Limitation Act, 1963 Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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The residuary Article 137 (any application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule) prescribes a period of:
a3 years from when the right to apply accrues
b1 year from when the right to apply accrues
c6 months from when the right to apply accrues
d30 days from when the right to apply accrues
Answer: A
Article 137 is the residuary article for applications and prescribes 3 years from when the right to apply accrues. Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma held Article 137 applies to applications under any Act, not merely the CPC.
What is the limitation for a suit on a promissory note or bond payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing reserving a right to exercise the demand at a future time (Article 21/22)?
a3 years from the date demand is made
b3 years from the date of the note or bond (i.e., the date it bears)
c6 years from the date of the note
d12 years from the date of the note
Answer: B
For a promissory note or bond payable on demand, limitation is 3 years running from the date of the instrument — the cause of action accrues at once because the debt is payable immediately, without need of any actual demand.
Under Article 113 (residuary article for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere), the period and starting point are:
a1 year from when the right to sue accrues
b6 years from when the right to sue accrues
c3 years from when the right to sue accrues
d12 years from when the right to sue accrues
Answer: C
Article 113 is the residuary article for suits and prescribes 3 years running from when the right to sue accrues (note: 'accrues', not 'first accrues', unlike Article 58).
What is the period of limitation for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged (Article 61(a)), and for a suit by a mortgagee for foreclosure (Article 63)?
aRedemption 12 years; foreclosure 12 years
bRedemption 12 years; foreclosure 30 years
cRedemption 30 years; foreclosure 12 years
dRedemption 30 years; foreclosure 30 years
Answer: D
Article 61(a) gives a mortgagor 30 years to redeem (from when the right to redeem accrues) and Article 63 gives a mortgagee 30 years to foreclose (from when the money becomes due) — both are 30-year periods.
A creditor advances money on a promissory note payable on demand on 1 January 2018. No demand is made and no payment received. Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, by what date does a suit on the note become time-barred?
a1 January 2021, since the period runs from the date of demand which is presumed immediate
b1 January 2021, three years from the date of the note as it was payable on demand
c1 January 2024, six years from the date the loan was advanced
dIt never becomes time-barred until a demand is actually made and refused
Answer: B
Under Article 35 of the Schedule, a suit on a promissory note payable on demand has a limitation of three years running from the date of the note (no demand is necessary to start time), so it expires three years after 1 January 2018.
Which of the following correctly states the period of limitation and its terminus a quo for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963?
aTwelve years from the date the mortgage money becomes due
bTwelve years from the date of the mortgage deed
cThirty years from the date when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues
dSixty years from the date of dispossession of the mortgagor
Answer: C
Article 61(a) of the Schedule prescribes thirty years for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged, computed from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.
An appeal lies to the High Court from a decree or order in a civil suit. Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, what is the prescribed period of limitation for filing such an appeal, and from when does it run?
aThirty days from the date of the decree or order appealed from
bSixty days from the date the decree is signed
cSixty days from the date of communication of the decree to the appellant
dNinety days from the date of the decree or order appealed from
Answer: D
Article 116(a) of the Schedule prescribes ninety days for an appeal to a High Court from a decree or order, running from the date of the decree or order; Article 116(b) gives thirty days for appeals to any other court.
A decree-holder seeks to execute a money decree by attachment of property. Apart from cases governed by special periods, what is the residuary period of limitation for an application for execution of a decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963?
aTwelve years from the date when the decree becomes enforceable or, where it directs periodic payments, when default occurs
bThree years from the date of the decree
cSix years from the date the decree becomes enforceable
dThirty years from the date of the decree, decrees being treated like mortgage claims
Answer: A
Article 136 of the Schedule prescribes twelve years for execution of any decree (other than one granting a mandatory injunction) or order of a civil court, running from when the decree or order becomes enforceable.
Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, what is the period of limitation for an application to set aside an ex parte decree, and from what point does it run?
aSixty days from the date of the ex parte decree in all cases
bThirty days from the date of the decree, or where summons was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree
cNinety days from the date the applicant had knowledge of the decree
dThree years from the date of the decree as it is a residuary application
Answer: B
Article 123 of the Schedule prescribes thirty days for an application to set aside an ex parte decree (or for a rehearing), running from the date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
Q11Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In Collector (LA) v. Katiji (1987), the Supreme Court laid down principles for condonation of delay. Which principle was emphasised?
aEvery day's delay must be explained with mathematical precision
bThe State is entitled to a longer limitation than private litigants
cA liberal approach should be adopted so that substantial justice is done, since refusing condonation can defeat a meritorious cause
dNegligence of counsel is always sufficient cause
Answer: C
In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, the Court favoured a justice-oriented, liberal approach to Section 5 so that substantial justice prevails over technical considerations, while noting "every day's delay must be explained" should not be applied pedantically.
Q12Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A person entitled to file a suit is a minor when the right to sue accrues. Under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, when may he institute the suit?
aWithin three years of the accrual of the right to sue, with no extension
bOnly after attaining majority, the entire prescribed period being suspended during minority
cAt any time during his life without any limitation
dWithin the same period (computed from the accrual) reckoned from the date on which the disability ceases, i.e., after attaining majority
Answer: D
Section 6 allows a person under disability (minority, insanity, idiocy) at the time the right to sue accrues to institute the suit within the same period after the disability ceases, computed from the date the disability ends.
Q13Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
The benefit of Section 6 (legal disability) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available only when the disability exists:
aAt the time the right to sue or apply accrues
bAt any time before the period of limitation expires
cContinuously throughout the limitation period
dBoth at accrual and at the time of filing
Answer: A
Under Section 6, the disability must exist at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned (i.e., when the right to sue accrues); a disability arising afterwards does not attract the section (subject to Section 9's rule that subsequent disability does not stop the running of time).
Q14Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Under Section 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the extended period available to a person under disability is subject to an outer limit. What is that maximum?
aThe suit must in no case be instituted later than two years after the disability ceases or the death of the disabled person
bThe extended time after the disability ceases shall not exceed the prescribed period of limitation
cThe suit must in no case be instituted after a period beyond three years from the cessation of disability
dThere is no outer limit; the disabled person may sue at any time after the disability ceases
Answer: B
Section 8 caps the concession in Sections 6 and 7: after the cessation of disability the further time allowed cannot exceed three years (the period prescribed), and in no case can the period be extended by more than three years from the cessation of disability or the death of the disabled person.
Q15Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A right to sue accrues to a minor X. Before attaining majority but after the right accrued, X also becomes insane, and on ceasing to be insane he is still a minor. Under Section 6(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, from when does the limitation period run?
aFrom the date the first disability (minority) commenced
bFrom the date the second disability (insanity) ceased, even if minority continues
cAfter both disabilities have ceased, the period being computed from the cessation of the later-ceasing disability
dFrom the date the right to sue first accrued, disabilities being irrelevant
Answer: C
Section 6(2) provides that where a person is affected by two disabilities, or a fresh disability supervenes before the first ceases, he may sue within the prescribed period after both disabilities have ceased; time runs only when the person is free of all disabilities.
Q16Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with disability of one of several persons jointly entitled. Which statement is correct?
aThe disability of any one joint claimant always saves limitation for all
bSection 7 applies only where every joint claimant is under the same disability
cWhere no discharge can be given without the concurrence of the disabled person, time runs against all from the accrual of the right
dIf one of several jointly-entitled persons is under disability and a discharge can be given without his concurrence, time runs against all of them
Answer: D
Under Section 7, where one of several persons jointly entitled is under disability and a discharge can be given without his concurrence (e.g., by the manager of a joint Hindu family), time runs against all; only if no such discharge can be given without him is limitation postponed until the disability ceases.
Q17Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Which of the following has been held by courts generally to NOT constitute "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aDeliberate and inexcusable inaction or gross negligence amounting to want of bona fides
bGenuine illness of the party supported by credible material
cWrong legal advice given in good faith by counsel
dTime spent diligently prosecuting proceedings in a court without jurisdiction
Answer: A
While bona fide mistakes, illness and pursuit of remedy in a wrong forum may be sufficient cause, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides or gross negligence is not; the conduct must not be want of bona fides (see N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy).
Q18Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998), the Supreme Court observed that in dealing with condonation of delay, the length of the delay:
aIs the decisive factor; a very long delay can never be condoned
bIs immaterial, and acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion
cMust be condoned only on payment of heavy costs in every case
dCan be condoned only if it is less than the original prescribed period
Answer: B
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, the Court held that the length of delay is not material; what matters is the acceptability of the explanation, and the discretion under Section 5 must be exercised to advance substantial justice.
Q19Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
A applies for review of a decree. In computing the period of limitation for an application for review of judgment, Section 12 allows exclusion of:
aOnly the day of the judgment
bThe day of the judgment and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree
cThe day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment
dNo time at all, since Section 12 applies only to appeals
Answer: C
Section 12(4) expressly provides that in computing limitation for an application for review of judgment, the day of pronouncement and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall be excluded.
Q20Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with exclusion of time in cases where:
aThe applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding in a wrong court
bThe defendant was a minor or insane
cA stay or injunction was in operation
dThe plaintiff was bona fide prosecuting an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper (in forma pauperis), and the time spent so prosecuting is excluded
Answer: D
Section 13 provides that in computing limitation, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper, and the time during which he prosecuted in forma pauperis, shall be excluded.
Q21Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Which of the following conditions is NOT essential for exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aThe earlier proceeding must have been decided on its merits
bThe earlier and later proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue
cThe prior proceeding must have been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith
dThe prior court must have been unable to entertain it due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature
Answer: A
Section 14 applies precisely where the earlier proceeding failed for defect of jurisdiction or other like cause, NOT on merits; the requirements are same matter, good faith/due diligence, and failure for a like cause. Decision on merits is not a requirement (indeed it defeats the section).
Q22Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008), the Supreme Court held that the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act:
aCannot apply to applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
bApplies, so that time spent bona fide prosecuting a Section 34 application before a court without jurisdiction can be excluded, the section being founded on advancing justice
cApplies only to suits and not to appeals or applications
dRequires the earlier court to have decided the matter on merits before exclusion is allowed
Answer: B
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (2008), the Supreme Court held that the principle underlying Section 14 applies to Section 34 Arbitration Act applications and is to be liberally construed to advance justice, allowing exclusion of time spent in a wrong forum prosecuted in good faith.
Q23Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing the period of limitation for any suit or application, the time during which an injunction or order staying the institution of the suit or execution remained in force is:
aNot excluded, as stay is no defence to limitation
bExcluded only if the stay was obtained by the defendant
cExcluded, along with the day on which the stay/injunction was issued and the day on which it was withdrawn
dExcluded only up to a maximum of one year
Answer: C
Section 15(1) excludes the time during which the institution/execution was stayed by an injunction or order, and the Explanation/proviso includes exclusion of the day the stay was granted and the day it was withdrawn.
Q24Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Where a suit cannot be instituted without giving statutory notice (e.g., notice under Section 80 CPC), Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act provides that:
aNo exclusion is permitted as the notice period is the plaintiff's own delay
bOnly half the notice period is excluded
cThe limitation period itself is extended by six months
dThe period of such notice shall be excluded in computing the limitation period
Answer: D
Section 15(2) provides that in computing limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent/sanction of the Government or any authority is required, the period of such notice or the time required for obtaining consent/sanction shall be excluded.
Q25Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(4) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which:
aA proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded
bThe judgment-debtor was a minor is excluded
cThe decree remained unexecuted is excluded
dThe purchaser negotiated possession is excluded
Answer: A
Section 15(4) provides that in a suit for possession by a purchaser at an execution sale, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded in computing limitation.
Q26Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In computing the period of limitation for an appeal, Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 mandates exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the:
aplaint and written statement only
bdecree or order appealed from and the judgment on which it is founded
cmemorandum of appeal alone
devidence recorded during trial
Answer: B
Section 12(2) excludes the day of pronouncement and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from and of the judgment on which it is founded.
Q27Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
An acknowledgment of liability in a balance sheet of a company, signed by the directors, in respect of a debt owed to a creditor:
aCan never amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18
bIs valid only if the auditor separately certifies the debt
cCan amount to a valid acknowledgment under Section 18 if it admits a subsisting liability
dIs valid only if the creditor is named in the balance sheet
Answer: C
Courts (e.g., the principle affirmed in cases such as Mahabir Cold Storage and earlier authorities) recognise that an entry in a signed balance sheet admitting a subsisting liability can constitute an acknowledgment under Section 18, extending limitation.
Q28Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Which statement about the effect of an acknowledgment under Section 18 on a time-barred debt is correct?
aAn acknowledgment made after the debt is already time-barred revives the debt and creates a fresh cause of action
bAn acknowledgment after expiry extends limitation by one year automatically
cSection 18 has no time restriction on when the acknowledgment may be made
dAn acknowledgment made after expiry of limitation cannot extend limitation under Section 18; a fresh contract under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act would be required
Answer: D
Section 18 operates only on acknowledgments made before the prescribed period expires; to make a time-barred debt enforceable a fresh promise in writing under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act is required, not a mere acknowledgment.
Q29Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for an acknowledgment of liability to extend the period of limitation, the acknowledgment must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period AND must be:
aIn writing signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf
bMade in the presence of two attesting witnesses
cRegistered before a Sub-Registrar
dAccompanied by part payment of the debt
Answer: A
Section 18(1) requires that the acknowledgment be in writing and signed by the party against whom the property or right is claimed (or his duly authorised agent), and made before the prescribed period expires; attestation, registration and part payment are not requirements for a valid acknowledgment.
Q30Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
A debt becomes due and limitation begins to run on 1 January 2018 (three-year period). The debtor makes a valid written acknowledgment on 1 January 2020. From which date will the fresh period of limitation be computed under Section 18?
aFrom 1 January 2018, the original cause of action
bFrom 1 January 2020, the date on which the acknowledgment was signed
cFrom the date the suit is actually filed
dFrom the date the debtor receives notice of demand
Answer: B
Under Section 18(1), where a valid acknowledgment is made before expiry of the prescribed period, a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when the acknowledgment was signed; thus limitation runs anew from 1 January 2020.
Q31Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Which of the following is the correct legal effect of an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aIt creates a new contract and a fresh cause of action between the parties
bIt revives a debt that has already become time-barred and extinguished
cIt does not create a new right but only extends/renews the period of limitation for the existing subsisting right
dIt transfers the burden of proof of the debt onto the debtor permanently
Answer: C
An acknowledgment under Section 18 does not create a new cause of action; it merely furnishes a fresh starting point of limitation for the pre-existing right, and it must be made while the right is still alive (before the prescribed period expires), so it cannot revive a barred debt.
Q32Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Regarding part payment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which condition is essential for the payment to furnish a fresh period of limitation?
aThe payment must be of at least half the principal amount due
bThe payment must be witnessed by the creditor's agent
cThe payment must be made after the prescribed period has already expired
dThe fact of payment must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment
Answer: D
Under the proviso to Section 19, an acknowledgment of the payment (in the case of part payment of a debt or interest on a legacy) must appear in the handwriting of, or in writing signed by, the person making the payment; the amount paid is immaterial, and the payment must be made before the period expires.
Q33Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
P owes Q on a promissory note. Before limitation expires, P pays a part of the interest due on the debt and the fact of payment appears in P's own handwriting. Under Section 19, the effect of this payment on the limitation period for the whole debt is that:
aA fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when the payment was made
bLimitation is extended only for the amount of interest paid, not the principal
cLimitation continues to run from the original date as part payment has no effect on interest
dLimitation is suspended indefinitely until the entire debt is cleared
Answer: A
Section 19 provides that where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before expiry of the prescribed period, a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when the payment was made, provided the fact of payment appears in the payer's handwriting or signed writing.
Q34Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Which of the following correctly distinguishes a question of limitation from a question of jurisdiction in light of Section 3?
aA bar of limitation ousts the court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit
bA court has jurisdiction to entertain a time-barred suit but is bound to dismiss it on the merits of the limitation bar
cLimitation and jurisdiction are identical concepts under Section 3
dA time-barred suit can never be presented before a competent court
Answer: B
Limitation goes to the remedy, not to jurisdiction. A court is competent to entertain a time-barred suit but, once it finds the suit out of time, Section 3 obliges it to dismiss the suit; the dismissal is on limitation, not for want of jurisdiction.
Q35Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Assertion (A): A plea of limitation can be raised for the first time even at the appellate or revisional stage. Reason (R): Section 3 casts a duty on the court to dismiss a barred proceeding irrespective of whether limitation is pleaded. Choose the correct option:
aBoth A and R are true but R is not the correct explanation of A
bA is true but R is false
cBoth A and R are true and R is the correct explanation of A
dA is false but R is true
Answer: C
Because Section 3 obliges the court to dismiss a barred proceeding even if limitation is not set up as a defence, the bar being a pure question of law can be examined at any stage, including appeal or revision, where it arises on admitted or proved facts.
Q36Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Where, in a suit triable on a plaint demurrer, it appears from the averments in the plaint itself that the suit is barred by limitation, the proper course is to:
aDirect the plaintiff to lead evidence on limitation before any decision
bDecree the suit and leave limitation to be agitated in appeal
cReturn the plaint for presentation to a court of higher jurisdiction
dFrame a preliminary issue and reject/dismiss the suit, the bar being apparent on the face of the plaint
Answer: D
When the bar of limitation is apparent on the face of the plaint, the court can and must give effect to Section 3; under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC such a plaint is liable to be rejected, no evidence being necessary.
Q37Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
X holds a promissory note executed by Y which has become time-barred. X is also in possession of certain goods of Y over which X claims a lien for the same debt. Y sues to recover the goods. Which is correct?
aX may retain the goods under his lien, since limitation bars only the suit-remedy and the debt still subsists
bX must return the goods because the debt is extinguished by limitation
cX loses the lien automatically when the period for suing on the note expires
dY can recover the goods only after depositing the time-barred amount
Answer: A
Since Section 3 bars only the remedy by suit and not the right, the underlying debt subsists; a creditor in possession may enforce a lien or right of retainer to satisfy a time-barred debt because no suit is being filed to recover it.
Q38Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies in terms to which of the following proceedings?
aOnly to suits
bTo suits, appeals and applications made after the prescribed period
cOnly to suits and appeals
dTo suits, appeals, applications and to writ petitions under Article 226
Answer: B
Section 3(1) by its terms requires the dismissal of every 'suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made' after the prescribed period; it does not in terms govern constitutional writ proceedings, to which limitation applies only on the principle of laches.
Q39Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A suit for possession of immovable property is filed by the true owner more than twelve years after the defendant's adverse possession began. Apart from dismissing the suit under Section 3, what is the additional consequence by virtue of Section 27?
aOnly the plaintiff's remedy is barred; his title remains intact
bThe plaintiff may re-file the suit after fresh demand
cThe plaintiff's right to the property is itself extinguished
dThe defendant must compensate the plaintiff despite the bar
Answer: C
While Section 3 ordinarily bars only the remedy, Section 27 is an exception: on the expiry of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession, the owner's right to the property is extinguished, perfecting the adverse possessor's title.
Q40Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Under Section 27, against the Government, the period of limitation for a suit for possession of immovable property (and hence the period of adverse possession required) is generally:
a12 years
b20 years
c60 years
d30 years
Answer: D
Article 112 prescribes 30 years for suits by the Government for possession of immovable property, so adverse possession against the State must continue for 30 years.
Q41Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the acquisition of:
aAn easement (such as a right to access of light, air or way) by twenty years' peaceable enjoyment as of right
bOwnership of immovable property by possession
cTitle to movable property by long use
dOwnership of land by registration
Answer: A
Section 25 governs acquisition of easements like right to light, air, watercourse or way by peaceable, open enjoyment as an easement and as of right, without interruption, for twenty years.
Q42Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Under Section 25, where the easement claimed (e.g., access of light or air) is over property belonging to the Government, the requisite period of enjoyment is enlarged to:
a20 years
b30 years
c40 years
d60 years
Answer: B
Section 25(1) prescribes twenty years generally, but the proviso enlarges it to thirty years where the property over which the right is claimed belongs to the Government.
Q43Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Under Section 26 of the Limitation Act, 1963, when computing the twenty-year period for acquiring an easement, a period during which the servient tenement was held under a lease and the claim is resisted by the reversioner:
aIs always counted in full
bDoubles the limitation period
cMay be excluded in computing the period if the reversioner resists the claim within three years of the lease ending
dHas no effect on the computation
Answer: C
Section 26 allows exclusion of the period the servient property was under a term lease where the reversioner, within three years of the lease's expiry, resists the easement claim.
Q44Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007), the Supreme Court emphasised that the twenty-year/required period of enjoyment or possession for prescriptive/adverse rights must end:
aAt any time within the claimant's lifetime
bExactly on the date of filing the suit
cThirty years before the suit
dWithin a period of two years next before the institution of the suit (for easements under Section 25)
Answer: D
Section 25(2) requires that, for an easement to be claimed by prescription, the twenty years' enjoyment must have ended within two years next before the institution of the suit.
Q45Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Where one co-owner is in possession of joint property, his possession is presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners; for it to become adverse against the others, what is required?
aA clear ouster, that is, an open and unequivocal denial of the other co-owners' title communicated to them
bMere continuous possession for 12 years by one co-owner
cPayment of municipal taxes alone
dMutation of the property in his sole name
Answer: A
Possession of one co-owner is presumed to enure for all; it turns adverse only upon proof of ouster, an open and hostile assertion denying the co-owners' title and brought to their knowledge.
Q46Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which of the following is generally NOT accepted as "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay under Section 5?
aWrong legal advice given in good faith by counsel
bDeliberate inaction or gross negligence amounting to want of bona fides
cIllness of the party preventing him from acting
dTime spent bona fide prosecuting the matter in a wrong forum
Answer: B
Sufficient cause connotes the absence of negligence and presence of bona fides; deliberate inaction, want of bona fides or gross negligence is not sufficient cause, whereas honest mistaken advice, illness, or bona fide pursuit of a wrong forum may be.
Q47Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Regarding the applicability of Section 5 (sufficient cause) to different proceedings, which statement is correct?
aSection 5 applies to suits as well as appeals and applications
bSection 5 applies only to execution applications under Order XXI CPC
cSection 5 does not apply to suits but applies to appeals and to applications other than under Order XXI CPC
dSection 5 applies to every application including those under Order XXI CPC
Answer: C
By its own terms Section 5 covers any appeal or application (other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI CPC) but not suits, for which there is no power to condone delay.
Q48Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) explained that, in considering "sufficient cause" under Section 5, the primary consideration is:
aThe exact length of the delay rather than its explanation
bWhether the opposite party consents to condonation
cWhether the delay exceeds the original limitation period
dWhether the explanation for the delay is acceptable and bona fide, length of delay being immaterial if explained
Answer: D
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998), the Court held that what matters is the acceptability and bona fides of the explanation, not the length of delay; even a long delay may be condoned if satisfactorily explained, and a short one refused if not.
Q49Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
A files a suit within time. Owing to a war, communication is disrupted and A is unable to take a further step for two years. Which principle governs whether limitation is suspended?
aUnder Section 9, an inability arising after time has begun to run does not stop it, absent an express statutory provision
bLimitation is automatically suspended for two years on grounds of equity
cThe two years are excluded as a matter of right under Section 5
dLimitation restarts afresh after the war ends
Answer: A
Section 9 bars the stopping of time for any subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit; supervening events like war provide no suspension unless a statute expressly so provides.
Q50Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which of the following best states the legal effect once a period of limitation expires under the scheme of the Limitation Act, read with Section 3?
aThe right itself is always extinguished
bOnly the remedy is barred (the right subsisting), except where Section 27 extinguishes the right
cThe court has discretion to entertain the suit regardless of the bar
dThe defendant must plead the bar or it cannot be noticed by the court
Answer: B
Limitation generally bars the remedy but not the right; Section 27 is the exception, extinguishing the right to property on expiry of the period for a possessory suit. Under Section 3 the court must dismiss a time-barred suit even if limitation is not pleaded.
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