 503 and 499
dSections 351 and 356
Answer: D
Under Chapter XIX of the BNS, criminal intimidation is dealt with in Section 351 and defamation in Section 356. The IPC numbering (Sections 503 and 499) no longer applies.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, both ‘criminal trespass’ and ‘house-trespass’ are defined in:
aSection 331
bSection 351
cSection 324
dSection 329
Answer: D
Section 329 BNS defines both criminal trespass and house-trespass; Section 331 provides the punishment for house-trespass or house-breaking. Section 324 deals with mischief.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, criminal conspiracy and abetment of a thing are respectively defined in:
aSections 120A and 107
bSections 62 and 45
cSections 61 and 45
dSections 45 and 61
Answer: C
Criminal conspiracy is defined in Section 61 BNS and abetment of a thing in Section 45 BNS (Section 62 deals with punishment for attempt). The old IPC numbering (120A, 107) is no longer in force.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of 'murder' is defined and the 'punishment for murder' is provided, respectively, in:
aSection 101 and Section 105
bSection 101 and Section 103
cSection 300 and Section 302
dSection 100 and Section 101
Answer: B
In the BNS, 2023, 'Murder' is defined in Section 101 and the 'Punishment for murder' (death or imprisonment for life and fine) is laid down in Section 103, while 'Culpable homicide' is defined in Section 100.
Section 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which prescribes death or imprisonment for life and fine where a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief, is best described as a provision dealing with:
aAbetment of murder by a public servant
bMob lynching
cDacoity with murder
dMurder by a life-convict
Answer: B
Section 103(2) of the BNS is a new provision penalising 'mob lynching' — murder by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on grounds such as race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief.
Statement I: Under Section 106(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to five years and fine. Statement II: Where such act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing a medical procedure, the imprisonment may extend only to two years and fine. Choose the correct option:
aOnly Statement I is true
bOnly Statement II is true
cBoth Statements I and II are true
dBoth Statements I and II are false
Answer: C
Section 106(1) of the BNS raises the general punishment for causing death by negligence to up to five years; its proviso carves out a lighter maximum of two years for a registered medical practitioner acting in a medical procedure.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, for the purpose of computing the death of a woman as a 'dowry death' under Section 80, such death by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances must occur:
aWithin five years of her marriage
bWithin seven years of her marriage
cWithin three years of her marriage
dAt any time during the subsistence of the marriage
Answer: B
Section 80 of the BNS, 2023 (corresponding to IPC Section 304B) requires the death to occur 'within seven years of her marriage', with cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand soon before death; it is punishable with imprisonment not less than seven years extending to life.
The offence of 'snatching', made a distinct offence for the first time and not merely treated as theft, is provided under which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 309
bSection 308
cSection 304
dSection 303
Answer: C
Section 304 of the BNS, 2023 introduces 'snatching' as a separate offence (theft by suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizing or grabbing movable property), while Section 303 covers theft, Section 308 extortion and Section 309 robbery.
Under Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where the commission of an organised crime has resulted in the death of any person, the offender shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and also with fine which shall not be less than:
aOne lakh rupees
bTwo lakh rupees
cTen lakh rupees
dFive lakh rupees
Answer: C
Section 111(2)(a) of the BNS provides that organised crime resulting in death is punishable with death or imprisonment for life and a fine of not less than ten lakh rupees; in any other case (clause (b)) the minimum fine is five lakh rupees.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offences of 'Organised crime', 'Petty organised crime' and 'Terrorist act' are provided, in that order, in:
aSections 109, 110 and 111
bSections 112, 113 and 114
cSections 110, 111 and 112
dSections 111, 112 and 113
Answer: D
Chapter VI of the BNS, 2023 places 'Organised crime' in Section 111, 'Petty organised crime' in Section 112 and 'Terrorist act' in Section 113 — all new offences not found in the IPC.
Under the proviso to Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where a cognizable offence is punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain a prima facie case. Such preliminary enquiry must be completed within:
aThirty days
bTwenty-one days
cFourteen days
dSeven days
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 173(3) BNSS permits a preliminary enquiry in offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to be completed within fourteen days, before proceeding to investigate.
The provision for default bail (formerly Section 167(2) CrPC) is now contained in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in:
aSection 190(3)
bSection 187(3)
cSection 480(3)
dSection 167(3)
Answer: B
Section 187(3) BNSS contains the default bail provision: ninety days where the offence is punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for ten years or more, and sixty days for other offences, on failure to complete investigation.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused becomes entitled to default bail if the investigation is not completed within sixty days, where the offence in question is:
aPunishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
bPunishable with death or imprisonment for life
cAny offence other than one punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than ten years
dAny offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session
Answer: C
Under Section 187(3) BNSS the ninety-day limit applies to offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of ten years or more; for all other offences the limit is sixty days, after which the indefeasible right to default bail accrues.
Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 deals with the maximum period of detention of an under-trial prisoner. Where the accused is a first-time offender who has never been convicted of any offence, he shall be released on bond by the Court on having undergone detention up to:
aOne-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
bOne-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
cThe full maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
dOne-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
Answer: D
The first proviso to Section 479(1) BNSS is a new benefit: a first-time offender (never previously convicted) is to be released on bond on having undergone detention up to one-third of the maximum imprisonment, as against one-half under the general rule.
The benefit of release under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (release of an under-trial after undergoing one-half of the maximum sentence) is NOT available where the offence is:
aOne for which death or imprisonment for life is specified as one of the punishments
bTriable by a Court of Session
cA non-bailable offence
dPunishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years
Answer: A
Section 479 BNSS expressly excludes offences for which death or imprisonment for life is specified as one of the punishments, and offences where proceedings are pending in more than one case against the accused.
A significant innovation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is the provision for trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender, allowing the Court to proceed with trial and pronounce judgment in his absence. This provision is found in:
aSection 356 BNSS
bSection 84 BNSS
cSection 482 BNSS
dSection 299 BNSS
Answer: A
Section 356 BNSS newly permits inquiry, trial and judgment against a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial, in his absence, the trial commencing not earlier than ninety days from the date of framing of charge.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the duty to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme is cast upon:
aThe National Human Rights Commission
bEvery State Government
cThe High Court of the State
dThe Central Government
Answer: B
Section 398 BNSS, a new provision, directs every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme for the State to ensure protection of witnesses.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a petition for mercy may be filed by a convict, or on his behalf, before the President of India or the Governor of the State only in respect of a case where the sentence pronounced is:
aImprisonment for life
bRigorous imprisonment exceeding ten years
cA sentence of death
dAny sentence confirmed by the High Court
Answer: C
Section 472 BNSS provides a structured procedure and timelines for filing a mercy petition before the Governor or the President specifically in cases where a sentence of death has been pronounced and confirmed.
Under Section 290 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an application for plea bargaining by the accused must be filed within a fixed period from the date of framing of charge. That period is:
aThirty days
bSixty days
cNinety days
dFifteen days
Answer: A
Section 290(1) BNSS introduces a time limit for plea bargaining: the accused must file the application within thirty days from the date of framing of charge, a restriction absent in the corresponding CrPC scheme.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an officer in charge of a police station who receives information disclosing a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but less than seven years may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry. Within what period must such preliminary enquiry be completed?
aThirty days
bFourteen days
cSeven days
dTwenty-one days
Answer: B
Section 173(3) of the BNSS, 2023 permits a preliminary enquiry (with DSP-rank approval) for cognizable offences punishable with 3 to less than 7 years, and requires it to be concluded within fourteen days.
Statutory recognition of the 'Zero FIR' — registration of information relating to a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where the offence is committed — has been introduced under which provision of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 175
bSection 154
cSection 173
dSection 193
Answer: C
Section 173 of the BNSS, 2023 governs information in cognizable cases and statutorily recognises the Zero FIR, allowing registration irrespective of territorial jurisdiction for onward transmission to the police station concerned.
Under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the recording of confessions and statements is to be done by whom?
aThe Public Prosecutor in charge of the case
bAny Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, and not by a police officer even if conferred with the powers of a Magistrate
cAny police officer specially empowered by the State Government
dThe Superintendent of Police of the district
Answer: B
Section 183 of the BNSS, 2023 empowers a Magistrate to record confessions and statements and expressly bars a police officer from doing so, even if such officer has been conferred Magistrate's powers.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the report of a police officer on completion of investigation (the police report) is to be forwarded to the Magistrate under which section?
aSection 173
bSection 190
cSection 187
dSection 193
Answer: D
Section 193 of the BNSS, 2023 corresponds to Section 173 of the old CrPC and deals with the report of a police officer on completion of investigation submitted to the Magistrate.
No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, if it is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, after the lapse of which period of limitation?
aOne year
bThree years
cFive years
dSix months
Answer: B
Section 514 of the BNSS, 2023 fixes the limitation as six months (fine only), one year (imprisonment up to one year) and three years (imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years).
Under Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no person who is infirm or above sixty years of age, and accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for less than three years, shall be arrested without the prior permission of an officer not below which rank?
aAn officer in charge of the police station
bAn Inspector General of Police
cA Superintendent of Police
dA Deputy Superintendent of Police
Answer: D
Section 35(7) of the BNSS, 2023 is a new safeguard requiring prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police to arrest an infirm person or one above sixty years for offences punishable with less than three years.
Compounding of offences under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is governed by which section, corresponding to Section 320 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
aSection 340
bSection 359
cSection 364
dSection 320
Answer: B
Section 359 of the BNSS, 2023 corresponds to Section 320 of the CrPC and lists offences compoundable with or without permission of the court.
The fact that a child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within a stated period after its dissolution (the mother remaining unmarried), is conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). That period is:
aTwo hundred days
bTwo hundred and eighty days
cThree hundred and sixty-five days
dOne hundred and eighty days
Answer: B
Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 fixes the period at two hundred and eighty days after dissolution of the marriage, the mother remaining unmarried, as conclusive proof of legitimacy unless non-access is shown.
Under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), where it is shown that a woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a demand for dowry soon before her death, the Court:
aShall presume that the accused caused the dowry death
bMay presume that the accused caused the dowry death
cMust conclusively presume guilt with no rebuttal permitted
dCannot draw any presumption without an eyewitness
Answer: A
Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 uses the mandatory word "shall" presume, unlike Section 117 (abetment of suicide) which uses "may" presume.
The presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman under Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) may be drawn where the suicide is committed within:
aTen years from the date of marriage
bFive years from the date of marriage
cSeven years from the date of marriage
dThree years from the date of marriage
Answer: C
Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 permits the Court to presume abetment where the woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage and was subjected to cruelty; "cruelty" carries the meaning given in Section 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon his uncorroborated testimony. This rule is contained in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) in:
aSection 124 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 139 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 158 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: B
Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 declares an accomplice a competent witness and validates conviction on his uncorroborated testimony, though illustration (b) to Section 119 adds a rule of caution requiring corroboration.
The rule of prudence that the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars is reflected in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) in:
aSection 119, illustration (a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 119, illustration (b) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 119, illustration (g) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: B
Illustration (b) to Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 allows the Court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars; read with Section 138 it forms a rule of prudence accepted as law.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the examination of a witness by the party who calls him is termed his examination-in-chief, and the examination by the adverse party is termed his cross-examination. These expressions are defined in:
aSection 140
bSection 141
cSection 143
dSection 142
Answer: D
Section 142 of the BSA defines examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination; Section 143 then deals with the order and direction of those examinations.
The doctrine of estoppel under Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) is properly described as a:
aRule of substantive law conferring rights
bRule of evidence which precludes a person from denying what he has earlier represented
cRule of limitation barring stale claims
dRule of pleading governing the framing of issues
Answer: B
Estoppel under Section 121 of the BSA is a rule of evidence; it prevents a person who, by declaration or conduct, induced another to act, from denying the truth of that representation.
Where a person is accused of an offence and claims the benefit of a General Exception in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within that exception lies on:
aThe Court, which must presume the exception in the accused's favour
bThe prosecution, which must negate the exception beyond reasonable doubt
cThe accused, by virtue of Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dNeither party, the matter being left to judicial discretion
Answer: C
Section 108 of the BSA places on the accused the burden of proving circumstances that bring his case within any General Exception, and the Court presumes the absence of such circumstances until proved.
Under Section 92 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the Court may presume that the signature and execution of a document are genuine where the document is produced from proper custody and is:
aThirty years old
bTwelve years old
cFive years old
dTwenty years old
Answer: A
Section 92 of the BSA permits a presumption as to genuineness of signature, execution and attestation where a document purporting to be thirty years old is produced from proper custody.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a confession made to a police officer is dealt with under:
aSection 22
bSection 26
cSection 23
dSection 24
Answer: C
Section 23 BSA (corresponding to old Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act) provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence.
Where a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused person in police custody, so much of that information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered may be proved. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 this discovery rule is contained as a proviso in:
aSub-section (2) of Section 23 (Confession to police officer)
bSection 27, retained with the same number as the Indian Evidence Act
cSection 22, dealing with confessions caused by inducement
dSection 24, as a separate provision on joint-trial confessions
Answer: A
The BSA merged the old Section 27 (discovery) into Section 23 itself as the proviso to sub-section (2); it is no longer a stand-alone section.
A statement made by a deceased person as to the cause of his death (a dying declaration) is relevant under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 under:
aSection 32
bSection 28
cSection 30
dSection 26
Answer: D
Section 26 BSA (corresponding to old Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act) covers cases in which a statement of a relevant fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found is relevant, including dying declarations.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the opinion of an expert upon a point of foreign law, science, art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, is a relevant fact under:
aSection 45
bSection 41
cSection 47
dSection 39
Answer: D
Section 39 BSA (corresponding to old Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act) makes the opinions of experts relevant.
The provision enumerating facts of which the Court shall take judicial notice (such as laws in force, public festivals, seals of courts and the territories of India) is found under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 in:
aSection 50
bSection 56
cSection 52
dSection 57
Answer: C
Section 52 BSA (corresponding to old Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act) lists the facts of which the Court shall take judicial notice.
"No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact." This rule is enacted under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 in:
aSection 142
bSection 134
cSection 139
dSection 119
Answer: C
Section 139 BSA (corresponding to old Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act) provides that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove any fact.
Under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, which of the following is NOT entitled to a general lien over goods bailed for a general balance of account?
aInnkeepers
bBankers
cWharfingers
dFactors
Answer: A
Section 171 confers a general lien only on bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers. Innkeepers are not in the enumerated list; other persons get only a particular lien unless there is an express contract for a general lien.
The classic rule on remoteness of damage, that damages recoverable are such as arise naturally from the breach or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of the contract, was laid down in:
aCurrie v. Misa
bHadley v. Baxendale
cFelthouse v. Bindley
dCarlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
Answer: B
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) settled the two-limb test for recoverable damages, which is reflected in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Damages too remote and indirect are not recoverable.
Under Section 124 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a 'contract of indemnity' is a contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by:
aAny event whatsoever, whether human or natural, including acts of God
bThe conduct of a third person only, but not the promisor
cThe conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person
dThe default of a principal debtor in a guaranteed transaction
Answer: C
Section 124 confines a contract of indemnity to loss caused by the conduct of the promisor himself or of any other person. Loss arising from accidents or events not depending on human conduct falls outside this statutory definition.
A delivers a watch to a repairer for repair. Under Section 148 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person delivering the goods and the person to whom they are delivered are respectively called:
aMortgagor and mortgagee
bPawnor and pawnee
cBailor and bailee
dPrincipal and agent
Answer: C
Section 148 defines bailment as delivery of goods for a purpose on a contract that they be returned or disposed of as directed. The person delivering is the 'bailor' and the person to whom delivered is the 'bailee'. Pawn is a special bailment of goods as security under Section 172.
Under Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in the absence of a contract to that effect, an agent:
aCan both personally enforce and is personally bound by contracts entered into on behalf of his principal
bCan personally enforce but is never personally bound by such contracts
cCannot personally enforce, nor is he personally bound by, contracts entered into on behalf of his principal
dIs personally bound but can never personally enforce such contracts
Answer: C
Section 230 lays down the general rule that an agent neither personally enforces nor is personally bound by contracts made on behalf of his principal, in the absence of a contrary contract. The section then lists three situations where a contrary contract is presumed.
The leading authority holding that an agreement by a minor is void ab initio and not merely voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is:
aMohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose
bSri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subba Rao
cKhan Gul v. Lakha Singh
dAjudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal
Answer: A
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, the Privy Council held that an agreement by a minor, who lacks contractual capacity under Section 11, is void ab initio. Khan Gul and Ajudhia Prasad deal with the later question of restitution against a minor.
Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, declares void every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person, other than a:
aMinor
bPerson already married
cWidow
dPerson of unsound mind
Answer: A
Section 26 makes every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person void, except in the case of a minor. A partial restraint on the marriage of a major is equally void under this section.
Which one of the following agreements is expressly saved from being void under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, relating to agreements in restraint of legal proceedings?
aAn agreement which limits the time within which a party may enforce his rights below the period of limitation
bAn agreement which absolutely restricts a party from enforcing his rights in the ordinary tribunals
cAn agreement which extinguishes the right of a party on the expiry of a specified period after the dispute arises
dAn agreement to refer to arbitration any dispute that may arise between the parties
Answer: D
The exceptions to Section 28 save agreements to refer present or future disputes to arbitration from the bar on restraint of legal proceedings. Absolute restrictions on enforcement and clauses curtailing the limitation period are void under the main provision.
Under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful where the court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. The effect on such an agreement is that it is:
aValid but unenforceable by way of specific performance
bVoidable at the option of the party not in default
cVoid
dMerely irregular and curable by ratification
Answer: C
Section 23 provides that where the consideration or object is unlawful, including where it is immoral or opposed to public policy, the agreement is void. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.
Under Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person for whom an act is done, or who is represented by another in dealings with third persons, is called the:
aBailee
bPrincipal
cAgent
dSurety
Answer: B
Section 182 defines an 'agent' as a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons, and the person for whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the 'principal'.
Under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in a contract of guarantee the person who gives the guarantee, the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given, and the person to whom the guarantee is given are respectively called:
aCreditor, surety and principal debtor
bIndemnifier, indemnity-holder and creditor
cPrincipal debtor, surety and creditor
dSurety, principal debtor and creditor
Answer: D
Section 126 defines a contract of guarantee as one to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. The giver of the guarantee is the 'surety', the person in respect of whose default it is given is the 'principal debtor', and the person to whom it is given is the 'creditor'.
The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 is an Act enacted primarily to:
aprovide only for the control of rents within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh
bprovide for the control of rents and regulation of evictions within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh
cprovide only for regulation of evictions within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh
dconsolidate the law relating to transfer of urban immovable property in Himachal Pradesh
Answer: B
The long title and preamble of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 declare it to be an Act to control the increase of rent of, and to regulate the conditions of tenancy including eviction, in respect of buildings and rented land within urban areas of Himachal Pradesh.
Where the fair rent of a building or rented land has been fixed under section 4 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, no further increase or decrease in such fair rent shall ordinarily be permissible for a period of:
atwo years
bthree years
cseven years
dfive years
Answer: D
Section 5 of the Act provides that once fair rent is fixed under section 4, no further increase or decrease in such fair rent is permissible for a period of five years.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, no person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with:
athe consent of the local municipal authority
bthe written permission of the Controller
ca decree of the competent civil court
dthe prior sanction of the State Government
Answer: B
Section 12 of the Act prohibits conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller.
Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 may prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction within:
afifteen days from the date of the order, subject to extension for sufficient cause
bninety days from the date of the order, without any extension
cthirty days from the date of the order, subject to extension for sufficient cause
dsixty days from the date of the order, without any extension
Answer: A
Section 24 of the Act provides that an appeal against an order of the Controller must be filed within fifteen days of the order, though the appellate authority may, for reasons recorded in writing, allow a longer period.
In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under section 24 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be:
aexcluded from the period of limitation
bincluded in the period of limitation
ctreated as condoned only if separately applied for
dadded only where the appellate authority so directs
Answer: A
While computing the period prescribed for appeal under section 24, the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the order appealed against is excluded.
Which section of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 prohibits a landlord from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant?
aSection 21
bSection 14
cSection 9
dSection 11
Answer: D
Section 11 of the Act deals with 'cutting off or withholding essential supply or service' and bars the landlord from doing so without just and sufficient cause.
The general provision relating to 'eviction of tenants' under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 is contained in:
aSection 15
bSection 13
cSection 12
dSection 14
Answer: D
Section 14 of the Act sets out the grounds and procedure for eviction of tenants, including non-payment of rent, sub-letting, misuse and the landlord's bona fide requirement.
In Hari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood (decided by the Supreme Court on 29 April 2013), the landlord had applied before the Rent Controller, Shimla, under section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 on the ground that he:
arequired the building because the tenant had ceased to occupy it
bbona fide required the building for purposes of addition, alteration or rebuilding
csought eviction for non-payment of rent for over six months
drequired the building because the tenant had sub-let it without consent
Answer: B
In Hari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood (2013), the landlord sought eviction under section 14 on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for addition, alteration or rebuilding, and the Supreme Court dealt with execution of such eviction orders.
Where a specified landlord, having evicted a tenant from a building in pursuance of an order under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, does not occupy it for the prescribed continuous period or lets it out to a person other than the evicted tenant, he is punishable under section 30 with:
aimprisonment which may extend to one year or fine up to five thousand rupees, or both
bimprisonment which may extend to three months or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both
cimprisonment which may extend to six months or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both
dfine up to ten thousand rupees only
Answer: C
Section 30 of the Act prescribes that such a landlord shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, where the landlord refuses to accept the rent tendered by the tenant or refuses or neglects to deliver a receipt, or where there is a bona fide doubt as to the person to whom rent is payable, the tenant may:
adeposit such rent with the Controller
bdeposit such rent in the nearest civil court
cwithhold the rent until the next financial year
ddeposit such rent with the municipal treasury
Answer: A
Section 21 of the Act permits the tenant, in such circumstances, to deposit the rent with the Controller, which operates as a valid tender of rent.
Under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, where a male Hindu adopts a daughter, the adoptive father must be:
aAt least 21 years older than the person to be adopted
bOf any age, there being no minimum age difference
cAt least 25 years older than the person to be adopted
dAt least 18 years older than the person to be adopted
Answer: A
Section 11(iii) of the HAMA, 1956 requires that where the adoption is by a male of a female child, the adoptive father must be at least 21 years older than the child being adopted.
Under Section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, who among the following is capable of giving a child in adoption?
aOnly a court-appointed guardian, never the natural parents
bAny senior member of the joint family
cThe father, mother or guardian of the child, subject to the conditions in the section
dOnly the father, in all circumstances
Answer: C
Section 9 of the HAMA, 1956 provides that no person except the father, mother or guardian of a child has the capacity to give the child in adoption, subject to the conditions prescribed therein.
Under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, in deciding the appointment of a guardian of a Hindu minor, the paramount consideration to which the court shall give weight is:
aThe welfare of the minor
bThe preference of the father in all cases
cThe financial standing of the proposed guardian alone
dThe religious customs of the family alone
Answer: A
Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 declares that the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration in the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian.
Under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the prohibition against either party having a spouse living at the time of the marriage is contained in which clause?
aClause (iv)
bClause (iii)
cClause (ii)
dClause (i)
Answer: D
Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lays down the condition of monogamy, requiring that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage.
A marriage solemnised in contravention of the condition relating to a 'spouse living at the time of marriage' (Section 5(i)) is, under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
aValid but liable to be dissolved by divorce
bVoidable at the option of the aggrieved party
cNull and void under Section 11
dMerely irregular and curable
Answer: C
Section 11 declares void any marriage solemnised in contravention of clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5; contravention of clause (i) (bigamy) thus renders the marriage null and void.
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B can be presented to the District Court only after the parties have been living separately for a period of:
aOne year or more
bThree years or more
cTwo years or more
dSix months or more
Answer: A
Section 13B(1) requires that the parties to a mutual-consent divorce have been living separately for a period of one year or more before presenting the joint petition.
In Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904, the Supreme Court held that, in a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
aThe statutory cooling-off period of six months cannot be waived under any circumstances
bConsent once given at the first motion cannot be withdrawn
cThe court must grant the decree at the first motion itself
dA party may unilaterally withdraw consent before the second motion / passing of the decree
Answer: D
In Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, the Supreme Court held that mutual consent must continue till the decree is passed, and either party is free to withdraw consent before the second motion.
Under Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, where the customary rite of a Hindu marriage includes the Saptapadi, the marriage becomes complete and binding:
aWhen the kanyadaan ceremony is performed
bWhen the seventh step is taken before the sacred fire
cOn the exchange of garlands
dOn registration of the marriage
Answer: B
Section 7(2) provides that where the Saptapadi is included, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken jointly before the sacred fire.
Under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, 'cruelty' as a ground for divorce was authoritatively explained, with an illustrative list of instances of mental cruelty, by the Supreme Court in:
aDastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534
bSamar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511
cNaveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, AIR 2006 SC 1675
dBipinchandra v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176
Answer: B
In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Supreme Court enumerated illustrative instances of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
An interest created on a transfer of property is said to be 'vested', under Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, when:
aNo time is specified for it to take effect, or it is to take effect forthwith or on the happening of an event certain to happen
bIt is created in favour of an unborn person
cIt is to take effect only on the happening of a specified uncertain event
dIt is restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally
Answer: A
Under Section 19, an interest is vested where no time is specified for its taking effect, or where it is to take effect forthwith or on an event that must necessarily happen; a contingent interest under Section 21 depends on an uncertain event.
Under Section 25 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transfer of property made subject to a condition that is impossible, unlawful, or immoral is:
aVoidable at the option of the transferor
bValid, the condition alone being void
cValid if the transferee accepts the condition
dVoid
Answer: D
Section 25 provides that an interest created on a transfer subject to a condition the fulfilment of which is impossible, or is forbidden by law, or is fraudulent, immoral, or opposed to public policy, does not take effect; the transfer itself fails.
The right of part performance, protecting a transferee who has taken possession in part performance of a written contract of transfer, is embodied in which section of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
aSection 52
bSection 51
cSection 53A
dSection 53
Answer: C
Section 53A embodies the equitable doctrine of part performance, barring the transferor from enforcing rights against a transferee who, in part performance of a written contract, has taken possession and done some act in furtherance of the contract.
The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis) is rendered non-transferable under which clause of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
aClause (b)
bClause (a)
cClause (dd)
dClause (e)
Answer: B
Section 6(a) declares that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred.
Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, "a mere right to sue" is made non-transferable by:
aClause (c)
bClause (e)
cClause (a)
dClause (h)
Answer: B
Section 6(e) provides that a mere right to sue cannot be transferred; the word "mere" excludes transfers where an actionable interest (such as a decree for damages) accompanies the right.
Under Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where on a transfer of property an interest is created for the benefit of an unborn person, such interest takes effect only if:
aThe interest is transferred directly to the unborn person without any prior interest
bThe transfer is limited to the lifetime of the transferor only
cThe interest is preceded by a prior life interest and the unborn person, on coming into existence, takes the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property
dThe unborn person is in existence at the date of the transfer
Answer: C
Section 13 permits a transfer for the benefit of an unborn person only by the machinery of a prior interest, and the entire remaining interest of the transferor must be conferred on the unborn person; a direct transfer to an unborn person is void.
Under the rule against perpetuity in Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the vesting of an interest may be postponed at most up to:
aThe lifetime of the transferor alone
bA perpetual period subject only to registration of the instrument
cA fixed period of eighteen years from the date of the transfer
dThe lifetime of one or more persons living at the date of the transfer and the minority of some person in existence at the expiration of that period
Answer: D
Section 14 prohibits the creation of an interest taking effect after the lifetime of one or more living persons plus the minority of a person in existence at the close of that period; vesting cannot be postponed beyond this limit.
A transfers a field F to B on condition that B shall walk a hundred miles in an hour. The condition being impossible, under Section 25 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the transfer is:
aValid only if B attempts performance
bValid, the condition alone being void
cVoidable at the option of B
dVoid
Answer: D
Section 25 provides that an interest created on a transfer subject to a condition precedent that is impossible, forbidden by law, immoral or opposed to public policy is void; the field accordingly does not pass to B.
The doctrine of election under Section 35 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 rests on the principle of:
aEstoppel by representation
bForfeiture of the benefit conferred
cSubrogation
dCompensation
Answer: D
Section 35 embodies the equitable rule that one who takes a benefit under an instrument must also bear its burden; where the owner dissents from the transfer of his property, he relinquishes the benefit, and the doctrine operates on the principle of compensation, not forfeiture.
A suit for possession of immovable property based on title is governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a period of:
aTwelve years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff
bThree years from the date the right to sue accrues
cSix years from the date of knowledge of dispossession
dThirty years from the date of dispossession
Answer: A
Article 65 prescribes twelve years for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, the period running from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
The residuary Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, governing any application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule, prescribes a period of:
aThirty days from the date of the order
bOne year from the date of the order
cThree years from the date the right to apply accrues
dSix years from the date the right to apply accrues
Answer: C
Article 137 is the residuary provision for applications and prescribes three years from when the right to apply accrues, applicable where no other Article in the Schedule covers the application.
A suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is governed by Article 113, which prescribes:
aTwelve years from the date when the right to sue accrues
bThree years from the date when the right to sue accrues
cOne year from the date when the right to sue accrues
dThirty years from the date when the right to sue accrues
Answer: B
Article 113 is the residuary provision for suits, prescribing three years from the date the right to sue accrues, and applies where no specific Article in the Schedule governs the suit.
Under the Limitation Act, 1963, the bar of limitation contained in Section 3 operates in such a way that every suit instituted, appeal preferred or application made after the prescribed period:
aShall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence
bMay be entertained at the discretion of the court even without sufficient cause
cShall be dismissed only if the defendant pleads limitation as a defence
dShall be returned for presentation to the proper court
Answer: A
Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 expressly provides that a suit, appeal or application made after the prescribed period 'shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence', making the bar mandatory on the court.
The benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (extension of prescribed period on sufficient cause) is available to:
aApplications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 only
bAny appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSuits and appeals only
dSuits, appeals and all applications
Answer: B
Section 5 allows admission after the prescribed period of 'any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC, 1908' on sufficient cause; it does not extend to suits.
Under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the prescribed period for a suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made:
aOn the day when the court re-opens
bWithin thirty days after the court re-opens
cOn the last working day preceding the closure
dOnly after obtaining leave of the court
Answer: A
Section 4 permits the act to be done 'on the day when the court re-opens', and the Explanation deems a court closed for the day if it remains closed during any part of its normal working hours.
The maxim 'vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt', frequently associated with the object of the law of limitation, means:
aNo one can be made a judge in his own cause
bWhere there is a right, there is a remedy
cAn act of the court shall prejudice no one
dThe law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights
Answer: D
The maxim translates to 'the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights', expressing the policy underlying limitation that stale claims should not be entertained.
Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from:
aOnly the day of pronouncement shall be excluded
bShall both be included
cOnly the time requisite for obtaining the copy shall be excluded
dShall both be excluded
Answer: D
Section 12(2) excludes both the day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from, when computing limitation for an appeal.
Where a suit is based upon the fraud of the defendant, Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the period of limitation shall not begin to run until:
aThree years from the date of the transaction have elapsed
bThe plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it
cThe defendant admits the fraud in writing
dThe fraud is committed
Answer: B
Under Section 17(1), in cases of fraud or mistake, limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or mistake, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
Sections 20A, 20B and 20C, inserted into the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by the 2018 Amendment, deal primarily with:
aRecovery of possession of movable property
bDeclaratory decrees and preventive relief
cRectification of instruments and cancellation of deeds
dContracts relating to infrastructure projects, designation of Special Courts and expeditious disposal of suits
Answer: D
The 2018 Amendment added Section 20A (no injunction to impede infrastructure projects), Section 20B (Special Courts for such suits) and Section 20C (endeavour to dispose of such suits within twelve months, extendable by six months).
Under Section 20C of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a suit filed in respect of a contract relating to an infrastructure project shall, as far as possible, be disposed of by the court within a period of:
aTwelve months from the date of service of summons on the defendant, extendable by a further six months
bSix months from the date of service of summons, extendable by three months
cThree months from the date of service of summons
dTwenty-four months from the date of institution
Answer: A
Section 20C directs the court to endeavour to dispose of such suits within twelve months from the date of service of summons on the defendant, which period may be extended for an aggregate not exceeding six months after recording reasons.
Which of the following contracts is NOT specifically enforceable under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as amended in 2018)?
aA contract to transfer a patent
bA contract which is in its nature determinable
cA contract for the sale of immovable property
dA contract to convey a particular piece of land
Answer: B
Section 14, as substituted in 2018, lists a contract which is in its nature determinable among contracts that cannot be specifically enforced, along with those involving substituted performance, continuous supervision, and dependence on personal qualifications.
Under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a court shall NOT make a declaration of legal character or right to property where the plaintiff:
aSeeks the declaration against the Government
bHas not paid the requisite court fee
cBeing able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so
dHas an alternative remedy by way of arbitration
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 34 bars a bare declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief (such as possession or injunction) than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Match List I (provision of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) with List II (subject) and select the correct answer using the codes below:
List I: (P) Section 31 (Q) Section 26 (R) Section 38 (S) Section 39
List II: (i) Rectification of instruments (ii) Mandatory injunction (iii) Cancellation of instruments (iv) Perpetual injunction
aP-(iii), Q-(i), R-(iv), S-(ii)
bP-(i), Q-(iii), R-(ii), S-(iv)
cP-(i), Q-(iii), R-(iv), S-(ii)
dP-(iii), Q-(i), R-(ii), S-(iv)
Answer: A
Section 31 deals with cancellation of instruments, Section 26 with rectification of instruments, Section 38 with perpetual injunction and Section 39 with mandatory injunction.
Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person may sue to have a written instrument adjudged void or voidable and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled where:
aThe instrument is merely inconvenient to him
bThe instrument is registered under the Registration Act, 1908
cThe instrument is void or voidable against him and he has reasonable apprehension that, if left outstanding, it may cause him serious injury
dThe instrument has already been fully performed by both parties
Answer: C
Section 31 permits a person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who reasonably apprehends serious injury if it is left outstanding, to sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; the court may in its discretion so adjudge and order cancellation.
Under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction cannot be granted to restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in:
aA civil court subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought
bA consumer forum of co-ordinate jurisdiction
cA court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought
dA tribunal constituted under a special statute
Answer: C
Section 41(b) bars an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought.
Under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, the expression "duly stamped" applied to an instrument means that the instrument bears an adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount and that such stamp:
ahas been affixed or used in accordance with the law for the time being in force in India
bhas been certified as genuine by the Collector of the district
chas been purchased from a licensed stamp vendor within the State
dhas merely been affixed to the instrument, irrespective of cancellation
Answer: A
Section 2(11) defines "duly stamped" as bearing an adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount, such stamp having been affixed or used in accordance with the law for the time being in force in India.
Which one of the following falls within the definition of "bond" under Section 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899?
aAny instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed or is not performed
bA bill of exchange drawn payable to order
cA promissory note payable to bearer on demand
dA letter of credit issued by a banker
Answer: A
Section 2(5) of the Act includes within "bond" any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed or is not performed, as well as instruments attested and not payable to order or bearer, and instruments to deliver grain or agricultural produce.
An instrument (not being a bill of exchange or promissory note) executed out of India and chargeable with duty may, under Section 18 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, be stamped within:
aforty-five days after it has been first received in India
btwo months after it has been first received in India
cone month after it has been first received in India
dthree months after it has been first received in India
Answer: D
Section 18 permits an instrument other than a bill of exchange or promissory note executed out of India to be stamped within three months after it has been first received in India.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, under Section 29 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the expense of providing the proper stamp on a conveyance shall be borne by:
athe grantor
bthe grantee
cthe parties in equal shares
dthe registering officer
Answer: B
Section 29 provides that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, in the case of a conveyance (including a reconveyance of mortgaged property) the duty is borne by the grantee.
Under the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for an offence to be made out the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of:
aSix months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier
bThree months from the date on which it is drawn in every case
cOne month from the date on which the cause of action arises
dThree months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier
Answer: D
Proviso (a) to Section 138 requires the cheque to be presented within three months from the date it is drawn or within its period of validity, whichever is earlier (reduced from six months by RBI direction w.e.f. 01.04.2012).
Under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the payee or the holder in due course must make a demand for payment by giving notice in writing to the drawer within:
aThirty days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid
bThirty days of the date on which the cheque was drawn
cFifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid
dForty-five days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid
Answer: A
Proviso (b) to Section 138 requires the written demand notice to be made within thirty days of receipt of information from the bank that the cheque has been returned unpaid.
Under proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the offence is complete only when the drawer fails to make payment of the cheque amount to the payee within:
aFifteen days of the receipt of the demand notice
bOne month of the receipt of the demand notice
cSeven days of the receipt of the demand notice
dThirty days of the receipt of the demand notice
Answer: A
Under proviso (c) to Section 138, the drawer must pay the amount within fifteen days of receipt of the notice; the cause of action arises on the sixteenth day if payment is not made.
A cheque issued by X is returned by the bank unpaid with the endorsement 'account closed'. As to liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
aNo offence is made out, as Section 138 applies only when funds are insufficient
bThe matter is purely civil and Section 138 has no application
cAn offence under Section 138 is made out, as return on account of the account being closed falls within the section
dAn offence is made out only if the account was closed after the cheque was issued
Answer: C
Section 138 covers dishonour for insufficiency of funds; the Supreme Court has held that return of a cheque because the 'account is closed' also attracts Section 138.
Under Section 26 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, if a licence holder or any person acting on his behalf sells or delivers any liquor to a person apparently under the age of 18 years, he shall be punishable with:
aImprisonment which may extend to three months and fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both
bFine which may extend to ten thousand rupees but shall not be less than two thousand rupees
cImprisonment which may extend to six months or fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or both
dFine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees but shall not be less than five thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 26(1) prescribes a fine extending to ten thousand rupees, but not less than two thousand rupees, for sale or delivery of liquor to a person apparently under 18 years. Option (a) is the punishment under Section 26(2) for employing a minor.
Under Section 26(2) of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the employment of a person under 18 years of age in a liquor vend, bar or any other place where liquor or other intoxicants are sold, stored or served is punishable with:
aImprisonment which shall not be less than six months
bFine which may extend to ten thousand rupees only
cImprisonment which may extend to three months and fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both
dImprisonment which may extend to one year and fine which may extend to two thousand rupees
Answer: C
Section 26(2) provides imprisonment which may extend to three months and fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both, for employing a person under 18 years in a liquor vend, bar or similar place.
Under the definitions in Section 2 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, "Financial Commissioner" means:
aThe Principal Secretary, Excise, appointed by the State Government
bThe Collector appointed under sub-section (2) of section 5
cAny Excise Officer appointed or invested with powers under section 6
dThe Excise and Taxation Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) of section 5
Answer: D
Section 2(k) defines "Financial Commissioner" as the Excise and Taxation Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) of section 5, in whom the general superintendence and administration of excise matters vests.
Match List-I (Section of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011) with List-II (subject) and select the correct answer using the codes below:
List-I: (P) Section 23 (Q) Section 29 (R) Section 32 (S) Section 35
List-II: (1) Surrender of license (2) Prohibition of sale etc. of liquor (3) Power to cancel or suspend licenses etc. (4) Power to withdraw license etc.
aP-4, Q-3, R-2, S-1
bP-2, Q-3, R-4, S-1
cP-2, Q-4, R-3, S-1
dP-3, Q-2, R-1, S-4
Answer: B
Section 23 deals with prohibition of sale of liquor, Section 29 with power to cancel or suspend licenses, Section 32 with power to withdraw a license, and Section 35 with surrender of a license.
Under Section 35 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the holder of a license to sell liquor may surrender his license only on the expiration of:
aThree months' notice in writing
bNinety days' notice in writing
cOne month's notice in writing
dFifteen days' notice in writing
Answer: C
Section 35 requires one month's notice in writing to the authority granting the license, along with payment of the fee for the whole period for which the license would have remained current, before a license may be surrendered.
Under the proviso to Section 51(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, an offence relating to hunting in a sanctuary or National Park, or relating to an animal specified in Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II, is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall:
aNot be less than three years but may extend to seven years, and also with fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees
bNot be less than five years but may extend to ten years, with fine of fifty thousand rupees
cExtend up to seven years only, with no minimum imprisonment
dNot be less than one year and may extend to three years, with fine of two thousand rupees
Answer: A
The first proviso to Section 51(1) prescribes for such aggravated offences imprisonment of not less than three years extending to seven years, and a fine of not less than ten thousand rupees.
Under Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, a private person may file a complaint enabling a court to take cognizance of an offence only after giving notice of not less than how many days to the Central Government or the authorised officer?
aNinety days
bThirty days
cForty-five days
dSixty days
Answer: D
Section 55 bars cognizance except on the complaint of the Director, Chief Wild Life Warden or authorised officers, or any person who has given notice of not less than sixty days of the alleged offence and his intention to make a complaint.
Under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the definition of 'trophy' in Section 2 expressly excludes a part derived from which category of animal?
aAnimals specified in Schedule I
bVermin
cAnimals kept in recognised zoos
dCaptive animals
Answer: B
Section 2(31) defines 'trophy' as the whole or any part of a captive or wild animal, other than vermin, which has been kept or preserved by any means; vermin is thus expressly excluded.
Under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the term 'hunting' as defined in Section 2(16) includes which one of the following?
aOnly the capturing and trapping of a wild animal, and not its killing
bKilling or poisoning of any wild or captive animal, and capturing, coursing, snaring, trapping, driving or baiting any such animal, and every attempt to do so
cOnly the killing or poisoning of any wild animal or captive animal
dDriving or baiting of a wild animal, but excluding any attempt to capture it
Answer: B
Section 2(16) defines 'hunting' to include killing or poisoning of any wild or captive animal, capturing, coursing, snaring, trapping, driving or baiting any such animal, and every attempt to do so. It also covers injuring, destroying or taking eggs/nests of birds and reptiles.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, where in any proceeding a question arises whether any forest-produce is the property of the Government, such produce:
aShall be presumed to be the property of the Government until the contrary is proved
bIs to be treated as ownerless and vested in the village panchayat
cShall be presumed to belong to the person in whose possession it is found
dMust be proved by the Government to be its property by positive evidence
Answer: A
Section 69 raises a statutory presumption that forest-produce is the property of the Government until the contrary is proved, shifting the burden to the person disputing Government title.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the power of the State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of all timber and other forest-produce, including the establishment of depots and the issue of passes, is contained in:
aSection 35
bSection 26
cSection 52
dSection 41
Answer: D
Section 41 empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of forest-produce, including prescribing routes, depots and passes; breach of such rules is punishable under Section 42.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, when there is reason to believe that a forest-offence has been committed in respect of any forest-produce, such produce, together with all tools, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing the offence, may be seized by:
aOnly the Divisional Forest Officer, under Section 26
bOnly a Magistrate, on an application under Section 64
cOnly the Forest Settlement Officer, under Section 11
dAny forest-officer or police-officer, under Section 52
Answer: D
Section 52 authorises any forest-officer or police-officer to seize forest-produce reasonably suspected to be the subject of a forest-offence, along with the tools, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing it.
Under Section 26(1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, a person who fells, girdles or lops any tree in a reserved forest shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to:
aOne year, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both
bThree months, or fine up to two hundred rupees, or both
cSix months, or fine up to five hundred rupees, or both
dTwo years, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both
Answer: C
Section 26(1) prescribes imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to five hundred rupees, or both, in addition to compensation for damage as the convicting court may direct.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the District Judge has control over all the Civil Courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction subject to:
athe general superintendence and control of the High Court
bthe orders of the Court of Session
cthe supervision of the District Magistrate
dthe directions of the State Government
Answer: A
The District Judge exercises control over the subordinate Civil Courts in his jurisdiction subject to the general superintendence and control of the High Court.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, in the event of absence of the District Judge or a vacancy in that office, the functions of the District Judge shall be discharged by:
athe District Magistrate of the district
ba Civil Judge nominated by the State Government
cthe Registrar of the High Court
dthe Additional District Judge, and where there are more than one, the first in rank among them
Answer: D
On absence or vacancy, the Additional District Judge (the first in rank where there are more than one, and failing that the senior-most Civil Judge present) discharges the functions of the District Judge in addition to his own.
In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), in the absence of enacted domestic law, the Supreme Court framed binding guidelines against sexual harassment at the workplace by relying, inter alia, on:
aThe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 only
bThe Beijing Declaration alone
cThe provisions of CEDAW read with Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution
dThe Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 only
Answer: C
Vishaka used CEDAW (especially the general recommendation on Article 11) together with fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 to lay down the workplace guidelines.
Under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (post-2019 amendment), the punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault is rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years extending to imprisonment for life, or with:
aDeath
bSolitary confinement
cFine only
dForfeiture of property only
Answer: A
Section 6, as amended in 2019, prescribes a minimum of twenty years' rigorous imprisonment extending to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, and also introduces the death penalty as the maximum.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
