Limitation Act, 1963 Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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Under the Schedule, an application for execution of a decree (other than one granting a mandatory injunction) is governed by Article 136, which prescribes a period of:
a12 years from when the decree becomes enforceable
b3 years from the date of the decree
c6 years from the date the decree becomes enforceable
d30 years from the date of the decree
Answer: A
Article 136 prescribes 12 years for execution of a decree or order, running from when the decree or order becomes enforceable (it replaced the earlier 3-year/12-year scheme of the 1908 Act).
A suit for compensation for breach of a contract, where no other article applies, must be filed within 3 years from the date the contract is broken. This is governed by:
aArticle 113
bArticle 55
cArticle 54
dArticle 58
Answer: B
Article 55 prescribes 3 years for compensation for breach of any contract (express or implied) not specifically provided for, running from when the contract is broken or, in case of successive breaches, when the breach occurs.
A suit for specific performance of a contract must be brought within 3 years. Under Article 54, the time runs from:
aThe date of execution of the contract in every case
bThe date the plaintiff first demands performance
cThe date fixed for performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused
dThe date the plaintiff discovers the breach
Answer: C
Article 54 provides 3 years from the date fixed for performance, or, if no such date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
A suit by a person to recover money paid by mistake or under coercion must be filed within 3 years. Under Article 24 (read with the residuary scheme), the limitation for money payable for money paid by mistake runs from:
aThe date of payment
bThe date the money was demanded back
cWhen the defendant refuses repayment
dWhen the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff
Answer: D
For money paid upon an existing consideration which afterwards fails / money paid by mistake, limitation is 3 years running from when the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff (cf. Article 24/113 scheme and section 17 on mistake).
Under the Schedule, an application for leave to appeal as an indigent person (pauper) to the High Court is governed by a special limitation. Generally, an application to a court for review of judgment must be made within:
a30 days from the date of the decree or order
b60 days from the date of the decree or order
c90 days from the date of the decree or order
d120 days from the date of the decree or order
Answer: A
Article 124 prescribes 30 days from the date of the decree or order for an application for review of judgment to a court other than the Supreme Court.
A suit on a promissory note or bond payable on demand must be filed within 3 years. Under Article 22 (money payable on demand), the time runs from:
aWhen the demand is actually made
bWhen the loan is made / the note is executed (i.e., the date the money becomes due)
cWhen the debtor refuses payment after demand
dWhen the creditor discovers the debtor's default
Answer: B
For money payable on demand, limitation under the Schedule runs from when the money becomes due, i.e., when the loan is advanced or the demand promissory note is executed; no actual demand is required to start time.
A suit for compensation for malicious prosecution must be instituted within 1 year. Under Article 74, the period runs from:
aThe date the prosecution was initiated
bThe date the plaintiff suffered loss
cThe date the plaintiff was acquitted or the prosecution otherwise terminated in his favour
dThe date the plaintiff had knowledge of the malice
Answer: C
Article 74 prescribes 1 year for compensation for malicious prosecution, running from when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution otherwise terminates in his favour.
A suit by a mortgagor to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged is governed by Article 61(a), which prescribes:
a12 years from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues
b3 years from the date of the mortgage
c60 years from the date of the mortgage
d30 years from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues
Answer: D
Article 61(a) prescribes 30 years for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged, running from when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.
A suit by a mortgagee to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage of immovable property (by sale) under Article 62 must be filed within:
a12 years from when the money sued for becomes due
b3 years from when the money becomes due
c30 years from when the money becomes due
d60 years from the date of the mortgage
Answer: A
Article 62 prescribes 12 years for a suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property (mortgage by sale), running from when the money sued for becomes due.
Under the Schedule, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein by or on behalf of the Central or State Government carries a special longer period of:
a12 years from when adverse possession begins
b30 years from when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the Government
c60 years from when the possession becomes adverse
d45 years from the date of dispossession
Answer: B
Article 112 grants the Government a 30-year period (instead of the ordinary 12 years under Article 65) for suits for possession of immovable property, running from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse.
Q11Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962), the Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 5 a party seeking condonation must explain:
athe whole period from the date of the decree, including time within limitation
bmerely that the appeal has good merits
conly the delay that occurred after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation
dnothing, once the appeal memo is filed with an affidavit
Answer: C
Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields held that the time taken before expiry of the limitation period is irrelevant; the appellant need only show sufficient cause for the period of delay running after the prescribed period expired.
Q12Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
The decision in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. also clarified the nature of the court's power under Section 5 even after sufficient cause is established. It held that:
aproof of sufficient cause entitles the applicant to condonation as a matter of right
bthe discretion to condone must always be exercised in favour of the appellant
cthe discretion can be exercised only by the appellate court and never by a trial court
deven where sufficient cause is shown, the court retains a discretion to refuse condonation having regard to all the circumstances
Answer: D
Ramlal held that establishing sufficient cause is a condition precedent, but the court still exercises a judicial discretion to grant or refuse condonation; sufficient cause does not create an absolute right to condonation.
Q13Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
The Explanation to Section 5 specifically protects an appellant or applicant who was misled in computing the prescribed period by:
aany order, practice or judgment of the High Court
bthe negligence of a court clerk in any subordinate court
can erroneous newspaper report of the law
dany wrong advice given by a private legal practitioner
Answer: A
The Explanation to Section 5 states that the fact of having been misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of the section.
Q14Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012), the Supreme Court addressed condonation of delay sought by government departments. It held that:
athe State is entitled to condonation as of right due to its impersonal bureaucratic machinery
bthe same yardstick of sufficient cause applies to the State, and condonation cannot be granted merely on the ground of departmental delay or red-tape without a reasonable explanation
cgovernment bodies cannot be granted any indulgence under Section 5 at all
ddelay by a government department is automatically excused if it does not exceed one year
Answer: B
Living Media India held that government departments must explain delay like any litigant; mere reliance on impersonal machinery, procedural red-tape or inter-departmental movement of files is no longer a sufficient or reasonable explanation.
Q15Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 9 of the Limitation Act provides that where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 9 is that legal disability extends limitation only when the disability:
aarises at any point before the suit is actually filed
bcontinues for at least three years after accrual of the cause of action
cexists at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned
dis certified by a medical board before limitation expires
Answer: C
Section 6 protects only a disability existing when the period of limitation first begins to run; Section 9 embodies the rule that a supervening disability, arising after time has started, cannot stop the running of limitation.
Q16Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 6(3) of the Limitation Act deals with the death of a disabled person while still under disability. In such a case, the legal representative claiming through him may institute the suit:
awithin three years from the date of death in every case
bonly after the legal representative's own disability, if any, ceases
cat any time, since death of a disabled person removes the bar entirely
dwithin the same period after the death as would otherwise have been allowed to the deceased from the time prescribed
Answer: D
Under Section 6(3), where the disabled person dies while still under disability, his legal representative may sue/apply after the death within the same period that would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed, reckoned from the death.
Q17Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Where, under Section 6(3), a legal representative through whom the claim devolves is himself under a disability on the date of the disabled person's death, the rules of Sections 6 and 7 are applied as if such legal representative were:
athe person originally entitled and under the disability
btreated as having no disability at all
cbarred from any extension because the chain of disability cannot continue
dgiven a fresh twelve-year period in all cases
Answer: A
Section 6(3) provides that where the legal representative is himself under disability on the date of death, the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 apply as if he were the person originally entitled and under the disability, allowing the chain of disability to continue.
Q18Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 8 of the Limitation Act, while limiting the benefit of disability under Sections 6 and 7, expressly excludes its operation in respect of:
asuits for recovery of possession of immovable property
bsuits to enforce a right of pre-emption
capplications for execution of a decree
dsuits for specific performance of a contract
Answer: B
Section 8 declares that nothing in Sections 6 and 7 applies to suits to enforce a right of pre-emption, and otherwise caps the extension at three years after the disability ceases.
Q19Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
The expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree' in Section 12(2) means:
aThe minimum time the appellant could possibly have taken if maximally diligent
bAny time the appellant chose to spend, including periods of his own default before applying
cThe time actually and necessarily occupied in the office's process of preparing the copy after the application, not delay due to the applicant's own default
dA fixed statutory period of 30 days irrespective of the actual time taken
Answer: C
'Time requisite' means the time properly required for obtaining the copy — the period actually and necessarily occupied after the application, excluding delay due to the applicant's own default (J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, AIR 1928 PC 103).
Q20Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
An applicant applied for a certified copy of the decree only several days after pronouncement of the judgment, instead of applying immediately. Regarding the period before he applied for the copy:
aThat pre-application period is also excluded as part of 'time requisite'
bThe entire period until the copy was actually collected is excluded irrespective of when he applied
cThe court must add an extra 30 days to compensate
dThat pre-application period is NOT excluded; only the period from the date of application till the copy was ready is the 'time requisite'
Answer: D
'Time requisite' under Section 12(2) runs from the date of the application for the copy; the delay in applying for the copy is the appellant's own and is not deductible (J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm).
Q21Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
The benefit of excluding 'time requisite for obtaining a copy' under Section 12(2) is available in computing limitation for:
aAppeals, applications for leave to appeal, and applications for revision or review of judgment — but NOT for ordinary suits
bSuits, appeals and all applications without distinction
cOnly first appeals
dOnly execution applications
Answer: A
Section 12(2) confines the copy-time benefit to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal, and an application for revision or for review of a judgment; ordinary suits get only the first-day exclusion under Section 12(1).
Q22Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in computing limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of which document is to be excluded?
aNo copy-time can be excluded for award matters
bA copy of the award
cA copy of the arbitration agreement only
dA copy of the cause-list only
Answer: B
Section 12(3) directs that where a copy of the award is required to be accompanied with the application, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall also be excluded.
Q23Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 12(4) deals with applications for review of judgment. Besides the day of pronouncement and the decree-copy time, the additional period to be excluded under Section 12(4) is the time requisite for obtaining a copy of:
aThe plaint
bThe cause-list entry
cThe judgment
dThe written statement
Answer: C
Section 12(4) provides that in computing limitation for an application for review of judgment, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded (in addition to the general decree-copy exclusion).
Q24Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for exclusion of time spent prosecuting, in good faith, an application for leave to sue or appeal as an indigent person (pauper). This exclusion applies where:
aThe pauper application has been granted, after deducting the court-fee that would have been paid had he not sued as a pauper
bOnly where the plaintiff was never an indigent person
cOnly in execution proceedings
dThe pauper application was rejected and the suit/appeal is then instituted on payment of court-fees, the time of bona fide prosecution of the pauper application being excluded
Answer: D
Section 13 allows exclusion of the time during which the applicant was prosecuting in good faith an application to sue/appeal as an indigent person, where that application is rejected and the suit/appeal is thereafter filed on payment of court fees.
Q25Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act allows exclusion, in computing limitation for a SUIT, of time spent prosecuting another civil proceeding. All the following conditions must be satisfied EXCEPT:
aThe prior proceeding was dismissed on the merits after a full trial
bThe prior proceeding was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith
cThe prior and later proceedings relate to the same matter in issue
dThe prior court was unable to entertain the matter from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature
Answer: A
Section 14 applies where the earlier proceeding failed for defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature (i.e., without a decision on merits); a dismissal on merits cannot attract Section 14.
Q26Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In Section 14, the words 'or other cause of a like nature' (following 'defect of jurisdiction') have been judicially construed to mean:
aAny reason whatsoever, including dismissal for default of appearance
bA cause analogous to a jurisdictional defect — read ejusdem generis, a defect preventing a decision on the merits
cOnly territorial-jurisdiction defects and nothing else
dOnly the death of the presiding judge
Answer: B
Applying ejusdem generis, 'other cause of a like nature' is read as analogous to defect of jurisdiction — a kindred defect that prevents the court from deciding on merits (India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh, AIR 1971 SC 2313).
Q27Acknowledgment & part payment (S18-19)
On a single debt, the debtor makes a first valid written acknowledgment before the original period expires, and then makes a second valid written acknowledgment before the fresh period (from the first) expires. What is the effect under Section 18?
aOnly the first acknowledgment counts; the second is disregarded
bThe second acknowledgment is void as it amounts to perpetuating a stale claim
cEach successive acknowledgment made before expiry of the then-running period starts a fresh period of limitation
dThe second acknowledgment must be registered to be effective
Answer: C
Section 18 permits successive acknowledgments: so long as each acknowledgment is made before the expiry of the limitation period then in force, it gives rise to a fresh period of limitation computed from each acknowledgment.
Q28Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for an acknowledgment of liability to extend the period of limitation, it must be made:
aAt any time, whether before or after the prescribed period has expired
bOnly within thirty days before the prescribed period expires
cOnly after the prescribed period has expired, provided it is in writing
dBefore the expiration of the prescribed period for the suit or application
Answer: D
Section 18 requires the acknowledgment to be made before the expiration of the prescribed period; an acknowledgment after the limitation has already run cannot revive a time-barred debt under S18.
Q29Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Which of the following requirements for a valid acknowledgment under Section 18 is INCORRECT?
aIt must specify the exact amount or quantum of the liability acknowledged
bIt must be in writing
cIt must be signed by the party against whom the right is claimed or his agent
dIt must be made before the expiry of the prescribed period
Answer: A
Explanation (a) to Section 18 provides that an acknowledgment may be sufficient even though it omits to specify the exact nature or amount of the liability; precise quantification is not required.
Q30Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
On a valid acknowledgment made under Section 18 before the expiry of limitation, a fresh period of limitation:
aBegins to run from the date of the original cause of action
bIs computed from the time the signed acknowledgment was made
cIs extended by a further period equal to the original period only
dDoes not commence afresh; only the running period is suspended
Answer: B
Section 18(1) provides that a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed, effectively giving a new starting point.
Q31Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Under Explanation (b) to Section 18, the word 'signed' means signed either personally or:
aBy any person who had knowledge of the liability
bOnly by a person holding a registered power of attorney
cBy an agent duly authorised in this behalf
dBy a legal heir of the party liable
Answer: C
Explanation (b) to Section 18 states that 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in that behalf.
Q32Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
An acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 is valid even if it is accompanied by:
aAn express statement that the debt is barred by limitation
bA condition that it shall not be used as an acknowledgment in any court
cAn oral promise to pay that contradicts the writing
dA refusal to pay, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the creditor
Answer: D
Explanation (a) to Section 18 expressly provides that an acknowledgment is valid even though it is accompanied by a refusal to pay, is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right.
Q33Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Under Section 18, an acknowledgment by an undated writing may be proved as to the date on which it was signed by:
aOral evidence of the time when it was signed
bThe party seeking to defeat limitation by leading no further evidence
cA presumption that it was signed on the last day of the prescribed period
dOnly documentary evidence bearing an official stamp
Answer: A
Explanation (c) to Section 18 permits oral evidence of the time when an undated writing purporting to be an acknowledgment was signed, but subject to the Indian Evidence Act regarding admissibility of oral evidence of contents of written documents.
Q34Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Which statement about the relationship between Section 3 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is correct?
aBoth Sections 3 and 27 merely bar the remedy
bSection 3 bars the remedy generally, whereas Section 27 is an exception under which the right to property is itself extinguished on lapse of the limitation period for a possessory suit
cSection 27 bars the remedy while Section 3 extinguishes the right
dSection 27 applies to all categories of suits in the Schedule
Answer: B
Ordinarily Section 3 bars only the remedy, but Section 27 is the recognised exception: where the period for a suit for possession of property expires, the right to that property is extinguished.
Q35Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A defendant raises the plea of limitation for the first time in second appeal, the question being a pure point of law not requiring fresh investigation of facts. The appellate court should:
aRefuse to entertain it because limitation was not pleaded earlier
bRemand the matter for a fresh trial on limitation in every case
cEntertain and decide it, since under Section 3 the court is bound to dismiss a barred suit whenever the bar appears, even if raised at a late stage on admitted facts
dTreat limitation as waived by the defendant's earlier silence
Answer: C
Since Section 3 obliges the court to dismiss a time-barred suit irrespective of any plea, a pure question of limitation arising on admitted facts can be raised and decided even at the appellate stage.
Q36Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
The expression 'prescribed period' as used in Section 3, read with Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, means:
aThe period of limitation computed in accordance with the Act, including any extension granted under Section 5
bOnly the bare period mentioned in the Schedule, ignoring Sections 12 to 24
cThe period fixed by the court in each individual case
dThe period of limitation computable under the provisions of the Act, but excluding any extension granted under Section 5
Answer: D
Section 2(j) defines 'period of limitation' as the period prescribed by the Schedule and 'prescribed period' as the period of limitation computed in accordance with the Act; condonation under Section 5 extends the time but does not form part of the prescribed period itself.
Q37Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A suit is filed after the prescribed period of limitation has expired, but the defendant does not raise the plea of limitation in his written statement nor at any stage of the trial. What is the duty of the court under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aThe court must dismiss the suit as barred by limitation even though no such defence was set up
bThe court must decree the suit since limitation is a personal defence that has been waived
cThe court may at its discretion either dismiss or proceed with the suit
dThe court must frame an issue and leave it to the defendant to prove the bar
Answer: A
Section 3(1) provides that every suit, appeal or application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence; the bar is mandatory and the court must apply it suo motu.
Q38Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Which of the following best states the effect of the expiry of the period of limitation on the substantive right of the creditor under the scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aIt extinguishes both the right and the remedy in all cases
bIt generally bars only the remedy and not the right, except where Section 27 applies
cIt extinguishes the right but preserves the remedy
dIt neither bars the remedy nor affects the right
Answer: B
Limitation bars the remedy but not the right; the debt subsists though unenforceable by suit. The sole exception is Section 27, where expiry of the period for a suit to recover possession of property extinguishes the right itself.
Q39Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A debt has become time-barred. The debtor nonetheless makes a fresh, unconditional written promise to pay it. Which of the following correctly describes the legal position?
aThe promise is void because limitation extinguishes the debt absolutely
bThe promise is unenforceable as it lacks consideration, the original debt being dead
cThe promise is enforceable under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, the original debt being only unenforceable, not extinguished
dThe promise merely extends limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act
Answer: C
Because Section 3 bars only the remedy and not the right, a time-barred debt remains a good consideration; a written signed promise to pay it is enforceable under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Q40Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
One co-owner is in sole possession and enjoyment of joint property for over twelve years. To claim adverse possession against the other co-owners, he must establish:
aMere exclusive possession and receipt of profits
bThat the other co-owners failed to demand partition
cPayment of the entire land revenue by him
dA clear and unequivocal ouster of the other co-owners brought to their knowledge
Answer: D
Possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all; to mature into adverse possession he must prove an open and unequivocal ouster of the other co-owners to their knowledge, mere exclusive enjoyment being insufficient.
Q41Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
In State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011), the Supreme Court observed regarding the State pleading adverse possession that:
aIt is rather peculiar and inappropriate for the State, as a welfare State, to grab citizens' property by pleading adverse possession
bThe State enjoys a longer 30-year period under all articles
cThe State can never lose its land to a private person by adverse possession
dAdverse possession against the State requires sixty years
Answer: A
In State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011), the Court strongly disapproved of the State invoking adverse possession against citizens, terming it inappropriate for a welfare State to seek to perfect title to a citizen's property in this manner.
Q42Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25–27)
Under Section 27 read with Article 65, the period of limitation for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title (against a private person in adverse possession) is:
aThree years
bTwelve years
cTwenty years
dThirty years
Answer: B
Article 65 prescribes a twelve-year period for a possession suit based on title against a private person; on its expiry Section 27 extinguishes the owner's title (the period being thirty years for suits by the Government under Article 112).
Q43Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, what is the legal consequence when the period of limitation for instituting a suit for possession of property expires?
aThe remedy is barred but the title of the dispossessed owner survives
bThe suit may still be filed with the court's leave
cThe right to such property is extinguished
dThe limitation period is automatically extended by three years
Answer: C
Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy; on expiry of the limitation period for a suit for possession, the owner's right to the property is itself extinguished.
Q44Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is generally regarded as the statutory basis for which doctrine?
aDoctrine of part performance
bDoctrine of lis pendens
cDoctrine of constructive notice
dDoctrine of acquisition of title by adverse possession
Answer: D
By extinguishing the true owner's right after limitation, Section 27 confers a substantive title on the adverse possessor, making it the statutory foundation of acquisition of ownership by possession.
Q45Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
To establish title by adverse possession, the possession must be shown to be:
aNec vi, nec clam, nec precario (without force, without secrecy, without permission)
bPermissive but open
cSecret yet continuous
dForcible but uninterrupted
Answer: A
Settled law (e.g., Karnataka Board of Wakf v. GOI) requires possession that is peaceful, open and continuous, classically expressed as nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.
Q46Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998), the Supreme Court held that the primary consideration in condonation of delay is:
aThe mere length of delay rather than the acceptability of the explanation
bThe acceptability of the explanation, since length of delay is no matter but acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion
cWhether the opposite party would suffer any inconvenience
dWhether the applicant is an indigent person
Answer: B
In N. Balakrishnan the Court held that the length of delay is no matter; what is decisive is the acceptability of the explanation, and the discretion under Section 5 is to be exercised to advance substantial justice.
Q47Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by its own terms applies to:
aSuits, appeals and all applications without exception
bOnly first appeals and not second appeals
cAppeals and applications (other than applications under Order XXI CPC), but not to suits
dOnly applications and not appeals
Answer: C
Section 5 expressly applies to appeals and applications other than an application under any provision of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure; it does not apply to suits, for which there is no power to condone delay.
Q48Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
A litigant who pursued a remedy in a wrong court in good faith and with due diligence seeks condonation of the consequent delay. The most appropriate position is that:
aTime spent in a wrong court can never be excluded under any circumstances
bSection 9 automatically stops limitation while the wrong proceedings continue
cOnly the High Court has power to condone such delay
dSuch bona fide prosecution in a wrong forum can constitute sufficient cause and the time so spent may be excluded under Section 14, with Section 5 supplementing where needed
Answer: D
Bona fide, diligent prosecution in a court without jurisdiction is excludable under Section 14, and the same diligence can constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5; the principles are read harmoniously to do substantial justice (Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary).
Q49Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which statement about the interplay of Section 9 with statutory acknowledgments and part-payments is correct?
aA valid acknowledgment under Section 18 or part-payment under Section 19 furnishes a fresh starting point, which is not contrary to Section 9 because it creates a new period rather than stopping a running one
bSection 9 prevents any fresh period of limitation from ever arising
cAcknowledgment merely suspends the running of time under Section 9
dPart-payment has no effect on limitation once Section 9 applies
Answer: A
Section 9 only forbids stopping time once it runs; it does not prohibit a fresh period commencing. A valid acknowledgment (Section 18) or part-payment (Section 19) before expiry starts a new limitation period and is fully consistent with Section 9.
Q50Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The discretionary power to condone delay for 'sufficient cause' is best described as:
aAn absolute right of the litigant that the court must always grant
bA judicial discretion to be exercised on sound principles, neither arbitrary nor a matter of right, and ordinarily not interfered with in appeal unless perverse
cA purely ministerial function with no element of discretion
dExercisable only once in the life of a proceeding
Answer: B
Condonation under Section 5 is a judicial discretion to be exercised on sound and reasonable principles in furtherance of justice; it is not a litigant's right, and an appellate court generally does not disturb its exercise unless it is perverse or arbitrary.
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