Penal Law (BNS, 2023) Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
For Exception 4 (sudden fight) to s 101 BNS, 2023 [old s 300 IPC] to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, all the following are required EXCEPT:
aIt must be shown which party offered the provocation or struck the first blow
bThe killing was without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
cThe offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner
dThe fight was sudden and in the heat of passion
Answer: A
The Explanation to Exception 4 expressly states it is immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault; the essential conditions are no premeditation, sudden fight/heat of passion, and no undue advantage or cruelty (s 101 BNS [old s 300 IPC]).
Q2Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Exception 5 to s 101 BNS, 2023 [old s 300 IPC] (consent of the deceased) applies only where the person whose death is caused is:
aAbove the age of sixteen years
bAbove the age of eighteen years
cAbove the age of twelve years
dOf any age, provided consent was freely given
Answer: B
Exception 5 requires the deceased to be above eighteen years and to suffer death or take the risk of death with his own consent; a person under eighteen is incapable of such consent (Illustration to the Exception, s 101 BNS [old s 300 IPC]).
Q3Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is concealed behind a bush, A being unaware of B's presence. A is:
aGuilty of murder under transferred malice
bGuilty of culpable homicide, since he was doing an unlawful act
cNot guilty of culpable homicide, as he had neither intention to kill B nor knowledge that his act was likely to cause death
dGuilty of causing death by negligence
Answer: C
Illustration 3 to s 100 BNS [old s 299 IPC]: although the act was unlawful, the absence of intention to cause death and of knowledge of likelihood of death means it is not culpable homicide.
Q4Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Whether the offender is convicted under Part I or Part II of the section punishing culpable homicide not amounting to murder (s 105 BNS / old s 304 IPC) turns on:
aWhether a deadly weapon was used
bWhether the death occurred instantly
cWhether the victim was a public servant
dWhether 'intention' (Parts I) or merely 'knowledge' (Part II) was the dominant factor
Answer: D
Where the act is done with intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it is Part I; where done merely with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without such intention, it is Part II (Arun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra; s 105 BNS [old s 304 IPC]).
Q5Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following is NOT listed among the kinds of hurt designated as 'grievous' under BNS, 2023 [old s 320 IPC]?
aAny hurt causing the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain for ten days
bPermanent privation of the sight of either eye
cFracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth
dPermanent disfiguration of the head or face
Answer: A
The eighth kind of grievous hurt requires the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow ordinary pursuits, for TWENTY days (not ten); the others are enumerated kinds (s 116 BNS [old s 320 IPC]).
Q6Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, intending only to facilitate a theft, cuts off the nostrils of Z; the death of Z is wholly unexpected and there was no intention to kill nor knowledge that death was likely. A is guilty of:
aMurder
bVoluntarily causing grievous hurt
cCulpable homicide not amounting to murder
dCausing death by negligence
Answer: B
Where there is no intention to cause death or knowledge that death is likely, but a serious injury is caused, the offence is grievous hurt even though death results (Guruvulu's case; ss 116/117 BNS [old ss 320/325 IPC]).
Q7Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Regarding clause 'Seventhly' of grievous hurt — fracture or dislocation of a bone — which statement is correct?
aThe bone must be cut through and through or the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface
bDisplacement of a fragment of bone is essential
cA mere partial cut, rupture or fissure of the bone amounts to a fracture and hence grievous hurt
dA tooth injury can never qualify, only bones
Answer: C
Per Hori Lal v State, a break by cutting/splintering or a rupture or fissure suffices; the crack need not extend through and through, nor is displacement required (s 116 BNS, cl 7 [old s 320 IPC]).
Q8Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Whether a given instrument is a 'dangerous weapon' for the aggravated hurt offence (s 118 BNS / old s 326 IPC) is to be decided by:
aThe medical officer's classification alone
bWhether the weapon is statutorily listed as a deadly weapon
cWhether the victim suffered a fracture
dThe factual circumstances such as the size and sharpness of the article, determined by the court
Answer: D
There is no earmarked weapon for causing hurt; whether an article is a dangerous weapon depends on facts like size and sharpness and is for the court to determine, which decides whether s 117 or s 118 BNS [old ss 325/326 IPC] applies (Prabhu v State of MP; State of UP v Indrajeet).
Q9Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
It is the duty of the court, not the doctor, to decide whether a hurt is simple or grievous. This is because:
aThe doctor describes the facts of the injury, but whether it falls within the statutory clauses of grievous hurt is a legal question for the court, the penal clause being strictly construed
bDoctors are not competent to examine injuries
cMedical evidence is always inadmissible on the nature of injury
dOnly the court can examine the victim
Answer: A
The doctor states the nature of the injury as fact, but classification under the enumerated clauses of grievous hurt is for the court, a penal statute being strictly construed (Hadis Mia v State of Assam; s 116 BNS [old s 320 IPC]).
Q10Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Six persons commit a robbery, but the trial court acquits two of them simply for failure to prove their identity, without recording any finding that unidentified persons besides the four convicted took part. Can the remaining four be convicted of dacoity?
aYes, because the robbery was admittedly committed by six persons originally charged
bNo, because in the absence of a finding that five or more participated, fewer than five cannot be convicted of dacoity
cYes, since dacoity requires only that the offence be committed conjointly, regardless of number convicted
dYes, with the help of the rule of constructive liability
Answer: B
Per Raj Kumar v State of Uttaranchal, 2008, dacoity (BNS s 310; old IPC s 391) needs five or more participants; where two co-accused are simply acquitted without a finding that five or more took part, the remaining four (being fewer than five) cannot be convicted of dacoity.
Q11Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
During an attempt to commit robbery, the offender carries a knife open to the view of the victims so as to terrorise them, but does not brandish it or cause any hurt. The robbery is not in fact completed. The aggravated provision attracted for the minimum seven-year sentence is the one corresponding to:
aIPC s 397 (robbery with use of deadly weapon), since the weapon was used to terrorise
bIPC s 394 (voluntarily causing hurt in robbery), since the knife is a deadly weapon
cIPC s 398 (attempt to commit robbery when armed with deadly weapon), as the robbery was not completed
dIPC s 392 (punishment for robbery), as the attempt itself is robbery
Answer: C
Per Phool Kumar v Delhi Admn, 1975 and Ganesh Singh v State of MP, the provision corresponding to IPC s 397 (now BNS s 311) applies only to a completed robbery; for an attempt while armed with a deadly weapon the provision corresponding to IPC s 398 (now BNS s 311 read with the attempt limb) regulates the minimum seven-year sentence.
Q12Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
At the time of committing robbery or dacoity, one of several offenders uses a deadly weapon. As to the enhanced minimum punishment of seven years under the provision corresponding to IPC s 397:
aIt applies to all the offenders who jointly committed the robbery, on the principle of common intention
bIt applies to all offenders armed with weapons whether or not they actually used them
cIt cannot apply at all unless grievous hurt is in fact caused
dIt applies only to the offender who actually uses the weapon himself; there is no constructive or vicarious liability under this provision
Answer: D
Per Ashfaq v State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 and Paramjeet Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001, the provision corresponding to IPC s 397 (BNS s 311) fixes individual liability only on the offender who actually uses the deadly weapon; s 34/common-intention (constructive liability) has no application to it.
Q13Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A finds a purse with money on the road, not knowing to whom it belongs, and picks it up intending to restore it to the owner; but later, after he discovers from the contents that it belongs to Z, he appropriates it to his own use. A is guilty of:
aDishonest misappropriation of property, since the original taking was innocent and the conversion came later
bTheft, because he moved Z's property out of possession
cNo offence, because property found on the road is res nullius
dCriminal breach of trust, because he held the purse for the owner
Answer: A
Per Explanation 2 and the illustrations to IPC s 403 (now BNS s 314), one who finds property not in anyone's possession commits no offence in taking it to restore it, but commits dishonest misappropriation if he later appropriates it once he knows or can discover the owner.
Q14Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A partner of a firm, in the absence of any special agreement entrusting him with dominion over a particular asset, takes some of the firm's goods and uses them for himself. The correct position regarding criminal breach of trust is:
aHe is guilty of criminal breach of trust because every partner holds firm property in a fiduciary capacity
bHe is not guilty, because mere dominion over partnership property is not enough; entrustment by a special agreement must be shown
cHe is guilty, since misappropriation of any firm property is automatically a breach of trust
dHe commits theft, not criminal breach of trust
Answer: B
Per Velji Raghavji Patel v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965, a partner has only undefined ownership over firm assets; without a special agreement entrusting him with dominion he is not 'entrusted' under IPC s 405 (now BNS s 316), so misappropriation gives rise only to civil liability.
Q15Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, by falsely declaring himself to be a Scheduled Caste candidate in his application before the Public Service Commission, obtains the relaxed standard prescribed for such candidates and is eventually appointed to a service post by the Government. Which is correct?
aNo cheating, because the Commission is an independent advisory body and the Government took the final decision
bOnly cheating by personation is made out
cHe has cheated both the Commission and the Government, the deception of the adviser being deception of the Government
dNo offence, since a Government appointment is not 'property'
Answer: C
Per Sushil Kumar Datta, 1985 (and Krishnamurthy, AIR 1965), a false caste declaration to the PSC to gain a relaxed standard and obtain appointment is cheating (BNS s 318; old IPC s 420); deception of the advising Commission is deception of the appointing Government.
Q16Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
In a normal sales transaction goods are delivered to a buyer who thereby becomes the owner, ownership not being linked to payment; the cheque issued in due course for the price later bounces. There is no evidence of any intention to cheat at the outset. The buyer is:
aGuilty of cheating, because dishonour of the cheque shows dishonest intention
bGuilty of criminal breach of trust over the goods
cGuilty of cheating by personation
dNot guilty of cheating, because dishonest intention must exist at the inception and mere subsequent dishonour does not establish it
Answer: D
Per HICEL Pharma Ltd v State of AP, 2000 and Hridaya Ranjan Pd Verma v State of Bihar, AIR 2000, cheating (BNS s 318; old IPC s 420) requires fraudulent/dishonest intention at the inception; a later dishonour of a cheque issued in due course, without such initial intent, does not amount to cheating.
Q17Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, a Government servant, removes an official file from his office to his house overnight, shows it to an outsider, and returns it to the office two days later intact. Which offence, if any, has A committed?
aTheft
bNo offence, as the file was returned undamaged
cOnly criminal breach of trust
dOnly criminal misappropriation of property
Answer: A
Theft does not require an intention to permanently deprive; temporary dishonest moving of movable property out of another's possession suffices — Pyare Lal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963. Punishable under BNS s 303 [old IPC s 378/379].
Q18General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
An assembly of five persons gathers for a wholly lawful purpose. During the gathering, its members suddenly form and adopt a common object to attack a rival and beat him. Which statement reflects the correct legal position?
aThe assembly remains lawful throughout because it was lawful when it assembled
bAn assembly lawful at its inception may subsequently become an unlawful assembly
cThe common object of an unlawful assembly must always exist before the members gather
dOnce lawful, an assembly can never be treated as unlawful for the same gathering
Answer: B
The Explanation to s 141 IPC (carried into s 189 BNS) and case law (Moti Das) establish that an assembly not unlawful when it assembled may subsequently become unlawful, and the common object may be formed on the spur of the moment.
Q19General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
The common object of an unlawful assembly was to kill V. Two members chased V, but being frustrated when they could not reach him, they instead gunned down V's two young daughters playing in the courtyard. Are the remaining members liable for the murder of the daughters under the common-object provision?
aYes, because the killings occurred while prosecuting the common object
bYes, because every member is automatically liable for all acts of any member
cNo, the murders of the daughters were neither the common object, nor incidental to it, nor necessary for its attainment
dNo, because the common-object provision never applies to murder
Answer: C
'In prosecution of the common object' means in order to attain it. Killing the daughters was a fresh act, neither the common object (to kill V) nor incidental or necessary to it, so the other members' conviction for those murders was set aside under s 149 IPC (now s 190 BNS).
Q20General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A, B and C, sharing a common intention to murder Z, go to Z's house. A and B enter and stab Z, while C stays outside near the gate to keep watch and warn the others of any approaching danger. C does no overt act and inflicts no injury. On the principle of joint liability for acts done in furtherance of common intention (BNS, 2023, s 3(5)), which statement is correct?
aC cannot be held liable because he did not himself inflict any injury on Z
bC is liable only for abetment, not for murder
cC is liable only if it is proved exactly which blow killed Z and that C struck it
dC is liable for Z's murder as if he had committed it alone, since participation by keeping watch at the scene suffices
Answer: D
Under BNS s 3(5) [IPC s 34], one who stands guard at the gate to warn his companions participates in the crime; Barendra Kumar Ghosh held 'they also serve who only stand and wait,' so C is liable as if he committed it himself.
Q21General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Regarding the distinction between joint liability under BNS, 2023, s 3(5) (common intention) [IPC s 34] and s 190 (common object) [IPC s 149], which of the following is INCORRECT?
aSection 3(5) creates a substantive offence by itself, whereas s 190 is merely a rule of evidence
bSection 3(5) does not fix any minimum number of persons, whereas s 190 requires at least five persons sharing the common object
cSome active participation is generally required under s 3(5), whereas liability under s 190 may arise by mere membership of the unlawful assembly with active participation being unnecessary
dCommon object under s 190 is wider in scope than common intention under s 3(5)
Answer: A
It is the reverse: s 3(5) [IPC s 34] does not create a substantive offence (it is a rule of constructive liability), whereas s 190 [IPC s 149] does create a distinct substantive offence; the other three distinctions are correctly stated.
Q22General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Six named persons were charged with murder read with the common-object provision (BNS, 2023, s 190) [IPC s 149] as members of an unlawful assembly. The court acquits two of them, and there is no finding that any other known or unknown person took part. Can the remaining four be convicted with the aid of s 190?
aYes, because the membership remains five or more by counting the absconders
bNo, because with the two acquitted and no finding of other participants, fewer than five remain and the unlawful assembly is not made out
cYes, because four members are enough once an unlawful assembly has once been formed
dNo, because s 190 can never be applied where any accused is acquitted
Answer: B
Per Mohan Singh v State of Punjab, an unlawful assembly requires five or more; where two of six are acquitted with no finding of other participants, only four remain and s 190 [IPC s 149] cannot be invoked, though the four may be convicted with the aid of s 3(5) [IPC s 34].
Q23General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Several persons quarrel suddenly with Z. The genesis of the wrangle is unknown but it appears to have arisen on the spur of the moment, giving no chance for any plan to be formed. Each attacker strikes Z with whatever he had. On the application of common intention under BNS, 2023, s 3(5) [IPC s 34], what is the correct legal position?
aAll are vicariously liable for the gravest injury caused by any one of them
bAll are liable because mere simultaneous participation establishes common intention
cEach attacker is punishable for his own individual act, since common intention requiring a meeting of minds cannot be inferred from a sudden free-fight without prior concert
dNone is liable because no single attacker can be shown to have caused the fatal injury
Answer: C
Where the quarrel arose suddenly with no opportunity to form a common intention, s 3(5) [IPC s 34] cannot be invoked; each attacker is punishable only for his individual act (Devaramani v State of Karnataka).
Q24General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A and B together attack Z and cause Z's death. A was acting under grave and sudden provocation, so that his act would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder; B, harbouring ill-will and intending to kill, was under no provocation. On the principle that persons concerned in the same criminal act may be guilty of different offences (BNS, 2023, s 3(8)) [IPC s 38], what is the correct outcome?
aBoth A and B are guilty of murder because they jointly caused the death
bBoth A and B are guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
cA is guilty of murder and B only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
dA is guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, while B is guilty of murder
Answer: D
Under BNS s 3(8) [IPC s 38], persons engaged in one criminal act may be guilty of different offences according to their respective mental states; the provoked A is guilty only of culpable homicide, while B, who killed with intent and without provocation, is guilty of murder.
Q25Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A person, by inducement, causes a 16-year-old girl to leave a place, knowing it likely that she will be seduced to illicit intercourse with another person. Which offence under the BNS, 2023 is most directly attracted?
aProcuration of a minor girl (under eighteen)
bKidnapping from lawful guardianship simpliciter
cImportation of a girl from a foreign country
dBuying a minor for prostitution
Answer: A
Inducing a girl under eighteen to go from any place, with intent or knowledge that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another, is procuration of a minor girl under BNS s.96 [IPC s.366A]; here 'kidnapping' is not an essential ingredient.
Q26Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Under the BNS, 2023, a person previously convicted of rape (or specified aggravated rape offences) who is subsequently convicted again of such an offence shall be punished with:
aImprisonment up to ten years and fine
bImprisonment for the remainder of natural life, or death
cDouble the original sentence
dRigorous imprisonment of not less than seven years
Answer: B
The repeat-offender provision, BNS s.71 [IPC s.376E], prescribes for a person previously convicted of rape (or specified sections) and subsequently convicted again, imprisonment for life meaning the remainder of natural life, or death.
Q27Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A married woman is found dead from burns at her matrimonial home five years after marriage. The prosecution proves that her husband had demanded a motorcycle as dowry and harassed her about it until roughly fifteen days before her death. The husband leads no evidence. Which statement best reflects the legal position under BNS, 2023?
aNo presumption can arise because death by burns within seven years is presumed accidental unless the husband admits otherwise
bDowry death is made out only if the demand was reduced to a written agreement before marriage
cThe court must presume the husband caused the dowry death, and the burden shifts to him to rebut it; harassment 'soon before death' is satisfied
dThe 'soon before death' requirement is never satisfied unless the cruelty occurred on the very day of death
Answer: C
Under s 80 BNS [s 304B IPC], read with s 118 BSA [s 113B IEA], once unnatural death within seven years and dowry-related cruelty 'soon before death' are shown, the court presumes dowry death and the onus shifts to the accused; harassment 15 days before death satisfies the proximity test (Suresh Kumar v State of Haryana).
Q28Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
An accused stealthily touches the body of a seven-and-a-half-month-old female infant with a sexual motive. He argues that an infant of that age has no 'modesty' capable of being outraged. Following the leading authority, which is correct under BNS, 2023?
aThe offence is not made out because modesty presupposes that the victim can perceive and react to the act
bThe act can only be punished as simple hurt since the child cannot feel her modesty insulted
cThe offence is made out only if the infant later shows signs of distress
dModesty is an attribute of every female regardless of age, and the offence of outraging modesty is made out
Answer: D
In State of Punjab v Major Singh the Supreme Court held modesty is an attribute associated with the female sex as a class 'young or old, awake or sleeping'; the offence is now under s 74 BNS [s 354 IPC] and the victim's reaction is relevant but not decisive.
Q29Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A man records video of a woman in a private act where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. She had consented to the recording but NOT to its circulation; he later forwards the clip to others. Which offence under BNS, 2023 is most precisely attracted?
aVoyeurism, under s 77 BNS, because dissemination beyond the consented purpose is itself an offence
bNo offence, because she consented to the recording
cStalking, under s 78 BNS
dSexual harassment, under s 75 BNS, as it amounts to a sexually coloured remark
Answer: A
Under s 77 BNS [s 354C IPC], Explanation 2, where the victim consents to capture of the image but not to its dissemination, such dissemination is itself an offence of voyeurism; consent to recording does not extend to circulation.
Q30Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
An accused forcibly lays the prosecutrix on a bed and breaks the string of her pyjama, but makes no attempt to undress himself, and when she pushes him away he does not try again. The medical and ocular evidence shows no determination to have intercourse at all events. Which offence is correctly made out under BNS, 2023?
aAttempt to commit rape, since disrobing of any kind necessarily proves intent to rape
bAssault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty, under s 74 BNS
cOnly criminal intimidation, as no force touched the woman's body
dNo offence, since the act stopped short of penetration
Answer: B
Per Jai Chand v State, absent a determination to have intercourse in spite of resistance the act is not attempt to rape but outraging of modesty under s 74 BNS [s 354 IPC]; the line between attempt to rape and indecent assault turns on that fixed determination.
Q31Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A husband is charged with dowry death but acquitted of that offence for want of proof that cruelty occurred 'soon before' death; the evidence does establish that he persistently harassed his wife with unlawful dowry demands during the marriage. No separate charge of matrimonial cruelty was framed. Under BNS, 2023, which is correct?
aAcquittal of dowry death bars any conviction for matrimonial cruelty on the same facts
bHe cannot be convicted of cruelty because that offence requires the woman to be dead
cHe can still be convicted of cruelty by husband/relative even without a separate charge, as the two offences are distinct
dMatrimonial cruelty requires proof that death occurred within seven years, just like dowry death
Answer: C
Dowry death (s 80 BNS [s 304B IPC]) and cruelty by husband/relative (ss 85-86 BNS [s 498A IPC]) are distinct offences; a person acquitted of dowry death can be convicted of cruelty even absent a separate charge (Akula Ravinder v State of AP; Arun Garg v State of Punjab), and cruelty needs no seven-year limit.
Which feature distinguishes the offence under the 'intentional insult to provoke breach of peace' provision (s 352 BNS [s 504 IPC]) from criminal defamation (s 356 BNS [s 499 IPC])?
aDefamation can be made out by communication only to the person concerned, whereas the insult offence requires publication to others
bBoth offences require an intention to cause death or grievous hurt
cNeither offence requires any mens rea on the part of the accused
dFor the insult offence, communication to the person insulted alone suffices, whereas defamation requires publication to a third person
Answer: D
The commentary notes that in defamation, publication to the prosecutor alone is insufficient, but under the intentional-insult provision (s 352 BNS [s 504 IPC]) the insult to the person himself completes the offence.
A sits in dharna at Z's door intending Z to believe that, by his so sitting, Z will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure, so as to make Z do what he is not legally bound to do. This conduct is punishable under the BNS, 2023 as:
aAn act caused by inducing a person to believe he will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure
bCriminal intimidation by threat of injury to person or property
cNo offence, since punishment by a deity cannot be inflicted or avoided by the accused
dIntentional insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace
Answer: A
The dharna illustration falls under s 354 BNS [s 508 IPC], which punishes causing a person to act by inducing belief that he will be made an object of Divine displeasure; it is distinct from criminal intimidation, which needs a threat the offender can himself execute.
A, intending to cause Z's death, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to administer a substance to Z. B, in consequence, does the act in A's absence and thereby causes Z's death. Which statement is correct regarding A's liability under the BNS, 2023?
aA cannot be punished because B, being below seven years, committed no offence at all
bA is liable to be punished as if B had been capable in law of committing the offence and had committed murder, and is subject to the punishment of death
cA is liable only for attempt to abet, since the actual offence was committed by a person incapable in law
dA is liable only for instigation, punishable with a fine, as no completed offence by a culpable person occurred
Answer: B
Under the abetment provisions of the BNS, 2023 (Sec 45/46, corresponding to s 107-108 IPC, Explanation 3 and its illustrations), it is not necessary that the person abetted be capable in law of committing the offence; A is punished as if B had been capable and had committed murder.
Regarding the distinction between abetment by conspiracy and the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy under the BNS, 2023, which proposition is INCORRECT?
aFor abetment by conspiracy, an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy
bFor the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy, a bare agreement to commit an offence is itself punishable even if no overt act follows
cAbetment by conspiracy is wider in amplitude than the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy
dCriminal conspiracy is an independent offence and does not require a separate charge linking it to the offence actually committed
Answer: C
Per Noor Mohammad Momin v State of Maharashtra, the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy (Sec 61 BNS [s 120A/120B IPC]) is wider than abetment by conspiracy (Sec 45 BNS [s 107 IPC]); abetment by conspiracy requires an act/illegal omission, whereas mere agreement suffices for criminal conspiracy.
A takes indecent photographs of a girl and writes letters to her father threatening to publish them unless 'hush money' is paid. On these facts, the most accurate characterisation of A's offence under the BNS, 2023 is:
aAttempt to commit extortion only
bDefamation, since publication of the photographs would harm reputation
cNo offence, as the threat was conditional and the money was never paid
dCriminal intimidation, being a threat of injury to reputation/property made with intent to cause the father to act
Answer: D
Following Romesh Chandra Arora, such a threat to injure reputation to extract money is criminal intimidation under Sec 351 BNS [s 503 IPC], not attempt to commit extortion.
Which of the following statements about the offence of defamation and its Exceptions under the BNS, 2023 is correct?
aIt is not defamation to impute anything true concerning a person only if it be for the public good that the imputation be made, which is a question of fact
bTruth alone is a complete defence to a charge of defamation, irrespective of public good
cCommunicating a defamatory imputation only to the person defamed, with no third party, completes the offence
dAn imputation concerning a deceased person can never amount to defamation
Answer: A
Under Sec 356 BNS [s 499 IPC, First Exception], truth is a defence only if publication is for the public good (a question of fact); defamation requires communication to a third person, and an imputation harming a deceased's reputation may be defamation under Explanation 1.
Which of the following is the key element that distinguishes the offence of intentional insult to provoke breach of the peace from defamation under the BNS, 2023?
aDefamation requires the insult to provoke a breach of public peace, whereas intentional insult does not
bFor intentional insult, an insult communicated only to the person insulted suffices, whereas defamation requires publication to a third person
cBoth offences require publication to a third person and are essentially identical in scope
dDefamation can be committed only by spoken words, while intentional insult can be by signs or visible representations
Answer: B
Per the comment under s 504 IPC, defamation (Sec 356 BNS [s 499 IPC]) requires publication to a third person, whereas in intentional insult to provoke breach of peace (Sec 352 BNS [s 504 IPC]) insult to the prosecutor alone completes the offence.
Under BNS s.28 [IPC s.90], a consent is NOT a valid consent in which of the following situations?
aGiven by a person of nineteen years after deliberation
bGiven expressly in writing for a fencing match
cGiven under a misconception of fact where the doer knows or has reason to believe the consent was so given
dGiven by an adult of sound mind for a surgical operation
Answer: C
BNS s.28 [IPC s.90] vitiates consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact where the doer knows or has reason to believe it was so given; both limbs (victim's and accused's) must be satisfied (Deelip Singh v State of Bihar).
A is compelled by a gang of dacoits, under threat of instant death, to break open the door of a house so they may plunder it. He claims the exception of acts done under threats (BNS s.32 [IPC s.94]). The exception is:
aUnavailable, because compulsion is never a defence in India
bUnavailable, because the offence committed was murder
cAvailable only if he also feared grievous hurt short of death
dAvailable, since the threat was of instant death and he did not of his own accord place himself in the situation
Answer: D
BNS s.32 [IPC s.94] (Explanation 2) protects a person, e.g. a smith forced by dacoits under threat of instant death, who did not voluntarily place himself in that situation; murder and offences against the State punishable with death are excepted.
Against which one of the following acts is there NO right of private defence under BNS s.37 [IPC s.99]?
aAn act of a public servant, acting in good faith under colour of office, which does not reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt, though not strictly justifiable by law
bAn assault reasonably causing apprehension of death
cAn assault with intent to commit rape
dRobbery
Answer: A
BNS s.37 [IPC s.99] bars private defence against acts of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office that do not reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt, even if not strictly justifiable.
Which of the following assaults does NOT, by itself, fall within the situations in which the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death under BNS s.38 [IPC s.100]?
aAn assault with the intention of committing rape
bAn assault by mere use of abusive language causing humiliation
cAn assault reasonably causing apprehension that grievous hurt will result
dAn assault with intention of kidnapping or abducting
Answer: B
Mere use of abusive language gives no right to cause death; BNS s.38 [IPC s.100] lists assaults causing apprehension of death/grievous hurt, intent to rape, unnatural lust, kidnapping/abduction, wrongful confinement (with the acid-attack clause), not insult.
Trespassers entering open land (mere criminal trespass) are confronted by the possessor, who kills one of them claiming defence of property. On the principle in Jassa Singh v State of Haryana, the killing is:
aJustified, because any trespass justifies causing death
bJustified under BNS s.38 [IPC s.100] for defence of body
cNot justified to the extent of causing death, since criminal trespass on open land is not among the offences in BNS s.41 [IPC s.103]; only house-trespass causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt qualifies
dJustified because there was no time to approach authorities
Answer: C
BNS s.41 [IPC s.103] permits causing death in defence of property only for robbery, house-breaking by night, mischief by fire on a dwelling, or theft/mischief/house-trespass causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt; mere trespass on open land is not covered (Jassa Singh v State of Haryana).
The right of private defence of property against theft, under BNS s.43 [IPC s.105], continues until which point?
aIndefinitely, until the owner personally punishes the thief
bOnly so long as the offender is physically inside the owner's house
cUntil the next sunrise after the theft
dUntil the offender has effected his retreat with the property, OR the assistance of public authorities is obtained, OR the property has been recovered
Answer: D
BNS s.43 [IPC s.105], second clause: the right against theft continues till the offender effects his retreat with the property, or public help is obtained, or the property is recovered (Mir Dad; Amar Singh).
Q45Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
An unlawful assembly's common object was only to give the victim a thrashing. One member suddenly pulls out a knife and fatally stabs the victim, an act neither shared nor foreseen as likely. Under the constructive-liability provision, the OTHER members are liable for:
aNot murder, because the fatal act was neither the common object nor known to be likely
bMurder, since they were members at the time the offence was committed
cMurder, because the death occurred during the prosecution of the common object
dAbetment of murder in every case
Answer: A
BNS s 190 [IPC s 149] fastens liability only for offences committed in prosecution of the common object or known to be likely; where the object was merely to thrash and the fatal stabbing was unforeseen, the others are not liable for murder.
Q46Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
An unlawful assembly is formed and one of its members, in prosecution of the common object, uses even the slightest force against an inanimate object (e.g. demolishes a wall). For the offence of rioting, this is:
aNot rioting, since force or violence must be directed against a person
bRioting, because 'violence' under the section extends to force against inanimate objects
cNot rioting, since alarm to a person of reasonable firmness must be proved
dRioting only if a deadly weapon was used
Answer: B
Under BNS s 191 [IPC ss 146/147], 'violence' is not restricted to persons; force against an inanimate object suffices, and unlike the common law no alarm to a person of reasonable firmness need be proved.
Q47Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
An author, in the guise of a political/historical thesis, describes a religious community as a basically violent race of rapists and murderers, in language showing malice calculated to promote hatred between two communities. Which is the correct legal position?
aIt is no offence because a truthful or historical account is a complete defence
bIt is an offence only if actual enmity is proved to have resulted
cIt is an offence of promoting enmity between groups; a truthful/historical account is not by itself a defence if the language is calculated to promote hatred
dIt cannot be an offence as it concerns political doctrines
Answer: C
Under BNS s 196 [IPC s 153A], criminality attaches to the manner, not merely the matter; adherence to history is no defence where language is calculated to promote enmity (Baburao Patel; R V Bhasin), and actual enmity need not be proved.
Q48Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Regarding the offence of promoting enmity between groups, the Supreme Court (Manzar Sayeed Khan; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo) held that a common essential feature is that enmity must be promoted 'between different' groups. It follows that merely inciting the feeling of one community without reference to another:
aSquarely attracts the offence
bAttracts the offence only if done in a place of worship
cAttracts the offence only if violence actually breaks out
dDoes not attract the offence
Answer: D
Under BNS s 196 [IPC s 153A], at least two groups must be involved; merely inciting one community without reference to another does not attract the offence (Bilal Ahmed Kaloo; Manzar Sayeed Khan). Mens rea/intention to incite disorder is the sine qua non.
Q49Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Two persons engage in a fight in a public place, thereby disturbing the public peace. P, however, merely abuses verbally without any exchange of force, while Q remains passive. Has the offence of affray been committed?
aNo, affray requires bilateral exchange of some force or violence, not mere verbal abuse or one-sided assault
bYes, mere verbal abuse in public amounts to affray
cYes, because the public was inconvenienced
dNo, affray requires at least five persons
Answer: A
Under BNS s 194 [IPC ss 159/160], affray needs two or more persons fighting (a bilateral exchange of some force/violence) in a public place disturbing the peace; mere verbal abuse or a one-sided assault with the other remaining passive is not affray.
Q50Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Which statement correctly distinguishes affray from rioting?
aAn affray can be committed in a private place, whereas a riot can only be committed in a public place
bAn affray cannot be committed in a private place and needs two or more persons, whereas a riot can be committed in a private place and needs five or more
cAn affray needs five or more persons, whereas a riot needs only two or more
dBoth require a minimum of five persons and a public place
Answer: B
Affray [BNS s 194; IPC ss 159/160] must occur in a public place and needs only two or more persons, while rioting [BNS s 191; IPC ss 146/147] can occur even in a private place and requires an unlawful assembly of five or more.
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