Penal Law (BNS, 2023) Test 2 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Under s.105 BNS [s.304 IPC], punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder is divided into two parts. Which part applies where the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but WITHOUT any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death?
aPart II, where the maximum is imprisonment up to ten years, or fine, or both
bPart I, carrying liability to imprisonment for life
cNeither part; it would fall under causing death by negligence
dBoth parts apply concurrently
Answer: A
Per s.105 BNS [s.304 IPC], where knowledge (not intention) is the dominant factor — corresponding to clause (c) of s.100/s.299 — Part II applies, with a maximum of ten years, or fine, or both.
Q2Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
In the 'BMW' / hit-and-run line of cases (e.g. Sanjeev Nanda, Alister Pareira), an intoxicated driver without a licence drove at high speed killing several pedestrians. The Supreme Court held the proper conviction was for:
aMurder [s.103 BNS / s.302 IPC]
bCulpable homicide not amounting to murder, Part II [s.105 BNS / s.304 Part II IPC], the rash act being coupled with knowledge it was likely to cause death
cCausing death by negligence only [s.106(1) BNS / s.304A IPC]
dVoluntarily causing grievous hurt only
Answer: B
In Sanjeev Nanda and Alister Pareira, the Court held that where a rash/negligent act is accompanied by knowledge that it is likely to cause death, it goes beyond s.304A and falls under s.304 Part II [s.105 BNS].
Q3Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following injuries is NOT, by itself, enumerated as 'grievous hurt' under s.320 IPC (now s.116 BNS)?
aPermanent privation of the sight of either eye
bFracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth
cA penetrating abdominal wound that touches the stomach but involves no organ and poses no danger to life
dAny hurt which causes the sufferer to be, for twenty days, in severe bodily pain or unable to follow ordinary pursuits
Answer: C
The eight enumerated kinds of grievous hurt in s.116 BNS [s.320 IPC] do not include a wound merely because it penetrates; in Jagdish Chand v State of HP such a wound, not endangering life, was held to be only simple hurt.
Q4Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
The accused, on a sudden impulse, squeezed the deceased's testicles, causing shock, cardiac arrest and sudden death (State of Karnataka v Shivlingaiah). Absent intention or knowledge of likelihood of death, the offence was held to be:
aSimple hurt only [s.115 BNS / s.323 IPC]
bMurder [s.103 BNS / s.302 IPC]
cCausing death by negligence [s.106 BNS / s.304A IPC]
dVoluntarily causing grievous hurt, the act endangering life under clause 'Eighthly' [s.117(2) BNS / s.325 IPC]
Answer: D
In State of Karnataka v Shivlingaiah the act fell under clause 'Eighthly' of grievous hurt (hurt endangering life); with no intention/knowledge of death it was voluntarily causing grievous hurt, not culpable homicide [s.117(2) BNS / s.325 IPC].
Q5Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Regarding the offence of attempt to murder (s.307 IPC, now s.109 BNS), which statement reflects the settled position of the Supreme Court (e.g. Ratan Singh v State of MP, State of MP v Kashiram)?
aThe determinative factor is the intention or knowledge of the accused, not the nature of the injury; even a simple injury does not rule out the offence
bAn accused cannot be convicted unless bodily injury capable of causing death is actually inflicted
cConviction is possible only if the injury is on a vital part of the body
dThe offence is made out merely by causing any hurt, regardless of intention
Answer: A
Per Ratan Singh v State of MP and State of MP v Kashiram, the determinative question for s.109 BNS [s.307 IPC] is intention or knowledge to commit murder; the simple or minor nature of the injury does not by itself rule out the offence.
Q6Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
For the offence of dowry death (s.304B IPC, now s.80 BNS), which combination of essentials must be established?
aDeath within ten years of marriage caused intentionally by the husband
bDeath by burns/bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, preceded soon before death by cruelty or harassment for or in connection with a demand for dowry
cDeath by poisoning at any time after marriage with proof of an agreement to pay dowry
dDeath in normal circumstances within seven years of marriage with proof that dowry was actually paid
Answer: B
Per Shanti v State of Haryana and the text of s.80 BNS [s.304B IPC]: unnatural death (burns/bodily injury/otherwise than normally) within seven years of marriage, with cruelty/harassment 'soon before death' for or in connection with a dowry demand.
Q7Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is concealed behind a bush, A not knowing B was there. On these facts, which is correct?
aA is guilty of culpable homicide because he was doing an unlawful act
bA is guilty of murder under the transferred-malice principle
cA is not guilty of culpable homicide as he had neither the intention nor knowledge of causing death of any person
dA is guilty of attempt to murder
Answer: C
Per Illustration to BNS s 100 [IPC s 299], an unlawful act causing death is not culpable homicide unless one of the mental states (intention/knowledge as to death) is present; A intended only to kill the fowl.
Q8Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A causes a bodily injury to Z, who is suffering from a diseased spleen, and thereby accelerates Z's death which would not have occurred to a healthy person. Under BNS, the correct position is:
aA has not caused Z's death because Z would not have died but for the spleen disease
bA is liable only for hurt regardless of his mental state
cA is guilty of murder in every such case
dA is deemed to have caused Z's death by virtue of Explanation 1 to the definition of culpable homicide
Answer: D
Explanation 1 to BNS s 100 [IPC s 299] deems a person who accelerates the death of one labouring under a disorder, disease or infirmity to have caused that death (subject to the requisite mens rea).
Q9Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Z is mortally wounded by A. With proper and skilful medical treatment Z's life might have been saved, but Z dies. Which statement reflects the law under BNS?
aA is deemed to have caused the death; the possibility of prevention by proper remedies is no defence (Explanation 2)
bA escapes liability because timely medical aid could have prevented death
cA is liable only for grievous hurt as death resulted from inadequate treatment
dA is liable only if the treatment given was negligent
Answer: A
Explanation 2 to BNS s 100 [IPC s 299] provides that one who causes a fatal bodily injury is deemed to cause death even if proper remedies and skilful treatment might have prevented it.
Q10Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, joint owner of a horse with B, takes it out of B's possession intending to use it; he has a right to use it. Later A sells the horse and pockets the entire proceeds. A's act in selling amounts to:
aTheft
bCriminal misappropriation of property
cNo offence, since A is a co-owner
dCheating
Answer: B
A co-owner who merely uses joint property commits no offence, but dishonestly converting the whole to his own use is criminal misappropriation under BNS s 314 [old s 403], per Illustration (c).
Q11Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
The essential element that distinguishes criminal breach of trust from theft is:
aThat the property must be immovable
bThat there is no dishonest intention in CBT
cEntrustment of property or dominion over property to the accused
dThat CBT does not require conversion to the offender's use
Answer: C
CBT presupposes lawful entrustment of property or dominion which is then dishonestly misappropriated/converted, unlike theft where property is taken out of another's possession — Velji Raghavji, 1965; BNS s 316 [old s 405].
Q12Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A partner uses partnership assets for his own purpose. There is no special agreement entrusting him with dominion over those assets. He is:
aGuilty of theft of the partnership assets
bGuilty of criminal breach of trust
cGuilty of criminal misappropriation
dNot guilty of criminal breach of trust, though he may be civilly accountable
Answer: D
A partner has undefined ownership over partnership assets; absent a special agreement entrusting dominion, his use of them is at most a civil liability, not CBT — Velji Raghavji Patel, 1965; BNS s 316 [old s 406].
Q13Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Which statement correctly distinguishes cheating from criminal breach of trust?
aIn cheating the dishonest intention exists at the very inception of the transaction, whereas in CBT the possession is obtained lawfully and later dishonestly retained/converted
bIn CBT the dishonest intention exists at the very inception; in cheating it arises later
cCheating always involves entrustment of property
dNeither offence requires dishonest intention
Answer: A
In cheating the dishonest intention is present at the inception (deception induces delivery); in CBT possession comes lawfully and the dishonesty is in subsequent conversion — KC Thomas v A Varghese, 1974; BNS ss 318 & 316 [old ss 415 & 405].
Q14Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A non-scheduled-caste candidate falsely declares himself a scheduled-caste candidate before the UPSC, secures relaxed standards, and is appointed to the IAS. He is guilty of:
aOnly forgery, not cheating
bCheating, having deceived the UPSC and the Government
cNo offence, as no money was delivered
dOnly criminal misappropriation
Answer: B
False representation inducing the appointing authority to act to its prejudice is cheating; delivery of money is not essential where the second limb (act/omission causing harm) applies — Sushil Kumar Datta, 1985; BNS s 318 [old s 420/415].
Q15Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, falsely professing to be a bachelor while he has a living wife, dishonestly induces the complainant and his daughter to go through a marriage ceremony, causing harm to their reputation. No property was delivered. A is guilty of:
aNo offence, since cheating requires delivery of property
bCheating by personation
cCheating, under the second limb of the definition (act/omission causing harm to mind, reputation or body)
dExtortion
Answer: C
Delivery of property is not essential; inducing a person by deception to do an act causing harm to body, mind or reputation is cheating — MNA Achar v DL Rajgopal, 1977; BNS s 318 [old ss 415/417].
Q16Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
For an offence of cheating in a breach-of-contract setting (e.g. failure to repay a loan or deliver goods), the fraudulent or dishonest intention must exist:
aOnly after the failure to perform becomes apparent
bAt any time, since mere breach of contract is itself cheating
cOnly at the time the civil suit is filed
dAt the time of making the promise or representation, i.e. at the inception of the transaction
Answer: D
Mere breach of contract is not cheating; a fraudulent/dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction is a sine qua non — Hridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma v State of Bihar, AIR 2000; BNS s 318 [old ss 415/420].
Q17Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, being on friendly terms with Z, enters Z's library in his absence and removes a book merely to read it, intending to return it, under the impression that he has Z's implied consent. Which statement is correct?
aA commits no theft, as the dishonest intention essential to theft is absent
bA commits theft because the intention to return is immaterial
cA commits theft because he moved movable property without express consent
dA commits criminal misappropriation the moment he picks up the book
Answer: A
Theft (BNS s.303; old IPC s.378) requires a dishonest intention at the moment of moving; where the taker believes he has implied consent and means to return the thing, dishonest intention is lacking, so no theft is committed (Illustration 13 to s.378).
Q18General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A and B are joint jailers, each in charge of prisoner Z for six hours alternately. Intending Z's death, each, during his own watch, illegally omits to give Z the food supplied for him, and Z dies of hunger. Which provision (and result) best applies?
aNeither is guilty, as each performed only part of the act by omission
bProvision corresponding to old IPC s.37 — both are guilty of murder for co-operating by doing one of several acts
cOnly the jailer on whose watch death occurred is guilty
dBoth are guilty only of an attempt to commit murder
Answer: B
This is illustration (b) to IPC s.37, now BNS s.3(8): where an offence is committed by several acts, one who intentionally co-operates by doing any one of them is guilty of the offence; both jailers are guilty of murder.
Q19General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A attacks Z under grave and sudden provocation such that his killing would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having no provocation but harbouring ill-will and intending to kill Z, joins A in killing Z. Under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.38:
aBoth A and B are guilty of murder
bBoth A and B are guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
cB is guilty of murder while A is guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
dOnly A is guilty, B being a mere assistant
Answer: C
This is the illustration to IPC s.38, now BNS s.3(9): persons concerned in one criminal act may be guilty of different offences; B (no provocation, intent to kill) is guilty of murder, A only of culpable homicide.
Q20General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Which of the following is NOT a correct point of distinction between the provisions corresponding to old IPC s.34 and s.149?
as.34 creates no offence whereas s.149 (per some Benches) creates a distinct offence
bs.34 requires some active participation while membership of the assembly suffices under s.149
cs.34 speaks of common intention while s.149 turns on common object, which is wider
ds.34 requires a minimum of five persons just as s.149 does
Answer: D
Under BNS s.3(5) [IPC s.34] there is no minimum number; BNS s.190 [IPC s.149] requires at least five persons sharing a common object. The other three distinctions are correct (Virendra Singh v State of MP).
Q21General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
An assembly of five or more persons becomes an 'unlawful assembly' (provision corresponding to old IPC s.141) by reason of:
aIts common object being one of the five objects enumerated in the section
bThe mere fact that the members are armed with weapons
cAny breach of the peace actually resulting, which is essential
dThe members being more than three in number
Answer: A
Under BNS s.189(1) [IPC s.141], an assembly of five or more becomes unlawful if its common object is one of the five enumerated objects; actual breach of peace is not a sine qua non, unlike at common law.
Q22General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Six persons were named as forming an unlawful assembly and charged for murder with the aid of the provision corresponding to old IPC s.149. Two are acquitted of all charges, with a finding that unidentified others were also involved. Can the remaining accused be convicted with the aid of s.149?
aNo, because at least five named persons must be convicted before s.149 can apply
bYes, provided the court can hold that there was an assembly of five or more, named or unnamed
cNo, s.149 ceases to apply the moment any accused is acquitted
dYes, but only by converting the charge to one under the provision for affray
Answer: B
Under BNS s.190 [IPC s.149], it is not necessary that five be convicted; conviction is valid if the court finds an assembly of five or more, identified or unidentified (Mohan Singh v State of Punjab).
Q23General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
The provision corresponding to old IPC s.149 is divided into two parts. The SECOND part fastens liability on every member where the offence committed is:
aDone in direct prosecution of the common object
bCommitted by a person who was not a member of the assembly
cSuch as the members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object
dOne which the members might possibly have known about
Answer: C
Under BNS s.190 [IPC s.149], the second part covers offences the members 'knew to be likely' to be committed in prosecution of the common object; 'knew' means more than 'might have known' (Bhanwar Singh v State of MP).
Q24General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
The common object of an unlawful assembly was to kill X. Two members chased X but, unable to reach him, instead gunned down two young girls of X's family playing in the courtyard. Are the remaining members vicariously liable for the girls' murder under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.149?
aYes, because the killings occurred during the prosecution of the common object
bYes, because all members are liable for every offence committed by any member
cNo, because fewer than five members participated in the actual killing
dNo, as that killing was neither the common object, nor incidental to it, nor necessary for its attainment
Answer: D
Under BNS s.190 [IPC s.149], 'in prosecution of the common object' means 'in order to attain' it; killing of the girls, being neither the object nor incidental/necessary to it, did not make other members liable.
Q25Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Which of the following, on the statutory definition, would NOT amount to the offence of stalking?
aFollowing a woman where the person was entrusted by the State with the responsibility of preventing or detecting crime and pursued it for that purpose
bRepeatedly following and contacting a woman to foster personal interaction despite her clear indication of disinterest
cMonitoring a woman's use of the internet or email against her wishes to foster personal interaction
dPersistently messaging a woman on social media after she has clearly told the man she is not interested
Answer: A
The proviso to the stalking provision exempts conduct pursued for prevention/detection of crime by a person so entrusted by the State; the other options fall within stalking — BNS s.78 [IPC s.354D].
Q26Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A is charged with kidnapping/abducting a woman with intent to compel her marriage or force her to illicit intercourse. The evidence merely shows that A confined the woman; no intent to compel marriage or illicit intercourse is proved. What is the correct outcome?
aA is guilty under the said section, since wrongful confinement alone suffices
bA is not guilty under that section; mere abduction/confinement without the specified intent does not attract it
cA is guilty because the woman did not consent to the confinement
dA is guilty as the offence is one of strict liability requiring no proof of intent
Answer: B
Mere abduction or confinement is not enough; the specified intent (to compel marriage or force/seduce to illicit intercourse) is the gravamen and must be proved, else conviction lies only for wrongful confinement — Gabbu v State of MP / Fiyaz Ahmad v State of Bihar, under BNS s.87 [IPC s.366].
Q27Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
On the distinction between the offence of kidnapping/abducting a woman to compel marriage and the offence of procuration of a minor girl (child), which statement is correct?
aKidnapping or abduction is an essential ingredient of procuration of a minor girl
bBoth offences require that the illicit intercourse be with the accused himself
cProcuration does not require kidnapping/abduction; 'inducement' of the girl to go or do an act is the essential common ingredient with the abduction offence
dProcuration applies only to girls who have completed eighteen years of age
Answer: C
For procuration of a minor girl, kidnapping/abduction is not an ingredient; inducement is the only common element with the abduction offence, and the intercourse must be with a person other than the accused — Kailash Laxman Khamkar v State of Maharashtra, BNS s.96 [IPC s.366A] vs s.87 [IPC s.366].
Q28Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Under the BNS definition of rape (Explanation 2 on consent), a woman who does NOT physically resist the act of penetration:
aIs, by reason of that fact alone, to be regarded as having consented
bIs deemed to have consented unless she shouts for help
cIs presumed to have consented if there are no injuries on her body
dShall not, by reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity
Answer: D
The proviso to Explanation 2 expressly states that absence of physical resistance shall not, by reason only of that fact, be regarded as consent; consent must be an unequivocal voluntary agreement — BNS s.63 [IPC s.375].
Q29Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A medical man, to whom a 14-year-old girl is sent for professional advice, has sexual connection with her while she submits in the bona fide belief that he is treating her medically. Which clause/description of the definition of rape is attracted?
aHer submission under a misconception of fact is no consent, so it amounts to rape (consent obtained by fraud/no real consent)
bWith her consent obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt
cAgainst her will, by use of force
dIt is not rape, because she physically submitted without resistance
Answer: A
Submission under a misconception of fact (here, belief that it was medical treatment) is not consent; the man is guilty of rape — William's Case; consent under misconception is no consent (BSA s.28 [IEA s.90]) read with BNS s.63 [IPC s.375].
Q30Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
In a prosecution for an aggravated category of rape under the BNS, sexual intercourse by the accused is proved, and the woman states in her evidence that she did not consent. The court is then required to:
aPresume that she consented unless she proves the contrary
bPresume that she did not consent
cTreat the prosecutrix as an accomplice requiring corroboration
dAcquit unless there is independent medical corroboration of absence of consent
Answer: B
In aggravated rape cases under s.64(2)/(3) categories, where intercourse is proved and the woman states she did not consent, the court 'shall presume' absence of consent — BSA s.120 [IEA s.114A], read with BNS s.63/64 [IPC s.375/376].
Q31Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Which set of facts attracts the AGGRAVATED form of rape punishable with a higher minimum sentence (rather than ordinary rape)?
aA stranger rapes an adult woman with no aggravating circumstance
bA man rapes a woman with whom he was in a consensual relationship that later broke down
cA police officer rapes a woman who is in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him
dA man attempts rape but does not succeed in penetration
Answer: C
Rape by a police officer on a woman in the custody of a subordinate police officer is an enumerated aggravated category carrying a higher minimum punishment — BNS s.64(2) [IPC s.376(2)]; (a) is ordinary rape and (d) is mere attempt.
A police constable kept watch over the husband and did nothing on hearing the shrieks of the wife while a head constable raped her in custody. As to the watching constable's liability under the BNS, 2023:
aHe is not liable as he merely failed to prevent the offence
bHe is liable only for criminal intimidation
cHe cannot be convicted unless he physically participated in the rape
dHe is liable for abetment of rape, having intentionally aided its commission by keeping watch
Answer: D
Per Ram Kumar v State of HP, keeping watch and doing nothing while aiding the principal amounts to intentional aiding and conviction for abetment of rape was upheld [BNS s.45 read with s.49; old ss.107/109 IPC].
Which of the following amounts to 'publication' so as to constitute defamation under the BNS, 2023?
aDictating a defamatory letter to one's clerk who reduces it to writing
bA defamatory notice sent in a closed cover by post addressed only to the person defamed
cCommunicating the defamatory matter only to the person defamed himself
dA solicitor dictating to his clerk a letter, in the ordinary course of business, containing defamatory statements about a person
Answer: A
Defamation [BNS s.356; old s.499 IPC] requires publication to a third person; dictating a letter to a clerk is publication, but a privileged solicitor's dictation, or communication only to the person defamed, is not.
A film was alleged to be defamatory of 'lawyers as a class.' On whether such a collection of persons can be defamed under the BNS, 2023:
aAny large class such as advocates generally can be defamed under the Explanation covering a collection of persons
bThe collection must be a small determinate body whose identity can be fixed; advocates as a class are incapable of being defamed
cA class of persons can never be defamed in any circumstances
dOnly an incorporated company can be the subject of group defamation
Answer: B
Under the Explanation to defamation [BNS s.356 Expl.2; old s.499 Expl.2 IPC], the collection must be an identifiable, determinate body; a vague class like 'advocates' is incapable of being defamed.
Which of the following Exceptions to defamation under the BNS, 2023 requires that the imputation be TRUE (and not merely made in good faith)?
aThe exception covering an opinion in good faith on the conduct of a public servant in discharge of public functions
bThe exception covering an accusation preferred in good faith to a person in lawful authority
cThe exception covering imputation of truth which the public good requires to be made or published
dThe exception covering a caution conveyed in good faith for the good of the person
Answer: C
The First Exception to defamation [BNS s.356; old s.499 IPC] (and the Fourth) require truth, the truth being for the public good; the remaining exceptions require only good faith.
The accused took indecent photographs of a girl and wrote letters to her father threatening to publish them unless 'hush money' was paid. As to the offence under the BNS, 2023:
aHe is guilty of attempt to commit extortion only
bHe is guilty of defamation only
cHe has committed no offence as no money was actually paid
dHe is guilty of criminal intimidation
Answer: D
Per Romesh Chandra Arora, the Supreme Court held the accused guilty of criminal intimidation (threat of injury to reputation with intent to cause the person to do an act) and not of attempt to commit extortion [BNS s.351; old s.503 IPC].
Which of the following is an essential ingredient that distinguishes the offence corresponding to old s.504 IPC (intentional insult to provoke breach of peace) from defamation under the BNS, 2023?
aFor the insult offence, provocation to the insulted person himself (intending or knowing it likely to cause him to break the peace) suffices; publication to a third party is not required
bThe insult must be communicated to a third person other than the person insulted
cBoth offences require an intention to cause alarm to the victim
dMere vulgar abuse is always sufficient to constitute the insult offence
Answer: A
Unlike defamation [BNS s.356; old s.499 IPC] which needs publication to a third person, the intentional-insult offence [BNS s.352; old s.504 IPC] is complete on provocation to the person insulted; mere vulgar abuse without intent/knowledge of breach of peace is not enough.
On the punishment of abetment where the act abetted is committed in consequence and no express provision is made for such abetment, which statement is correct under the BNS, 2023 (old s.109 IPC)?
aThe abettor must always be present at the scene to be punished
bThe abettor is punished with the punishment provided for the principal offence, and may be liable even if absent, provided the offence was committed in consequence of the abetment
cThe abettor is punished only if he is also a member of an unlawful assembly
dThe abettor receives half the punishment of the principal offender
Answer: B
Per NMMY Momin, the abettor is liable to the punishment for the offence and need not be present, provided the offence was committed in consequence of his instigation/conspiracy/aid [BNS s.49; old s.109 IPC].
A surgeon, knowing that an operation is likely to cause the death of Z who suffers a painful complaint, but not intending death and intending in good faith Z's benefit, performs it with Z's consent and Z dies. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which is correct?
aThe surgeon is guilty of culpable homicide because death resulted
bNo offence, but only because the patient was above eighteen years
cNo offence is committed, as harm (even risk of death) for the consenting person's benefit done in good faith is excepted
dThe surgeon is liable unless he obtained the consent of a Magistrate
Answer: C
BNS s.26 [IPC s.88] excepts any harm caused, even risk of death, for the consenting person's benefit done in good faith and not intending death; the section, unlike the preceding one, does not fix an age (but s.28 requires at least twelve years for valid consent).
A prosecutrix consents to sexual intercourse because the accused, from the very inception having no intention to marry her, falsely promised marriage to procure her assent. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 on consent vitiated by misconception, which is correct?
aThe consent is valid as she voluntarily participated
bA mere breach of a genuine promise to marry vitiates consent in every case
cConsent can never be vitiated by misrepresentation under the Sanhita
dConsent given under such a misconception of fact (a false promise never intended to be kept) is no consent
Answer: D
Under BNS s.28 [IPC s.90], consent given under a misconception of fact which the doer knows or has reason to believe induced it is no consent; a false promise of marriage never intended to be honoured from inception vitiates consent (Pradeep Kumar v State of Bihar; Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana). A mere breach of a genuine promise does not.
Seized by a gang of dacoits and forced by threat of instant death, a smith breaks open the door of a house for the dacoits, and a person compelled by the same gang abets a murder. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 provision on acts done under threats (old IPC s.94), which is correct?
aThe smith is excused; murder itself is not excused, but abetment of murder under fear of instant death is excused
bBoth the smith and the abettor of murder are excused
cNeither is excused, as duress is no defence under Indian law
dOnly murder is excused, not the housebreaking
Answer: A
BNS s.32 [IPC s.94] excuses acts done under threat reasonably causing apprehension of instant death, except murder and offences against the State punishable with death; but 'murder' does not include its abetment, so abetment of murder done under fear of instant death is excused (Umadasi Dasi; Bachchan Lal).
Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence by reason of unsoundness of mind. What is A's position under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aA has no right of private defence because Z has committed no offence
bA has the same right of private defence as he would have if Z were sane
cA may only flee and seek protection of public authorities
dA may use force only to cause hurt, never death
Answer: B
BNS s.36 [IPC s.98] gives every person the same right of private defence against an act of one suffering from unsoundness of mind, youth, intoxication or misconception as if the act were an offence — otherwise the right would lose most of its value.
Which of the following correctly states a limitation on the right of private defence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (old IPC s.99)?
aThe right may be exercised even where there is ample time to have recourse to the public authorities
bThe right may extend to inflicting more harm than necessary, since defence cannot be weighed in golden scales
cThere is no right against an act of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office which does not reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt, even if not strictly justifiable by law
dThe right is available even against a public servant acting strictly within his powers
Answer: C
BNS s.37 [IPC s.99] denies the right against acts of public servants acting in good faith under colour of office (not causing apprehension of death/grievous hurt), denies it where there is time to seek public authorities, and limits it to no more harm than necessary (Kanwar Singh; Kesho Ram).
Which one of the following is a situation in which the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (old IPC s.100)?
aMere use of abusive or insulting language by the aggressor
bA simple assault causing only apprehension of slight hurt
cTheft of movable property from an open field at night
dAn act of throwing or administering acid reasonably causing apprehension that grievous hurt will result
Answer: D
BNS s.38 [IPC s.100] permits causing death only for enumerated assaults — apprehension of death or grievous hurt, rape, unnatural lust, kidnapping/abduction, wrongful confinement preventing recourse to authorities, and throwing/administering acid causing apprehension of grievous hurt; mere abusive language or slight hurt gives no such right (Dattu Genu).
Q45Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A public servant having custody of a State prisoner or a prisoner of war NEGLIGENTLY suffers the prisoner to escape. He is liable to be punished with:
aSimple imprisonment which may extend to three years
bImprisonment for life
cRigorous imprisonment up to ten years
dFine only
Answer: A
BNS s 156 [IPC s 129] punishes a public servant who negligently suffers a State prisoner/prisoner of war to escape with simple imprisonment up to three years and fine; voluntary allowance to escape [IPC s 128 / BNS s 155] carries up to life.
Q46Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
An assembly of five or more persons is an 'unlawful assembly' only if the common object is one of those enumerated. Which of the following gatherings would NOT, on the facts, constitute an unlawful assembly?
aFive persons assembling to overawe a public servant by show of criminal force in the exercise of his lawful power
bFive or more persons assembling to maintain by force a right which they bona fide believe they already possess, i.e. to defend property within legal limits
cFive persons assembling to resist by force the execution of a lawful legal process
dFive persons assembling to take possession of property by show of criminal force
Answer: B
Under BNS s 189 [IPC s 141], an assembly to defend property or maintain a bona fide existing right within legal limits is not unlawful (Veerabadra Pillai); enforcing a 'supposed right' by criminal force is. The other objects squarely fall within the clauses.
Q47Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
On the vicarious liability of members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in prosecution of the common object [BNS s 190 / IPC s 149], which statement is INCORRECT?
aMere knowledge that the offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object is sufficient to fasten liability
bA clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be recorded before convicting with its aid
cIt is a substantive section creating an independent offence, not merely a rule of constructive liability
dA member who shared the original common object but who later disassociated himself after failing to prevent the assembly may not be held liable
Answer: C
The Supreme Court held BNS s 190 [IPC s 149] does NOT create a separate offence; it only declares vicarious/constructive liability of members for acts in prosecution of the common object or known to be likely. The other propositions are correct.
Q48Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
What single feature distinguishes the offence of 'rioting' [BNS s 191 / IPC s 146] from being a mere member of an 'unlawful assembly'?
aThe number of persons must be seven or more for rioting
bThe assembly must have been commanded to disperse
cThe presence of a deadly weapon with every member
dUse of force or violence by the unlawful assembly, or any member, in prosecution of the common object
Answer: D
Under BNS s 191 [IPC s 146], it is the use of force or violence (even against an inanimate object) by the unlawful assembly or any member in prosecution of the common object that converts unlawful assembly into rioting.
Q49Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A, though not himself a member of any unlawful assembly, hires and engages persons to join an unlawful assembly, in pursuance of which those persons commit an offence as members of that assembly. A's liability is:
aPunishable as a member of that unlawful assembly and for any offence committed by the hired persons, as if he were a member
bOnly for abetment, with a reduced sentence
cNil, as he was never physically present in the assembly
dOnly to pay a fine for conniving at the hiring
Answer: A
BNS s 193 [IPC s 150] makes one who hires, engages, employs, promotes or connives at hiring of persons for an unlawful assembly punishable as a member and for offences committed by them in pursuance of the hiring, as if he himself were a member.
Q50Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
On the offence of promoting enmity between different groups [BNS s 196 / IPC s 153A], as explained in Manzar Sayeed Khan and Bilal Ahmed Kaloo, which proposition is correct?
aInciting the feelings of one community alone, with no reference to any other, is sufficient
bIntention (mens rea) to promote enmity or cause disorder is the sine qua non, and at least two groups/communities must be involved
cAn adherence to a truthful historical account is always a complete defence irrespective of language used
dHatred or enmity must be proved to have actually resulted before any conviction
Answer: B
Under BNS s 196 [IPC s 153A], the intention to promote enmity/disorder is the sine qua non and at least two groups must be involved (Bilal Ahmed Kaloo; Manzar Sayeed Khan); a truthful historical account couched in malicious language is no defence.
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