Limitation Act, 1963 Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
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A files a suit for recovery of money lent under a loan agreement which contains no fixed date of repayment and is payable on demand. Within what period must the suit be filed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963?
aThree years from the date the loan was made (when payable on demand)
bThree years from the date the loan was advanced
cSix years from the date of the loan
dTwelve years from the date of the loan
Answer: A
Article 19 of the Schedule governs money payable for money lent and prescribes three years running from the date when the loan is made; for a demand loan the cause of action arises when the money is lent.
What is the period of limitation, and the point from which it runs, for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged?
a12 years from the date the mortgage money becomes due
b30 years from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues
c60 years from the date of the mortgage deed
d12 years from the date of dispossession
Answer: B
Article 61(a) of the Schedule prescribes 30 years for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged, running from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.
A mortgagee files a suit to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage of immovable property. The applicable period of limitation is:
a3 years from when the money becomes due
b12 years from the date of the mortgage
c12 years from when the money sued for becomes due
d30 years from when the money becomes due
Answer: C
Article 62 of the Schedule prescribes 12 years for a suit to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property, running from the date the money sued for becomes due.
A suit for possession of immovable property based on title (where no other article applies), filed by an owner against a person in adverse possession, must be brought within:
a12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession
b30 years from when possession becomes adverse
c3 years from the date of dispossession
d12 years from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff
Answer: D
Article 65 of the Schedule prescribes 12 years for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, the period running from when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
What is the limitation period for a suit for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession (Article 64)?
a12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance
b12 years from when possession becomes adverse
c30 years from the date of dispossession
d6 years from the date of dispossession
Answer: A
Article 64 of the Schedule prescribes 12 years for a possessory suit based on previous possession (and subsequent dispossession), running from the date of dispossession; Article 64 rests on possession whereas Article 65 rests on title.
A suit for compensation for a malicious prosecution must be instituted within what period under the Schedule, and from what point does time run?
a3 years from when the plaintiff is acquitted
b1 year from when the prosecution ends in the plaintiff's favour
c1 year from the date the prosecution was launched
d3 years from the date of arrest
Answer: B
Article 74 of the Schedule prescribes one year for a suit for compensation for a malicious prosecution, running from the date when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.
Under the Schedule, what is the period of limitation for a suit on a foreign judgment, and from when does it run?
a6 years from the date of the judgment
b12 years from the date of the judgment
c1 year from the date of the judgment
d3 years from the date of the judgment
Answer: D
Article 101 of the Schedule prescribes three years for a suit upon a judgment, including a foreign judgment, or a recognizance, running from the date of the judgment or recognizance.
Which of the following correctly states the limitation for an appeal to a High Court from a decree or order in a civil matter (other than a death sentence appeal)?
a90 days from the date of the decree or order
b30 days from the date of the decree or order
c60 days from the date of the decree or order
d120 days from the date of the decree or order
Answer: A
Article 116(a) of the Schedule prescribes 90 days for an appeal to a High Court from a decree or order, whereas an appeal to any other court (Article 116(b)) is 30 days, both running from the date of the decree or order.
What is the limitation period for an appeal from an order to a court other than a High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
a90 days from the date of the order
b30 days from the date of the order
c60 days from the date of the order
d45 days from the date of the order
Answer: B
Article 116(b) of the Schedule prescribes 30 days for an appeal to any court other than a High Court from a decree or order, running from the date of the decree or order.
Q11Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (condonation of delay on "sufficient cause") applies to which of the following?
aEvery suit instituted after the prescribed period
bEvery suit, appeal and application alike
cAny appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI CPC
dOnly appeals, and not to any application whatsoever
Answer: C
Section 5 applies to appeals and applications (with sufficient cause shown), but expressly excludes applications under any provision of Order XXI CPC; it does not apply to suits at all.
Q12Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Which proposition about Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is correct?
aOnce sufficient cause is shown, the court is bound to condone the delay
bLength of delay is wholly irrelevant if any cause is pleaded
cSection 5 statutorily dispenses with the need to explain each day's delay in all cases
dSufficient cause must be shown for the entire period of delay, but condonation remains discretionary even thereafter
Answer: D
Even after sufficient cause for the whole period of delay is established, condonation is discretionary; the proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent, not a guarantee (Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields, AIR 1962 SC 361).
Q13Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987), the Supreme Court laid down which principle for Section 5?
aA liberal, justice-oriented approach should be adopted so that substantial justice is preferred over technical considerations
bGovernment litigants are entitled to a stricter standard than private parties
cDelay can never be condoned where the State is the applicant
dSufficient cause must always be proved by documentary evidence alone
Answer: A
Mst. Katiji laid down a justice-oriented, liberal approach to condonation, holding that substantial justice deserves preference over technical considerations and that refusal can defeat the cause of justice.
Q14Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
An advocate's mistake in computing limitation is pleaded as sufficient cause under Section 5. The correct legal position is:
aMistake of counsel can never be a sufficient cause in any circumstance
bMistake of counsel, if bona fide and not tainted by want of due care, may constitute sufficient cause
cAny mistake of counsel automatically entitles the party to condonation
dOnly a mistake by a senior advocate, not a junior, can be a sufficient cause
Answer: B
A bona fide mistake of counsel, made in good faith and not due to negligence or want of due care, may amount to sufficient cause; gross or reckless negligence will not (Concord of India Insurance v. Nirmala Devi).
Q15Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Under the Explanation to Section 5, where an appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period, this fact:
aIs irrelevant and cannot be looked into
bAutomatically extends the period by a further 30 days
cMay be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5
dBars the application altogether
Answer: C
The Explanation to Section 5 states that being misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in computing limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of the section.
Q16Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A person entitled to institute a suit is a minor at the time the cause of action accrues. Under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, he may institute the suit:
aOnly before he attains majority, never after
bAt any time during his life with no time limit at all
cWithin thirty days of attaining majority in every case
dWithin the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed
Answer: D
Section 6 permits a person under disability (minority, insanity or idiocy) to file within the same period, after the disability ceases, as would otherwise have been allowed from the date prescribed in the third column of the Schedule.
Q17Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Legal disability under Sections 6–8 of the Limitation Act, 1963 includes:
aMinority, insanity and idiocy
bMinority, poverty and illiteracy
cImprisonment, insanity and minority
dInsanity, marriage and minority
Answer: A
Section 6 recognises three legal disabilities: minority, insanity and idiocy. Poverty, illiteracy and imprisonment are not legal disabilities under the Act.
Q18Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (extension on account of legal disability) applies to:
aSuits and appeals only
bSuits and applications for execution of a decree only
cAll appeals and applications without restriction
dSuits, appeals and applications equally
Answer: B
By its terms and Section 6(1), the benefit of legal disability under Section 6 is confined to the institution of a suit or the making of an application for the execution of a decree; it does not extend to appeals.
Q19Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In computing the period of limitation for an appeal, Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 mandates exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the:
aplaint and written statement only
bmemorandum of appeal alone
cdecree or order appealed from and the judgment on which it is founded
devidence recorded during trial
Answer: C
Section 12(2) excludes the day of pronouncement and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from and of the judgment on which it is founded.
Q20Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing any period of limitation, which day is to be excluded?
aThe day on which the cause of action arose
bThe last day of the prescribed period
cEvery Sunday falling within the period
dThe day from which such period is to be reckoned
Answer: D
Section 12(1) provides that the day from which the period is to be reckoned shall be excluded; it does not exclude intervening holidays or Sundays.
Q21Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
The expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy' in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, as interpreted by the courts, means:
athe minimum time legally needed, excluding any delay caused by the applicant's own default
bthe entire period from the date of judgment to delivery of copy in all cases
conly the time taken after the copy was ready for delivery
dthe time the appellant chose to take, regardless of diligence
Answer: A
'Time requisite' means the time actually and properly required to obtain the copy excluding time lost by the appellant's own negligence; it is not necessarily the whole period from judgment to delivery (J. Kondaiah and similar rulings).
Q22Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that, in addition to the copy of the decree, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded where:
athe appeal is filed before the Supreme Court only
ba copy of the judgment is required to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal or application
cthe appellant is an indigent person
dthe decree is a money decree exceeding rupees ten thousand
Answer: B
Section 12(3) excludes the time for obtaining a copy of the judgment, in addition to the decree/order, where such copy of the judgment is required to be filed along with the appeal or application.
Q23Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
An appellant could have applied for a certified copy of the decree on the day judgment was pronounced but applied three days later. For exclusion under Section 12(2), the three days of inaction are:
aalways excluded as part of time requisite
bexcluded only if a holiday intervened
cnot part of the 'time requisite' and hence not excluded
dexcluded at the discretion of the appellate court
Answer: C
Time lost due to the appellant's own delay in applying for the copy is not 'time requisite for obtaining' it, and is therefore not excludible under Section 12(2).
Q24Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with exclusion of time in which the plaintiff or applicant has been:
aprosecuting bona fide a proceeding in a wrong court
bawaiting consent of the Advocate-General
cobtaining a certified copy of the decree
dprosecuting in good faith an application for leave to sue or appeal as an indigent person, including the time for paying court fees
Answer: D
Section 13 excludes the time during which the applicant was bona fide prosecuting an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper (indigent person), and the time for payment of court fees.
Q25Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
For the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the earlier proceeding prosecuted in the wrong court must have failed because of:
adefect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature
bthe plaintiff's deliberate forum shopping
ca decision on the merits against the plaintiff
dabandonment by the plaintiff without reason
Answer: A
Section 14 excludes time spent in a prior bona fide proceeding prosecuted with due diligence in a court unable to entertain it due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.
Q26Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Which of the following is NOT a condition required to claim exclusion of time under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aBoth proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue
bThe prior proceeding must have been decided on merits in the plaintiff's favour
cThe prior proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence
dThe prior court must have been unable to entertain it due to defect of jurisdiction or like cause
Answer: B
Section 14 requires same parties, same matter in issue, good faith, due diligence and failure for defect of jurisdiction or like cause; a decision on merits is not a requirement, since the prior proceeding fails on a technical ground.
Q27Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
For an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to validly extend the period of limitation, it must satisfy several conditions. Which of the following is NOT a requirement?
aThe acknowledgment must be in writing
bThe acknowledgment must be signed by the party against whom the right is claimed or by his authorised agent
cThe acknowledgment must expressly promise to pay the amount due
dThe acknowledgment must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period
Answer: C
Section 18 requires a written, signed acknowledgment of liability made before expiry of the limitation period; it need not contain an express promise to pay, as mere acknowledgment of a subsisting jural relationship suffices.
Q28Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
A debt becomes due and the limitation period would ordinarily expire on 1 January 2024. The debtor makes a valid written and signed acknowledgment of liability on 1 December 2023. What is the effect under Section 18?
aThe limitation period is extended by the unexpired balance of the original period
bThe acknowledgment merely suspends limitation until the acknowledged amount is denied
cThe acknowledgment has no effect since the original period had not yet expired
dA fresh period of limitation is computed from 1 December 2023, the date of acknowledgment
Answer: D
Under Section 18, a valid acknowledgment made before expiry of limitation starts a fresh period of the same length computed from the time the acknowledgment was signed, not the original cause of action.
Q29Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
The limitation period for a debt expired on 10 March 2023. On 5 April 2023 the debtor signs a written acknowledgment of the debt. Which statement is correct regarding the effect of this acknowledgment under Section 18?
aIt is wholly ineffective to extend or revive limitation
bIt revives the time-barred debt and starts a fresh period of limitation
cIt extends limitation only if accompanied by part payment
dIt converts the time-barred debt into a decree
Answer: A
Section 18 requires the acknowledgment to be made before the prescribed period expires; an acknowledgment of an already time-barred debt cannot revive it under Section 18 (though it may found a fresh contract under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act).
Q30Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
Under Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, an acknowledgment of liability is sufficient even if it omits or 'avoids' to specify the exact nature of the property or right. This is provided for in:
aThe proviso (i) to Section 18(1)
bExplanation (a) to Section 18
cSection 18(2)
dSection 19 proviso
Answer: B
Explanation (a) to Section 18 provides that an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment has not yet come, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the claimant.
Q31Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
X owes a debt to Y. Before limitation expires, X writes to a stranger Z stating, 'I still owe Y a sum of money on the old account.' Can Y rely on this writing as an acknowledgment under Section 18?
aNo, because an acknowledgment must be addressed to the creditor to whom liability is acknowledged
bNo, because a letter to a third party can never bind the writer
cYes, because Explanation (a) provides that an acknowledgment may be sufficient though addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the right
dYes, but only if Z forwards the letter to Y before limitation expires
Answer: C
Explanation (a) to Section 18 expressly states an acknowledgment is not insufficient merely because it is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right, so a writing to a third party can operate as an acknowledgment.
Q32Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
Regarding the timing of the signature on an acknowledgment under Section 18, where the writing is undated, Section 18(2) permits which of the following?
aThe court must reject the acknowledgment as invalid for want of a date
bThe acknowledgment is deemed to be made on the date the suit is filed
cThe date is conclusively presumed to be the date the debt fell due
dOral evidence may be given of the time when the acknowledgment was signed, subject to the Evidence Act
Answer: D
Section 18(2) provides that where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed, but oral evidence of its contents is not admissible save in cases provided by the Evidence Act.
Q33Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
A debtor's letter states: 'I admit the account, but the entire debt is barred by limitation and I am not liable to pay anything.' Does this constitute a valid acknowledgment under Section 18?
aNo, because there must be an admission of a subsisting jural relationship coupled with an intention to admit liability
bYes, because the mere admission of the account is enough irrespective of denial of liability
cYes, because Section 18 ignores any accompanying denial
dNo, because acknowledgments must always be made to a lawyer
Answer: A
An acknowledgment under Section 18 must indicate a subsisting jural relationship and an intention to admit that liability (Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad); an express repudiation of liability negates the requisite intention.
Q34Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A suit is filed three days after the period of limitation has expired, but the defendant fails to raise the plea of limitation in his written statement and does not contest it at any stage. The court, however, on examining the plaint, finds the suit to be barred by time. What is the correct course?
aThe court must decree the suit since the defendant waived the plea of limitation
bThe court must dismiss the suit as barred, even though limitation was not set up as a defence
cThe court may proceed only if the plaintiff applies for condonation
dThe court must frame an issue and leave the question to the defendant's option
Answer: B
Section 3 is mandatory and casts a duty on the court to dismiss a suit/appeal/application filed beyond limitation 'although limitation has not been set up as a defence'; the bar cannot be waived by the parties.
Q35Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
The bar of limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ordinarily operates to:
aExtinguish both the right and the remedy in every case
bExtinguish the right while leaving the remedy intact
cBar the remedy by way of suit but, as a rule, not destroy the right itself (subject to Section 27)
dBar only the execution of decrees and not the institution of suits
Answer: C
Section 3 bars the remedy (the right to sue) but does not by itself extinguish the substantive right; only Section 27 extinguishes the right to property on lapse of the prescribed period for a possessory suit.
Q36Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Under the Explanation to Section 3(2)(a), for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, a suit (other than by a pauper) is instituted:
aOnly when summons is issued to the defendant
bWhen the court takes the plaint on file after scrutiny
cWhen the first hearing of the suit takes place
dWhen the plaint is presented to the proper officer
Answer: D
Section 3(2)(a) provides that a suit is 'instituted' when the plaint is presented to the proper officer (in the case of a pauper, when the application for leave to sue as a pauper is made).
Q37Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
P, suing as an indigent person (pauper), presents an application for leave to sue as a pauper. For computing limitation under Section 3, the suit is deemed instituted on the date:
aThe application for leave to sue as a pauper is made
bLeave to sue as a pauper is finally granted by the court
cThe required court fee is eventually paid
dThe plaint is numbered and registered
Answer: A
Per the Explanation to Section 3(2)(a), in the case of a pauper the suit is instituted when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made, not when leave is granted.
Q38Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A creditor's debt has become time-barred. The debtor nevertheless makes a part-payment toward the debt after the period has already expired. The legal position regarding the creditor's right is best stated as:
aThe right to recover the debt was extinguished, so nothing can revive it
bThe debt was never destroyed (Section 3 barred only the remedy), but acknowledgement or part-payment must occur before expiry to give a fresh start; payment made after expiry does not revive the barred remedy
cPart-payment after expiry automatically revives a time-barred debt for a further three years
dThe creditor can recover by execution even without a suit
Answer: B
Section 3 bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt; however acknowledgement or part-payment under Sections 18/19 must be made before the period expires to provide a fresh starting point — it cannot resurrect an already-barred debt.
Q39Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Which of the following is NOT a proceeding to which the mandatory bar under Section 3(1) directly applies?
aA suit instituted after the prescribed period
bAn appeal preferred after the prescribed period
cA written statement filed after the time fixed by the court
dAn application made after the prescribed period
Answer: C
Section 3(1) commands dismissal of a suit, appeal or application instituted/preferred/made after the prescribed period; the filing of a written statement is governed by the CPC, not by the Section 3 bar of limitation.
Q40Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the period of limitation for a person to bring a suit for possession of any property has expired, the effect is that:
aThe remedy alone is barred but the owner's title survives
bOnly the suit for the particular relief is barred
cThe possessor must still prove a hostile animus to claim title
dThe right to such property is extinguished
Answer: D
Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy; on expiry of the limitation period for a possession suit, the owner's right to the property is itself extinguished, perfecting the possessor's title.
Q41Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
The classical requirement that adverse possession must be 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario' means the possession must be:
aWithout force, without secrecy, and without permission
bContinuous, open and exclusive only
cPeaceful, profitable and permanent
dHostile, hidden and held under a licence
Answer: A
The maxim 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario' (not by force, not by stealth, not by permission) describes the quality of possession needed to be adverse, reaffirmed in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. GOI (2004).
Q42Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan (2009), the Supreme Court characterised the law of adverse possession as:
aA salutary doctrine rewarding diligent owners
bIrrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate, urging reconsideration
cA constitutionally protected facet of the right to property
dApplicable only to government land
Answer: B
In Hemaji Waghaji Jat (2009), the Supreme Court called the existing law of adverse possession 'irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate' and recommended that Parliament reconsider it.
Q43Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
A licensee occupies the suit land with the owner's permission for 15 years and then files a suit claiming title by adverse possession. The claim must fail because:
aFifteen years is insufficient as the period is twenty years
bPermissive possession can never become adverse
cPossession that began with permission is not adverse unless and until the licence is determined and possession becomes hostile to the owner's knowledge
dA licensee can only claim easementary rights
Answer: C
Permissive possession does not become adverse unless the permissive character is shed by an overt hostile assertion brought to the owner's knowledge, from which time alone limitation begins to run.
Q44Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (suit for possession based on title) is significant for adverse possession because limitation begins to run from:
aThe date of the plaintiff's dispossession
bThe date the plaintiff acquires title
cThe date of registration of the sale deed
dThe date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff
Answer: D
Unlike Article 64 (possessory title, running from dispossession), Article 65 prescribes 12 years running from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff, casting the onus of proving adverse possession on the defendant.
Q45Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
In Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019), a three-judge Bench held that a person who has perfected title by adverse possession:
aCan file a suit for declaration of title and even recover possession if subsequently dispossessed
bCan use it only as a shield in defence, never as a sword
cAcquires no title but only immunity from eviction
dMust first obtain a decree under Section 27 before suing
Answer: A
Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019) overruled the 'shield not sword' view and held that adverse possession perfects a positive title, so the possessor may sue for declaration and recover possession if later ousted.
Q46Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 embodies the principle that:
aTime begins to run only after the plaintiff attains majority
bOnce time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it
cTime is suspended during the pendency of any appeal
dTime runs afresh on every fresh demand by the creditor
Answer: B
Section 9 provides that where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. This codifies the maxim that time once set in motion runs continuously.
Q47Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The proviso to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 carves out an exception in cases where:
aThe plaintiff is a minor at the date of accrual of the cause of action
bThe defendant is absent from India when the cause of action arises
cLetters of administration to the estate of a creditor are granted to his debtor
dA subsequent statute amends the period of limitation
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 9 states that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues.
Q48Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The principle in Section 9 that 'once time begins to run it does not stop' applies to a subsequent disability arising in the case of:
aOnly the original plaintiff but not his legal representatives
bOnly a person under legal disability at the date the right accrued
cOnly the State as a party
dBoth the person originally entitled to sue and the person deriving title from him
Answer: D
Once time has begun to run against a person entitled to sue, it continues against his legal representatives and assignees; a disability arising after the cause of action accrued does not stop the clock, as confirmed by the scheme of Sections 6 and 9.
Q49Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
A right to sue accrues to X, an adult, on 1 January. On 1 March, X becomes insane. The effect under the Limitation Act is that:
aLimitation continues to run from 1 January unaffected by the subsequent insanity
bLimitation is suspended from 1 March until X recovers, by virtue of Section 6
cLimitation never began to run and starts only on recovery of sanity
dLimitation runs afresh from 1 March
Answer: A
Section 6 (disability) benefits only a person under disability at the time the right to sue accrues. Since X was an adult of sound mind when the cause of action arose, Section 9 applies and the subsequently arising insanity does not stop the running of time.
Q50Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which of the following correctly distinguishes the 'inability to sue' referred to in Section 9 from an exception that genuinely stops limitation?
aA subsequent fraud discovered later does not extend limitation at all
bPractical or personal inability (e.g., poverty, illness) does not stop time, but specific statutory provisions like Section 17 may postpone the starting point
cAny bona fide inability to sue suspends limitation under Section 9 itself
dInability caused by war between countries is the only recognised suspension
Answer: B
Section 9 makes clear that mere personal or practical inability does not stop time once it has begun; only specific statutory provisions (such as Section 17 on fraud/mistake fixing a later starting point) can affect the computation, not Section 9's bar.
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