Limitation Act, 1963 Test 2 — Questions & Solutions
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An application for leave to appeal as a pauper (indigent person) to a High Court must be made within what period from the date of the decree appealed from?
a60 days
b30 days
c90 days
d120 days
Answer: A
Article 121 of the Schedule prescribes 60 days for an application for leave to appeal as a pauper to a High Court (30 days to any other court under Article 122), running from the date of the decree appealed from.
An application to set aside an ex parte decree, or for a re-hearing of an appeal decided ex parte, must be made within what period under the Schedule?
a60 days from the date of the decree
b30 days from the date of the decree, or where summons was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree
c90 days from the date of the decree
d30 days from the date the applicant had knowledge in every case
Answer: B
Article 123 of the Schedule prescribes 30 days for an application to set aside an ex parte decree, running from the date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
What is the limitation period for an application for execution of a decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) under the Schedule?
a3 years from the date of the decree or order
b6 years from the date of the decree
c12 years from the date the decree becomes enforceable
d30 years from the date of the decree
Answer: C
Article 136 of the Schedule prescribes 12 years for execution of any decree (other than one granting a mandatory injunction) or order of a civil court, running from when the decree or order becomes enforceable.
An application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule (the residuary article for applications) must be made within:
a30 days from when the right to apply accrues
b1 year from when the right to apply accrues
c6 months from when the right to apply accrues
d3 years from when the right to apply accrues
Answer: D
Article 137 of the Schedule is the residuary article for applications, prescribing three years from when the right to apply accrues; it applies generally to applications under any Act where no specific period is provided.
What is the limitation period for a suit for compensation for breach of a contract where no special period is otherwise provided, and from when does it run?
a3 years from when the contract is broken, or where there are successive breaches, when the breach occurs
b1 year from the date of the contract
c3 years from the date of the contract
d6 years from when the contract is broken
Answer: A
Article 55 of the Schedule prescribes three years for compensation for breach of any contract (express or implied) not specifically provided for, running from when the contract is broken, or in case of successive breaches, when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs.
A files a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on his title (not on dispossession). Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed is:
a3 years from the date of dispossession
b12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff
c12 years from the date of accrual of title
d30 years from the date of dispossession
Answer: B
Article 65 governs suits for possession based on title; the 12-year period runs from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff, not merely from dispossession.
A plaintiff who has been dispossessed of immovable property and sues to recover possession on the basis of previous possession (a possessory suit) must file the suit within:
a12 years from the date of dispossession
b6 years from the date of dispossession
c12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession
d12 years from accrual of title
Answer: C
Article 64 prescribes 12 years for a possessory suit based on previous possession, running from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession; it is distinct from Article 65 (suit on title).
Under the Schedule, the general residuary article (Article 113) for a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere prescribes a period of:
a1 year from when the right to sue accrues
b6 years from when the right to sue accrues
c3 years from the date of the cause of action being discovered
d3 years from when the right to sue accrues
Answer: D
Article 113 is the residuary article for suits, prescribing 3 years from the time the right to sue accrues.
A suit by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside his father's alienation of ancestral property must be filed within what period under the Schedule?
a12 years from when the alienee takes possession of the property
b3 years from when the alienee takes possession
c3 years from when the son attains majority
d6 years from the date of the alienation
Answer: A
Article 109 prescribes 12 years, running from when the alienee takes possession, for a suit by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside his father's alienation of ancestral property.
An appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure to a High Court from a decree or order must, under the Schedule, ordinarily be preferred within:
a30 days from the date of the decree or order
b90 days from the date of the decree or order
c60 days from the date of the decree or order
d120 days from the date of the decree or order
Answer: B
Article 116 prescribes 90 days for an appeal to a High Court under the CPC from a decree or order (and 30 days for an appeal to any other court).
Q11Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A disability (e.g., minority) supervenes AFTER the limitation period has already begun to run. Under the Limitation Act, 1963:
aTime already running is suspended for the duration of the disability
bA fresh period of limitation starts from the date of disability
cTime once begun continues to run; subsequent disability does not stop it (Section 9)
dThe whole suit becomes time-barred immediately
Answer: C
Section 9 provides that once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it; Section 6 protects only a disability existing at the time the cause of action accrues.
Q12Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Under Section 6(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, where a person affected by disability dies after the disability ceases but within the allowed period:
aHis legal representatives lose all benefit of the extended period
bA fresh full period of limitation begins from the date of death
cThe suit must be filed within thirty days of death
dHis legal representatives may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death as would otherwise have been allowed from the cessation of disability
Answer: D
Section 6(2) allows the legal representative the same period after the death of the disabled person (who died after the disability ceased) as would have been allowed from the time the disability ceased.
Q13Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with which situation?
aDisability of one of several persons jointly entitled to sue or apply
bContinuous running of time once it has begun
cEffect of fraud or mistake on limitation
dLegal disability of the defendant
Answer: A
Section 7 governs disability of one of several persons jointly entitled, addressing when time runs against all and when a discharge can be given without the concurrence of the disabled person.
Q14Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Under Section 7, where several persons are jointly entitled to sue and one is under disability, time will run against ALL of them where:
aAny one of them is alive
bA discharge can be given without the concurrence of the disabled person
cThe disabled person remains a minor only
dAll of them are under disability
Answer: B
Section 7 provides that where one of several jointly entitled persons is under disability and a discharge can be given without his concurrence, time runs against all; if no such discharge can be given without him, time does not run against any until the disability ceases.
Q15Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963 operates as:
aAn independent provision unconnected with Sections 6 and 7
bA provision that abolishes the disability altogether
cA proviso/exception to Sections 6 and 7, capping the extended period to a maximum of three years from the cessation of disability or death
dA section dealing solely with condonation of delay in appeals
Answer: C
Section 8 is a proviso to Sections 6 and 7; it limits the extended period so that the suit/application is not brought after three years from the cessation of disability or death, except where the ordinary period would be longer.
Q16Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
The three-year cap under Section 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does NOT cut down the time where:
aThe disability is insanity rather than minority
bThe plaintiff is represented by a guardian
cThe defendant consents to the extension
dThe ordinary period of limitation prescribed for the suit would expire later than the three-year period
Answer: D
Section 8's three-year cap yields where the ordinary prescribed period (e.g., 12 years for possession) would expire later; the party then gets the benefit of the longer ordinary period rather than being curtailed to three years.
Q17Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
X has a right to sue for possession (prescribed period 12 years) but is a minor when the cause of action accrues. He attains majority and the disability ceases. Reading Sections 6 and 8 together, the period available to him after the disability ceases is:
aThe longer of three years from cessation OR the unexpired ordinary period of 12 years
bLimited strictly to three years from cessation of disability
cA fresh 12 years from the date of cessation of disability
dOnly the balance of the original 12 years, with no benefit of disability
Answer: A
Section 6 read with Section 8 gives the longer of the two: three years from cessation of disability, or the remainder of the ordinary 12-year period; since the ordinary period is longer than three years, X gets the benefit of the longer period.
Q18Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 3 of the Limitation Act obliges a court to dismiss a time-barred proceeding even if limitation is not pleaded as a defence. Section 5 modifies this only to the extent that it permits:
acondonation of delay in instituting any suit on sufficient cause
badmission of a belated appeal or application where sufficient cause for the delay is shown
cextension of the period for execution applications under Order XXI CPC
dthe court to waive limitation suo motu in the interest of justice
Answer: B
Section 3 mandates dismissal of time-barred matters whether or not limitation is set up as a defence; Section 5 is the narrow exception allowing a belated appeal/application (not a suit, and not Order XXI applications) to be admitted on sufficient cause.
Q19Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008), the Supreme Court held that the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
acannot apply to applications under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
bonly excludes time for suits and never for applications
capplies to exclude time in computing limitation for an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
drequires the prior proceeding to be a suit in a civil court only
Answer: C
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises, the Supreme Court held that the principle underlying Section 14 applies to exclude time spent in bona fide prosecution before a wrong forum even for a Section 34 application under the Arbitration Act, 1996.
Q20Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing limitation for any suit or application, the period during which the institution has been stayed by an injunction or order is:
aadded to the limitation period
btreated as fresh limitation under Section 19
cignored only if the stay was wrongly granted
dexcluded, along with the day on which the stay was issued and the day it was withdrawn
Answer: D
Section 15(1) excludes the time during which institution of the suit/application was stayed by injunction or order, and the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn are also excluded.
Q21Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for exclusion of the period of notice where:
aprevious consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, or notice has been given, in accordance with the requirement of any law
bnotice is given to the opposite party as a courtesy
cany notice is sent by registered post
dthe defendant requests time to settle
Answer: A
Section 15(2) excludes the time of notice and the time required for obtaining consent/sanction of Government or other authority where such notice or sanction is mandated by law (e.g., notice under Section 80 CPC).
Q22Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing limitation for a suit, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government is:
aadded at the end of the limitation period
bexcluded
cirrelevant to limitation
ddoubled to compensate the plaintiff
Answer: B
Section 15(5) excludes the period during which the defendant has been absent from India and from such territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government, in computing the limitation for any suit.
Q23Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, where a suit is instituted by a receiver or interim receiver appointed in insolvency proceedings, the period excluded is the time:
abetween the appointment of the receiver and the conclusion of the suit
bof one year from the order of adjudication
cbeginning with the institution of the insolvency proceeding and ending three months after the appointment of the receiver
dduring which the debtor was untraceable
Answer: C
Section 15(3) excludes the time beginning with the date of institution of the insolvency proceeding and ending with the expiry of three months after the appointment of the receiver, in a suit by a receiver/liquidator.
Q24Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
The protection of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 differs from Section 5 in that Section 14:
aapplies only to appeals and applications, not suits
brequires showing 'sufficient cause' just like Section 5
ccan be invoked only with the court's prior leave
dmandatorily excludes the time once its conditions are met, whereas Section 5 confers a discretion to condone delay on showing sufficient cause
Answer: D
Section 14 provides for mandatory exclusion of time once its conditions (good faith, due diligence, defect of jurisdiction) are satisfied, while Section 5 is a discretionary power to condone delay; Section 14 even applies to suits.
Q25Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
A plaintiff's suit, filed in good faith and prosecuted diligently, was returned by the District Court for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. On re-filing in the proper court, the plaintiff seeks exclusion of the period spent in the District Court. This benefit flows from:
aSection 14(1)
bSection 12(2)
cSection 13
dSection 15(2)
Answer: A
Section 14(1) excludes the time spent bona fide and with due diligence in a court that could not entertain the suit due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, including lack of pecuniary jurisdiction.
Q26Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, while computing the period of limitation for an appeal, in addition to the period requisite for obtaining copies, which day(s) is/are to be EXCLUDED?
aOnly the day from which the period is reckoned
bBoth the day from which the period is reckoned AND the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced
cThe day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced
dNeither day is excluded; only copy-time is excluded
Answer: B
Section 12(1) excludes the day from which the period is to be reckoned, and Section 12(2) excludes the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, besides the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree/judgment.
Q27Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
Under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, part payment of a debt extends limitation only if which condition is satisfied?
aThe payment is made before a notary public
bThe payment exceeds half the principal sum due
cThe fact of payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment
dThe creditor records the payment in his own books of account
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 19 requires that an acknowledgment of payment (i.e., the fact of the payment) must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment for a fresh period of limitation to run.
Q28Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
Section 19 (part payment) applies to which of the following claims?
aOnly a debt
bOnly a legacy
cAny claim for damages in tort
dPayment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy
Answer: D
Section 19 applies where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the prescribed period expires; it does not extend to general tort claims for damages.
Q29Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
A debtor pays a sum 'on account of interest' on a subsisting debt before limitation expires, and the fact of payment is recorded in a writing signed by him. From what date does the fresh period of limitation run under Section 19?
aFrom the date when the payment was made
bFrom the date the debt originally fell due
cFrom the date the creditor demands the balance
dFrom the date the writing is produced in court
Answer: A
Under Section 19, where payment on account of a debt or interest on a legacy is made, a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when the payment was made.
Q30Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
Which of the following is a key distinction between Section 18 (acknowledgment) and Section 19 (part payment) of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aSection 18 requires the writing to be made before expiry while Section 19 does not
bUnder Section 18 the acknowledgment itself must be in writing and signed, whereas under Section 19 the payment may be made in cash but the fact of payment must appear in writing signed by the payer
cSection 19 applies only to mortgages while Section 18 applies only to simple debts
dSection 18 starts limitation from the date of payment, Section 19 from the date of writing
Answer: B
Under Section 18 the acknowledgment of liability itself must be a signed writing made before expiry; under Section 19 the payment can be actual (even cash) but its proviso requires the fact of payment to appear in the payer's handwriting or in a writing signed by him. Both require action before limitation expires.
Q31Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
A signs a written acknowledgment of a debt 'as the duly authorised agent' of the debtor B before limitation expires. Is this acknowledgment effective under Section 18?
aNo, because Section 18 requires the personal signature of the debtor only
bNo, because agents can never bind principals in matters of limitation
cYes, because Section 18 expressly permits signature by the party 'or his agent duly authorised in this behalf'
dYes, but only if A is an advocate
Answer: C
Section 18(1) provides that the acknowledgment may be signed by the party against whom the right is claimed 'or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability', and the Explanation extends 'signed' to signature by an agent duly authorised in this behalf.
Q32Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
In Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria (AIR 1961 SC 1236), the Supreme Court laid down the essential requirements of an acknowledgment under (the predecessor of) Section 18. Which proposition reflects the ruling?
aAn acknowledgment must contain an express promise to pay and an exact quantification of the amount
bAn acknowledgment is valid even if made after the period of limitation has expired
cOnly a registered acknowledgment can extend limitation
dThe statement must be made before expiry and indicate the existence of a jural relationship, with an intention to admit that jural relationship, which may be implied
Answer: D
In Shapoor Freedom Mazda the Supreme Court held that an acknowledgment, made before expiry, need not be express, need not specify the exact amount, and need not contain a promise to pay, but must indicate the existence of a subsisting jural relationship with an intention (express or implied) to admit it.
Q33Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
A balance sheet of a company, signed by its directors and showing the creditor's outstanding amount, is relied upon by the creditor as an acknowledgment under Section 18. Which view best reflects the settled legal position?
aEntries in a balance sheet showing a subsisting debt can amount to an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18
bA balance sheet can never be an acknowledgment because it is a statutory document
cOnly an entry in the creditor's own books can be an acknowledgment
dA balance sheet operates as an acknowledgment only if it is registered
Answer: A
Courts (e.g., Bengal Silk Mills and reaffirmed in Bishal Jaiswal, 2021) have held that entries in a duly signed balance sheet acknowledging a subsisting debt can constitute an acknowledgment of liability extending limitation under Section 18.
Q34Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A set-off or counter-claim is treated, for the purposes of limitation, as a separate suit. Under Section 3(2)(b), a counter-claim is deemed instituted on the date:
aOn which the original plaint is presented
bOn which the counter-claim is made in court
cOn which issues are framed
dOn which the written statement was due
Answer: B
Section 3(2)(b) deems a set-off or counter-claim a separate suit instituted, in the case of a set-off on the date the written statement pleading it is presented, and in the case of a counter-claim on the date it is made in court.
Q35Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
The mandate of Section 3 that a time-barred suit 'shall be dismissed' is expressly made subject to the savings contained in:
aSections 12 to 24 only
bSections 4 to 11 only
cSections 4 to 24
dSections 25 to 27 only
Answer: C
Section 3(1) opens with the words 'Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24', so the otherwise absolute bar yields to those savings (e.g., exclusion of time, legal disability, condonation under Section 5).
Q36Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
In which of the following did the Supreme Court emphasise that the law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure finality, fixing a lifespan for the legal remedy while leaving the right surviving, and that the Section 3 bar is to be applied by the court itself?
aHukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra
bN. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
cPopat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn.
dRajender Singh v. Santa Singh
Answer: D
In Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537, the Supreme Court explained that limitation rests on public policy to quiet stale claims and that Section 3 bars the remedy though the right may survive; the bar is to be applied by the court itself.
Q37Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
An appellate court, while admitting an appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC, fails to notice that the appeal was barred by limitation and admits it. At the hearing the respondent contends the appeal is time-barred. Which is correct?
aThe duty under Section 3 continues, and the appeal must be dismissed if found barred, the admission notwithstanding
bOnce admitted, the appeal cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation
cThe respondent is estopped from raising limitation after admission
dLimitation can be examined only if a cross-objection is filed
Answer: A
Section 3 imposes a continuing mandatory duty; admission of an appeal does not preclude its dismissal as time-barred, and the question of limitation can be examined at the hearing.
Q38Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Regarding the burden of proving that a suit is within time, the correct principle under the scheme of Section 3 is:
aThe defendant must always prove that the suit is barred
bThe plaintiff who comes to court must show that the suit is within limitation; the court must dismiss it if barred even absent a plea
cThe burden lies on the court, not on either party
dThere is no burden since limitation is a pure question of law
Answer: B
Because Section 3 obliges the court to dismiss a time-barred suit even without a defence plea, the onus is on the plaintiff to show the suit is within time; the bar is not dependent on the defendant pleading it.
Q39Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Where the last day of the prescribed period falls on a day the court is closed, and the suit is filed on the day the court reopens, the suit is:
aBarred under Section 3, as Section 3 admits no exception for holidays
bWithin time only if Section 5 condonation is also sought
cWithin time, because Section 3 is expressly subject to Section 4
dBarred unless the closure exceeded thirty days
Answer: C
Section 3 is subject to Sections 4 to 24; Section 4 allows institution on the day the court reopens when the prescribed period expires on a day the court is closed, so the suit is in time.
Q40Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with acquisition of an easement (such as a right to light, air or way) by prescription. The minimum period of uninterrupted enjoyment required against private property is:
aTwelve years
bThirty years
cSixty years
dTwenty years
Answer: D
Section 25(1) requires peaceable, open enjoyment of an easement as of right, without interruption, for twenty years (the period being thirty years where the property belongs to the Government).
Q41Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Under the proviso to Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the twenty/thirty year period of enjoyment of an easement must have ended:
aWithin two years before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested
bAt least five years before filing the suit
cOn the date of filing the suit
dWithin one year before institution of the suit
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 25(3) requires that the period of enjoyment be one ending within two years next before the institution of the suit in which the claim to the easement is contested.
Q42Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Where a suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant, Section 17(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the period of limitation does not begin to run until:
aThe fraud is committed
bThe plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it
cThe defendant admits the fraud
dThe transaction tainted by fraud is set aside by a court
Answer: B
Section 17(1)(a) postpones the running of limitation in cases of fraud until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
Q43Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Mere long and continuous possession, however lengthy, does not by itself amount to adverse possession unless it is accompanied by:
aPayment of property tax alone
bA registered document in the possessor's favour
cAn intention to hold adversely (animus possidendi) coupled with possession in denial of the true owner's title, to his knowledge
dCultivation of the land for profit
Answer: C
Settled law (e.g., P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, 2007) requires that possession be coupled with the requisite animus, i.e., an open and hostile assertion of title in denial of the true owner's right, known to him.
Q44Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
A defendant pleading adverse possession in his written statement must specifically plead and prove three essentials, often abbreviated as the possession being:
aQuiet, lawful and registered
bPermissive, partial and provisional
cJoint, constructive and symbolic
dNec vi, nec clam, nec precario — and that the owner had knowledge of the hostile possession
Answer: D
The defendant must plead and prove the date of commencement, the nature (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario — hostile, open and continuous), and that it was to the knowledge of the true owner; absence of such pleading defeats the plea.
Q45Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
X dispossesses the true owner O and remains in adverse possession for 8 years, then transfers the land to Y who continues for a further 5 years. In a suit by O, the law of 'tacking' permits:
aY to add X's period to his own where there is privity between them, completing 12 years and extinguishing O's title
bY to claim title only after his own independent 12 years
cNo combination, since adverse possession is strictly personal
dO to recover at any time as transfer breaks continuity automatically
Answer: A
Successive periods of adverse possession may be 'tacked' together where there is privity (e.g., transfer) between the holders; X's 8 years and Y's 5 years aggregate to 13 years, extinguishing O's title under Section 27.
Q46Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
'Sufficient cause' for the purposes of condonation of delay under the Limitation Act is to be construed:
aStrictly and narrowly so as to defeat stale claims at the threshold
bLiberally to advance substantial justice, especially where no negligence or mala fides is imputable to the applicant
cOnly by reference to events that occurred before the cause of action arose
dSolely on the basis of the financial status of the applicant
Answer: B
The Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) held that 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal, justice-oriented construction so that substantial justice prevails over technical considerations, absent negligence or mala fides.
Q47Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The expression 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay appears in which provision of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aSection 3
bSection 9
cSection 5
dSection 12
Answer: C
Section 5 empowers a court to admit an appeal or application after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had 'sufficient cause' for not preferring it within time.
Q48Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which of the following is NOT, by itself, ordinarily accepted as 'sufficient cause' under Section 5?
aWrong legal advice given in good faith by counsel
bSerious illness of the party preventing timely filing
cTime taken in obtaining certified copies after diligent application
dDeliberate and conscious inaction with knowledge of the limitation period
Answer: D
Deliberate, conscious or culpable inaction is not 'sufficient cause'; the explanation must be bona fide and free of negligence. Bona fide wrong legal advice, genuine illness, and time for certified copies have been treated as sufficient cause.
Q49Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987), the Supreme Court laid down that:
aRefusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated
bThe State and ordinary litigants stand on entirely different footing for condonation
cEvery day's delay must be explained with documentary proof failing which condonation must be refused
dCondonation of delay can never be granted after one year
Answer: A
In Mst. Katiji the Court emphasised a liberal approach, observing that when delay is not condoned, a meritorious matter may be thrown out at the threshold and justice defeated, whereas condonation at most decides a case on merits.
Q50Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Regarding the requirement of explaining delay, the correct position is that:
aEach day of the entire prescribed limitation period must be explained
bOnly the delay beyond the prescribed period needs to be satisfactorily explained, not the period within limitation
cNo explanation is required where the delay is less than 30 days
dDelay can be condoned only if the opposite party consents
Answer: B
Under Section 5, what must be explained is the delay occurring after the expiry of the prescribed period; the applicant need not account for the time he was within limitation, and 'every day's delay' is to be applied in a rational, pragmatic manner (N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy).
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