Specific Relief Act, 1963 Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this subject test with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a topic-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
50
Questions
6
Topics
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
Q1Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the enforcement of specific performance of a contract under the substituted Section 10 is made expressly subject to which of the following provisions?
aSections 11(2), 14 and 16
bSections 9, 14 and 20
cSections 11(2), 12 and 41
dSections 14, 16 and 20
Answer: A
The substituted Section 10 mandates that a court 'shall enforce' specific performance of a contract subject only to the provisions of Section 11(2), Section 14 and Section 16 of the Act.
Q2Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which statement best describes the principal change made to Section 10 by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018?
aIt abolished the remedy of specific performance for movable property
bIt converted specific performance from a discretionary remedy into a remedy the court must enforce, subject to the statutory exceptions
cIt made specific performance available only where damages are an inadequate remedy
dIt made specific performance available only for contracts relating to immovable property
Answer: B
The amendment recast specific performance from a discretionary equitable remedy into an enforceable right ('shall be enforced'), removing the court's discretion and the 'adequacy of damages' inquiry, subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16.
Q3Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under the pre-2018 Section 10, the Explanation created a rebuttable presumption regarding adequacy of compensation. What was the effect of the 2018 amendment on this Explanation?
aIt was retained but made irrebuttable
bIt was extended to cover movable property as well
cIt was deleted, so the adequacy-of-money inquiry is no longer relevant to grant of specific performance
dIt was transferred to Section 14
Answer: C
The Explanation to old Section 10 (presuming damages inadequate for immovable property breaches) was deleted by the 2018 amendment; after the amendment the question whether money will afford adequate relief is no longer relevant.
Q4Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Regarding the applicability of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 making specific performance mandatory, the Supreme Court has held that the amendment:
aApplies retrospectively to all pending suits
bApplies only to contracts relating to infrastructure projects
cApplies retrospectively only where the contract is for immovable property
dApplies prospectively and does not govern transactions that took place before 1 October 2018
Answer: D
The Supreme Court held the 2018 amendment, creating substantive rights, operates prospectively and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on 1 October 2018.
Q5Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 11, after the 2018 amendment, a contract the performance of which is wholly or partly in performance of a trust:
aShall be specifically enforced, except as otherwise provided in the Act
bMay, in the discretion of the court, be specifically enforced
cCan never be specifically enforced
dCan be enforced only with the consent of all beneficiaries
Answer: A
The 2018 amendment substituted 'contract may, in the discretion of the court' with 'contract shall', so Section 11(1) now mandates enforcement of acts done in performance of a trust, except as otherwise provided in the Act.
Q6Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A and B are trustees empowered to sell trust property worth one lakh rupees; they contract to sell it to C for Rs. 30,000. C sues for specific performance. Which provision governs and what is the result?
aSection 10; the contract must be enforced as specific performance is now mandatory
bSection 11(2); the contract cannot be enforced as it is in breach of trust
cSection 14(d); the contract is determinable and unenforceable
dSection 12; only part of the contract can be enforced
Answer: B
Section 11(2) bars specific enforcement of a contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers or in breach of trust; selling lakh-rupee property for Rs. 30,000 is so disadvantageous as to be a breach of trust.
Q7Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12, where a party is unable to perform a small proportion of the contract in value which admits of compensation in money, specific performance of the remainder:
aCannot be granted at all, as the court shall not decree part performance
bMay be granted only at the suit of the defaulting party
cMay be granted at the suit of either party, with compensation in money for the deficiency
dMay be granted only if the plaintiff relinquishes all claim to compensation
Answer: C
Section 12(2) allows the court, at the suit of either party, to direct specific performance of so much as can be performed and award compensation for the small, money-compensable deficiency.
Q8Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(3), where the unperformed part forms a considerable part of the whole but admits of compensation in money, the party in default may be directed to perform the part he can perform only if the other party, among other things:
aPays the full consideration for the whole contract without any abatement
bFurnishes security for the unperformed portion
cObtains the consent of the court before the suit is filed
dPays the agreed consideration for the whole reduced by the consideration for the part left unperformed, and relinquishes all claims to the remaining performance and to compensation
Answer: D
Under Section 12(3)(i) for a clause (a) case, the plaintiff pays consideration for the whole reduced by that for the unperformed part, and under 12(3)(ii) must relinquish all claims to the remaining performance and to compensation.
Q9Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(4), where a part of a contract that can and ought to be specifically performed stands on a separate and independent footing from another part that cannot or ought not be performed, the court:
aMay direct specific performance of the former part
bMust refuse specific performance of the entire contract
cMay enforce the whole contract only with compensation
dMust refer the matter to arbitration
Answer: A
Section 12(4) permits the court to direct specific performance of a severable part that stands on a separate and independent footing from a part which cannot or ought not be performed.
Q10Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
For Section 12(4) to apply to a divisible contract, which of the following set of conditions must be satisfied?
aThe contract is for immovable property, both parts are equal in value, and money compensation is adequate
bThe contract can be split into parts; one part is by itself capable of and ought to be specifically performed; and that part stands on a separate and independent footing
cThe plaintiff has paid the entire consideration and the defendant is in possession
dThe contract is determinable and the unperformed part admits of compensation
Answer: B
Courts (AIR 1965 Mad 188) lay down three conditions for Section 12(4): the contract can be split into parts; one part is itself capable of and ought to be specifically performed; and it stands on a separate and independent footing from the rest.
Q11Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 13(1)(c), where a vendor professes to sell unencumbered property which is in fact mortgaged for an amount not exceeding the purchase money and he has only a right to redeem, the purchaser may:
aOnly claim a refund of his deposit with interest
bCompel the mortgagee directly to convey the property to him
cCompel the vendor to redeem the mortgage, obtain a valid discharge and, where necessary, a conveyance from the mortgagee
dRescind the contract and claim damages only
Answer: C
Section 13(1)(c) entitles the purchaser to compel the vendor to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge, and where necessary also a conveyance from the mortgagee.
Q12Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 13(1)(d), where a vendor sues for specific performance and the suit is dismissed on the ground of his want of or imperfect title, the defendant purchaser is entitled to:
aSpecific performance of the contract against the true owner
bDouble the amount of his deposit as agreed liquidated damages
cPossession of the property until the vendor perfects his title
dReturn of his deposit with interest, his costs of suit, and a lien for these on the vendor's interest, if any, in the property
Answer: D
Section 13(1)(d) gives the defendant a right to return of his deposit with interest, his costs of the suit, and a lien for such deposit, interest and costs on the vendor's or lessor's interest in the property.
Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by:
ainjunction, temporary or perpetual
ban award of compensation only
ca decree of specific performance only
drescission of the contract
Answer: A
Section 36 provides that preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. Injunction is the form of specific relief by which a party is restrained from, or compelled to do, an act.
Which statement about temporary and perpetual injunctions under Section 37 is correct?
aBoth temporary and perpetual injunctions are governed exclusively by the Specific Relief Act
bA temporary injunction continues until a specified time or further order and is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, while a perpetual injunction is granted by decree at the hearing on the merits
cA perpetual injunction may be granted at any stage before the suit is decided
dA temporary injunction can only be granted after final decree
Answer: B
Section 37 provides that temporary injunctions continue until a specified time or further order and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Order XXXIX), whereas a perpetual injunction is granted by the decree made at the hearing and on the merits of the suit.
A plaintiff suing for specific performance of a contract of sale apprehends that the defendant will dispose of the subject-matter pending trial. The appropriate relief the court may grant is:
aa perpetual injunction immediately by decree
ba mandatory injunction directing the sale deed to be executed at once
ca temporary injunction in aid of specific performance restraining removal or disposal of the subject-matter pending trial
dno injunction, since damages are the only remedy
Answer: C
The court may grant a temporary injunction in aid of specific performance, e.g. to restrain removal or disposal of the subject-matter of the contract pending trial (CPC Order XXXIX; Rajeev Singh v Gurmeet Singh, AIR 1998 Del 384).
Performance of a negative obligation in a contract — for instance restraining a defendant from committing a breach of a negative term — is most appropriately compelled by:
aspecific performance of a positive obligation
brescission of the contract
ca declaratory decree
dan injunction
Answer: D
Performance of a contract may in certain cases be compelled by injunction rather than by specific performance, viz. for restraining a defendant from committing a breach of a negative obligation (S42), specific performance being the proper method for positive obligations.
An employee's contract of personal service contains a covenant not to take up employment with a competitor during the term. Which is the correct position regarding enforcement by injunction?
aAn injunction may sometimes enforce such a negative covenant even though the contract of personal service is not itself directly enforceable by specific performance
bThe contract of personal service itself can be specifically enforced
cNeither injunction nor specific performance can ever be considered
dOnly a mandatory injunction compelling the employee to work can be granted
Answer: A
An injunction may be issued to enforce covenants the court would not enforce directly by specific performance, e.g. a covenant against accepting employment with a competitor, even though a contract of personal service is not directly enforceable (Adhunik Steels Ltd v Orissa Manganese & Minerals, (2007) 7 SCC 125).
Where a licensor seeks to evict a licensee within a reasonable time after the licence term is over, the relief he seeks is in substance:
aa perpetual injunction restraining the licensee from using the property
ba mandatory injunction (though possession must be sought thereafter, since the licensee becomes a trespasser)
ca temporary injunction only
dspecific performance of the licence agreement
Answer: B
Where a licensor seeks to evict the licensee within reasonable time after the licence term is over, he seeks a mandatory injunction; thereafter he must seek the relief of possession because the licensee becomes a trespasser (Joseph Severance v Benny Mathew, (2005) 7 SCC 667).
A plaintiff in fact out of possession frames his suit as one for a 'mandatory injunction' when in substance it is a suit for recovery of possession. The court's correct approach is to:
adismiss the suit because a mandatory injunction can never relate to possession
bconvert it automatically into a suit for specific performance
cnot deny the relief merely because the plaint is couched as a suit for mandatory injunction, treating it according to its true nature
dgrant a perpetual injunction instead
Answer: C
Where a suit is in effect one for possession, the relief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a suit for mandatory injunction (Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857).
A plaintiff seeks to enforce an agreement to sell immovable property by praying for a mandatory injunction rather than specific performance. The correct legal position is that:
athis is permissible and the relief is interchangeable
bonly a temporary injunction can be granted
cthe court must grant a perpetual injunction
dthe proper relief is a suit for specific performance, and the plaintiff cannot obtain specific performance of an agreement to sell by couching the relief as one for mandatory injunction
Answer: D
The relief to enforce an agreement to sell immovable property is a suit for specific performance; the plaintiff cannot seek specific performance by couching the relief as one for mandatory injunction (AIR 2020 SC 3413).
A vendor enters into a subsequent agreement to sell the same property to a third party after an earlier agreement with the plaintiff. In the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, the only appropriate relief against the vendor regarding the subsequent dealing is:
aan injunction restraining the vendor from selling the property to third parties
ba declaration that the subsequent documents are null and void
cimpleading the third parties as necessary parties
da mandatory injunction directing the third parties to reconvey
Answer: A
Where the vendor has entered a subsequent agreement to sell, no title is conveyed to the third parties; the only remedy in the suit for specific performance is an injunction restraining the vendor from selling the property to third parties.
A distributorship/agency contract is by its nature determinable (terminable at will). With respect to preventive relief, the court will:
agrant an injunction restraining determination of the contract
bnot grant an injunction to restrain determination of such a contract
cgrant a mandatory injunction to restore the distributorship
dgrant a perpetual injunction in every case of wrongful termination
Answer: B
Where a contract is by its nature determinable, restoration cannot be ordered (Indian Oil Corpn v Amritsar Gas Service, (1991) 1 SCC 533), and an injunction cannot be granted to restrain determination of such a contract (Ramchandra Tanwar v Ram Rakhmal Amichand, AIR 1971 Raj 292).
Q23Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, where the contract is a settlement on marriage or a compromise of doubtful rights between members of the same family, specific performance may be obtained by:
aonly a party who actually signed the deed
bonly the karta of the joint family
cany person beneficially entitled thereunder
dany stranger who shows affection towards the family
Answer: C
Section 15(c) makes a marriage settlement or family compromise an exception to privity, allowing 'any person beneficially entitled thereunder' to sue, even if not a party (MC Chacko v State Bank of Travancore, AIR 1970 SC 504).
Q24Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A entered into a contract with B where B's personal skill was a material ingredient. B died before performing his part. Can B's representative-in-interest obtain specific performance under Section 15(b)?
aYes, unconditionally, since the right to sue is heritable
bYes, but only if the contract was for immovable property
cNo, a representative-in-interest can never sue under Section 15
dNo, the proviso bars it unless B had already performed his part or the other party accepted performance by the representative
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 15(b) denies the representative-in-interest or principal specific performance where personal skill/quality is material, unless the party had already performed or the other party accepted the representative's performance.
Q25Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Where promoters of a company, before its incorporation, enter into a contract warranted by the terms of incorporation, the company may obtain specific performance under Section 15(h) only if:
athe company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party
bthe contract is registered with the Registrar of Companies
cthe directors expressly ratify it within six months
dthe promoters are themselves made parties to the suit
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 15(h) requires the company to have accepted the pre-incorporation contract and communicated that acceptance to the other party (Vali Pattabhirama Rao v Sri Ramanuja Ginning, AIR 1984 AP 176).
Q26Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
In Beswick v Beswick, the House of Lords allowed specific performance of A's promise to pay an annuity to B's widow after B's death. The widow succeeded because she sued:
aas a third-party beneficiary in her own right
bas the personal representative (administratrix) of the estate of B, a party to the contract
cunder a registered marriage settlement
das a reversioner in remainder under Section 15(f)
Answer: B
In Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 the widow succeeded as administratrix of the deceased promisee's estate, enforcing the contract on the estate's behalf, not as a third-party beneficiary, given inadequacy of damages and that the promisor had received full consideration.
Q27Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Several persons jointly contract to purchase land. Some of them wish to enforce the contract but the others refuse to join as plaintiffs. According to the Supreme Court's resolution of the conflict, the correct course is that:
athe willing purchasers cannot sue at all and the contract fails
beach willing purchaser may obtain a separate decree for his own share automatically
cthe unwilling purchasers must be impleaded as defendants so all parties are before the court
dthe suit is barred by the Limitation Act
Answer: C
Where co-contractors refuse to join as plaintiffs they must be impleaded as defendants so that all parties to the contract are before the court (Mukesh Kumar v Col Harbans Waraich, (1999) 9 SCC 380).
Q28Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Which of the following persons is enabled by Section 15 to enforce a contract made by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power?
aa bona fide transferee for value without notice
ba sub-contractor approved by the authority
can estate agent with limited authority
dthe remainderman
Answer: D
Section 15(d) enables the remainderman to enforce a contract entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power, even though he is neither assignee nor successor-in-title of the life-tenant.
Q29Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Regarding the right of repurchase (reconveyance) in a sale deed, the settled position under Section 15 is that:
ait can be assigned even to a stranger unless the deed, expressly or by implication, makes it personal
bit is always personal to the original vendor and can never be assigned
cit can only be exercised by the legal heirs of the original vendor
dassignment is denied wherever the deed mentions only parties and not assignees
Answer: A
The right of repurchase is ordinarily assignable, even to a stranger, and is not personal to the vendor unless the document so provides expressly or by implication; assignment is not defeated merely because the deed names only parties (Indira Devi v Veena Gupta, (2023) 8 SCC 124; Shyam Singh v Daryao Singh, AIR 2004 SC 348).
Q30Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 16, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who:
ais merely a representative-in-interest of a deceased party
bfails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms to be performed by him
chas obtained the contract through an agent rather than personally
dis a beneficiary under a marriage settlement
Answer: B
Section 16(c) bars relief where the plaintiff fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms to be performed by him (other than those prevented or waived by the defendant).
Q31Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
The Law Commission's Ninth Report (1958), on which the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is based, identified the kinds of equitable remedies dealt with by the Act. Which of the following is NOT one of the seven heads of relief it enumerated?
aRectification of instruments
bRescission of contracts
cAward of compensatory damages as the primary relief
dCancellation of instruments
Answer: C
The Act enumerates seven equitable remedies: recovery of possession, specific performance, rectification of instruments, rescission of contracts, cancellation of instruments, declaratory decrees and injunctions; damages as a primary head is not among them (PART I, Ninth Report list).
Q32Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Under the scheme of the Specific Relief Act, the remedy by which the very words of a written instrument are corrected to express the parties' true common intention, where the writing through mutual mistake fails to do so, is termed:
aCancellation of instruments
bRescission of contracts
cDeclaratory decree
dRectification of instruments
Answer: D
Rectification of instruments is listed as a distinct head of equitable relief, separate from rescission and cancellation; it corrects the instrument to reflect the parties' true intention (PART I, enumeration of remedies).
Q33Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A, a Hindu separated from his father B, sells fields X, Y and Z to C representing he is authorised to transfer them. Field Z in fact belongs to B (retained on partition). On B's death A inherits Z. Which proposition is correct?
aC, not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to deliver Z to him
bThe sale of Z is void as a transfer of spes successionis and C can claim nothing
cC may obtain Z only if he first sues to rescind and re-execute the contract
dA may keep Z because title to after-acquired property never feeds the estoppel
Answer: A
Per the illustration to section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act discussed in the commentary, this is not a transfer of spes successionis but of specific property; C, not having rescinded the contract, may require A to deliver Z (CHAPTER II, spes successionis discussion).
Q34Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
When a court refuses specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property on the ground that the vendor cannot give a title free from reasonable doubt, the effect, as the commentary explains, is best described as:
aA mere dismissal that leaves the contract fully alive between the parties
bA judicial rescission of the contract, with the consequences that follow
cAn automatic order for rectification of the title deeds
dA cancellation of the contract that bars any refund of the deposit
Answer: B
The commentary states that the effect of the court refusing specific performance on the ground of want of title is a judicial rescission of the contract with the consequences stated (CHAPTER II, around the title/deposit discussion, citing Ardeshir H. Mama v Flora Sassoon).
Q35Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property has been passed. As regards the court's continuing control over that decree, which statement is correct?
aThe decree terminates the suit and the court becomes functus officio at once
bOnly an appellate court may set aside the decree; the trial court loses all power
cThe court retains control and may execute the decree or rescind it under section 28
dThe decree may be rescinded only by a fresh independent suit, not in the same proceedings
Answer: C
A specific-performance decree does not terminate the suit; the court retains control and can execute the decree or rescind it under section 28 (CHAPTER II, citing Joseph v Joseph, AIR 1997 Ker 301).
Q36Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Rescission of a decree for specific performance under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is available, as the commentary notes, in respect of a decree for the sale or lease of which kind of property?
aMovable property only
bShares and other actionable claims
cAny property, movable or immovable, without distinction
dImmovable property
Answer: D
The commentary records that section 28 of the 1963 Act provides for rescission of a decree for specific performance for the sale or lease of immovable property (PART I, discussion of accrued rights citing AIR 1971 Cal 182).
Q37Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
An appellant sought to rescind a specific-performance decree for transfer of company shares passed under the repealed 1877 Act, at the time of that Act's repeal. The court held he could not invoke section 6 of the General Clauses Act or section 28 of the 1963 Act. The principal reason was:
aSection 28 covers only sale or lease of immovable property, and reasonable time since the (stayed) decree had not passed, so no accrued right to rescind existed
bShares are movable property and section 28 applies equally, but limitation had expired
cRescission of a decree can never be claimed once an appeal has been filed
dThe General Clauses Act expressly bars rescission of all pre-repeal decrees
Answer: A
The mere right to take advantage of an Act is not an accrued right; section 28 of the 1963 Act covers sale/lease of immovable property, reasonable time had not passed and the decree was stayed in appeal, so no accrued right to rescind subsisted (PART I, AIR 1971 Cal 182).
Q38Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A seller, before institution of the suit, issued a letter cancelling the agreement to sell. The buyer sued for specific performance without seeking declaratory relief that the cancellation was bad in law. Per Sangita Sinha v Shawana Bhardwaj (2025), the suit is:
aMaintainable, because cancellation by a unilateral letter is a nullity needing no challenge
bNot maintainable, as the cancellation is a jurisdictional fact that must first be set aside by a prayer for declaratory relief
cMaintainable, since cancellation can be ignored at the stage of final decree
dLiable to be stayed pending a separate cancellation suit by the seller
Answer: B
The pre-suit cancellation letter is a jurisdictional fact; until it is set aside, the buyer is not entitled to specific performance, so absent a prayer for declaratory relief that the cancellation is bad in law the suit is not maintainable (CHAPTER II, Sangita Sinha v Shawana Bhardwaj, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723).
Q39Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A is forcibly dispossessed of immovable property by B, the true owner, otherwise than in due course of law. A files suit nine months after dispossession. Which remedy is correctly available to A?
aA suit under Section 6, since six months is merely a condition precedent that the court may relax for sufficient cause
bNo remedy, as the lapse of six months extinguishes A's entire right to recover the property
cA suit under Section 5 on the strength of his prior possession within twelve years, where B may defeat it only by proving a superior title
dA suit under Section 6, but only against the Government
Answer: C
Once the six-month period under Section 6 lapses, the summary remedy is barred, but the dispossessed person may still sue under Section 5 within twelve years on prior possession; title need not be proved unless the defendant proves a better title (Nair Service Society Ltd v K C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165).
Q40Recovery of possession (S5–8)
In a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which one of the following defences is the defendant permitted to raise?
aThat the defendant has a title superior to that of the plaintiff
bThat a third party (jus tertii) has a better right to the property than the plaintiff
cThat the plaintiff obtained his earlier possession by fraud
dThat the plaintiff was not in possession within six months immediately preceding the suit
Answer: D
Under Section 6 the only questions are prior possession and dispossession without consent within six months; the defendant cannot set up his own better title or jus tertii, but may show the plaintiff was not in possession within the relevant period (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620).
Q41Recovery of possession (S5–8)
By the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which class of persons was newly enabled to sue under Section 6(1)?
aA person through whom the dispossessed person had been in possession (the predecessor in possession)
bA person in mere joint possession of the property
cA person dispossessed by the Government
dA person claiming on the basis of adverse possession
Answer: A
The 2018 Amendment inserted the words 'through whom he has been in possession or any person,' enabling the predecessor through whom the dispossessed person claims (e.g., a landlord whose tenant is dispossessed) to sue; the joint-possession and date-of-knowledge recommendations were not adopted (Section 6(1); Sadashiv Shyama Sawant v Anita Anant Sawant, (2010) 3 SCC 385).
Q42Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A landlord lets premises to a tenant. A third party forcibly dispossesses the tenant. Which statement reflects the law on the landlord's right to sue under Section 6?
aThe landlord cannot sue under Section 6 because he was not in actual physical possession
bThe landlord retains legal possession and may sue under Section 6 if the tenant is forcibly dispossessed, and non-impleadment of the tenant is not fatal
cThe landlord may sue only jointly with the tenant, whose impleadment is mandatory
dOnly the tenant may sue, the landlord having parted with all possession and remedies
Answer: B
A landlord parting with physical possession retains legal possession and all legal remedies, and may file under Section 6 on forcible dispossession of the tenant; the tenant may be impleaded but non-impleadment is not fatal (Sadashiv Shyama Sawant v Anita Anant Sawant, (2010) 3 SCC 385).
Q43Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Regarding an appeal or review against a decree passed in a suit under Section 6, which statement is correct?
aBoth an appeal and a review lie, the suit being a regular civil suit
bAn appeal lies but a review does not
cNo appeal and no review lie, but the aggrieved party may invoke the High Court's revisional jurisdiction
dA review lies but an appeal does not
Answer: C
Section 6(3) bars both appeal and review from a decree in a Section 6 suit; the aggrieved party's recourse is revision under Section 115 CPC, exercised only in exceptional cases (Section 6(3); Sanjay Kumar Pandey v Gulbahar Sheikh, AIR 2004 SC 3354).
Q44Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which of the following is NOT a defence available against a suit for ejectment based on title under Section 5?
aThat the defendant has a better title than the plaintiff
bThat the defendant has an enforceable right to specific performance entitling him to remain in occupation
cThat the plaintiff is himself a trespasser
dThat a third person, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant, is the true owner (jus tertii)
Answer: D
A defendant cannot plead jus tertii—that some third person is the true owner—against the plaintiff's prior possession; but better title in the defendant, the defendant's right to specific performance, and the plaintiff being himself a trespasser are all good defences (Nair Service Society Ltd v K C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165).
Q45Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff who is NOT in possession of immovable property files a suit merely for a declaration of his title, without claiming the consequential relief of recovery of possession. What is the fate of the suit under the proviso to Section 34?
aThe suit is not maintainable, as the plaintiff has omitted to seek the further relief of possession
bThe suit is fully maintainable as a pure declaratory suit
cThe suit is maintainable only if the defendant consents
dThe court must convert it suo motu into a suit for possession
Answer: A
Under the proviso to S.34, a plaintiff out of possession seeking only a declaration while able to seek further relief of possession must claim it; a suit for declaration alone is not maintainable (Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust v Chandran, (2017) 3 SCC 702).
Q46Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
In a suit for possession resting on title, when is the plaintiff additionally required to seek a declaration of his title, according to Anathula Sudhakar and Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah?
aIn every suit for possession based on title, without exception
bOnly where there is a serious cloud raised over the plaintiff's title
cOnly when the defendant is a tenant
dOnly where the property is movable
Answer: B
A plaintiff suing for possession on the strength of title need not also seek a declaration unless there is a serious cloud on his title (Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288; Anathula Sudhakar v P Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594).
Q47Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
When is a 'cloud' said to be raised over a person's title for the purpose of deciding whether a declaration of title must be sought?
aWhenever any defendant denies the plaintiff's title in the written statement
bWhenever the property is jointly owned
cWhen some apparent defect in the plaintiff's title is made out or shown
dOnly when a registered sale deed exists in favour of the defendant
Answer: C
A cloud is said to be raised when some apparent defect in the plaintiff's title is made out or shown (Anathula Sudhakar v P Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594).
Q48Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
The plaintiff's title is supported by documentary evidence, but a mere trespasser or interloper without any apparent title of his own simply denies the plaintiff's title. Is the plaintiff bound to sue for a declaration of title?
aYes, any denial of title compels a declaratory suit
bYes, but only if the trespasser is in possession
cNo, but the plaintiff must obtain leave of the court to omit it
dNo, such a bare denial does not raise a cloud, so a declaration is unnecessary
Answer: D
A bare denial of title by a trespasser or interloper with no apparent title does not amount to raising a cloud, so the plaintiff need not sue for declaration (Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v Muddasani Sarojana, AIR 2016 SC 2250).
Q49Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
In a suit for possession of immovable property, the person in possession disputes the very title or rights on which recovery is sought. What is the correct course as to relief?
aDeclaratory relief as to title and consequential possession is mandatory
bA bare prayer for possession is sufficient
cOnly an injunction can be sought, not a declaration
dThe suit must be filed under Section 6 within six months
Answer: A
Where the person in possession disputes the title on which recovery is sought, declaratory relief as to title together with consequential possession is mandatory (Shiv Kumar Sharma v Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600).
Q50Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A person has been actually dispossessed of immovable property. Which relief is appropriate, and which cannot be granted?
aA mere declaration of possession is the proper relief
bThere is no scope for a declaration of possession; the necessary prayer is recovery of possession
cA declaration of possession can be granted, but not recovery of possession
dOnly damages can be claimed, never possession
Answer: B
Where a person is dispossessed, there is no scope for the relief of a declaration of possession; the necessary prayer is one for recovery of possession (Gangadhar Somarath v Honu Majhi, AIR 1988 Ori 141).
Practiced enough reading? Attempt Specific Relief Act, 1963 mocks under real exam conditions and track your weak subjects.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
