Specific Relief Act, 1963 Test 2 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this subject test with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a topic-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
50
Questions
6
Topics
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
Q1Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which of the following contracts is NOT specifically enforceable under Section 14 as it stands after the 2018 amendment?
aA contract which is in its nature determinable
bA contract running into minute or numerous details
cA contract dependent on the volition of the parties
dA contract for which compensation in money is an adequate relief
Answer: A
After the 2018 amendment, Section 14 bars only four classes: substituted performance availed (a), continuous duty the court cannot supervise (b), dependence on personal qualifications (c), and contracts determinable in nature (d). The 'minute details', 'volition' and 'adequacy of money' grounds were removed.
Q2Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A distributorship/agency agreement gives one party an unfettered right to terminate it without cause. The other party sues for specific performance / restoration. Applying Section 14, the contract is:
aSpecifically enforceable because specific performance is now mandatory under Section 10
bNot specifically enforceable because it is in its nature determinable under Section 14(d)
cSpecifically enforceable because it does not depend on personal qualifications
dEnforceable only as to the part already performed under Section 12
Answer: B
A contract terminable at the will of one party without cause is 'determinable' under Section 14(d) and cannot be specifically enforced; in Indian Oil Corpn v Amritsar Gas Service the restoration of a determinable distributorship was held contrary to this bar.
Q3Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which contract is NOT specifically enforceable under Section 14(c) (post-2018), being so dependent on the personal qualifications of a party that the court cannot enforce its material terms?
aA contract appointing a person to cut and remove timber from land
bA contract referred to arbitration
cA contract of personal service requiring an artiste to sing or a teacher to teach
dA contract by a Government to appoint a pujari to perform pooja to a deity
Answer: C
Section 14(c) bars contracts so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce their material terms — classically contracts of personal service such as singing or teaching; the other examples have been held enforceable as not so dependent.
Q4Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the enforcement of specific performance of a contract under Section 10 is now subject only to the provisions of which sections?
aSections 14, 16 and 20
bSections 11(2), 16 and 23
cSections 12, 14 and 20
dSections 11(2), 14 and 16
Answer: D
Amended Section 10 mandates the court to enforce specific performance subject only to the exceptions in Sections 11(2), 14 (clauses a–d) and 16 (clauses a–c).
Q5Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which of the following best states the principal effect of the 2018 amendment to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aIt converted specific performance from a discretionary remedy into an enforceable right, dispensing with the inquiry whether money compensation is adequate
bIt made specific performance a discretionary equitable remedy guided by Section 20
cIt abolished specific performance of contracts for immovable property
dIt restricted specific performance to contracts for movable property of special value
Answer: A
Post-amendment, specific performance ceased to be discretionary and became an enforceable right; the question whether money compensation affords adequate relief is no longer relevant (per the Supreme Court, (2023) 1 SCC 355).
Q6Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
What did the 2018 amendment do to the Explanation to Section 10 (the presumption distinguishing movable and immovable property)?
aRetained it for immovable property only
bDeleted the Explanation altogether
cMade the presumption irrebuttable
dExtended it to all movable property
Answer: B
The Explanation to Section 10, which raised a presumption that breach of a contract to transfer immovable property could not be adequately compensated in money, was deleted by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018.
Q7Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Regarding the temporal operation of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which proposition is correct as held by the courts?
aIt applies retrospectively to all pending suits
bIt applies to transactions after 19 September 2018 regardless of suit date
cIt applies prospectively and not to transactions that took place before 1 October 2018
dIt applies only to contracts executed after the suit is filed
Answer: C
The Supreme Court held that the 2018 amendment making specific performance mandatory operates prospectively and does not apply to suits or transactions arising before its enforcement on 1 October 2018 (2025 INSC 1267).
Q8Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 11(2) of the Act, a contract made by a trustee is:
aSpecifically enforceable even if in breach of trust, subject to the court's discretion
bSpecifically enforceable only against the beneficiary
cAlways specifically enforceable as it is a trust transaction
dNot specifically enforceable if made in excess of his powers or in breach of trust
Answer: D
Section 11(2) expressly provides that a contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers or in breach of trust cannot be specifically enforced.
Q9Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A, a trustee of land empowered to lease it for seven years, contracts with B to grant a seven-year lease coupled with a covenant to renew at the end of the term. As to specific performance of this contract:
aIt cannot be specifically enforced because the renewal covenant exceeds A's powers as trustee
bIt can be specifically enforced as the lease term is within A's power
cIt can be enforced only as to the renewal covenant
dIt can be enforced if B pays additional consideration for the renewal
Answer: A
The contract is in excess of the trustee's powers (the renewal covenant goes beyond the seven-year limit) and so cannot be specifically enforced under Section 11(2).
Q10Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(2), where a party is unable to perform the whole of his part of a contract but the unperformed part bears only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, the court may:
aRefuse all relief and dismiss the suit
bDirect specific performance of the performable part, with money compensation for the deficiency, at the suit of either party
cDirect performance only at the suit of the party not in default
dDirect performance only if the plaintiff relinquishes all compensation
Answer: B
Section 12(2) allows the court, at the suit of either party, to direct specific performance of so much as can be performed and to award money compensation for the small deficiency.
Q11Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(3), where the unperformed part of the contract forms a considerable part of the whole or does not admit of compensation in money, the party not in default may obtain specific performance of the performable part only if he, among other things:
aPays double the agreed consideration
bObtains the consent of the defaulting party
cRelinquishes all claims to performance of the remaining part and all right to compensation for the deficiency
dFiles the suit within one year of breach
Answer: C
Section 12(3)(ii) requires the party seeking part performance to relinquish all claims to the remaining part and all right to compensation for the deficiency or loss; it is the price for invoking the sub-section.
Q12Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A contracts to sell B a piece of land of 100 bighas; it turns out 98 bighas belong to A and 2 bighas to a stranger who refuses to part with them, the 2 bighas being unnecessary for enjoyment of the 98. Which relief is correct?
aThe whole contract is void for impossibility
bB can only claim damages and not any conveyance
cA must acquire the 2 bighas before any decree can pass
dB may compel A to convey the 98 bighas with compensation for the 2; or B may be directed at A's suit to pay the price less compensation for the deficiency
Answer: D
This is the classic Section 12(2) illustration (drawn from Rutherford v Acton-Adams): the small deficiency admits of money compensation, so part performance with compensation may be decreed at either party's suit.
An injunction is sought to compel a company to appoint the plaintiff as its agent under a restrictive covenant. The court should refuse the injunction because:
ain substance and effect it would amount to a decree of specific performance of an agreement of personal service
binjunctions can never be granted in commercial matters
can injunction always requires court supervision and is therefore barred
dthe plaintiff must instead seek a declaratory decree
Answer: A
The grant of an injunction compelling appointment as agent would in substance and effect be a decree of specific performance of an agreement of personal service, and an injunction ought not to be granted (Percept D'Mark (India) (P) Ltd v Zaheer Khan, (2006) 4 SCC 227).
A wrongfully dismissed employee seeks an injunction restraining the employer from removing him and from interfering with his exercise of duties. Such a suit is, in truth:
aa maintainable suit for preventive relief by perpetual injunction
btruly one for specific performance of a contract of personal service, and cannot be enforced
ca suit for a mandatory injunction that must be granted
da suit for a declaratory decree that must be granted
Answer: B
A suit for an injunction restraining the defendants from removing the plaintiff or interfering with his duties is truly one for specific performance of a contract of personal service and cannot be enforced (Mahommad Mustafa Ali Khan v District Board of Bareilly, AIR 1934 All 101).
Where money compensation is found to be an adequate and ascertainable remedy, the effect on the grant of preventive relief by injunction is that:
aan injunction must still be granted because preventive relief is a matter of right
bonly a temporary injunction may be granted
can injunction restraining the breach will not be granted
da mandatory injunction is granted instead
Answer: C
Where the plaintiff can be compensated adequately and the loss is ascertainable in money, an injunction restraining the breach will not be granted (e.g. Gujarat Electricity Board v Maheshkumar & Co, AIR 1985 All 265; Best Sellers Retail v Aditya Birla Nuvo, AIR 2012 SC 2448).
Regarding the court's power to interfere by injunction in matters that are criminal or immoral, the correct principle is:
athe court will always grant an injunction to restrain a criminal act
bspecific relief is available solely to enforce a penal law
can injunction can be granted to restrain a public wrong even where no individual civil right is involved
dthe court will not interfere by injunction in matters merely criminal or immoral which do not affect any right in property, but may do so where a criminal act also touches the enjoyment of property
Answer: D
The court will not interfere by injunction in matters merely criminal or immoral not affecting property; but where a criminal act also touches the enjoyment of property the court has jurisdiction, its interference founded solely on injury to property (linked to S4 — specific relief enforces individual civil rights, not penal laws).
Which of the following is a correct illustration of preventive relief being granted by mandatory injunction?
aA suit by a municipal committee seeking demolition of an illegal construction
bA suit by an employer to compel an employee to render personal service
cA suit to restrain a person from a purely immoral act not affecting property
dA suit to enforce a penal law as the sole object of the relief
Answer: A
A suit for mandatory injunction by a municipal committee seeking demolition of an illegal construction is maintainable (AIR 1999 MP 205), whereas personal-service contracts, purely immoral acts not affecting property, and the mere enforcement of penal laws cannot be enforced by injunction.
Which of the following best describes the nature of an injunction as a form of specific relief?
aAn order strictly limited to compelling payment of a debt
bAn order of a court requiring a party either to do, or to refrain from doing, a specific act, either for a limited period or without limit of time
cAn order that can only restrain a party and can never command the doing of an act
dAn order available solely as a final relief after full trial and never on an interlocutory basis
Answer: B
An injunction is an order of court requiring a party to do or refrain from doing a specific act, either for a limited period (temporary) or without limit of time (perpetual). It is recognised as a form of specific relief.
An employee's contract contains a covenant that he will not accept employment with a competitor. The employer cannot directly compel performance because a contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable. What is the appropriate route to enforce the negative covenant?
aA decree of specific performance compelling the employee to keep working for the employer
bA suit for recovery of possession of property
cAn injunction restraining the employee from breaching the negative obligation, under section 42
dNo relief is available because personal service contracts are wholly outside the Act
Answer: C
Section 42 permits an injunction to enforce a negative agreement (e.g., a covenant not to work for a competitor) even though the affirmative agreement of personal service cannot be specifically enforced.
Performance of a contract may, in certain cases, be compelled by an injunction rather than by specific performance. Which situation is the proper occasion for specific performance (not injunction)?
aRestraining a defendant from committing a breach of a negative obligation
bRestraining a defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's exercise of rights under the contract
cRestraining a covenantor from accepting employment with a competitor
dCompelling a defendant to perform a positive obligation of his own under the contract
Answer: D
Specific performance is the proper method of compelling a defendant to perform a positive obligation; injunction is used to restrain breach of negative obligations or interference with the plaintiff's contractual rights (sections 38 and 42).
Pending a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, the plaintiff fears the defendant will dispose of the subject-matter. Which relief, and under which provision, is appropriate to preserve the subject-matter?
aA temporary injunction in aid of specific performance under section 37, read with Order XXXIX rule 2 CPC, to restrain removal or disposal pending trial
bA perpetual injunction under section 38 finally deciding title
cA mandatory injunction under section 39 directing immediate execution of the sale deed
dRecovery of possession under Part II of the Act
Answer: A
The court may grant a temporary injunction in aid of specific performance (section 37; Order XXXIX rule 2 CPC) to restrain removal or disposal of the subject-matter pending trial, as in Rajeev Singh v Gurmeet Singh.
A licensor seeks to evict a licensee within a reasonable time after the licence term is over, the licensee not yet having become a trespasser. According to Joseph Severance v Benny Mathew, what relief does the licensor properly seek at that stage?
aA perpetual prohibitory injunction only
bA mandatory injunction
cA suit under section 6 for recovery of possession
dA declaration of title without any consequential relief
Answer: B
Per Joseph Severance v Benny Mathew, where a licensor seeks to evict the licensee within a reasonable time after the licence term ends, he seeks a mandatory injunction; once the licensee becomes a trespasser he must thereafter sue for possession.
Q23Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which of the following is a personal bar under Section 16 disentitling a person from obtaining specific performance?
athat compensation in money is an adequate relief
bthat the contract runs into minute and numerous details
cthat he has obtained substituted performance of the contract under Section 20
dthat the contract is in its nature determinable
Answer: C
Section 16(a), as amended, bars relief to a person who has already obtained substituted performance of the contract under Section 20; determinability and minute details relate to Section 14, not Section 16.
Q24Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 19, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against a person claiming under a party by a title arising subsequently to the contract, EXCEPT against:
aa transferee who took the property by gift after the contract
ba person who acquired title with full knowledge of the prior contract
cthe new company formed on amalgamation
da transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract
Answer: D
Section 19(b) excludes a bona fide transferee for value who paid in good faith without notice of the original contract; this codifies the protection also found in Section 40 TPA and Section 91 Trusts Act (Venigalla Koteswaramma v Malampati Suryamba, (2021) 4 SCC 246).
Q25Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
In a simple suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, a stranger to the contract who is in possession claiming an independent title adverse to the vendor:
acannot be impleaded, as it would convert the suit into one for title and possession
bis a necessary party and must be impleaded
cmust be impleaded to avoid multiplicity of proceedings
dmay be impleaded only with the court's prior sanction
Answer: A
A stranger asserting an independent/adverse title cannot be impleaded since it would enlarge the suit into one for title and possession; Section 19 is exhaustive on who may be sued (Kasturi v Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733).
Q26Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 17, a contract to sell immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor who:
ais unable to give vacant possession on the date of the suit
bknowing himself not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell it
chas refused to accept earnest money
dis a minor acting through a guardian
Answer: B
Section 17(1)(a) disentitles a vendor who, knowing he has no title, contracts to sell, and 17(1)(b) one who cannot give a title free from reasonable doubt by the completion date.
Q27Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A, without C's authority, contracts to sell B an estate which A knows belongs to C. Even before the suit C becomes willing to confirm the sale. Can A enforce specific performance against B?
aYes, because A can now make a good title through C's concurrence
bYes, because Section 17 does not invalidate the contract
cNo, because A knew at the date of the agreement that he had no title; the court will not force a new vendor on the buyer
dNo, because the contract is void ab initio and gives rise to no liability
Answer: C
Under Section 17(1)(a), a vendor who knew at the date of agreement he had no title cannot obtain specific performance even if he can later show good title; the court will not compel the buyer to accept a conveyance from a substituted vendor (Kisanlal Agarwal v Namdeo Dhangar, (1944) Nag 90).
Q28Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
After the 2018 amendment, which of the following contracts is listed in Section 14 as NOT specifically enforceable?
aa contract which runs into minute or numerous details
ba contract so dependent on the volition of the parties
ca contract for which compensation in money is an adequate relief
da contract which is in its nature determinable
Answer: D
Amended Section 14(d) retains determinable contracts as non-enforceable; the grounds of minute details, volition, and adequacy of money compensation were removed by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018.
Q29Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 14(b) (post-2018), a contract whose performance involves a 'continuous duty which the court cannot supervise' is not specifically enforceable. As judicially explained, this exception applies where:
aan indefinite succession of court rulings would be necessary to carry out the order
bthe contract involves construction of a building on land
cany physical supervision by a court officer would be needed
dthe contract value exceeds a statutory monetary threshold
Answer: A
Section 14(b)'s bar applies where an indefinite succession of rulings would be necessary to carry out the order, not merely where physical supervision is required; thus build/repair contracts not needing endless rulings remain enforceable (Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu, (2019) 2 SCC 241).
Q30Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of a party is a material ingredient in the contract, his representative in interest or his principal:
amay always obtain specific performance as a representative
bshall not be entitled to specific performance unless that party has already performed his part, or his representative's/principal's performance has been accepted by the other party
cmay obtain specific performance only with leave of the court
dis wholly barred from suing in every case without exception
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 15(b) denies specific performance to the representative in interest or principal where a personal quality of the party is material (or assignment is barred), unless that party has already performed or the performance by the representative/principal has been accepted by the other party.
Q31Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Where a buyer under a prior agreement obtains a decree for specific performance, and the property was meanwhile conveyed to a subsequent purchaser, the position in Lala Durga Prasad v Lala Deep Chand (AIR 1954 SC 75) on cancellation of the subsequent sale is:
aThe prior buyer must separately sue and obtain cancellation of the subsequent sale deed
bThe subsequent sale survives and the prior buyer can claim only damages
cThe relief of cancellation of the subsequent sale need not be sought separately, the decree's effect being to cancel it
dCancellation is available only if the subsequent purchaser had paid no consideration
Answer: C
As the effect of a decree for specific performance is the cancellation of the subsequent sale, the relief of cancellation of that sale need not be sought separately (CHAPTER II, Lala Durga Prasad v Lala Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75).
Q32Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
On whether a prayer for cancellation of the subsequent sale is a precondition to a specific-performance decree, the commentary states that the view in B Vijaya Bharathi v P Savitri and Alagammal v Ganesan:
aCorrectly lays down the law and overrules Durga Prasad
bApplies only to leases and not to sales
cIs binding because it is the later and larger bench
dRequires reconsideration, as it overlooks the cancelling effect of the specific-performance decree itself
Answer: D
The commentary submits that the Vijaya Bharathi/Alagammal view (that a separate prayer for cancellation of the subsequent sale is necessary) fails to take into account the effect of the specific-performance decree and requires reconsideration (CHAPTER II, citing (2018) 11 SCC 761 and (2024) 3 SCC 232).
Q33Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
In Rathnavathi v Kavita Ganashamdas (2015) the execution of the sale deed in the plaintiff's favour resulted in cancellation of the contract of sale between the owner and the subsequent purchaser. To do complete justice the Supreme Court additionally:
aDirected the owner to repay the purchase consideration to the subsequent purchaser, invoking Article 142
bAwarded exemplary damages against the subsequent purchaser
cRemitted the matter for a fresh cancellation suit
dAllowed the subsequent purchaser to retain a charge over the property
Answer: A
Invoking its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed repayment of the purchase consideration by the owner to the subsequent purchaser whose contract stood cancelled by effect of the decree (CHAPTER II, Rathnavathi v Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223).
Q34Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A contracts to sell land to B; A then conveys the land to C, who has notice of the original contract, and puts C in possession. B, ignorant of the transfer, sues A alone and obtains a decree for specific performance. Per Gaffer v Bhikaji Govind, the decree against A:
aOperates as a complete cancellation of C's possession without further suit
bDoes not bar a subsequent suit by B against C for possession
cBars any later suit by B against C for possession
dEntitles C to retain the land on refunding the higher price to A
Answer: B
A specific-performance decree obtained by B against A alone does not bar a suit by B against C (a transferee with notice) for possession, and merely paying a higher price gives C no equity (CHAPTER II, Gaffer v Bhikaji Govind, (1901) ILR 26 Bom 159).
Q35Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Where mortgaged property was auctioned and the purchaser paid the deposit and part of the balance but defaulted on the rest, time being of the essence, and the mortgagee then negotiated to sell to a third party, the court held that, as to the purchaser's contract:
aSpecific performance was decreed because negotiation with a third party waived the time stipulation
bThe contract was rectified to extend the payment period
cSpecific performance was refused, time being of the essence, the third-party negotiation notwithstanding
dThe deposit had to be refunded as the contract was rescinded by the mortgagee's conduct
Answer: C
Specific performance was refused because time was of the essence; the mere fact that the mortgagee negotiated to sell to a third party, or asserted a right to extend, did not exclude time as being of the essence (CHAPTER II, AIR 1963 Mad 468).
Q36Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A vendor who has accepted instalment payments of the price over years without prescribing any time-limit later purports to treat the contract as cancelled for delay. Where time was not of the essence and no notice terminating the contract was given, the court will:
aUphold the cancellation, as continued delay automatically ends the contract
bOrder rectification of the instalment schedule only
cRefuse all relief and direct refund of the instalments
dDecree specific performance, the delay having been acquiesced in and no terminating notice given
Answer: D
Where time is not of the essence, delay acquiesced in by the vendor, with no notice terminating the contract, does not entitle him to treat the contract as cancelled, and the court will decree specific performance (CHAPTER II, AIR 1971 AP 293 and AIR 1946 Cal 521).
Q37Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Even where time is not originally of the essence in a contract for sale of immovable property, the commentary (following Stickney v Keeble) recognises that a vendor faced with the purchaser's unnecessary delay may:
aServe a notice limiting a reasonable time, on the expiry of which he may treat the contract as ended
bRescind the contract instantly without any communication to the purchaser
cSeek rectification to insert a time-of-the-essence clause retrospectively
dForfeit the entire price already paid as a penalty
Answer: A
By notice the vendor may call upon the purchaser to complete within a fixed reasonable time and intimate that, in default, the contract will be treated as cancelled/ended (CHAPTER II, applying Stickney v Keeble [1915] AC 386 and Gomathinayagam Pillai v Palaniswami Nadar).
Q38Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
The Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with seven kinds of specific relief. Which of the following is NOT one of them?
aRectification of instruments
bAssessment of unliquidated damages for tort
cRescission of contracts
dCancellation of instruments
Answer: B
The Act enumerates recovery of possession, specific performance, rectification of instruments, rescission of contracts, cancellation of instruments, declaratory decrees and injunctions; assessment of unliquidated tort damages is not among them (Part I, Introduction).
Q39Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A registered lease deed expressly empowers the landlord to break open the lock and re-enter if the lessee overstays after termination. The lessee overstays; the landlord re-enters by force under this clause. What is the legal position?
aThe clause is valid, having been voluntarily agreed, and the re-entry is lawful
bThe re-entry is lawful because Indian law recognises a landlord's right of extra-judicial re-entry
cThe clause is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, and the lessee may sue under Section 6
dThe lessee's only remedy is damages, possession having been lost under a valid contract
Answer: C
Indian law does not recognise extra-judicial re-entry; such a self-help clause is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as against law and public policy, and the forcibly dispossessed lessee may sue under Section 6 (Audio Voice India Pvt Ltd v Vivek Khanna, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8643; Patil Exhibitors v Corpn of Bangalore, AIR 1986 Kant 194).
Q40Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A trespasser in 'settled possession' of land is sought to be physically evicted by the true owner without recourse to court. Which proposition is correct?
aThe true owner may always evict a trespasser by force, as no court permits a wrongdoer to retain possession
bSettled possession requires only that the trespasser entered overnight and erected a hut before morning
cA trespasser in settled possession acquires title and can resist even a suit for possession on title
dA trespasser in settled possession cannot be dispossessed by the owner except in due course of law, and may even defend his possession against the rightful owner
Answer: D
A person in settled (as against fugitive) possession, even with no right to remain, cannot be dispossessed by the owner except through recourse to law and may defend his possession even against the rightful owner (Munshi Ram v Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702; Rame Gowda v M Varadappa Naidu, AIR 2004 SC 4609).
Q41Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Under the Limitation Act, 1963, what distinguishes Article 64 from Article 65 in suits for possession of immovable property?
aArticle 64 is based on previous possession with limitation running from dispossession; Article 65 is based on title with limitation from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse
bArticle 64 is based on title with limitation from adverse possession; Article 65 is based on prior possession with limitation from dispossession
cBoth are based on title, differing only in the length of the limitation period
dArticle 64 applies to movable property and Article 65 to immovable property
Answer: A
Article 64 covers suits based on previous possession (not title) with limitation of 12 years from dispossession; Article 65 covers suits based on title with limitation reckoned from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff (Rajesh Kumar v Sunil Kumar, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2982).
Q42Recovery of possession (S5–8)
On the question whether a person who has perfected title by adverse possession may use it to recover possession after being dispossessed, the law (per Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur) is that:
aAdverse possession can be pleaded only as a defence (a shield) and never to found a suit
bAdverse possession may be used not merely as a defence but also as a sword to sue for recovery of possession when dispossessed
cA plaintiff in adverse possession can never seek a declaration that his possession has matured into ownership
dTitle acquired by adverse possession is good only against trespassers and not against the original owner
Answer: B
The Constitution-Bench-overruling decision held that a person who has prescribed title by adverse possession may sue for recovery when dispossessed—the plea is a sword as well as a shield—since extinguishment of the owner's right under Section 27 of the Limitation Act gives corresponding title to the possessor (Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729).
Q43Recovery of possession (S5–8)
In a suit for possession based on title under the Limitation Act, 1963, where does the burden of proof lie once the plaintiff has proved his title?
aOn the plaintiff, who must also prove possession within twelve years preceding the suit, as under the 1908 Act
bOn the plaintiff, to disprove the defendant's adverse possession
cOn the defendant, to establish that he perfected title by adverse possession for the statutory period
dOn neither party, possession being presumed to follow registered title irrespective of evidence
Answer: C
Under the 1963 Act, unlike Articles 142/144 of the 1908 Act, once the plaintiff proves title the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he perfected title by adverse possession for the statutory period (M Durai v Madhu, (2007) 3 SCC 114).
Q44Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which of the following persons can maintain a suit for recovery of immovable property on the basis of prior possession under Section 5?
aA mere caretaker or servant in possession on behalf of his employer
bA son occupying a room in his father's house in a ministerial capacity
cAn agent denying his principal's title to the property he holds
dA tenant who has been wrongfully dispossessed, suing even his own landlord on possessory title
Answer: D
The claimant must have juridical possession; a tenant wrongfully dispossessed may recover even from his landlord on possessory title, whereas a mere caretaker, servant, agent or person occupying in a ministerial capacity cannot sue (Nasib Singh v Bajo Ram, AIR 1969 J&K 9; Southern Roadways Ltd v S M Krishnan, AIR 1990 SC 673).
Q45Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A decree declaring the plaintiff's title to immovable property has been obtained. Does a decree for possession follow automatically from it?
aNo; entitlement to possession must be independently established
bYes, possession automatically follows a declaration of title
cYes, but only in suits against tenants
dNo; the plaintiff must file a fresh suit under Section 6
Answer: A
A decree for possession does not automatically follow a decree for declaration of title; entitlement to get possession must be established (Nazir Mohamed v J Kamala, (2020) 19 SCC 57: AIR 2020 SC 4321).
Q46Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
While confirming a decree for eviction, the Supreme Court directed that if the tenant later sues for a declaration of title, such a suit should not be entertained unless the tenant first does what?
aDeposits the entire arrears of rent
bVacates and hands over possession to the landlord
cObtains the landlord's written consent
dFiles the suit within six months of eviction
Answer: B
A tenant cannot deny the landlord's title while in possession; any later suit for declaration of title should not be entertained unless the tenant first vacates and hands over possession (State of AP v D Raghukul Pershad, (2012) 8 SCC 584).
Q47Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
An employee of a statutory body (an instrumentality of the State under Article 12) is dismissed in contravention of statutory provisions. Following Sukhdev Singh, what declaratory relief is available?
aOnly damages, never a declaration
bA declaration only if the employer consents to reinstatement
cA declaration that he continues to be in service
dNo relief, as the contract is one of personal service
Answer: C
Employees of statutory bodies have a statutory status; if dismissed in breach of statutory provisions, they can get a declaration that they continue to be in service (Sukhdev Singh v Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331).
Q48Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
An ordinary private employee is dismissed in breach of his contract of personal service. As a general rule, can the court declare that the contract still subsists and that he continues in service?
aYes, a declaration of subsistence is the normal remedy
bYes, provided the employer is a company
cOnly if the employee has served more than twelve years
dNo; the court will not declare the contract subsists against the employer's will, the remedy being damages
Answer: D
A contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced and the court will not declare it subsists against the employer's will; the remedy is damages (Pearlite Liners Pvt Ltd v Manorama Sirsi, AIR 2004 SC 1373).
Q49Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A person whose claim is based purely on prior possession (not title) is dispossessed and does not sue under Section 6 within six months. On what basis can he still recover possession in a regular suit?
aOnly by proving his title, at least possessory title (12 years' possession)
bOn the strength of his previous possession alone
cOn the strength of a declaration of possession
dHe has no remedy whatsoever after six months
Answer: A
Where the six-month period under S.6 has lapsed, the plaintiff cannot recover merely on previous possession and must prove his title, at least possessory title of 12 years (Nair Service Society Ltd v KC Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165).
Q50Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
Following the larger-Bench decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal, can a person who has perfected title by adverse possession sue for a declaration that his adverse possession has matured into ownership?
aNo, adverse possession can only ever be used as a defence
bYes; adverse possession can be used as a sword, and such a declaratory/recovery suit is maintainable
cYes, but only as a counter-claim, never an independent suit
dNo, because Section 27 of the Limitation Act bars any such suit
Answer: B
The right to plead adverse possession can be used as a sword and not merely as a shield, so such a plaintiff may sue, overruling the contrary view in Gurdwara Sahib (Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729).
Practiced enough reading? Attempt Specific Relief Act, 1963 mocks under real exam conditions and track your weak subjects.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
