Penal Law (BNS, 2023) Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a man. Z dies in consequence. A did not actually intend to cause Z's death. Which clause of the definition of murder (BNS, 2023) is squarely attracted?
aThe clause requiring intention to cause bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
bThe clause requiring intention to cause death
cThe clause requiring intention to cause such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of that particular person
dThe clause requiring knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death
Answer: A
This is Illustration to s.101 BNS [old s.300 IPC], clause Thirdly: intention to cause the bodily injury actually inflicted plus that injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; intention to cause death is not required (Virsa Singh v State).
Q2Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
In Virsa Singh v State, the Supreme Court laid down a four-step enquiry for clause 'Thirdly' of murder. Which of the following correctly states the nature of the LAST step (sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death)?
aIt is a purely subjective enquiry into the offender's intention
bIt is a purely objective and inferential enquiry, having nothing to do with the offender's intention
cIt can only be inferred from the fact that death actually resulted
dIt must be proved by the offender's confession as to the likely result
Answer: B
Per Virsa Singh v State, once the intention to inflict the particular injury is proved (subjective), whether that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is a purely objective inference [s.101 'Thirdly' BNS / s.300 IPC].
Q3Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following best captures the distinction between clause 'Secondly' of s.300 IPC (now s.101 BNS) and clause (b) of s.299 IPC (now s.100 BNS), as explained in R Punnayya's case?
aClause 'Secondly' requires the injury to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
bClause 'Secondly' requires an actual intention to cause death
cClause 'Secondly' requires the offender's special knowledge that the particular victim's peculiar condition makes the intended injury likely to be fatal, which clause (b) of s.299 does not postulate
dThere is no real distinction; the two clauses are identical
Answer: C
Per State of AP v R Punnayya, the distinguishing mens rea under clause 'Secondly' is the offender's knowledge that the particular victim is in such a state of health that the intended injury is likely to be fatal; clause (b) of s.299 postulates no such knowledge.
Q4Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself likely to kill Z, who is near him but out of sight. A kills Z. What is A's liability?
aMurder, because the death of Z resulted
bNo offence, since Z gave no provocation
cCausing death by negligence only
dCulpable homicide not amounting to murder, Exception 1 to s.101 BNS applying even to the accidental killing of Z
Answer: D
This is an Illustration to Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) of s.101 BNS [old s.300 IPC]: where, deprived of self-control, the offender kills another by accident, the exception still applies, reducing it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Q5Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest and kills Z. Which proviso to the grave-and-sudden-provocation exception denies A its benefit, making the act murder?
aThat the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the lawful exercise of his powers
bThat the provocation was sought by the offender as an excuse for killing
cThat the provocation was given in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence
dThat the provocation was not grave and sudden
Answer: A
Per the Illustration and Second proviso to Exception 1 of s.101 BNS [s.300 IPC]: provocation given by anything done by a public servant in lawful exercise of his powers does not reduce the offence; A is guilty of murder.
Q6Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Exception 4 to s.300 IPC (culpable homicide in a sudden fight) is now Exception 4 to s.101 BNS. Which one of the following is NOT a requirement for this exception to apply?
aThe act was committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
bIt must be shown which party offered the provocation or struck the first blow
cThe offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner
dThe fight was sudden and in the heat of passion
Answer: B
The Explanation to Exception 4 of s.101 BNS [s.300 IPC] expressly states it is immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault; that is therefore not a requirement of the exception.
Q7Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Exception 5 to s.300 IPC (consent) is reproduced as Exception 5 to s.101 BNS. A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. What is A's liability?
aCulpable homicide not amounting to murder, since Z consented
bOnly abetment of suicide
cAbetment of murder, because Z, being under eighteen, was incapable of giving valid consent to his own death
dNo offence, as Z took the risk of death himself
Answer: C
Per the Illustration to Exception 5 of s.101 BNS [s.300 IPC]: the consent exception protects only where the person killed is above eighteen; a minor cannot give valid consent, so A has abetted murder.
Q8Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
An accused, intending to kill A who is behind a bush, induces B (who does not know A is there) to fire at the bush; B fires and kills A. Considering the rules on causing death (s.100 BNS / s.299 IPC), which statement is correct?
aOnly B is guilty; the inducer is not, as he did not fire
bBoth A's inducer and B are guilty of culpable homicide
cNeither is guilty, since the death of the concealed person was accidental
dB may be guilty of no offence, but the inducer has committed culpable homicide
Answer: D
This is Illustration 2 to s.100 BNS [s.299 IPC]: B, ignorant of A's presence, may commit no offence, but the inducer, having the requisite intention/knowledge, commits culpable homicide.
Q9Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, knowing Z is labouring under a disease such that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him intending only to cause bodily injury; Z dies. The blow would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a healthy person. A's liability is:
aMurder, under the clause requiring intention to cause bodily injury that the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of that particular person
bOnly causing grievous hurt, as the injury would not normally be fatal
cCausing death by negligence
dNo offence, because the blow was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
Answer: A
This is Illustration (b) to s.101 BNS [s.300 IPC], clause 'Secondly': A's knowledge of Z's diseased condition makes the intentional blow murder, even though it would not kill a healthy person.
Q10Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, a Government servant, removes an official file from his office to his house overnight, shows it to an outsider, and returns it to the office two days later intact. Which offence, if any, has A committed?
aNo offence, as the file was returned undamaged
bTheft
cOnly criminal breach of trust
dOnly criminal misappropriation of property
Answer: B
Theft does not require an intention to permanently deprive; temporary dishonest moving of movable property out of another's possession suffices — Pyare Lal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963. Punishable under BNS s 303 [old IPC s 378/379].
Q11Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A pawns his own watch to Z. Without paying back the loan, A takes the watch out of Z's possession without Z's consent. Is A guilty of theft of his own watch?
aNo, because a person cannot steal his own property
bNo, only criminal breach of trust arises
cYes, because the taking is dishonest even though the watch is his own
dYes, but only criminal trespass is made out
Answer: C
Per Illustration to BNS s 303 [old s 378], a pawnor who removes his pawned watch without repaying takes dishonestly (depriving the pawnee of his security) and commits theft, though the property is his own.
Q12Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A finds a ring lying on the public highroad, not in anyone's possession, and dishonestly keeps it. Which offence is made out?
aTheft
bCriminal breach of trust
cRobbery
dCriminal misappropriation of property
Answer: D
Property lying on a highroad is in nobody's possession, so taking it is not theft; dishonest appropriation by a finder is criminal misappropriation under BNS s 314 [old s 403], per Illustration to s 378.
Q13Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
An accused husband took his wife to a forest and, by threatening to kill her, made her hand over her ornaments to him, which were later recovered from him. The correct offence is:
aExtortion
bRobbery, since fear of instant death was caused
cTheft, since he took the ornaments without consent
dCriminal breach of trust
Answer: A
Because the wife delivered the ornaments under fear of injury, the offence is extortion (delivery by the victim is essential), not robbery — State of Karnataka v Basavegowda, 1997; BNS s 308 [old s 383/384].
Q14Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Which of the following is the key distinction between extortion and theft?
aExtortion can be committed only against movable property; theft against any property
bIn extortion the property is obtained by wrongfully obtaining the victim's consent, whereas in theft it is taken without consent
cTheft requires fear of injury; extortion does not
dExtortion requires actual delivery; theft can be of immovable property
Answer: B
In extortion the offender wrongfully obtains the victim's consent by putting him in fear of injury; in theft there is no consent at all. Extortion can also cover immovable property and valuable securities — BNS s 308 [old s 383].
Q15Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
While committing theft of a basket, A accidentally cuts the wrist of the owner who tried to seize it, and then runs away with the basket. A is guilty of:
aRobbery, because hurt was caused during the theft
bExtortion, because the owner parted with the basket in fear
cTheft, because the hurt was accidental and not voluntarily caused for the theft
dDacoity
Answer: C
Theft becomes robbery only when the offender 'voluntarily' causes hurt for the ends of the theft; an accidental injury does not convert theft into robbery — Edwards (1843); BNS s 309 [old s 390].
Q16Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A obtains property from Z by saying, 'Your child is in the hands of my gang and will be killed unless you send us ten thousand rupees,' the child being elsewhere. This is:
aRobbery, because of fear of death to the child
bTheft
cDacoity
dExtortion, but not robbery
Answer: D
Per Illustration (d) to BNS s 309 [old s 390], extortion becomes robbery only if the offender is present and puts the victim in fear of instant death/hurt; here the threat is not of instant harm, so it is extortion, not robbery.
Q17Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Five persons set out to commit a robbery but, faced with stiff resistance from the inmates, flee without taking any booty. The most accurate position is:
aDacoity is complete, as an attempt to commit robbery by five or more persons is itself dacoity
bOnly an attempt to commit robbery; no dacoity
cNo offence, since nothing was taken
dOnly assembling for the purpose of dacoity
Answer: A
When five or more persons conjointly attempt to commit robbery, the offence of dacoity is complete even without booty — Shyam Behari v State, 1957; BNS s 310 [old s 391].
Q18General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A, B and C share a pre-arranged plan to kill Z. During the attack, B and C catch hold of Z while A delivers the single fatal blow. It is not established who individually struck the death-blow as among them, but the plan is proved. Under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34, who can be convicted of Z's murder?
aOnly A, because he alone inflicted the fatal injury
bAll three, each being liable as if he had committed the act alone
cOnly B and C, as facilitators, while A is liable for a lesser offence
dNone, because the actual author of the fatal blow is uncertain
Answer: B
Under BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34], where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention, each is liable as if he did it alone; it is not necessary to find who struck the fatal blow (Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor).
Q19General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Which of the following is the most accurate statement of the nature of the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34 (acts done in furtherance of common intention)?
aIt applies only where at least five persons share the intention
bIt creates a distinct substantive offence punishable on its own
cIt is only a rule of evidence laying down the principle of constructive/joint liability and creates no offence
dIt dispenses entirely with the need to prove any intention
Answer: C
BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34] does not create a substantive offence; it is a rule of evidence embodying constructive liability, requiring common intention plus participation (Barendra Kumar Ghosh; Pandurang v State of Hyderabad).
Q20General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
On the question whether 'common intention' under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34 requires a pre-arranged plan, which proposition is correct?
aA pre-arranged plan is always essential and can never develop on the spot
bMere similar intention of several persons is by itself sufficient
cCommon intention is identical to mens rea and need not be shared
dCommon intention implies a pre-arranged plan, but such plan may develop even at the spur of the moment during the incident
Answer: D
BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34] requires a pre-arranged plan, but the plan/common intention may develop on the spot during the occurrence (Mahbub Shah; Kripal Singh; Dharnidhar v State of UP). Mere similar intention is not enough.
Q21General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A party of farmers, all empty-handed except one who secretly carried a knife, surrounded Z to recover crop he had taken. The knife-carrier suddenly stabbed Z to death; the others did not know he was armed. What is the correct conclusion as to the others under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34?
aThe others did not share the common intention to cause death and cannot be vicariously convicted of murder
bAll are guilty of murder, as they surrounded Z together
cThe others are guilty of murder because death was a probable consequence of surrounding Z
dAll are equally guilty of attempt to murder
Answer: A
Where the others did not know of the knife and all were bare-handed, common intention to cause death cannot be inferred; only the stabber is liable for the death (Rambilas Singh v State of Bihar, on BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34]).
Q22General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Regarding the requirement of physical presence/participation for the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34, which statement is correct on the authorities?
aParticipation is irrelevant; mere prior agreement always suffices
bParticipation is essential, but in offences not involving physical violence it need not be by physical presence at the spot
cThe accused must always be inside the very room where the act occurs
dStanding guard or facilitating escape can never amount to participation
Answer: B
Under BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34] participation in furtherance of common intention is the sine qua non; for offences not involving physical violence, presence at the scene is not always necessary (Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of AP; Suresh v State of UP). Standing guard amounts to participation.
Q23General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Two accused caught hold of the deceased, having neither the intention nor knowledge of causing death, while a third accused alone struck the fatal blow. Applying the provision corresponding to old IPC s.34, the common intention of the two who held the victim is best inferred to be:
aTo commit murder
bTo commit theft
cTo cause grievous hurt
dNo common intention at all
Answer: C
Where two accused merely facilitated by catching hold of the victim without knowledge/intention to kill, the common intention inferable is only to cause grievous hurt (Harbans Nonia v State of Bihar, on BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34]).
Q24General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
An act is criminal only because it is done with a particular criminal knowledge or intention. Several persons join in doing it, but each acts with a different intention or knowledge. Under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.35, the liability of each is:
aIdentical for all, fixed by the most culpable participant's intention
bNil, because they did not share a common intention
cJoint and several for the gravest offence committed
dAccording to his own criminal knowledge or intention, and no further
Answer: D
Under BNS s.3(6) [IPC s.35], where each joins with a different intention or knowledge, each is liable according to his own intention or knowledge, not jointly for the gravest result (Afrahim Sheikh v State of WB).
Q25Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
X, a married woman, dies of burns 6 years and 9 months after her marriage. The prosecution proves that two days before her death she was harassed by her husband for a demand of a motorcycle connected with the marriage. On these facts alone, which presumption operates against the husband on a charge of dowry death?
aThe court 'shall' presume the husband caused the dowry death, a rebuttable presumption shifting the burden onto him
bThe court 'may' presume the husband caused the death, the discretion lying with the court
cNo presumption arises because the death was beyond seven years
dAn irrebuttable presumption of guilt arises which cannot be displaced by any defence evidence
Answer: A
Where death occurs within seven years and cruelty/harassment for dowry is shown soon before death, the court 'shall presume' (deemed fiction, but rebuttable) that the accused caused the dowry death under BSA 2023 s.118 [IEA s.113B] read with BNS s.80 [IPC s.304B].
Q26Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
In a prosecution for dowry death, the husband proves that although there was a quarrel and dowry demand 15 months before the wife's unnatural death, thereafter the couple had lived happily with no further harassment. What is the correct legal effect of this on the 'soon before her death' requirement?
aAny cruelty at any time during the marriage automatically satisfies the requirement
bThe cruelty has become stale with no proximate and live link to the death, so the requirement is not satisfied
cA fixed period of three months before death is statutorily prescribed and 15 months always fails
dThe requirement is satisfied because the demand, once made, is presumed to continue till death in every case
Answer: B
'Soon before her death' applies a proximity test requiring a proximate and live link between the dowry-cruelty and the death; if remote and stale (e.g. 15 months with happy intervening life), the presumption is not attracted — Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, under BNS s.80 [IPC s.304B].
Q27Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A husband is tried for dowry death but is acquitted of that charge. Evidence on record nonetheless establishes that he subjected his wife to wilful conduct and harassment for an unlawful dowry demand. There was no separate charge framed for cruelty. Which is correct?
aHe must be acquitted altogether since acquittal of dowry death bars any other conviction
bA fresh trial is mandatory because the two offences are mutually exclusive
cHe can still be convicted of cruelty by husband even without that specific charge being framed
dHe can be convicted of cruelty only if the wife had died within three years of marriage
Answer: C
Dowry death and cruelty are distinct offences with cruelty as a common element; a person acquitted of dowry death can be convicted of cruelty by husband/relatives even without a charge — Shanti v State of Haryana, BNS s.85 [IPC s.498A] and s.80 [IPC s.304B].
Q28Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Which of the following has the Supreme Court held does NOT, by itself, amount to 'cruelty' so as to attract the offence of cruelty by husband or his relatives?
aPersistent harassment to coerce the wife to meet an unlawful demand for property
bWilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
cA husband bringing a concubine to the house and cohabiting with her in the wife's presence
dA husband merely developing intimacy with another woman and failing to discharge marital obligations, where it is not likely to drive her to suicide
Answer: D
Mere extra-marital intimacy/failure of marital obligations is not 'cruelty' unless of such nature as is likely to drive the spouse to suicide — Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v State of Gujarat, under BNS s.85/86 [IPC s.498A]; (b), (a) and (c) all squarely fall within cruelty.
Q29Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A 26-year-old man pulls a sleeping woman's flesh stealthily with a corrupt mind; in another instance, an accused indecently assaults a female infant of seven and a half months. On the offence of assault/criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage modesty, which statement is correct per State of Punjab v Major Singh?
aA woman of any age — young or old, awake or sleeping, even an infant — possesses modesty capable of being outraged
bOnly an adult woman, aware of the act and reacting to it, possesses modesty capable of being outraged
cModesty cannot be outraged where the victim is incapable of appreciating the act
dThe victim's actual reaction of resentment is always decisive of the offence
Answer: A
The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex; the modesty of a female of any age — including an infant or a sleeping woman — is capable of being outraged, the culpable intention being the crux — State of Punjab v Major Singh, under BNS s.74 [IPC s.354].
Q30Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
The accused forcibly laid the prosecutrix on a bed, broke the string of her pyjama and tore her underwear, but made no attempt to undress himself, and when she pushed him away he made no further effort to grab her. What offence is made out?
aAttempt to commit rape, because disrobing shows a determination to have intercourse at all events
bAssault or criminal force with intent to outrage modesty, not attempt to rape
cRape, since penetration is irrelevant once disrobing is proved
dNo offence, as breaking a string is mere preparation
Answer: B
Without a determination to have intercourse at all events in spite of resistance, the act is outraging modesty (now also disrobing) and not attempt to rape — Jai Chand v State, under BNS s.74/76 [IPC s.354/354B] not s.62 r/w s.63 [IPC s.376 r/w 511].
Q31Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A woman consents to a man capturing intimate images of her engaging in a private act, but does not consent to their being shared. The man later disseminates those images to third persons. Under the BNS provision on voyeurism, this dissemination:
aIs no offence because she consented to the capture of the images
bIs only a civil wrong of breach of privacy, not a criminal offence
cConstitutes the offence of voyeurism, consent to capture not being consent to dissemination
dAmounts to stalking and not voyeurism
Answer: C
Per Explanation 2 to the voyeurism provision, where the victim consents to capture but not to dissemination, such dissemination is itself an offence — BNS s.77 [IPC s.354C].
A, intending to cause Z's death, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in A's absence and causes Z's death. Which statement is correct under the BNS, 2023?
aA cannot be punished because B, being below seven, is incapable of committing any offence
bA can only be punished for abetment of an act, not for murder, since no offence was committed by B
cA is liable only for attempt to abet murder
dA is liable to be punished as if B had been capable in law and had committed murder, and is subject to the punishment for murder
Answer: D
Under BNS s.46 Expl.3 [old s.108 IPC, Expl.3, illustration (b)], it is not necessary that the person abetted be capable in law of committing the offence; A is liable as if B had committed murder and is subject to the punishment of death.
A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. What is A's liability under the BNS, 2023?
aA is guilty of abetting B to commit murder, as commission of the act abetted is not necessary to constitute abetment
bA is not liable, since the offence abetted was never committed
cA is liable only if C ultimately dies of some other cause
dA is liable only for criminal intimidation of C
Answer: A
BNS s.46 Expl.2 and illustration [old s.108 IPC, illustration (a)]: to constitute abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted be committed; the offence of abetment is complete on instigation even if the person abetted refuses.
A held the antarpat (screen) during the performance of a marriage which he knew to be a void second marriage punishable as bigamy. On the question of abetment, which view is correct under the BNS, 2023?
aMere presence at a bigamous marriage is enough to constitute abetment
bHolding the screen knowing the marriage to be void amounts to intentional aid and is abetment
cAbetment is impossible because bigamy is not an offence one can aid
dA is liable only if he himself performed the marriage rituals
Answer: B
Following Malan (1957) under the third clause of abetment [BNS s.45 'intentionally aids'; old s.107 Thirdly IPC], knowingly holding the antarpat at a void marriage is intentional aid and falls within the Explanation; mere presence alone (Muthammal) is not enough.
Regarding the difference between abetment by conspiracy and the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy under the BNS, 2023, which statement is correct?
aBoth require that an act be done in pursuance of the agreement
bFor abetment by conspiracy a mere agreement suffices, whereas criminal conspiracy needs an overt act
cFor abetment by conspiracy an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy, whereas criminal conspiracy is complete on the bare agreement (except where the object is not an offence)
dThere is no difference; the two provisions are identical in scope
Answer: C
Per Pramatha Nath v Saroj Ranjan, abetment by conspiracy [BNS s.45 Secondly; old s.107 IPC] requires an act/illegal omission in pursuance, while criminal conspiracy [BNS s.61; old s.120A/120B IPC] is complete on bare agreement to commit an offence.
A concerts with B a plan to poison Z, A to administer the poison. B explains the plan to C, saying a third person will administer it but not naming A. C procures and delivers the poison to B; A administers it and Z dies. As to C's liability under the BNS, 2023:
aC is not guilty because C never conspired directly with A, who administered the poison
bC is liable only if C knew A's identity
cC is liable only for the lesser offence of supplying poison
dC is guilty of abetment by conspiracy and liable to the punishment for murder, though C and A never conspired together
Answer: D
BNS s.46 Expl.5 [old s.108 IPC, Expl.5 illustration]: it is not necessary that the abettor concur with the actual doer; it is enough that C engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the murder was committed.
Which of the following best reflects the law on abetment of suicide where the accused merely told the deceased 'to go and die' in the course of a quarrel, the suicide occurring two days later, under the BNS, 2023?
aWords uttered in a fit of anger without mens rea and intention to bring about the consequence do not amount to instigation
bThe words automatically constitute instigation and abetment of suicide
cMere demand of a loan amount amounts to instigation if suicide follows
dAny harassment of the deceased is by itself abetment of suicide
Answer: A
Per Sanju v State of MP, instigation requires mens rea; a word uttered in anger without intending the consequence to follow, and where the suicide is not the direct result, is not instigation [BNS s.45; old s.107 IPC].
On the distinction between active abetment at the time of the offence and abetment prior to it, which statement is correct under the BNS, 2023 (corresponding to old ss.109 and 114 IPC)?
aActive abetment at the moment of commission is governed only by the provision corresponding to old s.114
bThe provision corresponding to old s.114 applies where the abettor is present at the commission after having abetted previously
cBoth provisions apply only when the abettor is absent from the scene
dPresence of the abettor is irrelevant to either provision
Answer: B
Per Kulwant Singh, the provision corresponding to old s.114 IPC [BNS s.55] covers an abettor who first abets and is then present at commission, while active abetment at the time of commission is covered by old s.109 [BNS s.49].
A, while guarding his maize field at night, shoots an arrow at a moving object in the bona fide belief that it is a bear, and thereby kills a man hiding there. On a charge of murder, which defence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 best protects A?
aRight of private defence, as he apprehended attack by a wild animal
bGrave and sudden provocation
cMistake of fact in good faith believing himself justified by law / accident in a lawful act
dNo defence is available since a man, not a bear, was killed
Answer: C
On these facts (State of Orissa v Khora Ghasi) the act is covered by the general exceptions of mistake of fact and accident — BNS s.17 and s.18 [IPC ss.79, 80] — as A acted in good faith with proper care believing he was shooting an animal.
A picks up his gun, unlocks it, loads it with cartridges, aims at the chest of the victim from a close range of 4–5 feet and shoots him dead. He pleads the act was an 'accident'. Which is correct under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aThe plea of accident succeeds because the gun could have gone off by chance
bThe plea succeeds only if the gun was unlicensed
cThe plea succeeds because no motive was proved
dThe plea of accident fails as the act itself was of a criminal nature and intentional
Answer: D
Where the act of the accused is itself criminal, the exception of accident cannot be availed (Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra) — the protection of BNS s.18 [IPC s.80] requires a lawful act done in a lawful manner with proper care and caution.
Regarding the defence of unsoundness of mind under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which statement is correct as laid down by the Supreme Court?
aThe court is concerned with legal insanity, not medical insanity; the accused must be incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law
bBoth medical insanity and legal insanity entitle the accused to acquittal
cIrresistible impulse and partial delusion are sufficient to claim the exception
dMere absence of motive for a brutal crime by itself proves insanity
Answer: A
BNS s.22 [IPC s.84] recognises only legal insanity — incapacity to know the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law (Bapu v State of Rajasthan; Surendra Mishra v State of Jharkhand); medical insanity, irresistible impulse, partial delusion or mere absence of motive do not suffice.
On a plea of unsoundness of mind under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, what is the correct position on burden of proof, as settled in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v State of Gujarat?
aThe accused must prove insanity beyond reasonable doubt
bThe accused bears a burden no higher than that on a party to a civil proceeding (preponderance of probabilities), and may also rely on a reasonable doubt thereby raised on mens rea
cThe burden never lies on the accused at all; the prosecution must disprove insanity
dThe accused must conclusively establish insanity or else cannot be acquitted on any ground
Answer: B
Though the burden of proving the exception lies on the accused under the rule corresponding to s.105 of the Evidence Act (now BSA, 2023), it is no higher than a civil burden of preponderance of probabilities; even if not conclusively proved, the evidence may raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea (Dahyabhai's case), relevant to BNS s.22 [IPC s.84].
A voluntarily becomes heavily intoxicated and commits an act that is an offence only if done with a particular intent or knowledge. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, how is he to be dealt with?
aHe is presumed to have both the knowledge and the intention he would have had if sober
bHe is presumed to have the same intention as if sober, but not knowledge
cHe is presumed to have the same knowledge as if sober, but intention is not presumed and must be gathered from the circumstances
dHe is wholly exonerated because intoxication negatives mens rea
Answer: C
Under BNS s.24 [IPC s.86] voluntary intoxication imputes only the knowledge of a sober man; the word 'intention' is deliberately omitted, so intent must be gathered from the attending circumstances and degree of intoxication (Basdev v State of Pepsu; Mavari Surya Satyanaraina).
Under the consent exception in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 corresponding to old IPC s.87 (harm by consent where act not intended/known likely to cause death or grievous hurt), the consenting person must be above what age?
aTwelve years of age
bSixteen years of age
cTwenty-one years of age
dEighteen years of age
Answer: D
The provision (BNS s.25 [IPC s.87]) protects harm caused by consent of a person above eighteen years of age, where the act is neither intended nor known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, e.g. friendly fencing.
Q45Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
In the Parliament Attack Case [State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu], the Supreme Court held that the expression 'waging war' against the Government of India under what is now BNS s 147 [IPC s 121] should be understood as:
aAn insurrection or organised violent uprising directed against the sovereign authority of the State, 'in like manner and by like means as a foreign enemy would do'
bConventional inter-country war involving military operations between two sovereign nations
cAny act of violence causing destruction of public property, regardless of the object
dOnly an armed attack mounted from outside Indian territory by foreign nationals
Answer: A
The Court held war under BNS s 147 [IPC s 121] is not conventional inter-nation war but includes insurrection striking at the sovereignty of the State, and cautioned against the old 'general public/political object' test; mere destruction of property is not enough.
Q46Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Under the Explanation to BNS s 148 (conspiracy to commit offences punishable under s 147) [IPC s 121A], to constitute the conspiracy it is:
aNecessary that war is actually waged in pursuance of the conspiracy
bNot necessary that any act or illegal omission shall take place in pursuance of the conspiracy
cNecessary that some overt act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the agreement
dNecessary that at least five persons participate in the agreement
Answer: B
The Explanation to BNS s 148 [IPC s 121A] expressly provides that no act or illegal omission need take place in pursuance of the conspiracy; the agreement itself completes the offence (Navjot Sandhu).
Q47Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
X collects men, arms and ammunition and otherwise prepares, intending to be ready to wage war against the Government of India, but no attack is launched. X is most appropriately guilty under:
aBNS s 147 [IPC s 121] for waging war
bBNS s 150 [IPC s 123] for concealing a design to wage war
cBNS s 149 [IPC s 122] for collecting arms etc. with intent to wage war
dNo offence, as mere preparation is never punishable
Answer: C
BNS s 149 [IPC s 122] punishes mere preparation (collecting men, arms, ammunition) to wage war against the Government of India; preparation to wage war is one of the rare instances where preparation itself is an offence.
Q48Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A, knowing of a design to wage war against the Government of India, by an illegal omission conceals its existence intending thereby to facilitate the waging of such war, but does not himself participate in any attack. A is liable under:
aBNS s 148 [IPC s 121A] — conspiracy to wage war
bBNS s 147 [IPC s 121] — abetting the waging of war
cNo penal provision, since omission is not an offence
dBNS s 150 [IPC s 123] — concealing with intent to facilitate a design to wage war
Answer: D
BNS s 150 [IPC s 123] punishes concealment, by act or illegal omission, of the existence of a design to wage war, intending or knowing it likely to facilitate the war; in Shaukat Hussain Guru the accused was convicted under this section as a minor offence.
Q49Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
The offence of assaulting or wrongfully restraining the President of India or the Governor of a State, with intent to compel or restrain the exercise of any of their lawful powers, is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to:
aSeven years
bThree years
cTen years
dImprisonment for life
Answer: A
BNS s 151 [IPC s 124] punishes assaulting/wrongfully restraining/overawing the President or a Governor to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power with imprisonment up to seven years and fine.
Q50Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Regarding the offence of waging war against the Government of an Asiatic Power in alliance or at peace with the Government of India, which statement is correct?
aIt is punishable only if the depredation is committed within Indian territory
bWaging, attempting, or abetting such war against an allied/at-peace Asiatic Power is itself an offence
cIt deprives India of its sovereign right to grant political asylum to a deposed ruler
dIt applies to any foreign power, whether Asiatic or not
Answer: B
BNS s 153 [IPC s 125] makes waging, attempting or abetting war against an Asiatic Power in alliance or at peace with India an offence; it does not affect India's sovereign right to grant political asylum to a deposed ruler.
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