Penal Law (BNS, 2023) Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following best states the distinction drawn in Virsa Singh v State of Punjab for an offence of murder under clause 'Thirdly' of the murder definition?
aThe prosecution must prove the accused intended that particular bodily injury, which injury is objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
bThe prosecution must prove the accused intended to cause death
cIt must be shown the injury was on a vital part of the body
dIt must be shown the accused used a deadly weapon
Answer: A
Virsa Singh, applying clause Thirdly of BNS s 101 [IPC s 300], requires proof of intention to inflict the particular injury found, after which the sufficiency of that injury to cause death is a purely objective inquiry — intention to cause death is not required.
Q2Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
The key difference between clause 'Secondly' of BNS s 299 (culpable homicide) and clause 'Thirdly' of the murder provision lies chiefly in:
aWhether a weapon was used
bThe degree of probability of death — 'likely to cause death' versus 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death'
cWhether the victim consented
dWhether the act was premeditated
Answer: B
Per Rayavarapu Punnayya, clause (b) of BNS s 100 [IPC s 299] uses 'likely to cause death' (probable) while clause Thirdly of BNS s 101 [IPC s 300] uses 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' (most probable result) — a difference of degree of probability.
Q3Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A, knowing Z is suffering from a heart disease, strikes Z a blow intending to cause bodily injury but not death; the blow, by reason of Z's condition, kills Z though it would not kill a healthy man. A is guilty of:
aCulpable homicide not amounting to murder only
bGrievous hurt only
cMurder, under clause 'Secondly' of the murder provision
dNo offence, as he did not intend death
Answer: C
Clause Secondly of BNS s 101 [IPC s 300], as illustrated, applies where the offender knows the victim's peculiar state of health makes the intended injury likely to cause that victim's death; intention to cause death is not required.
Q4Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. Excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, A kills Z. A's plea of grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 will:
aSucceed, reducing the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder
bSucceed only if A was unaware that Z was a public servant
cFail only if the arrest was actually unlawful
dFail, because the provocation was given by a lawful act and so A is guilty of murder
Answer: D
By the provisos to Exception 1 of BNS s 101 [IPC s 300, Exception 1], provocation given by anything done in obedience to law or by a public servant lawfully exercising his powers is excluded; hence it remains murder (Illustration).
Q5Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
For Exception 4 (sudden fight) to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is NOT a required condition?
aIt must be proved which party gave the provocation or struck the first blow
bThe killing was without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
cThe offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner
dThe act occurred in the heat of passion
Answer: A
The Explanation to Exception 4, BNS s 101 [IPC s 300, Exception 4], expressly makes it immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault.
Q6Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Under Exception 5 to the murder provision, consent of the deceased reduces culpable homicide to not-murder only where the deceased:
aWas above sixteen years and gave express consent
bWas above the age of eighteen years and suffered death or took the risk of death with his own consent
cWas of sound mind, irrespective of age
dConsented in writing before two witnesses
Answer: B
Exception 5 to BNS s 101 [IPC s 300, Exception 5] applies only where the person killed, being above eighteen years of age, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent (see Illustration on incapacity of a minor).
Q7Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Where death is caused by an act done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (but the case is taken out of murder by an Exception, or otherwise does not fall in clauses 1-3 of murder), the proper conviction is under:
aThe provision punishing culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Part II (knowledge)
bThe provision for causing death by negligence
cThe provision punishing culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Part I (intention)
dThe provision for grievous hurt
Answer: C
Where intention is the dominant factor (clauses (i)/(ii) of BNS s 100 [IPC s 299]), conviction falls under Part I of BNS s 105 [IPC s 304]; only knowledge-based clause (iii) falls under Part II (Arun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra).
Q8Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
Which of the following is NOT, by itself, listed as a category of 'grievous hurt'?
aPermanent privation of the sight of either eye
bFracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth
cPermanent disfiguration of the head or face
dAny hurt requiring hospitalisation for ten days
Answer: D
The clauses of grievous hurt in BNS s 116 [IPC s 320] require, in the relevant limb, severe bodily pain or inability to follow ordinary pursuits for twenty days — not mere ten-day hospitalisation; the other three are enumerated kinds.
Q9Offences against the human body — culpable homicide, murder, hurt
On the question whether a hurt is 'grievous', the settled position is that:
aThe court must itself decide whether the injury falls within an enumerated clause of grievous hurt; the doctor only states the facts of the injury
bThe doctor's classification of the injury as grievous is binding on the court
cAny injury caused by a sharp weapon is automatically grievous
dTwenty days' hospitalisation alone makes a hurt grievous
Answer: A
Per Hadis Mia v State of Assam, under BNS s 116 [IPC s 320] the court, not the doctor's label, decides whether the described injury falls within an enumerated category of grievous hurt; mere hospitalisation does not suffice (inability to follow ordinary pursuits must be proved).
Q10Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A, having pawned his own watch to Z and without repaying the loan, takes the watch out of Z's possession without consent. As to the offence of theft, which is true?
aNo theft, because a person cannot steal his own property
bA commits theft, since the taking is dishonest even though the watch is his own property
cOnly criminal trespass is committed, not theft
dExtortion, because Z is deprived of his security
Answer: B
Under BNS s.303 (old IPC s.378, Illustration 11), a person can commit theft of his own property if it is taken dishonestly from one who holds it lawfully (here, the pawnee Z holding it as security), causing wrongful loss to Z.
Q11Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
An officer of the Indian Air Force took out a service plane for an unauthorised flight intending to fly it back. On a charge of theft, the position is:
aNo theft, because there was no intention to deprive the owner permanently
bNo theft, since temporary use of property is at most a breach of discipline
cTheft, because permanent deprivation is not required; dishonest moving suffices
dOnly criminal misappropriation, the possession being innocent at the outset
Answer: C
Theft (BNS s.303; old IPC s.378) does not require intention to deprive permanently; a transient dishonest taking is enough (K N Mehra v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 369).
Q12Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A finds a ring lying on the public highway, not in anyone's possession, and picks it up. Which offence, if any, can arise on these bare facts?
aTheft, as he moved movable property without consent
bExtortion of the true owner
cCriminal breach of trust, the finder being a trustee
dNo theft; at most criminal misappropriation if he later appropriates it dishonestly
Answer: D
Property not in anyone's possession cannot be 'taken out of possession', so no theft arises (Illustration 7 to old IPC s.378 / BNS s.303); a finder who later dishonestly appropriates it commits dishonest misappropriation under BNS s.314 (old IPC s.403).
Q13Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A husband took his wife to a forest and, by threatening to kill her, obtained her ornaments which she handed over; the ornaments were later recovered from him. The offence is best described as:
aExtortion, the property having been delivered under fear of injury
bRobbery, since instant hurt was threatened
cTheft, as ornaments are movable property
dCriminal breach of trust between spouses
Answer: A
Where a person is put in fear of injury and is thereby induced to deliver property, the offence is extortion (BNS s.308; old IPC s.383-384), as held in State of Karnataka v Basavegowda, 1997 — delivery by the victim distinguishes it from robbery.
Q14Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Through fear of an armed gang a victim offers no resistance while the gang carries off his goods, but he himself delivers nothing to them. The offence committed is:
aExtortion, because the victim was put in fear
bRobbery, because there was no delivery by the victim
cOnly criminal intimidation
dDishonest misappropriation
Answer: B
Delivery by the person put in fear is essential to extortion (BNS s.308; old IPC s.383); where the victim merely submits and delivers nothing, the offence is robbery (Duleelooddeen Sheik, 1866; see BNS s.309 / old IPC s.390).
Q15Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A snatches a watch from Z in a running train; as A tries to alight Z raises an alarm and A's associate slaps Z to facilitate escape with the watch. The correct offence is:
aTheft only, since hurt was caused merely to avoid capture
bDacoity, more than one person being involved
cRobbery, the hurt being caused to facilitate carrying away the stolen property
dExtortion, the slap putting Z in fear
Answer: C
Theft becomes robbery if hurt is voluntarily caused 'for that end', i.e. in carrying away property obtained by theft (BNS s.309; old IPC s.390 read with s.392); the slap to enable escape with the watch satisfies this (Harish Chandra, 1976).
Q16Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
A thief, surprised while stealing and pursued, abandons the stolen property and throws stones at his pursuer only to deter the chase. As to robbery:
aIt is robbery, because hurt was attempted during the transaction
bIt is robbery, the pursuit being part of carrying away
cIt is extortion, the pursuer being put in fear
dIt is theft, not robbery, since the violence was not for any end specified in the section
Answer: D
Violence converts theft into robbery only when caused for committing theft or carrying away the property (BNS s.309; old IPC s.390); where the property is abandoned and force is used merely to escape, the offence remains theft (Kalio Kerio, 1872).
Q17Offences against property — theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, CBT
Six named persons are charged with dacoity; two are acquitted because only four are found to have participated, and there is no finding that any unidentified persons took part. Can the remaining four be convicted of dacoity?
aNo, dacoity requires the participation of five or more persons
bYes, four persons acting conjointly suffice for dacoity
cYes, since the original charge was for dacoity by six
dNo, but only because there was no recovery of property
Answer: A
Dacoity (BNS s.310; old IPC s.391/395) requires that five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt robbery; where participation of five cannot be sustained and no unidentified participants are found, conviction for dacoity of fewer than five cannot stand (Raj Kumar v State of Uttaranchal, 2008).
Q18General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A man of one faction was wounded in a fight and retired to the roadside, taking no further part. After his retirement, a member of his faction killed a man of the opposing faction. Is the wounded man liable for that subsequent murder under the provision corresponding to old IPC s.149?
aYes, because he was originally a member of the unlawful assembly
bNo, because he had ceased to be a member of the unlawful assembly before the killing
cYes, because his earlier participation shows shared common object
dYes, because retirement from an assembly is legally irrelevant
Answer: B
Liability under BNS s.190 [IPC s.149] attaches only to one who is a member 'at the time of committing' the offence; having ceased to be a member by retiring wounded, he is not liable for the later murder.
Q19General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A, B and C share a pre-arranged plan to murder Z. A and B physically restrain Z while C deals the fatal blow; A and B inflict no injury at all. As to A and B's liability for Z's murder, which statement is correct under the BNS provision on acts done in furtherance of common intention?
aA and B cannot be convicted of murder because they did not cause any injury to Z
bA and B are liable only for the lesser offence of restraining Z
cA and B are each liable for the murder as if each had committed it alone
dOnly the person who struck the fatal blow can be convicted of murder
Answer: C
Section 3(5) BNS [s 34 IPC] makes each participant in a criminal act done in furtherance of common intention liable as if he did it alone; the acts of the several persons need not be identical, so A and B are equally guilty of murder.
Q20General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Which of the following best states the nature of Section 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 (common intention), as explained by the courts?
aIt creates a distinct substantive offence punishable on its own
bIt can be invoked only where a charge under it has expressly been framed
cIt applies only where at least five persons share the common intention
dIt is merely a rule of evidence and does not by itself create a substantive offence
Answer: D
Section 3(5) BNS [s 34 IPC] lays down a principle of constructive/joint liability and is only a rule of evidence; it creates no substantive offence and can apply even if no charge is framed under it, provided a pre-arranged plan is shown.
Q21General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
In Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor the Privy Council held that 'common intention' within the meaning of the joint-liability provision implies—
aa pre-arranged plan, the criminal act being done in concert pursuant to it
bmerely a similar intention independently entertained by each accused
cthe same intention as mens rea, the two being identical concepts
dan intention that must necessarily exist before the parties reach the scene
Answer: A
Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor held common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and the act must be done in concert pursuant to that plan; common intention is, however, distinct from mens rea and may even develop on the spot.
Q22General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Several persons surround Z. Each, acting on his own and without any prior concert or shared design, strikes Z; one blow by P proves fatal while the others cause only minor hurt. Common intention to kill cannot be inferred. What is the legal position?
aAll are guilty of murder because they collectively assaulted Z
bEach is liable only for the injury he individually caused; none is vicariously liable for P's fatal blow
cAll are vicariously liable for murder since they shared a similar intention
dOnly those who were physically nearest to P are liable for murder
Answer: B
Same or similar intention without sharing of each other's intention is not common intention (Dajya Moshaya Bhil; Parichhat). Absent common intention, each is liable for whatever injury he personally caused and none can be vicariously convicted under s 3(5) BNS [s 34 IPC].
Q23General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
Regarding the requirement of participation under the common-intention provision, which statement is INCORRECT?
aParticipation in action with common intention is an essential ingredient
bStanding guard at a gate or waiting in a getaway car can amount to participation
cPhysical presence at the actual room where the crime occurs is required in every case
dIn offences not involving physical violence, presence at the scene may not be necessary
Answer: C
Per Shreekantiah Ramayya and Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao, participation is essential but physical presence at the very spot is not a sine qua non in every case (e.g., offences of diverse acts); hence (b) is incorrect as a universal proposition.
Q24General principles — stages, common intention/object, joint liability
A and B agree to murder Z by giving him small doses of poison severally and at different times. Both administer doses per the agreement and Z dies of the cumulative effect. Which BNS provision most directly fixes both A and B with guilt for the murder though their acts were separate?
aSection 3(5) BNS — acts in furtherance of common intention
bSection 3(9) BNS — persons concerned may be guilty of different offences
cSection 3(7) BNS — effect caused partly by act and partly by omission
dSection 3(8) BNS — co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence
Answer: D
This is the illustration to s 3(8) BNS [s 37 IPC]: where an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates by doing any one of them commits that offence; the poison-by-doses illustration applies squarely.
Q25Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Following Independent Thought v Union of India, what is the present legal position of the marital-rape exception (the wife not being below a certain age) under the rape provision?
aThe exception is read down so that intercourse by a man with his wife who is below eighteen years of age is rape
bSexual intercourse by a man with his wife is never rape, regardless of her age
cThe exception protects the husband where the wife is not below fifteen years of age, as originally enacted
dThe exception was struck down entirely, making all marital intercourse rape
Answer: A
Independent Thought v UOI read down the marital-rape exception: intercourse by a man with his wife below eighteen years is rape (the earlier 'fifteen years' line being unconstitutional and inconsistent with POCSO) — under BNS s.63 Exception [IPC s.375 Exception 2].
Q26Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A man, knowing that a married woman believes him to be her lawfully wedded husband returning in the dark, has sexual intercourse with her with her consent. Which of the following best states the legal position under the BNS, 2023?
aNo offence, because the woman consented to the act
bIt amounts to rape, the consent being vitiated as it was given in the belief that he was the man to whom she was lawfully married
cIt is only cheating, not rape, as there was no force
dIt amounts to outraging modesty alone, since intercourse was consensual
Answer: B
Under the 'Fourthly' description in the rape definition, BNS s.63 [IPC s.375], consent obtained because the woman believes the man to be her lawful husband (whom he is not) is no consent, and the act is rape.
Q27Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
Regarding the marital-intercourse exception to rape under the BNS, 2023, the wife must not be below which age for the exception (sexual acts by a man with his own wife) to apply, following Independent Thought v Union of India?
aFifteen years
bSixteen years
cEighteen years
dTwenty-one years
Answer: C
Though Exception 2 to s.375 [now BNS s.63] textually read 'fifteen years', Independent Thought v UOI (AIR 2017 SC 4904) read it down to eighteen years; the BNS exception thus applies only where the wife is not under eighteen.
Q28Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
X catches hold of a married woman and tries to open the string of her salwar intending to commit rape, but flees on being struck by her with a kulhari. As held in Ram Asrey v State of UP, the proper conviction is under which provision?
aAttempt to commit rape
bGang rape
cKidnapping to compel marriage
dAssault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty
Answer: D
Per Ram Asrey v State of UP (1990 Cr LJ 405), the act did not show a determination to have intercourse at all events in spite of resistance, so attempt-to-rape failed and the conviction was under BNS s.74 [IPC s.354], outraging modesty.
Q29Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
In State of Punjab v Major Singh, the Supreme Court held that the modesty of a female child aged seven and a half months can be outraged. Which principle underlies this holding?
aModesty is an attribute associated with the female sex as a class, irrespective of age
bModesty depends on the actual reaction of the particular victim
cAn infant cannot have modesty, so the conviction was for hurt only
dModesty attaches only once a girl attains puberty
Answer: A
State of Punjab v Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63) held modesty is a virtue attaching to a female on account of her sex as a class, not referable to the particular victim; the offence is now BNS s.74 [IPC s.354].
Q30Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A man, despite a woman's clear and repeated indication of disinterest, continues to follow her and contact her to foster personal interaction. Which defence, if proved, would prevent this from being the offence of stalking under the BNS, 2023?
aThat the woman never lodged a formal complaint
bThat the man was entrusted by the State with prevention/detection of crime and pursued the conduct for that purpose
cThat the man was emotionally attached to the woman
dThat the contact was only through electronic means
Answer: B
Under the proviso to the stalking provision, BNS s.78 [IPC s.354D], conduct is not stalking if pursued by a person entrusted by the State with prevention/detection of crime, under law, or where reasonable and justified.
Q31Offences against women & children (BNS chapter)
A woman consents to a man capturing her image while engaged in a private act, but does not consent to its dissemination; the man later circulates the image. Under the voyeurism provision of the BNS, 2023, this is:
aNo offence, since she consented to the image being captured
bOnly a civil wrong for breach of privacy
cAn offence of voyeurism, dissemination beyond the consent given being expressly covered
dPunishable only as defamation
Answer: C
Explanation 2 to the voyeurism section, BNS s.77 [IPC s.354C], makes dissemination an offence where the woman consented to capture but not to dissemination to third persons.
A person abets the commission of suicide, but the suicide attempt is unsuccessful (the person survives). On the correct mode of punishing such abetment of an attempted suicide, the better view under the law is:
aIt is punishable only as attempt to commit suicide, with no role for abetment
bAbetment of an unsuccessful suicide attempt is not an offence at all
cIt is punishable as full abetment of suicide with no reference to the attempt provision
dIt is the abetment of suicide read with the general attempt provision (old s.306 read with s.511 IPC; BNS s.108 read with s.62)
Answer: D
Per Berin P Varghese, one who abets an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide is punishable under the abetment-of-suicide provision read with the attempt provision [old s.306 r/w s.511 IPC; BNS s.108 r/w s.62].
A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes Z's death. B does the act in A's absence and Z dies. As to A's liability under the BNS, 2023:
aA is liable to be punished as if B had been capable of committing, and committed, murder
bA is not liable, because B (the doer) is incapable of committing any offence in law
cA is liable only for abetment of an unsuccessful act, since B was incapable
dA is liable only for the lesser offence of causing death by negligence
Answer: A
Under s 46 BNS, 2023 [s 108 IPC] Explanation 3, the person abetted need not be capable in law of committing the offence; A is punishable as if B had committed murder and is subject to the murder punishment.
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z; B instigates C, and C murders Z in consequence of B's instigation. Which statement is correct under the BNS, 2023?
aOnly C is liable; abetment of an abetment is not recognised in law
bBoth B and A are liable to the punishment for murder
cOnly B is liable as abettor; A is too remote to be punished
dA and B are liable only for criminal conspiracy, not for murder
Answer: B
Per s 46 BNS [s 108 IPC] Explanation 4, the abetment of an abetment is itself an offence; B is punishable for murder and A, having instigated B, is also liable to the same punishment.
A instigates B to murder C. B flatly refuses and does nothing. What is A's liability under the BNS, 2023?
aA has committed no offence because the act abetted was never committed
bA is liable only if B at least attempted the murder
cA is guilty of abetting B to commit murder, the offence of abetment being complete
dA is liable only for criminal intimidation of C
Answer: C
By s 46 BNS [s 108 IPC] Explanation 2 and its illustration, it is not necessary that the act abetted be committed; abetment by instigation is complete even where the person abetted refuses to act.
Which of the following is essential to constitute 'abetment by conspiracy' (the second clause of the abetment definition) under the BNS, 2023, as distinguished from the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy?
aA bare agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence is by itself sufficient
bThe conspirators must actually carry out and complete the object of the conspiracy
cAll conspirators must be physically present at the place of the offence
dAn act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and in order to the doing of the thing
Answer: D
Under s 45 BNS [s 107 IPC] Secondly, abetment by conspiracy needs an act or illegal omission in pursuance of the conspiracy; unlike s 61(2) BNS [s 120B IPC] criminal conspiracy, a mere agreement is not enough (Pramatha Nath v Saroj Ranjan).
A constable, while a head constable raped the victim, kept watch over the victim's husband in a separate room and did nothing on hearing her shrieks. Most appropriately, under the BNS, 2023 the constable is liable for:
aRape read with abetment, having intentionally aided the commission of the offence
bNothing, since mere failure to prevent an offence is never punishable
cCriminal intimidation of the husband only
dAbetment by instigation of the head constable
Answer: A
On the facts of Ram Kumar v State of HP, keeping watch to facilitate the rape is intentional aiding under s 45 BNS [s 107 IPC] Thirdly, making the constable liable for rape read with abetment (s 49 BNS / s 109 IPC).
Which proposition about abetment as an offence is INCORRECT under the principles of the BNS, 2023?
aThe offence of abetment is a substantive and independent offence
bAn abettor who merely instigated can never be convicted unless the principal is convicted
cAn abettor by intentional aiding must ordinarily be acquitted if the principal offender is acquitted of the offence
dMere failure to prevent the commission of an offence is not by itself an abetment
Answer: B
Abetment is a distinct offence; conviction of an abettor by instigation/conspiracy does not depend on conviction of the principal (Jamuna Singh v State of Bihar) under s 45-49 BNS [ss 107-109 IPC]. Only an aider must fall with the acquitted principal.
The accused is attacked by a mob attempting to murder him; he cannot effectually defend himself except by firing into the mob, and cannot fire without risk of harming young children mingled with the mob. He fires and a child is harmed. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, what is the result?
aHe is liable for the harm to the innocent child, as the right of private defence is personal
bHe is liable unless the children were the children of his assailants
cHe commits no offence; his right of private defence extends to running that risk of harm to the innocent person
dHe is liable for culpable homicide of the child but not for the harm to the mob
Answer: C
BNS s.44 [IPC s.106] provides that where a defender facing an assault reasonably causing apprehension of death cannot effectually exercise the right without risk of harm to an innocent person, the right extends to running that risk.
Two parties, both armed and determined to settle a land dispute by force, go to the field and a free fight ensues in which persons on both sides are injured and one is killed. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, who may claim the right of private defence?
aWhichever party did not strike the first blow
bBoth parties, since each was defending itself
cOnly the party that suffered the death
dNeither party; in a free fight both sides are aggressors and no right of private defence arises
Answer: D
Where two parties come armed determined to fight and exchange blows, both are aggressors and no right of private defence (BNS ss.34-44 [IPC ss.96-106]) arises for either; the question of who struck first is immaterial (Onkarnath Singh v State of UP; Rohtash v State of Haryana).
The right of private defence of property against theft, under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (old IPC s.105), continues until which point?
aUntil the offender has effected his retreat with the property, or assistance of public authorities is obtained, or the property is recovered
bUntil the property is first touched by the thief
cIndefinitely, until the owner finally recovers the property even days later
dOnly so long as the thief remains inside the owner's house
Answer: A
BNS s.43 [IPC s.105] provides the right against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property, or assistance of public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered; a recapture after the offender's final retreat is not an exercise of this right (Mir Dad).
A, while guarding his maize field at night, shoots an arrow at a moving object in the bona fide belief that it is a bear, and thereby kills a man who was hiding there. Which general exception best protects A from liability for the death?
aAct done by a person bound by law (mistake of fact believing himself bound)
bAct done by a person justified, or who by mistake of fact believes himself justified, by law
cAct done under threat of instant death
dAct causing slight harm
Answer: B
On these facts (State of Orissa v Khora Ghasi) the accused acted under a bona fide mistake of fact believing himself justified, attracting BNS s.17 [IPC s.79] (the act also falls under accident, BNS s.18 [IPC s.80]).
The maxim 'ignorantia facti doth excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat' underlies which pair of general exceptions, both of which require the mistake to be one of fact and not of law?
aBNS s.18 and s.19 [IPC ss.80 and 81]
bBNS s.15 and s.16 [IPC ss.77 and 78]
cBNS s.14 and s.17 [IPC ss.76 and 79]
dBNS s.22 and s.23 [IPC ss.84 and 85]
Answer: C
BNS s.14 [IPC s.76] (bound by law) and BNS s.17 [IPC s.79] (justified by law) both rest on this maxim and require a mistake of fact, not of law.
A Judge, acting judicially and in good faith believing he has jurisdiction, exceeds his jurisdiction and orders an act which is otherwise an offence; meanwhile an officer carries out an order of a court which in fact had no jurisdiction, the officer believing in good faith it had jurisdiction. Which statement is correct?
aThe Judge is protected only if strictly within jurisdiction; the officer enjoys no protection at all
bNeither is protected because both exceeded jurisdiction
cOnly the officer is protected; a Judge gets no general-exception protection
dBoth are protected, but the Judge's protection (BNS s.15) covers even acts in excess of jurisdiction, while the officer's protection (BNS s.16) covers carrying out an order of a court that had no jurisdiction
Answer: D
BNS s.15 [IPC s.77] protects a Judge acting judicially even where he in good faith exceeds jurisdiction; BNS s.16 [IPC s.78] protects one acting under a court's order even if the court had no jurisdiction, if he believed in good faith it had.
Q45Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
Two persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace. Which statement about the offence of affray [BNS s 194 / IPC s 159] is correct?
aIt requires fighting (bilateral use of some force or violence) in a public place that disturbs the public peace; mere verbal abuse is not enough
bIt can be committed in a private place, unlike a riot
cIt requires at least five persons, like a riot
dMere causing of public inconvenience by two persons suffices, even without violence
Answer: A
BNS s 194 [IPC s 159] requires fighting (a bilateral exchange of some force/violence) by two or more persons in a public place disturbing public peace; mere verbal quarrel or public inconvenience is insufficient (C Subbarayudu v State of AP).
Q46Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A group of seven persons, sharing the common object of murder, attacks a man. Acting on a developed common object, two of them chase the victim into his house and, frustrated, gun down his two young daughters playing in the courtyard. As to the remaining five members' liability for the daughters' murders under BNS s 190 [IPC s 149]:
aAll seven are automatically liable for the murders, membership alone being conclusive
bThe remaining five are not liable, as killing the daughters was neither the common object, nor incidental to it, nor necessary for its attainment
cThe remaining five are liable because the murders occurred during the prosecution of the common object
dOnly the actual shooters are liable, and the offence is reduced to culpable homicide for all
Answer: B
The phrase 'in prosecution of the common object' means 'in order to attain' it; where the killing of the daughters was neither the common object, incidental to it, nor necessary for it, the other members are not vicariously liable under BNS s 190 [IPC s 149].
Q47Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
On the principle of waging war under BNS s 147 [IPC s 121], which of the following is NOT a correct proposition?
aNo specific number of persons is necessary, nor is the manner of arming material; the true criterion is the animus with which the gathering assembled
bThere is no distinction between principal and accessory; all who take part incur the same guilt
cA foreign national stealthily entering Indian territory to subvert the Government cannot be guilty, as the section applies only to those owing allegiance to India
dAbetment of waging war is a special offence and need not result in war actually being waged
Answer: C
The word 'whoever' in BNS s 147 [IPC s 121] is of broad import; foreign nationals entering India to subvert the Government are not excluded (Navjot Sandhu; Kasab). The other propositions are settled principles under the section.
Q48Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
In the Parliament Attack Case (Navjot Sandhu) and the Mumbai Terror Attack Case (Kasab), the Supreme Court explained the concept of 'waging war against the Government of India'. Which of the following best states the law on whether 'war' under this provision means conventional inter-country war?
aIt must always be conventional warfare between two sovereign nations involving military operations
bIt applies only where the accused owes allegiance to the established Government of India
cIt requires a minimum specified number of armed persons to be involved
dIt is NOT confined to conventional inter-country war; organising or joining an insurrection or civilian uprising against the Government is also a form of war
Answer: D
Under BNS s 147 [IPC s 121], 'war' is not understood in the international-law sense; the Supreme Court in Navjot Sandhu and Kasab held that insurrection or a civilian uprising against the Government is also a form of waging war. Neither a particular number of persons nor allegiance is required.
Q49Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A, a foreign national, stealthily enters Indian territory with co-conspirators and launches an armed assault aimed at striking at the sovereignty of the Indian State. He is prosecuted for waging war against the Government of India. Which statement is correct?
aHe can be convicted; the word 'whoever' is of broad import and foreign nationals are not excluded
bHe cannot be convicted because the offence is confined to persons owing allegiance to the established Government
cHe can only be tried under anti-terror law and never under the offence of waging war
dHe cannot be convicted unless India had formally declared war on his country
Answer: A
BNS s 147 [IPC s 121] uses 'whoever', a word of broad import; in Kasab the Supreme Court held foreign nationals entering to subvert the Government are guilty of waging war, the section not being confined to those owing allegiance.
Q50Offences against the State, public tranquillity, organised crime, terrorism, mob lynching (new)
A group of persons conspires to overawe the State Government by show of criminal force through a serious riot, but no overt act takes place in pursuance of the conspiracy. As regards their criminal liability for conspiracy to commit offences against the State, which is correct?
aNo offence is made out because conspiracy requires at least one overt act in pursuance of it
bThe offence is complete; it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission take place in pursuance of the conspiracy
cLiability arises only if the riot is actually committed
dOnly those who physically take part in the riot can be punished
Answer: B
Under BNS s 148 [IPC s 121A], the Explanation makes clear that to constitute the conspiracy no act or illegal omission need take place in pursuance of it; conspiring to overawe Government by criminal force is itself punishable.
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