Limitation Act, 1963 Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
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Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, what is the period of limitation for a suit by a plaintiff for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title, when he has been dispossessed (Article 64)?
a12 years from the date of dispossession
b3 years from the date of dispossession
c6 years from the date of dispossession
d12 years from the date the defendant's possession became adverse
Answer: A
Article 64 prescribes 12 years for a possessory suit (based on previous possession, not title) running from the date of dispossession. Article 65 (title suits) runs 12 years from when possession becomes adverse, which is the distinguishing point.
For a suit for possession of immovable property based on title (Article 65), the limitation is 12 years computed from which point?
aFrom the date of the plaintiff's dispossession
bFrom the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff
cFrom the date the plaintiff acquired title
dFrom the date the cause of action accrued generally
Answer: B
Article 65 fixes 12 years running from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff, not from dispossession. Mere possession by another is not enough; it must be adverse.
What is the period of limitation for a suit for compensation for breach of any contract, express or implied, not specifically provided for elsewhere in the Schedule (Article 55)?
a1 year
b6 years
c3 years
d12 years
Answer: C
Article 55 prescribes 3 years for a suit for compensation for breach of contract, running from the date the contract is broken (or when breach is repeated, from each breach, or when performance is refused).
Under Article 58 (residuary article for declaratory and other suits not otherwise provided for), the limitation period and starting point are:
a6 years from when the right to sue first accrues
b3 years from when the right to sue accrues
c1 year from when the right to sue first accrues
d3 years from when the right to sue first accrues
Answer: D
Article 58 (the residuary 'to obtain any other declaration' article) prescribes 3 years from when the right to sue 'first' accrues — the word 'first' means the earliest accrual starts the clock, unlike Article 56 etc.
What is the limitation period for an application for execution of a decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court under Article 136?
a12 years from the date the decree or order becomes enforceable
b3 years from the date of the decree
c6 years from the date of the decree
d30 years from the date of the decree
Answer: A
Article 136 provides 12 years for execution of a decree/order (other than a mandatory injunction decree), running from when the decree becomes enforceable, or where payable in instalments, when default occurs.
A money decree directs payment by 'X' on a future date. For execution of a mandatory injunction decree, the limitation under Article 135 is:
a12 years from when the decree becomes enforceable
b3 years from the date of the decree or, where a date is fixed for performance, that date
c30 years from the date of the decree
d1 year from the date of the decree
Answer: B
Article 135 carves out the execution of a decree granting a mandatory injunction from the 12-year Article 136 rule, prescribing 3 years from the date of the decree or, if a date is fixed for performance, that date.
Under the Schedule, the limitation for an appeal to a High Court from a decree or order (Article 116, when the High Court is the appellate court for a subordinate court's decree) is:
a30 days
b60 days
c90 days
d120 days
Answer: C
Article 116 prescribes 90 days for an appeal to a High Court from a decree or order, running from the date of the decree or order; appeals to other courts (Article 116(b)) are 30 days.
What is the period of limitation for an application to set aside an ex parte decree, or to re-hear an appeal decided ex parte, under Article 123?
a60 days from the date of the decree
b90 days from the date of the decree
c30 days from the date of knowledge in all cases
d30 days from the date of the decree or, where summons was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree
Answer: D
Article 123 prescribes 30 days running from the date of the decree, but where the summons or notice was not duly served, time runs from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree (Explanation: substituted service is not 'due service' for this purpose).
Which articles of the Schedule govern an application to set aside an abatement and an application to set aside the dismissal of a suit for non-substitution of a legal representative, and what is the period for each?
aArticle 121 — set aside abatement, 60 days; Article 122 — set aside dismissal, 60 days
bArticle 124 — set aside abatement, 30 days; Article 125 — set aside dismissal, 30 days
cArticle 121 — set aside abatement, 90 days; Article 122 — set aside dismissal, 90 days
dArticle 137 — both, 3 years
Answer: A
Article 121 prescribes 60 days to set aside an abatement (from the date of abatement) and Article 122 prescribes 60 days to set aside the dismissal of a suit for failure to substitute a legal representative (from the date of dismissal).
What is the limitation for an application for review of a judgment by a court other than the Supreme Court, under Article 124 of the Schedule?
a60 days from the date of the decree or order
b90 days from the date of the decree or order
c30 days from the date of the decree or order
d20 days from the date of the decree or order
Answer: B
Article 124 prescribes 90 days for an application for review of judgment by a court other than the Supreme Court, running from the date of the decree or order sought to be reviewed.
Q11Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A minor's right to sue for possession (ordinary limitation 12 years) accrues on 1 January 2005. He attains majority on 1 January 2021, i.e. 16 years after accrual. Applying Section 6 read with the cap in Section 8, by when must he sue?
aby 1 January 2017 (12 years from accrual)
bthe suit is already barred and no extension is available
cby 1 January 2024 (three years after attaining majority)
dby 1 January 2033 (12 years from majority)
Answer: C
Although the ordinary 12-year period from accrual expired in 2017 during minority, Section 6 keeps the right alive and Section 8 allows up to three years after the disability ceases; three years from majority (1-1-2021) gives until 1-1-2024.
Q12Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Under Section 7, where several persons are jointly entitled and the disabled person is the manager (karta) of a Hindu joint family whose concurrence is necessary for a discharge, the effect is that:
atime runs against all the joint claimants from the date of accrual
bonly the manager's individual share is protected, the rest are barred
cSection 7 has no application to a Hindu joint family
dtime does not run against any of them until the disability of the manager ceases or a discharge can be validly given
Answer: D
Section 7 provides that where a discharge cannot be given without the concurrence of the disabled person (such as the karta whose concurrence is essential), time does not run against any of the joint claimants until that disability ceases or a competent discharge becomes possible.
Q13Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998), explaining the object of the law of limitation in the context of Section 5, the Supreme Court observed that rules of limitation:
aare not meant to destroy the rights of parties but to see that they do not resort to dilatory tactics, and the acceptability of the explanation is the criterion
bare meant to destroy the rights of the parties on the lapse of time
ccreate a vested right in the opposite party that can never be defeated by condonation
drequire the length of delay to be the decisive factor in every case
Answer: A
N. Balakrishnan held that limitation law fixes a lifespan for legal remedies for the public good but is not meant to destroy parties' rights; what matters is the acceptability of the explanation, not the mere length of delay.
Q14Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 6 confers the benefit of legal disability only in respect of certain proceedings. It does NOT extend the period of limitation for:
aa suit by the disabled person
ban appeal preferred by the disabled person
can application by the disabled person for execution of a decree
deither a suit or an execution application
Answer: B
Section 6 protects only a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for execution of a decree; it does not apply to appeals, for which Section 5 (condonation on sufficient cause) is the relevant provision.
Q15Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Two minors, X and Y, are jointly entitled to sue and a valid discharge of the claim cannot be given without the concurrence of both. X attains majority in 2022 while Y remains a minor until 2025. Under Section 7, time begins to run against the joint claim:
ain 2022, when X (one of them) attains majority
bfrom the original accrual, since two minors cannot claim the benefit
cin 2025, when the disability of the last of them (Y) ceases
dseparately for each, running independently from each one's majority
Answer: C
Under Section 7, where no discharge can be given without the concurrence of the disabled persons, time does not run against the joint claim until the disability of the last of them ceases — here, when Y attains majority in 2025.
Q16Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
A defendant resists a Section 5 application contending that the appellant's delay was caused by his own gross negligence and want of bona fides, even though some 'cause' is shown. The most accurate statement of the law is:
aAny cause, however negligent, must be accepted under a liberal approach
bNegligence of the party is wholly irrelevant under Section 5
cSufficient cause is conclusively established once any reason is offered on affidavit
dSufficient cause connotes a cause beyond the party's control and free from negligence or want of bona fides; want of bona fides or culpable negligence can defeat the plea
Answer: D
Though 'sufficient cause' is construed liberally, it requires a cause that is bona fide and not the result of the party's own negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides; such factors (as in Esha Bhattacharjee and allied cases) can justify refusal of condonation.
Q17Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
An applicant files an appeal 40 days beyond the prescribed period and seeks condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Which of the following best states what the applicant must establish?
aThat he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period
bThat the delay was not deliberate and the opposite party suffered no prejudice
cThat the delay was caused by his lawyer alone
dThat substantial justice requires admission irrespective of any explanation
Answer: A
Section 5 permits an appeal/application (not suit) to be admitted after the prescribed period only if the appellant satisfies the court that he had "sufficient cause" for the delay; the test is sufficient cause for not filing in time.
Q18Condonation of delay (S5) & legal disability (S6–8)
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, by its own terms, is NOT available to which of the following?
aAn appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure
bA suit instituted beyond the period of limitation
cAn application for review
dAn application for leave to appeal
Answer: B
Section 5 applies only to appeals and applications (other than under Order XXI CPC); it does not apply to suits, for which delay cannot be condoned.
Q19Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Karnataka (2008), the Supreme Court held that the principle of Section 14 (exclusion of time spent bona fide before a wrong forum):
aHas no application to applications under special statutes
bCan be invoked only through Section 5, never Section 14
cApplies to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, since Section 14 advances the cause of justice and is not expressly excluded by the 1996 Act
dApplies only to suits and never to applications
Answer: C
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Karnataka (2008) 7 SCC 169, the Supreme Court held the principle of Section 14 applies to Section 34 arbitration applications, the provision being intended to advance justice and not excluded by the 1996 Act.
Q20Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Which statement correctly distinguishes Section 5 from Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aSection 14 requires proof of 'sufficient cause' and is discretionary, while Section 5 is a mandatory exclusion
bBoth operate identically in every respect
cSection 14 applies only to appeals and Section 5 only to suits
dSection 5 confers discretion to condone delay on 'sufficient cause', whereas Section 14 mandatorily excludes the time spent once its conditions are satisfied, leaving no discretion
Answer: D
Section 14 operates as a mandatory exclusion of time once its conditions (good faith, due diligence, same matter, defect of jurisdiction/like cause) are met, unlike the discretionary condonation for 'sufficient cause' under Section 5.
Q21Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act excludes time during which the institution of a suit or execution has been stayed by an injunction or order. The period of exclusion is:
aThe time during which the stay was in force, including the day on which it was issued and the day on which it was withdrawn
bOnly the day on which the stay was granted
cThe entire pendency of the main suit irrespective of any stay
dNo time at all; a stay is irrelevant to limitation
Answer: A
Section 15(1) excludes the time during which institution was stayed by injunction or order; the excluded period includes the day on which the order was issued/made and the day on which it was withdrawn.
Q22Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(2), in computing limitation for a suit for which (i) notice has been given, or (ii) the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any authority is required, the period excluded is:
aSix months from the date of the cause of action
bThe period of such notice, or the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction
cThe entire period of correspondence with the defendant
dThirty days in every case
Answer: B
Section 15(2) excludes the period of notice (where notice of suit is mandatory) or the time required for obtaining the requisite consent or sanction of the Government/authority before instituting the suit.
Q23Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 15(3), in computing limitation for a suit or application for execution by a receiver or interim receiver appointed in insolvency proceedings (or a liquidator), what is excluded?
aNo time is excluded for such persons
bOnly the day of the appointment order
cThe time during which a proceeding to appoint such receiver/liquidator was pending, and the time before he was duly authorised to act
dSix months from the order of appointment
Answer: C
Section 15(3) excludes the time during which the proceeding to appoint the receiver/liquidator was pending and the time before he was duly authorised to act, since he could not have sued earlier.
Q24Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Section 15(4) applies where a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree later finds the sale set aside. In computing limitation for his suit for possession, the period excluded is:
aNo exclusion is allowed to such a purchaser
bThe entire period for which the purchaser held possession
cThree years from the date of the auction
dThe time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted
Answer: D
Section 15(4) provides that, in computing limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at an execution sale, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale was prosecuted shall be excluded.
Q25Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
In computing the period of limitation for an appeal under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which of the following is to be EXCLUDED?
aThe day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from
bOnly the day from which the period is to be reckoned
cThe time requisite for obtaining a copy of the plaint
dThe entire vacation period of the appellate court
Answer: A
Section 12(1) excludes the day on which the period is to be reckoned (day of pronouncement), and Section 12(2) excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment appealed from.
Q26Computation of period — exclusions (S12–15)
Under Section 12(2), where the court delivers the judgment and the decree is drawn up later, the time requisite for obtaining the copy is computed from:
aThe date of pronouncement of the judgment in every case
bThe date the application for the copy is made, and continues until the copy is ready for delivery
cThe date the decree is signed only
dThe date the appeal memorandum is filed
Answer: B
The time requisite under Section 12(2) runs from the date the application for a certified copy is filed until the copy is ready/delivered; days before the application (when no copy was sought) are not part of the requisite time.
Q27Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
For an acknowledgment under Section 18 to operate, the essential requirement as to the relationship in time is that there must be:
aAn unconditional promise to pay supported by fresh consideration
bA statement under oath before a magistrate
cAdmission of a subsisting jural relationship and a conscious or implied intention to admit it
dA formal demand for payment by the creditor first
Answer: C
As held in Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, an acknowledgment must indicate the existence of a subsisting jural relationship (debtor-creditor) and an intention, express or implied, to admit that relationship.
Q28Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the effect of payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy. For a fresh period of limitation to start under Section 19, what is mandatory?
aOnly the payment itself, whether or not any writing exists
bPayment of at least half the principal amount
cAn oral acknowledgment by the debtor before two witnesses
dThe fact of payment must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making it
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 19 requires that an acknowledgment of the payment must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment; the mere fact of payment is not enough by itself.
Q29Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Under Section 19, where part payment of a debt is made before the expiry of the prescribed period, the fresh period of limitation is computed from:
aThe time when the payment was made
bThe date the creditor demands the balance
cThe date of the original loan
dThe date the written acknowledgment of payment is registered
Answer: A
Section 19 provides that where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made.
Q30Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
A debtor pays interest on a loan and the fact of payment is endorsed on the promissory note but the endorsement is in the creditor's handwriting and is not signed by the debtor. The effect under Section 19 is that:
aLimitation is extended because part payment by itself suffices
bLimitation is NOT extended, as the proviso requires the writing to be in the handwriting of or signed by the person making the payment
cLimitation is extended because the creditor's endorsement is sufficient proof
dLimitation is extended only if the endorsement is dated
Answer: B
Under the proviso to Section 19, the acknowledgment of payment must appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment (the debtor); a writing only in the creditor's hand and unsigned by the debtor does not satisfy the section.
Q31Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Which of the following correctly distinguishes Section 18 from Section 19?
aSection 18 deals with payment of a debt while Section 19 deals with written acknowledgment of liability
bUnder Section 18 the acknowledgment must be signed by the party; under Section 19 the payment may itself extend limitation even without any writing
cUnder Section 18 there must be a signed acknowledgment of liability; under Section 19 it is the part payment (proved by writing in the payer's hand/signed) that extends limitation
dBoth sections require registration of the document acknowledging liability
Answer: C
Section 18 concerns a signed written acknowledgment of liability, whereas Section 19 concerns payment on account of a debt or interest on a legacy, the fact of which must appear in the payer's handwriting or a writing signed by him.
Q32Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does NOT apply to which of the following?
aSuits for recovery of money on a promissory note
bSuits for possession based on title where the limitation is governed by Article 65
cSuits for the price of goods sold and delivered
dApplications for execution of a decree under Order XXI
Answer: D
Section 18(2) expressly excludes applications for execution of decrees; acknowledgment under S18 applies to suits and applications generally but not to applications for the execution of a decree or order.
Q33Acknowledgment & part payment (S18–19)
P owes Q a debt. Before limitation expires, P writes to a third party R stating, 'I still owe Q the loan amount but I will not pay until he returns my documents.' In a suit by Q against P, this writing:
aIs a valid acknowledgment under Section 18, extending limitation
bIs no acknowledgment because it is addressed to R and not to Q
cIs no acknowledgment because it is coupled with a refusal to pay
dIs valid only if R consents to its use in court
Answer: A
Under Explanation (a) to Section 18, an acknowledgment is valid even though coupled with a refusal to pay and even though addressed to a person other than the creditor; P's signed writing admits a subsisting liability.
Q34Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
In computing the 'prescribed period' for the purpose of dismissing a suit under Section 3, the court must:
aIgnore the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 and look only at the Schedule
bApply Sections 4 to 24 as the period of limitation is the period computed in accordance with those sections
cApply only Section 5 relating to condonation of delay
dTreat the period in the Schedule as final and non-extendable
Answer: B
Section 2(j) defines 'period of limitation' as the period prescribed by the Schedule and 'prescribed period' as the period computed in accordance with the Act; thus the exclusions and extensions in Sections 4 to 24 are read into Section 3 before deciding whether the suit is barred.
Q35Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
For the purposes of the bar of limitation under Section 3(2), a suit is deemed to have been 'instituted' in an ordinary case:
aOn the date the summons is served on the defendant
bOn the date the plaint is admitted by the court
cWhen the plaint is presented to the proper officer
dOn the date the first hearing is fixed
Answer: C
Section 3(2)(a) provides that a suit is instituted, in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; this is the relevant date for testing whether the suit is within time.
Q36Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
Under Section 3(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, a set-off or a counter-claim is treated as a separate suit and deemed to have been instituted, respectively, on which dates?
aSet-off on the date of the written statement; counter-claim on the date the suit was instituted
bBoth on the date the original suit was instituted
cBoth on the date the written statement is filed
dSet-off on the date the suit was instituted; counter-claim on the date it is made in court
Answer: D
Section 3(2)(b) deems a set-off instituted on the same date as the suit, while a counter-claim is deemed instituted on the date it is made in court; this difference can decide whether a counter-claim is time-barred.
Q37Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
The principle that limitation bars the remedy but does not destroy the right (subject to Section 27) was authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in which decision?
aBombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay (1958)
bCollector of Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)
cN. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998)
dPopat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. (2005)
Answer: A
In Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court held that the law of limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right; the debt subsists though it cannot be recovered by suit.
Q38Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A money decree is passed by a court in favour of P even though P's suit was, on the face of the plaint, barred by limitation, and the defendant had not pleaded limitation. The court overlooked the bar. Which statement is most accurate?
aThe decree is a nullity and can be ignored in execution
bThe decree, though erroneous for ignoring Section 3, is not a nullity and binds the parties unless set aside in appeal/revision
cThe decree can be reopened at any time because Section 3 is mandatory
dThe executing court must refuse to execute it as it offends Section 3
Answer: B
Failure to apply Section 3 is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not a lack of jurisdiction; the resulting decree is erroneous but not void, and must be corrected by appeal or revision rather than treated as a nullity in execution.
Q39Bar of limitation & effect of expiry (S3)
A appeal is presented before the appellate court after the prescribed period, accompanied by an application under Section 5 for condonation of delay. Until that application is decided, can the bar in Section 3 be said to apply?
aYes, the appeal must be dismissed at once under Section 3 regardless of the Section 5 application
bYes, but only if the respondent objects to limitation
cNo, because Section 3 operates 'subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24', so the court must first decide the condonation application
dNo, because Section 3 has no application to appeals
Answer: C
Section 3(1) operates 'subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24'; therefore the mandatory dismissal cannot be applied until the prayer for condonation under Section 5 is first considered and decided.
Q40Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004), the Supreme Court held that a plea of adverse possession requires the claimant to prove the 'animus possidendi'. This means:
aMere physical possession for the statutory period
bPossession taken with the owner's implied consent
cPossession coupled with payment of rent
dA hostile intention to possess to the exclusion of, and adverse to, the true owner
Answer: D
Animus possidendi denotes the conscious, hostile intention to hold the property as one's own to the exclusion of the true owner, an essential ingredient of adverse possession.
Q41Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
What is the period of limitation prescribed by Article 65 of the Schedule for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, against which adverse possession may be pleaded?
a12 years from when possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff
b3 years from dispossession
c6 years from dispossession
d30 years from dispossession
Answer: A
Article 65 prescribes 12 years for a suit for possession based on title, the period running from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Q42Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
A key distinction between Article 64 and Article 65 of the Schedule (relating to possession suits) is that:
aBoth run from the date of dispossession
bArticle 64 is based on previous possession with limitation running from dispossession, while Article 65 is based on title with limitation running from when possession becomes adverse
cArticle 65 is based on prior possession and Article 64 on title
dArticle 64 prescribes 30 years and Article 65 prescribes 12 years
Answer: B
Article 64 (possessory title, 12 years) runs from the date of dispossession, whereas Article 65 (title) runs from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Q43Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
In a suit governed by Article 65, where does the burden of proving the starting point of the limitation period lie?
aOn the plaintiff to prove possession within 12 years
bEqually on both parties
cOn the defendant who pleads and proves adverse possession
dOn the court to determine suo motu
Answer: C
Unlike Article 142 of the old Act, under Article 65 the plaintiff need only prove title; the burden of proving adverse possession (and thus when limitation began) lies on the defendant who asserts it.
Q44Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
In Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019), the Supreme Court held that a person who has perfected title by adverse possession:
aCan use it only as a shield in defence, never as a sword
bCannot claim any title at all, only immunity from suit
cAcquires title only if the true owner consents
dCan file a suit to protect or recover possession as a plaintiff, using adverse possession as the basis of title
Answer: D
Ravinder Kaur Grewal overruled earlier doubts and held that adverse possession can be used as a sword: a person who perfected such title may sue to recover possession if subsequently dispossessed.
Q45Fraud, acquisition of ownership by possession / adverse possession (S25-27)
Possession that originates as permissive (e.g., a tenant or licensee) can become adverse only when:
aThere is an open and hostile assertion of an adverse right brought to the knowledge of the true owner
bThe statutory 12-year period from entry expires automatically
cThe permission is renewed
dRent ceases to be demanded by the owner
Answer: A
Permissive possession never ripens into adverse possession by mere lapse of time; there must be an overt, hostile disclaimer of the owner's title, communicated to or known by the owner.
Q46Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the principle that "once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit stops it" is subject to which express statutory exception?
aWhere the debtor acknowledges the debt in writing
bWhere letters of administration to the estate of a creditor are granted to his debtor
cWhere the plaintiff was a minor when the cause of action accrued
dWhere part-payment of the principal is made by the debtor
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 9 carves out the only exception: where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor are granted to his debtor, the running of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues.
Q47Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Time begins to run against A for a suit on 1 January 2020. On 1 March 2020, A becomes of unsound mind. Applying Section 9, what is the effect on the limitation period?
aLimitation is suspended for the duration of A's unsoundness of mind
bA fresh period of limitation begins once A recovers
cTime continues to run notwithstanding A's subsequent unsoundness of mind
dThe period is extended by the number of days A remained of unsound mind
Answer: C
Section 9 provides that where time has once begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it; subsequent unsoundness of mind (a disability arising after accrual) does not halt the running of limitation.
Q48Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
Which of the following correctly distinguishes the scope of Section 9 from Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aSection 9 applies to disability existing at the date of accrual, while Section 6 applies to disability arising afterwards
bBoth sections deal exclusively with disability arising after the suit is filed
cSection 9 extends time for minors, while Section 6 deals only with insolvents
dSection 6 gives relief for disability existing at the time the cause of action accrued, whereas Section 9 denies relief for disability arising after time has begun to run
Answer: D
Section 6 protects a person under disability (minority, insanity, idiocy) at the time the right to sue accrues, while Section 9 declares that a disability or inability supervening after time has begun to run cannot stop it.
Q49Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
The expression "continuous running of time" under Section 9 means that the limitation period, once it has commenced, runs without interruption EXCEPT where:
aA statute expressly provides for exclusion, suspension or a fresh start of time
bThe defendant is absent from India
cThe plaintiff is engaged in bona fide negotiations for settlement
dThe court is closed during long vacation
Answer: A
Section 9 embodies the rule of continuous running, which can only be displaced by an express statutory provision (e.g., Sections 12-18 for exclusion/acknowledgment) or the proviso to Section 9 itself; equitable considerations do not stop time.
Q50Continuous running of time (S9) & sufficient cause
In the context of condonation of delay, the phrase "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been judicially interpreted (as in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji) to require courts to adopt:
aA strict and pedantic approach favouring finality of judgments
bA liberal, justice-oriented approach so that substantial justice is preferred over technical considerations
cAn approach that automatically condones every delay by the State
dAn approach where length of delay alone is decisive
Answer: B
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987), the Supreme Court held that "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice, since refusing condonation defeats the cause on a technicality.
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