Penal Law (BNS, 2023) Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, in a sudden quarrel and without intention or knowledge of causing death, strikes Z a single blow with a light bamboo stick on the region of Z's diseased spleen; Z dies. A is most appropriately guilty of:
aCausing grievous hurt
bMurder
cCulpable homicide not amounting to murder
dCausing death by negligence
Answer: A
On the diseased-spleen line of cases (Megha Meeah; O'Brien) under BNS ss 116/117 [IPC ss 320/325], absent intention/knowledge as to death the offence is grievous hurt, not culpable homicide.
Q2Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
What distinguishes the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means from the ordinary offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt?
aThe hurt must result in death
bThe grievous hurt must be caused by an instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or one likely to cause death, or by fire, poison, corrosive or explosive substance, etc.
cThe victim must be a public servant
dThere must be more than one assailant
Answer: B
BNS s 118(2) [IPC s 326] adds the differentia of the dangerous means/weapon (shooting, stabbing, cutting instrument, fire, poison, corrosive, explosive, etc.); whether an article is a 'dangerous weapon' depends on its size, sharpness, etc. (Prabhu v State of MP).
Q3Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
An assailant throws acid on a victim's face but, fortunately, only simple (non-grievous) injuries result. Regarding liability for the dedicated acid-attack offences, the correct position is:
aNo offence is made out because the hurt was not grievous
bOnly the general hurt provision applies
cThe offence of throwing acid is attracted even where injuries are simple; gravity of injury is not a precondition
dLiability arises only if the victim is permanently disfigured
Answer: C
Per Maqbool v State of UP, under the acid provisions BNS s 124 [IPC ss 326A/326B] it is not necessary that injuries be grievous; the mere act of throwing or attempting to throw acid attracts the offence.
Q4Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a man. Z dies. A had no premeditated design to kill Z. Under the scheme of BNS, 2023, A is guilty of:
aCulpable homicide not amounting to murder, as there was no intention to cause death
bVoluntarily causing grievous hurt only
cDeath caused by negligence
dMurder, because the bodily injury intended was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
Answer: D
This is Illustration 3 to s 101 BNS, 2023 [old s 300 IPC] clause Thirdly: intention to cause death is not required; it suffices that the intended bodily injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (Virsa Singh v State).
Q5Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
The crucial distinction between clause 'thirdly' of murder (BNS s 101 / old s 300 IPC) and the corresponding limb of culpable homicide (BNS s 100 / old s 299 IPC) lies in:
aThe degree of probability of death — 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature' versus merely 'likely' to cause death
bWhether a weapon was used
cWhether the act was an omission or a positive act
dWhether the victim actually died
Answer: A
Per State of AP v R Punnayya, the difference is one of degree of probability: 'likely to cause death' means probable, while 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' means death is the most probable result (BNS ss 100/101 [old ss 299/300 IPC]).
Q6Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, knowing Z is suffering from a diseased enlarged spleen, strikes him a fist blow intending only bodily injury; Z dies because of rupture of the spleen, though such a blow would not kill a healthy person. A's offence falls under which limb of murder?
aClause 'Firstly' — intention to cause death
bClause 'Secondly' — intention to cause such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of THAT person
cClause 'Thirdly' — injury sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death
dClause 'Fourthly' — imminently dangerous act
Answer: B
Clause 'Secondly' of s 101 BNS [old s 300 IPC] applies where the offender knows the victim's peculiar condition makes an otherwise non-fatal injury likely to be fatal; intention to cause death is not required (Illustration 2 to the section).
Q7Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A aims a fatal blow at his enemy B, but C throws himself in between and dies instead. Under the doctrine of transferred malice in BNS, 2023, A's liability is:
aReduced to causing death by negligence, since A did not intend C's death
bOnly grievous hurt, since the wrong person was hit
cTreated as if A had killed B — A answers for it as the offence it would have been against B
dNo offence, because there was no intention to kill C
Answer: C
Section 102 BNS [old s 301 IPC] embodies transferred malice: the culpable homicide is of the description it would have been had the death of the intended victim been caused (Shankarlal; Gyanendra Kumar v State).
Q8Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following provisos to the 'grave and sudden provocation' exception is INCORRECTLY stated?
aThe provocation must not be sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing
bThe provocation must not be given by anything done in obedience to the law or by a public servant lawfully exercising his powers
cThe provocation must not be given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence
dThe provocation, even if slight, suffices so long as the offender actually lost self-control
Answer: D
Exception 1 to s 101 BNS [old s 300 IPC] requires the provocation to be both 'grave' AND 'sudden'; the three provisos are (a),(b),(c). The test is that of a reasonable person of the same class, not the offender's subjective excitability.
Q9Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. Excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, A kills Z. A's plea of grave and sudden provocation:
aFails, and the offence is murder, because the provocation was given by a thing lawfully done by a public servant
bSucceeds, reducing the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder
cSucceeds only if A was unaware Z was a bailiff
dFails, but the offence is reduced to grievous hurt
Answer: A
Illustration 3 to Exception 1, s 101 BNS [old s 300 IPC]: provocation arising from a public servant's lawful exercise of power cannot be relied on; the offence remains murder.
Q10Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
While committing robbery only one of the offenders is actually armed with and uses a deadly weapon. As to the minimum seven-year sentence for using a deadly weapon, who is liable?
aEvery participant in the robbery, by constructive liability
bOnly the offender who himself was armed with and used the deadly weapon
cAll, provided they shared a common intention
dOnly the leader of the group
Answer: B
The enhanced minimum punishment for use of a deadly weapon attaches to 'the offender' who actually uses it, not to mere co-participants; there is no constructive liability (BNS s.311; old IPC s.397, Willson v State of Maharashtra, 1995).
Q11Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A finds a purse in a crowded temple, not knowing whose it is, and merely puts it in his pocket but is immediately arrested before any further act. Is dishonest misappropriation made out?
aYes, picking it up itself amounts to conversion
bNo, because a purse is not movable property
cNo, there must be actual conversion to his own use, which mere retention so far does not show
dYes, because he did not at once attempt to find the owner
Answer: C
Dishonest misappropriation (BNS s.314; old IPC s.403) requires actual conversion to one's own use; merely picking up and pocketing a found article, with no chance to appropriate, does not establish the offence (Phuman, 1907).
Q12Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A partner, having undefined ownership over partnership assets, uses some of those assets for his own purpose. In the absence of a special agreement entrusting him with dominion, his liability is:
aCriminal breach of trust, since he dealt with another's property
bDishonest misappropriation of the firm's property
cTheft of the share belonging to co-partners
dOnly a civil liability to account to the other partners; no criminal breach of trust
Answer: D
Mere dominion of a partner over partnership property is not 'entrustment'; without a special agreement entrusting the asset, using it gives rise only to a civil duty to account, not criminal breach of trust (BNS s.316; old IPC s.405/406, Velji Raghavji Patel v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1433).
Q13Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Which of the following best states the essential distinction between cheating and criminal breach of trust?
aIn cheating the dishonest intention exists from the inception of the transaction, whereas in criminal breach of trust the initial possession is lawful and intention turns dishonest later
bCheating always involves movable property, while breach of trust involves only immovable property
cCheating requires entrustment, while breach of trust requires deception
dBoth require that the offender obtain possession by force
Answer: A
In cheating (BNS s.318; old IPC s.415) the dishonest/fraudulent intention exists at the very inception and induces delivery by deception; in criminal breach of trust (BNS s.316; old IPC s.405) possession is lawfully acquired and the intention to misappropriate arises afterwards (K C Thomas v A Varghese, 1974).
Q14Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A orders goods on credit by falsely pretending to be a person in the Civil Service, intending not to pay for them, and obtains the goods. The offence is:
aTheft of the goods supplied
bCheating (and, delivery of property having been induced, the aggravated form)
cOnly criminal breach of trust
dExtortion, the seller having been deceived
Answer: B
Deceiving a person and thereby dishonestly inducing delivery of property is cheating; where delivery of property is actually induced it falls under the aggravated provision (BNS s.318, especially s.318(4); old IPC s.415 Illustration (a), punishable under s.420).
Q15Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A non-scheduled-caste candidate falsely declares himself to be a Scheduled Caste candidate before the Public Service Commission, secures the relaxed standard and is appointed to service. The offence committed is:
aNo offence, since the Commission only tenders advice and suffers no loss
bExtortion of the appointment
cCheating, the deception of the appointing authority causing wrongful gain and inducing acts to his benefit
dOnly criminal breach of trust against the Government
Answer: C
Making a false representation that dishonestly induces the appointing authority to act constitutes cheating (BNS s.318; old IPC s.415/420); the deception of the Commission is deception of the Government (Sushil Kumar Datta, 1985).
Q16Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, an officer of a Government department, removes a confidential file from his office to his house, makes it available to an outsider, and then quietly returns the file to the office two days later without anyone suffering permanent loss. Which of the following is correct?
aNo theft, because the intention was never to deprive the owner permanently and the file was in fact returned
bOnly criminal breach of trust, since the file was already in his lawful custody
cOnly criminal misappropriation, since possession came to him innocently
dTheft is made out, because a permanent intention to deprive is not required and even a temporary dishonest moving of property out of possession suffices
Answer: D
Following Pyare Lal Bhargava v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963, theft (BNS s 303; old IPC s 378) does not require an intention to deprive permanently; a transient dishonest moving of movable property out of another's possession completes the offence even if it is later returned.
Q17Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A husband takes his wife to a forest and, by threatening to kill her, obtains her ornaments, which are later recovered from him. On these facts the offence is:
aExtortion, because the ornaments were delivered by the wife under fear of injury
bRobbery, since the ornaments were taken by force
cTheft, since the husband simply took his wife's property
dNo offence, since spouses cannot steal from each other
Answer: A
On the facts of State of Karnataka v Basavegowda, 1997, where the victim is put in fear of injury and is thereby induced to deliver property, the offence is extortion (BNS s 308; old IPC s 383), not robbery, because delivery by the person put in fear is the hallmark of extortion.
Q18General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A attacks Z under grave and sudden provocation, such that A's killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having no such provocation but bearing ill-will and intending to kill Z, assists A. Both are 'concerned' in causing Z's death. What is their liability?
aBoth are guilty of murder
bB is guilty of murder; A is guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
cBoth are guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
dA is guilty of murder; B is guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Answer: B
This is the illustration to s 3(9) BNS [s 38 IPC]: persons concerned in the same criminal act may be guilty of different offences according to their respective mens rea; B (no provocation, intent to kill) is guilty of murder, A only of culpable homicide.
Q19General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Three accused jointly assault Z. Two use their weapons in a determined manner showing intent to kill, and Z dies. The third carried only a lathi, did not use it, but had joined knowing the assault was likely to cause death though he did not intend to kill. Which provision best fixes the third accused's liability for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Part II)?
aSection 3(5) BNS read with the murder provision
bSection 3(6) BNS — act criminal by reason of criminal knowledge or intention
cSection 3(9) BNS — persons concerned may be guilty of different offences
dSection 190 BNS — vicarious liability of members of an unlawful assembly
Answer: C
On the facts of Bhaba Nanda v State of Assam, the two who intended to kill were liable for murder while the third, who joined with knowledge that death was likely but without intent to kill, was liable under Part II via s 38 IPC = s 3(9) BNS.
Q20General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Under Section 189 BNS, 2023 [s 141 IPC], the minimum number of persons required to constitute an 'unlawful assembly' is—
atwo or more persons
bthree or more persons
cseven or more persons
dfive or more persons
Answer: D
An unlawful assembly requires an assembly of five or more persons with one of the specified common objects (s 189 BNS [s 141 IPC]); the common-law rule of three persons does not apply in India (Mohan Singh).
Q21General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Six persons are charged as an unlawful assembly with murder under the common-object provision. Two are acquitted, but the court records no finding that any other known or unknown person took part. Can the remaining four be convicted with the aid of the common-object provision?
aNo, because the assembly then falls below five and no other participants are found
bYes, because four persons are sufficient for an unlawful assembly
cYes, because acquittal of co-accused never affects the others' liability
dNo, because the common-object provision can never apply once anyone is acquitted
Answer: A
Per Subran v State of Kerala and Mohan Singh, where acquittal reduces the proved number below five and there is no finding that other known/unknown persons participated, the remaining four cannot be convicted with the aid of s 190 BNS [s 149 IPC].
Q22General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Section 190 BNS, 2023 [s 149 IPC] fixing every member of an unlawful assembly with liability is, as judicially explained, in two parts. The SECOND part covers an offence which—
ais committed directly in prosecution of the common object
bthe members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object
cany member commits with a private intention unconnected with the assembly
dis committed after the assembly has already dispersed
Answer: B
Section 190 BNS [s 149 IPC] has two limbs: (1) offences committed in prosecution of the common object, and (2) offences the members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object; mere knowledge of likelihood suffices for the second part.
Q23General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Which of the following is a correct point of distinction between common intention (s 3(5) BNS / s 34 IPC) and common object (s 190 BNS / s 149 IPC)?
aCommon intention requires a minimum of five persons whereas common object does not
bCommon object necessarily requires active participation by every member, common intention does not
cThe common-object provision creates a substantive offence whereas the common-intention provision does not by itself create one
dCommon intention is wider in scope and amplitude than common object
Answer: C
Section 34 IPC (s 3(5) BNS) creates no offence and needs some active participation, with no fixed minimum number; s 149 IPC (s 190 BNS) creates a distinct offence, fixes liability by mere membership (no active participation needed), requires at least five persons, and 'object' is wider than 'intention'.
Q24General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Five or more persons assemble and use force to maintain undisturbed their own actual possession of land they are in possession of, repelling those who try to dispossess them. On these facts, is the assembly 'unlawful' under s 189 BNS [s 141 IPC]?
aYes, because any use of force by five or more persons makes the assembly unlawful
bYes, because the fourth clause covers all disputes over property
cNo, but only if the persons are unarmed
dNo, the common object is to maintain an existing right of possession, not to enforce a right or supposed right by criminal force
Answer: D
Per Silajit Mahto and Veerabadra Pillai, an assembly to maintain by force a right one already possesses (defending actual possession) is not unlawful; the fourth clause of s 141 strikes at enforcing a right or supposed right by criminal force, not at defending an existing one.
Q25Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Under the BNS, 2023, a man who makes sexually coloured remarks (and nothing more) towards a woman commits sexual harassment. The maximum punishment specifically prescribed for this particular clause is:
aImprisonment up to one year, or fine, or both
bRigorous imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both
cRigorous imprisonment of not less than three years
dImprisonment for life
Answer: A
For making sexually coloured remarks (clause (iv)), BNS s.75 [IPC s.354A] prescribes imprisonment up to one year, or fine, or both; the heavier three-year term applies to physical contact, demand for sexual favours, or showing pornography.
Q26Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A police officer commits rape on a woman within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed. Under the BNS, 2023, the minimum punishment prescribed is:
aRigorous imprisonment of not less than seven years
bRigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life
cRigorous imprisonment of not less than five years
dSimple imprisonment up to three years
Answer: B
Custodial/aggravated rape (including by a police officer within his station limits) under BNS s.64(2) [IPC s.376(2)] carries rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life.
Q27Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
While committing rape, the offender inflicts an injury that puts the woman in a persistent vegetative state. Under the BNS, 2023, the punishment prescribed is:
aImprisonment up to ten years
bImprisonment of not less than seven years
cRigorous imprisonment of not less than twenty years, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, or death
dFine only, in addition to the rape sentence
Answer: C
Where rape causes death or a persistent vegetative state, BNS s.66 [IPC s.376A] prescribes rigorous imprisonment of not less than twenty years, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, or death.
Q28Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A jail superintendent abuses his position to induce a female inmate in his charge to have sexual intercourse with him, the intercourse not amounting to rape. Under the BNS, 2023, this is punishable by:
aImprisonment up to two years, or fine
bNo offence, as the inmate consented
cImprisonment for life
dRigorous imprisonment of not less than five years extendable to ten years, and fine
Answer: D
Sexual intercourse by a person in authority (including a jail superintendent) abusing his position, not amounting to rape, is punishable under BNS s.68 [IPC s.376C] with rigorous imprisonment of not less than five years extendable to ten years, and fine.
Q29Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A married woman dies of burns within seven years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was harassed by her husband for dowry. Which statement is correct under the BNS, 2023 read with the BSA, 2023?
aIt is 'dowry death' and the court shall presume that the husband caused the dowry death
bThe prosecution must independently prove the husband caused the death; no presumption arises
cThe presumption arises only if death occurs within three years of marriage
dNo presumption can arise unless there was a written dowry demand
Answer: A
Dowry death under BNS s.80 [IPC s.304B], read with the presumption in BSA s.118 [IEA s.113B], requires the court to presume the husband/relative caused the dowry death where the woman was subjected to dowry-related cruelty soon before her death within seven years of marriage.
Q30Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
On the requirement of 'soon before her death' in dowry death, the Supreme Court (e.g., Keshab Chandra Panda; Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana) has held that:
aIt means within twenty-four hours of death
bThere must be a proximate and live link between the dowry-related cruelty and the death; stale cruelty will not suffice
cAny cruelty at any time after marriage is sufficient
dIt means 'immediately before' death in the literal sense
Answer: B
Courts have read 'soon before her death' under BNS s.80 [IPC s.304B] as requiring a proximate and live link between the dowry cruelty and the death; cruelty too remote/stale to disturb the woman's mental equilibrium is of no consequence (Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350).
Q31Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Under the cruelty-by-husband-or-relatives provision of the BNS, 2023, which of the following is correct regarding the meaning of 'cruelty'?
aCruelty must necessarily be physical to attract the section
bOrdinary wear and tear of married life is always cruelty
cWilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury/danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical), or harassment to coerce an unlawful dowry demand, amounts to cruelty
dOnly conduct after seven years of marriage qualifies as cruelty
Answer: C
The Explanation to BNS s.85/86 [IPC s.498A] defines cruelty as wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury/danger to life, limb or health, or harassment to coerce an unlawful property/dowry demand; cruelty need not be physical (Gananath Pattnaik v State of Orissa).
Regarding the distinction between abetment by being present (older s 114 IPC) and abetment punished as the principal offence (older s 109 IPC), now carried into the BNS, 2023, which is correct?
aActive abetment at the very time of commission is covered by the s 114-type provision
bBoth provisions require the abettor to be absent from the scene
cNeither provision applies where the act abetted is actually committed
dThe s 114-type provision applies where abetment was previous to the crime and the abettor is present at its commission
Answer: D
Per Kulwant Singh, the s 114 IPC-type provision applies to abetment prior to the crime where the abettor is then present at commission, while active abetment at the time itself falls under s 49 BNS [s 109 IPC].
On the question whether the abetment of an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide can be punished, the law as explained in the Ratanlal commentary (carried to the BNS scheme) holds that:
aAbetment of an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide can be punished as abetment of suicide read with the attempt provision
bThere can be no abetment of an attempt to commit suicide in any circumstance
cIt is punishable only as abetment of attempt to suicide and never with reference to the suicide offence
dIt is not an offence because suicide itself is no longer an offence
Answer: A
Per Berin P Varghese v State, one who abets an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide is punishable under the abetment-of-suicide provision (s 108 BNS [s 306 IPC]) read with the attempt provision (s 62 BNS [s 511 IPC]).
Which of the following, on settled authority, would amount to 'instigation' so as to constitute abetment of suicide under the BNS, 2023?
aA word uttered to the deceased in a sudden fit of anger without intending the consequence
bA continued course of conduct creating circumstances leaving the deceased with no option but to commit suicide, coupled with intent
cA mere demand for repayment of a loan from the debtor who then kills himself
dA threat merely to involve the deceased's family in a false case
Answer: B
Per Chitresh Kumar Chopra / Ramesh Kumar, instigation may be inferred where the accused by a continued course of conduct leaves the deceased no option but suicide, with the requisite mens rea; words in anger, mere loan demands and threats of false cases do not suffice (s 45 BNS / s 107 IPC).
A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch, intending it to be believed that Z stole the watch. Assuming no exception applies, under the BNS, 2023 this is:
aNot defamation, because defamation requires spoken or written words only
bOnly criminal intimidation of Z
cDefamation, since imputation by visible representation is covered
dNot an offence unless Z actually suffers proven loss
Answer: C
Under s 356(1) BNS [s 499 IPC], defamation may be by words, signs OR visible representations; the illustration of drawing such a picture is expressly defamation, and actual proof of harm is not required.
Which of the following defamation exceptions under the BNS, 2023 [s 499 IPC] requires the imputation to be TRUE (and for the public good), as opposed to merely being made in good faith?
aThe exception for opinion in good faith on the conduct of a public servant in his public functions
bThe exception for an accusation preferred in good faith to a person in lawful authority
cThe exception for a caution conveyed in good faith for the good of the person addressed
dThe exception for imputation of truth which the public good requires to be made or published
Answer: D
Per the commentary, only the First Exception (and the Fourth, on court reports) require the imputation to be true and for the public good; the remaining exceptions require only good faith (s 356 BNS [s 499 IPC]).
A's advocate dictates to his steno a reply notice containing defamatory remarks, which is then sent only to the complainant's advocate. Communicating a defamatory imputation solely to the person defamed (or his agent), without more, is:
aNot 'publication', so the offence of defamation is not made out
bAlways defamation, since making the imputation alone completes the offence
cDefamation only if the imputation is in writing
dCriminal intimidation, not defamation
Answer: A
Defamation under s 356 BNS [s 499 IPC] requires publication to a third person; communicating the matter only to the person defamed is no publication (a man has no reputation as against himself), so the offence is not constituted.
An accused took indecent photographs of a girl and wrote letters to her father threatening to publish them unless 'hush money' was paid. The Supreme Court held the accused guilty of:
aAttempt to commit extortion, but not criminal intimidation
bCriminal intimidation, and not attempt to commit extortion
cBoth extortion and defamation
dOnly defamation of the girl
Answer: B
In Romesh Chandra Arora, threatening injury to reputation to make the father pay was held to be criminal intimidation under s 351 BNS [s 503 IPC], not an attempt to commit extortion.
A picks up his loaded gun, unlocks it, aims at the chest of the victim from 4-5 feet and shoots him dead, then pleads accident. On the principle in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar, the exception of accident in doing a lawful act (BNS s.18 [IPC s.80]) is unavailable mainly because:
aThe harm caused was more than slight
bThere was no consent of the sufferer
cThe act itself was not lawful, nor done with proper care and caution, and could not be an accident
dThe accused had time to approach public authorities
Answer: C
BNS s.18 [IPC s.80] requires a lawful act done lawfully with proper care; deliberately aiming and shooting cannot be an accident and is not a lawful act (Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra).
A child commits an act that would otherwise be an offence. In which case is the act NOT an offence purely by force of the child's age, without any need to prove immaturity of understanding?
aA child of ten who has not attained sufficient maturity
bA child of eleven who ran away after the act
cA child of twelve who used a sharp weapon
dA child under seven years of age
Answer: D
Under BNS s.20 [IPC s.82] a child under seven is doli incapax absolutely; BNS s.21 [IPC s.83] (above seven, under twelve) additionally requires proof of immature understanding.
A boy above seven but under twelve picks up a knife, advances on the deceased saying he will cut him to bits, and does cut him. No evidence of immaturity is led. Which is correct under BNS s.21 [IPC s.83]?
aHe is liable, because the burden to show want of sufficient maturity of understanding lies on the defence and was not discharged
bHe is automatically immune because he is under twelve
cHe is immune because running-away children are presumed immature
dHe can claim the exception only if a guardian consents
Answer: A
BNS s.21 [IPC s.83] protects a child 7-12 only if it is shown he had not attained sufficient maturity to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct; absent such proof the presumption is he intended his act (Ulla Mahapatra).
Which of the following, standing alone, would entitle an accused to the defence of unsoundness of mind under BNS s.22 [IPC s.84]?
aIrresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath
bIncapacity, by reason of unsoundness of mind, of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law
cMere medical insanity or partial delusion not impairing cognition
dAbsence of motive for the crime
Answer: B
BNS s.22 [IPC s.84] embodies legal (not medical) insanity on the McNaughten test; irresistible impulse, partial delusion and mere absence of motive do not by themselves attract it.
Regarding voluntary intoxication, which statement correctly reflects the relationship between BNS s.23 and s.24 [IPC ss.85 and 86]?
aIn voluntary intoxication, both the requisite knowledge and the requisite intention are presumed as if the person were sober
bVoluntary intoxication is a complete defence to all offences
cIn voluntary intoxication, the requisite knowledge is imputed as if the person were sober, but intention is not presumed and must be gathered from the circumstances
dSection 24 [IPC s.86] presumes intention but not knowledge
Answer: C
BNS s.24 [IPC s.86] imputes only the knowledge of a sober man in voluntary intoxication; intention is not presumed and is inferred from the facts (Basdev v State of Pepsu; the word 'intention' is deliberately omitted from the second part).
A surgeon, knowing an operation is likely to cause death of Z who suffers a painful complaint, but not intending death and acting in good faith for Z's benefit, operates with Z's consent and Z dies. Which provision protects the surgeon, and what is its key limit?
aBNS s.25 [IPC s.87]; the consenting person must be above eighteen and the act must not be intended or known likely to cause death or grievous hurt
bBNS s.30 [IPC s.92]; consent is dispensed with entirely
cBNS s.33 [IPC s.95]; the harm is trifling
dBNS s.26 [IPC s.88]; any harm except death may be inflicted for the benefit of the consenting person, but death cannot be intentionally caused
Answer: D
BNS s.26 [IPC s.88] protects acts done in good faith for the consenting person's benefit even where death may ensue, provided death is not intended; intentional causing of death is never justified by consent.
Q45Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
The distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt' is significant because preparation is punishable only in exceptional cases. Collecting men, arms or ammunition with the intention of waging war against the Government of India is an example of which?
aMere preparation, which the law specially makes punishable
bAn attempt to wage war, punishable as such
cAbetment of waging war only
dSedition, since arms have been collected
Answer: A
BNS s 149 [IPC s 122] punishes collecting men, arms or ammunition or otherwise preparing to wage war; these are preparations (not attempts) that the law specially makes punishable, as also preparation for dacoity.
Q46Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Shaukat (Parliament Attack Case) was charged with waging war but the evidence showed only that he concealed a design to wage war, intending to facilitate it. The Supreme Court held that he could be convicted of which minor offence even without a separate charge?
aSedition
bConcealing with intent to facilitate a design to wage war
cCollecting arms to wage war
dAbetment of waging war
Answer: B
BNS s 150 [IPC s 123] punishes concealing, by act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to wage war intending to facilitate it; in Shaukat Hussain Guru this was held a minor offence of the charge of waging war and conviction was sustained without a separate charge.
Q47Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
X raises casual slogans against the Government once or twice; the slogans evoke no response from anyone and there is no incitement to violence or tendency to create public disorder. On the constitutional reading of the sedition law in Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar, X is:
aGuilty, because exciting disaffection alone is enough irrespective of public disorder
bGuilty, because slogans are visible representations
cNot guilty, as the offence is limited to acts having a tendency to create public disorder or incitement to violence
dNot guilty only if he later tenders an apology
Answer: C
In Kedar Nath Singh the Court read the sedition provision [IPC s 124A; cf. BNS s 152, acts endangering sovereignty/unity] narrowly to apply only to acts with a tendency to create public disorder or incite violence; casual slogans (Balwant Singh) do not attract it.
Q48Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A is a public servant having custody of a State prisoner. A voluntarily allows the prisoner to escape. Compared with a public servant who voluntarily allows an ordinary prisoner to escape, A's offence is:
aA less serious offence, since State prisoners are differently treated
bIdentical in gravity and punishment
cNo offence at all unless the prisoner is recaptured
dAn aggravated form of the offence, punishable more severely
Answer: D
BNS s 155 [IPC s 128] punishing a public servant who voluntarily allows a State prisoner or prisoner of war to escape is an aggravated form of the offence of allowing an ordinary prisoner to escape.
Q49Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Five persons assemble whose common object is, by show of criminal force, to maintain undisturbed their own actual possession of land which they bona fide believe is theirs (not to enforce a disputed or supposed right). Are they an unlawful assembly?
aNo, defending actual possession within the limits of law is not an unlawful common object
bYes, any assembly of five with weapons is unlawful
cYes, because they used show of criminal force
dNo, but only if fewer than five are armed
Answer: A
Under BNS s 189 [IPC s 141], the fourth clause aims at enforcing a 'right or supposed right' by force; an assembly merely defending actual possession of property within the limits of law (Silajit Mahto; Veerabadra Pillai) is not unlawful.
Q50Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Six named persons are charged as an unlawful assembly that committed murder in prosecution of its common object. Two are acquitted, with a finding that some other unknown persons were also part of the assembly. Can the remaining four be convicted with the aid of the constructive-liability provision?
aNo, because at least five persons must always be convicted before constructive liability can apply
bYes, provided the court finds at least five persons (known or unknown) formed the assembly
cNo, constructive liability cannot apply once any accused is acquitted
dYes, automatically, because the charge named six persons
Answer: B
Per Mohan Singh, BNS s 190 [IPC s 149] does not require five persons to be convicted; it suffices that the court finds with certainty that at least five (named or unknown/unidentified) shared the common object.
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