Specific Relief Act, 1963 Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Section 11 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as amended in 2018, deals with contracts connected with trusts. Which statement is correct?
aSpecific performance of an act done in performance of a trust 'shall' be enforced, except as otherwise provided
bA contract by a trustee in excess of his powers may be specifically enforced if the beneficiary consents
cSpecific performance of an act done in performance of a trust 'may, in the discretion of the court,' be enforced
dSpecific performance of a trustee's contract is barred in all cases involving trust property
Answer: A
Section 11(1), amended by Act 18 of 2018, replaced 'may, in the discretion of the court' with 'shall'; but section 11(2) still bars enforcement of a contract made by a trustee in excess of powers or in breach of trust.
Q2Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Two trustees, A and B, empowered to sell trust property worth a lakh of rupees, contract to sell it to C for Rs. 30,000. Can C enforce specific performance of this contract?
aYes, because the trustees were empowered to sell the property
bNo, because the contract is so disadvantageous as to be a breach of trust
cYes, because C is a bona fide purchaser for value
dNo, because trust property can never be the subject of specific performance
Answer: B
Under section 11(2), a contract made by a trustee in breach of trust cannot be specifically enforced; a sale at Rs. 30,000 of property worth a lakh is so disadvantageous as to amount to a breach of trust.
Q3Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the general rule regarding part performance is that:
aThe court must always direct specific performance of whatever part can be performed
bPart performance is granted only for contracts relating to movable property
cThe court shall not direct specific performance of a part of a contract, except as provided in the section
dThe court may direct part performance only where the whole is incapable of performance
Answer: C
Section 12(1) lays down the general rule that the court shall not direct specific performance of a part of a contract, the exceptions being provided in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4).
Q4Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A contracts to sell B 100 bighas; it turns out 98 bighas belong to A and 2 belong to a stranger who refuses to part with them, the 2 bighas being unnecessary for the enjoyment of the 98. Which course is permissible under section 12?
aNeither party can seek any specific performance; only damages lie
bB may be compelled, at A's suit, to take the whole 100 bighas with no abatement
cSpecific performance is wholly barred because A had imperfect title to part of the land
dAt B's suit, A may be directed to convey 98 bighas with compensation for the deficiency
Answer: D
Under section 12(2), where the unperformed part bears only a small proportion to the whole and admits of compensation, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct specific performance of the performable part with compensation for the deficiency.
Q5Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under section 12(3), where the part of a contract that must be left unperformed does NOT admit of compensation in money, the party not in default may obtain specific performance of the rest only if he:
aPays the consideration for the whole contract without any abatement and relinquishes all claims to the remaining part and to compensation
bPays the consideration for the whole contract reduced by the value of the unperformed part
cFurnishes security for the value of the unperformed part
dObtains the leave of the court under Order II, Rule 2 CPC
Answer: A
Section 12(3)(b) read with (i) and (ii) requires the plaintiff, where the unperformed part does not admit of compensation, to pay the consideration for the whole contract without abatement and to relinquish all claims to the remaining part and to compensation.
Q6Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
The Explanation to section 12 deems a party 'unable to perform the whole of his part' of the contract where:
aThe other party has failed to pay the consideration
bA portion of the subject-matter existing at the date of the contract has ceased to exist at the time of performance
cThe contract is determinable in nature
dThe party has obtained substituted performance under section 20
Answer: B
The Explanation to section 12 provides that a party is deemed unable to perform the whole of his part if a portion of the subject-matter existing at the date of the contract has ceased to exist at the time of performance.
Q7Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under section 13(1)(c), where a vendor professes to sell unencumbered property but it is in fact mortgaged for an amount not exceeding the purchase money and he has only a right to redeem it, the purchaser may compel the vendor to:
aForfeit the mortgaged property in the purchaser's favour without any conveyance
bRescind the contract and refund the deposit with interest
cRedeem the mortgage, obtain a valid discharge and, where necessary, a conveyance from the mortgagee
dPay damages equal to the mortgage amount instead of conveying the property
Answer: C
Section 13(1)(c) entitles the purchaser to compel the vendor to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge, and where necessary also a conveyance from the mortgagee.
Q8Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Do the rights conferred by section 13 against a vendor with no or imperfect title extend to contracts for the sale or hire of movable property?
aNo, section 13 is confined exclusively to immovable property
bOnly where the movable property is of special value to the purchaser
cOnly where the purchaser is already in possession of the goods
dYes, sub-section (2) applies the provisions of sub-section (1), as far as may be, to movable property
Answer: D
Section 13(2) extends the provisions of sub-section (1), as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire of movable property.
Q9Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as substituted in 2018, which of the following contracts can NOT be specifically enforced?
aA contract which is in its nature determinable
bA contract for the construction of a building where the contract is precise and the defendant has obtained possession
cA contract that runs into minute or numerous details
dA contract for the sale of an ordinary article of commerce
Answer: A
Amended section 14(d) bars specific performance of a contract which is in its nature determinable; the 'minute details' bar was removed by the 2018 amendment, and the building-contract clause (old 14(3)(c)) was deleted.
Q10Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which one of the following grounds for refusing specific performance was REMOVED from section 14(1) by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018?
aA contract dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties
bA contract which runs into minute or numerous details
cA contract involving the performance of a continuous duty the court cannot supervise
dA contract which is in its nature determinable
Answer: B
The 2018 amendment recast section 14(1)(b): the exclusions for contracts running into minute details and for contracts whose material terms the court cannot enforce were removed, leaving the personal-qualifications, continuous-duty (now clause b) and determinable (clause d) bars.
Q11Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the enforcement of specific performance of a contract under the substituted Section 10 is made expressly subject to which of the following provisions?
aSections 9, 14 and 20
bSections 11(2), 12 and 41
cSections 11(2), 14 and 16
dSections 14, 16 and 20
Answer: C
The substituted Section 10 mandates that a court 'shall enforce' specific performance of a contract subject only to the provisions of Section 11(2), Section 14 and Section 16 of the Act.
Q12Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which statement best describes the principal change made to Section 10 by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018?
aIt abolished the remedy of specific performance for movable property
bIt made specific performance available only where damages are an inadequate remedy
cIt made specific performance available only for contracts relating to immovable property
dIt converted specific performance from a discretionary remedy into a remedy the court must enforce, subject to the statutory exceptions
Answer: D
The amendment recast specific performance from a discretionary equitable remedy into an enforceable right ('shall be enforced'), removing the court's discretion and the 'adequacy of damages' inquiry, subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16.
A municipal committee finds an illegal construction within its area and seeks its demolition. According to the commentary, which suit is maintainable for this purpose?
aA suit for a mandatory injunction seeking demolition of the illegal construction
bA suit for a perpetual injunction restraining future construction only
cA suit under Section 6 for recovery of possession
dA suit for specific performance of building bye-laws
Answer: A
A suit for a mandatory injunction by a municipal committee seeking demolition of an illegal construction is maintainable (commentary; AIR 1999 MP 205).
A plaintiff out of possession files a suit only for declaration of his title, without seeking the consequential relief of possession. What is the consequence for such a suit?
aIt is maintainable as declaration alone restores possession
bIt is not maintainable; the further relief of possession must be sought
cIt must be treated as a suit for a mandatory injunction
dIt is converted automatically into a Section 6 suit
Answer: B
A suit filed by a plaintiff who is not in possession only for declaration, without the further relief of possession, is not maintainable (Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust v Chandran, (2017) 3 SCC 702).
A suit originally filed for a permanent injunction is later amended to seek a mandatory injunction. On these facts, what did the court hold regarding the applicability of Section 6 and the maintainability of an appeal?
aSection 6 applied, so no appeal was maintainable
bBoth the suit and the appeal were barred by Section 41(a)
cSection 6 did not apply, and the appeal was maintainable
dThe amendment converted it into a Section 6 suit barring appeal
Answer: C
Where a suit originally filed for a permanent injunction was later amended to seek a mandatory injunction, Section 6 did not apply and the appeal was maintainable (HP Vedavyasachar v Shivashankara, 2010 AIR SCW 468).
A plaintiff seeks specific performance and a temporary injunction in a contract where damages can be calculated on the basis of business lost, accounts can be drawn up, and the security deposit can be refunded. How is the claim for injunctive relief to be treated?
aInjunction must follow automatically as preventive relief
bA mandatory injunction must be granted to protect the deposit
cThe court must grant a perpetual injunction in aid of the deposit
dThe temporary injunction should be denied, as the contract cannot be specifically enforced where damages are an adequate remedy
Answer: D
Where damages can be calculated from business lost, accounts drawn up, and the security deposit refunded, the contract cannot be specifically enforced and the temporary injunction is denied (AIR 2009 MP 124; Best Sellers Retail (India) Pvt Ltd v Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd, AIR 2012 SC 2448).
The commentary distinguishes a perpetual injunction from a temporary injunction chiefly on which basis?
aA perpetual injunction restrains a party permanently and is granted by the decree made at the hearing on the merits, while a temporary injunction continues only for a limited period and is regulated by the CPC
bA perpetual injunction is interim and may be granted at any stage, while a temporary injunction is granted only after a final decree
cA perpetual injunction can only be mandatory, while a temporary injunction can only be prohibitory
dThere is no difference; the two terms are used interchangeably
Answer: A
An injunction may be granted for a limited period (temporary, regulated by the CPC) or without limit of time (perpetual, granted by the decree at the hearing on the merits) (Sections 36–37; commentary).
A plaintiff who is in fact out of possession frames his plaint as a suit for a mandatory injunction, though in substance the relief sought is recovery of possession. Which proposition best reflects the position laid down in Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh?
aThe suit must be dismissed because a person out of possession can never obtain a mandatory injunction.
bRelief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a suit for mandatory injunction where in effect it is a suit for possession.
cA mandatory injunction is automatically converted into a decree for damages where possession cannot be restored.
dThe court must compel the plaintiff to first obtain a declaration of title before any injunction can issue.
Answer: B
In Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857, the Supreme Court held that where a suit is in effect one for possession, relief should not be refused merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a mandatory injunction; substance prevails over form.
A person wrongfully dispossessed obtains a decree of restoration in his favour under section 6. The party against whom that decree was passed then sues for a permanent injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing it. On the reasoning in Lakhmi Chand v Sarla Devi, such an injunction is:
aMaintainable, because every owner may protect his title by injunction.
bMaintainable, provided the plaintiff also proves settled possession.
cNot maintainable, as it would render section 6 nugatory and is barred by section 41(a) against restraining prosecution of a judicial proceeding.
dNot maintainable only if the suit is filed beyond six months of dispossession.
Answer: C
In Lakhmi Chand v Sarla Devi, AIR 1988 P&H 146, it was held that such an injunction would render section 6 nugatory and violate section 41(a), which bars an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit, save to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.
X has been in settled (not merely fugitive) possession of land for several years though he has no right to remain there. The true owner Y wishes to evict him. Which statement correctly states the law on injunctive protection of X's possession?
aX, being a trespasser, can be summarily evicted by Y by self-help and has no protection at all.
bX is entitled to a perpetual injunction permanently restraining Y the true owner from ever recovering the land.
cX may seek an injunction against Y only if X has already perfected title by adverse possession.
dX's settled possession can be protected by injunction against dispossession otherwise than in due course of law, but X cannot obtain an injunction against the true owner to perpetuate his wrong.
Answer: D
Per Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137, and Xavier Thomas v K P Johnson, a person in settled possession may have his possession protected by injunction against dispossession except in due course of law, yet judicial process cannot be used to perpetuate a wrong by injuncting the true owner.
Following the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, a contractor seeks an injunction in a suit relating to a contract for an infrastructure project, the grant of which would delay completion of the project. Which provisions principally govern refusal of the injunction?
aSection 20A together with the newly added clause (ha) to section 41.
bSection 6 read with section 39 of the Act.
cSection 41(a) read with section 42 of the Act.
dSection 38 read with Order XXXIX CPC alone.
Answer: A
Section 20A bars grant of an injunction in a suit involving a contract for an infrastructure project if it would impede or delay the project, and the newly inserted section 41(ha) likewise prohibits an injunction that would impede the project or interfere with continued provision of the relevant facility or services.
In what circumstances will a civil court interfere by injunction in respect of an act that is merely criminal or immoral?
aWhenever the act is shown to be a criminal offence, irrespective of any effect on property.
bOnly where the criminal or immoral act also touches the enjoyment of property, the court's interference being founded solely on the ground of injury to property.
cOnly where the applicant first obtains a conviction in the criminal court.
dNever, since injunctions are confined to breaches of contract.
Answer: B
The court will not interfere by injunction in matters merely criminal or immoral which do not affect any right in property; but where such an act also touches the enjoyment of property, the court has jurisdiction founded solely on the ground of injury to property.
Q23Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A contract provides that A shall personally render services dependent on his learning and skill, and stipulates that A's interest shall not be assigned. A dies before performance. Can A's representative in interest obtain specific performance under Section 15(b)?
aYes, unconditionally, since the representative steps into A's shoes
bYes, but only if the other party first sues for damages
cNo, unless A had already performed his part or the representative's performance has been accepted by the other party
dNo representative can ever enforce a contract in any circumstance
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 15(b) bars the representative in interest where a personal quality of the party is a material ingredient or assignment is barred, unless that party has already performed or the representative's performance has been accepted by the other party.
Q24Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Which of the following contracts CANNOT be specifically enforced under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as amended in 2018)?
aA contract for sale of immovable property where compensation in money is adequate
bA contract which runs into minute or numerous details
cA contract dependent on the volition of the parties but not their personal qualifications
dA contract which is in its nature determinable
Answer: D
Post the 2018 amendment, Section 14(d) bars specific performance of a contract which is in its nature determinable; the 'minute details', 'adequacy of compensation' and 'volition' grounds were omitted.
Q25Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
In Beswick v Beswick, A promised B, in return for transfer of B's business, to pay an annuity to B's widow after B's death. The House of Lords allowed specific performance of this promise to be enforced by the widow. In what capacity was she allowed to enforce it?
aAs the personal representative (administrator) of B's estate
bAs a third-party beneficiary suing in her own right
cAs a member of the same family under a family arrangement
dAs an assignee of B's contractual rights
Answer: A
In Beswick v Beswick the widow could enforce the promise only as the personal representative of B's estate, not as a third-party beneficiary, since a stranger to the contract cannot sue under Section 15(a).
Q26Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Where there is a single indivisible contract to convey land to several persons jointly, and some of the intending purchasers refuse to seek specific performance, what is the correct position as laid down in Mukesh Kumar v Col Harbans Waraich?
aThe willing purchasers can obtain specific performance of their proportionate share alone
bSome of the intending purchasers cannot seek specific performance if the others do not want that relief
cThe suit is wholly not maintainable and must be dismissed at the threshold
dThe unwilling purchasers must be paid compensation before the decree
Answer: B
In Mukesh Kumar v Col Harbans Waraich the Supreme Court held that where there is a single indivisible contract to convey land to several persons, some intending purchasers cannot seek specific performance if the others do not want that relief; non-joining parties must be impleaded as defendants.
Q27Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A contracts to sell B a house and to become B's tenant therein for fourteen years at a stated rent. Before performance, A becomes insolvent. Regarding specific performance of this contract:
aA's assignee in insolvency can enforce it, though A personally cannot
bB can be compelled to perform, but A cannot be compelled in turn
cNeither A nor his assignee can enforce specific performance of the contract
dSpecific performance is available once A is judicially adjudged insolvent only
Answer: C
Under Section 16(b), a plaintiff who has become incapable of performing cannot obtain specific performance; on A's insolvency neither A nor his assignee can enforce the contract, and judicial adjudication of insolvency is not essential.
Q28Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 17, a contract to sell or let immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of which person?
aA purchaser who has paid only part of the consideration
bA lessee who has taken possession before execution of the lease deed
cA reversioner entitled to the benefit of a covenant
dA vendor or lessor who, at the time of the contract or thereafter at the hearing, has no title to the property
Answer: D
Section 17 provides that a contract to sell or let immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or lessor who has no title to the property.
Q29Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A contracts to sell B a house and garden containing ornamental trees, a material element in its value as a residence. Without B's consent, A fells the trees before completion. With respect to A's suit for specific performance:
aA cannot enforce specific performance of the contract
bA can enforce the contract, subject to compensation to B for the trees
cA can enforce the contract since felling trees is a non-essential variation
dB alone is barred from enforcing, but A retains his right to enforce
Answer: A
Under Section 16(b), a plaintiff who acts at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended by the contract, or violates an essential term, cannot obtain specific performance; A's felling of the ornamental trees disentitles him.
Q30Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Which one of the following persons is NOT enumerated in Section 15 as a person who may obtain specific performance of a contract?
aWhere the contract is a settlement on marriage, any person beneficially entitled thereunder
bA transferee for value of the subject property who paid in good faith without notice of the contract
cA reversioner in remainder entitled to the benefit of a covenant who will sustain material injury by its breach
dThe new company arising from amalgamation, which has accepted a pre-incorporation contract warranted by its terms of incorporation
Answer: B
Section 15 lists the persons who may obtain specific performance (parties, representatives, beneficiaries under marriage settlements/family compromises, reversioners, amalgamated companies, etc.); a bona fide transferee for value without notice is a Section 19(b) protected defendant, not a Section 15 plaintiff.
Q31Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Where a court refuses specific performance of a contract on the ground that the vendor has no good title (want of title), the contract is treated as having undergone:
aa statutory novation by the court
brectification to reflect the true intention of the parties
ca judicial rescission of the contract, with the consequences attached thereto
da mere suspension, leaving the contract enforceable later
Answer: C
The book notes that clause (d) shows the effect of the court refusing specific performance on the ground of want of title is a judicial rescission of the contract with the consequences stated.
Q32Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A, a Hindu separated from his father B, sells fields X, Y and Z to C, representing he is authorised to transfer them. Z in fact belongs to B (retained by B on partition). On B's death, A inherits Z. C has NOT rescinded the contract of sale. Which is correct?
aC cannot claim Z, as the original sale of Z was a transfer of spes successionis and void
bC must obtain rectification of the sale deed before claiming Z
cA may keep Z, the contract having stood automatically rescinded on B's death
dC may require A to deliver Z to him, because C did not rescind the contract
Answer: D
Under the feeding-the-grant principle (illustration to s.43 TPA), since C had not rescinded the contract of sale, C may require A to deliver Z; this is not a transfer of spes successionis but of specific property the seller later acquires.
Q33Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A purchaser pays a deposit (earnest) under a contract for sale of immovable property, then defaults and repudiates the contract, putting an end to it. Specific performance is refused. As to the deposit:
athe purchaser, having repudiated the contract, has no right to recover the deposit, which the vendor may retain
bthe purchaser is always entitled to a refund of the deposit once specific performance is refused
cthe vendor must give credit for the deposit but cannot retain it in any case
dthe deposit is treated as a penalty and must be returned regardless of the purchaser's conduct
Answer: A
A deposit is a guarantee that the contract will be performed; where the contract goes off by the purchaser's default/repudiation, he has no right to recover it and the vendor may retain it (Howe v Smith principle as adopted by Indian courts).
Q34Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Specific performance of a contract is refused by the court under its ordinary equitable rules (e.g. for delay), but in circumstances where the purchaser's conduct does NOT amount to repudiation or putting an end to the contract. Regarding the deposit paid by the purchaser:
athe vendor may nonetheless retain the deposit because specific performance was refused
bthe purchaser is entitled to a return of the deposit, even though specific performance is refused
cthe deposit is forfeited to the State as the contract has failed
dthe court must order the vendor to pay double the deposit to the purchaser
Answer: B
Refusal of specific performance does not automatically entitle the vendor to retain the deposit; only where the purchaser's conduct amounts to repudiation may the vendor retain it. Absent such repudiation, the purchaser is entitled to a return of the deposit though specific performance is refused.
Q35Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
In a suit by a plaintiff seeking specific performance, the defendant who had earlier admitted due execution of the agreement now applies to amend his written statement to plead that the agreement stood cancelled and was superseded by a subsequent agreement. Which is correct?
aA new contract completely replacing the original can never be set up as a defence to specific performance
bThe amendment must be allowed as of right because the defence of a substituted contract is always available
cSuch amendment alleging cancellation/supersession cannot be allowed after the defendant has admitted due execution of the agreement
dThe defendant may plead supersession only by filing a separate suit for cancellation
Answer: C
While a new contract completely replacing the original may be set up as a defence (Morris v Baron & Co), a defendant who has once admitted due execution of the agreement cannot be allowed to amend to allege it stood cancelled and was superseded (Krishan Swarup Bhatnagar v Chander Mohan Rewal, AIR 2000 HP 53).
Q36Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Among the kinds of equitable remedies dealt with by the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as identified following the Law Commission's Ninth Report), which set correctly distinguishes 'rescission' from 'cancellation' as separate heads of relief?
aRescission of instruments; Cancellation of contracts
bRectification of contracts; Rescission of instruments
cCancellation of contracts; Rescission of decrees
dRescission of contracts; Cancellation of instruments
Answer: D
The Act deals with, inter alia, rectification of instruments, rescission of contracts, and cancellation of instruments as distinct heads of relief; rescission attaches to contracts while cancellation attaches to instruments.
Q37Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
An appellant sought, after the repeal of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, to rescind a decree of specific performance for transfer of company shares passed under the 1877 Act, relying on Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 / Section 28 of the 1963 Act. Why did this fail?
aBecause Section 28 of the 1963 Act extends only to decrees for sale or lease of immovable property, not transfer of shares, and the mere right to take advantage of the old provision was not an accrued right
bBecause a decree for specific performance can never be rescinded once passed
cBecause the decree had already been fully executed before repeal
dBecause rescission of a decree can only be sought by the plaintiff, not the appellant-defendant
Answer: A
The mere right to take advantage of a provision is not an accrued right; the appellant had no accrued right to rescind, and Section 28 of the 1963 Act provides for rescission of a decree for specific performance only for the sale or lease of immovable property, not transfer of shares.
Q38Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A sale of immovable property is executed and registered on the understanding (the Bihar practice of 'ta khubzul badlain') that property passes only on exchange of equivalents — the registration receipt against full price. Before that exchange the seller, having a power to repudiate, cancels the sale. The purchaser sues for specific performance. Which is correct?
aThe purchaser is entitled to specific performance because the sale deed was already registered
bThe purchaser is not entitled to specific performance where the seller, having a power to repudiate, has cancelled the sale before property passed
cThe seller cannot cancel a registered sale deed except by a decree of court
dRegistration conclusively passed title, so the question of cancellation does not arise
Answer: B
Per Janak Dulari Devi v Kapildeo Rai (AIR 2011 SC 2521), where property was to pass only on exchange of equivalents, the purchaser is not entitled to specific performance where the seller, having a power to repudiate, has cancelled the sale.
Q39Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A is in settled possession of land, though with no right to remain on it. The true owner B forcibly dispossesses A without recourse to law. Which proposition is correct per the Supreme Court?
aB, being the true owner, may dispossess A by force at any time
bA, having no right, has no remedy whatsoever
cA, being in settled possession, cannot be dispossessed even by the true owner except in due course of law, and may recover possession under Section 6
dA may obtain an injunction restraining B, the true owner, from ever entering
Answer: C
A trespasser in settled possession cannot be dispossessed by the true owner except in due course of law and may recover under Section 6; though an ousted trespasser cannot get an injunction against the true owner (Munshi Ram v Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702; Rame Gowda v M Varadappa Naidu, AIR 2004 SC 4609).
Q40Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which of the following persons CAN maintain a suit for possession on the basis of prior possession under Section 5/6, the others being unable to do so?
aA mere caretaker of the property
bA servant in possession on behalf of his master
cA son occupying a room in his father's house in a ministerial capacity
dA mortgagee in possession, if dispossessed by the mortgagor
Answer: D
Juridical possession is required; a caretaker, servant or one in ministerial capacity lacks it, but a mortgagee in possession has juridical possession and may sue even his mortgagor if dispossessed (Sayaji bin Nimbaji v Ramji bin Langapa, ILR 5 Bom 446).
Q41Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Section 7 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with recovery of specific movable property. Per Explanation 2, what kind of right suffices to support such a suit?
aA special or temporary right to the present possession of the movable property
bOnly absolute ownership of the movable property
cOnly a registered title to the movable property
dA mere expectancy of future possession
Answer: A
Explanation 2 to Section 7 provides that a special or temporary right to the present possession of movable property (e.g. that of a bailee, pawnee, lien-holder or finder) is sufficient to support a suit under the section.
Q42Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A delivers furniture to B, his agent, while abroad. B wrongfully pledges it to C, who, knowing B had no right to pledge, advertises it for sale. Under Section 8, can A compel C to deliver the furniture?
aNo, because compensation in money is an adequate remedy
bYes, because C holds it as A's trustee under Section 8(a)
cNo, because A is not the owner of the furniture
dNo, because the furniture has no peculiar or intrinsic value
Answer: B
Where a thing is held by the defendant as agent or trustee of the plaintiff, Section 8(a) allows specific delivery; C holds the furniture as A's trustee and may be compelled to deliver it, and special value is immaterial (Wood v Rowcliffe).
Q43Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Under the Explanation to Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, on whom does the burden of proof lie regarding clauses (b) and (c) (compensation inadequate / damage difficult to ascertain)?
aOn the plaintiff, who must prove that compensation would be inadequate
bOn the plaintiff, who must prove the fiduciary relationship
cOn the defendant, who must prove that money compensation would be adequate and that damage can be easily ascertained
dOn neither party, as the court presumes nothing
Answer: C
The Explanation to Section 8 raises a presumption in the plaintiff's favour under clauses (b) and (c); the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that money would be adequate relief and that the damage is not difficult to ascertain.
Q44Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which statement about a suit under Section 8 versus Section 7 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is correct?
aA suit under Section 8 lies against the owner of the movable, but a Section 7 suit does not
bBoth Section 7 and Section 8 suits can be brought only by the owner
cNeither section permits recovery of the article in specie
dA suit under Section 8 does not lie against the owner of the movable, whereas under Section 7 a person with a temporary or special right to possession may sue even the owner
Answer: D
Section 8 applies only to a person 'not the owner' in possession, so it does not lie against the owner; under Section 7 a person with a special or temporary right to possession may maintain a suit even against the owner.
Q45Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A defendant who was unsuccessful in a summary possession suit later wishes to establish his title to the property. Which is correct?
aEven an unsuccessful defendant can file a suit for a declaration of his title
bAn unsuccessful defendant is estopped from claiming title
cOnly the successful plaintiff may sue for declaration
dA declaration suit is barred for two years after the summary order
Answer: A
Even an unsuccessful defendant can file a suit for declaration of his title; the summary finding is conclusive only as to possession within the limitation window (AIR 1934 All 541).
Q46Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A purchaser in possession under an agreement of sale, who was inducted into possession by the rightful owner, is disturbed by a trespasser. Which relief can he pursue?
aHe can obtain a declaration of title against the world
bHe can seek possession against the trespasser, though not a declaration of title
cHe can neither seek possession nor declaration
dHe can only sue the rightful owner
Answer: B
Such a possessory holder has a better title than a trespasser and can seek possession against him, but not a declaration of title (discussed with Rai Kiran Chandra Roy v Prosanna Kumar Chakravarti, AIR 1934 Cal 561).
Q47Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A person, alleging himself to be the true owner, seeks a declaration of his title together with a consequential injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing a summary possession decree obtained against him. One judicial view is that:
aSuch combined prayers are wholly impermissible
bOnly the injunction, not the declaration, can be granted
cSuch prayers for declaration with consequential injunction are maintainable
dThe true owner must wait until execution is complete
Answer: C
One view holds that a true owner may sue for declaration of title with a consequential relief of injunction restraining execution of the summary possession decree (Chunni v Sullahar, AIR 1972 All 418).
Q48Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
Declaratory decrees, as a head of relief, are:
aNot provided for under the Specific Relief Act at all
bAvailable only as ancillary to specific performance
cConfined to movable property
dAmong the reliefs enumerated under the scheme of the Specific Relief Act
Answer: D
Declaratory decrees are an enumerated head of relief under the scheme of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Q49Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
Where a suit is in effect one for possession but the plaint is loosely worded as a suit for a mandatory injunction, the correct approach is that:
aThe relief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a mandatory injunction
bThe relief must be denied for defective framing
cThe plaint must be returned for fresh presentation
dOnly nominal damages may be granted
Answer: A
Where a suit is in substance one for possession, relief should not be refused merely because the plaint is couched as a suit for mandatory injunction (Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857).
Q50Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
When a possession suit against a main tenant and his sub-tenant was decreed ex parte, an appeal filed by the sub-tenant alone without joining the main tenant was held to be:
aMaintainable, as the sub-tenant has an independent interest
bNot maintainable
cMaintainable, subject to deposit of arrears
dMaintainable only with the court's leave
Answer: B
An appeal by the sub-tenant alone, without the main tenant, against an ex parte possession decree was held not maintainable (Anathula Sudhakar v P Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594).
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