Specific Relief Act, 1963 Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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Q1Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(4), where a part of a contract that can and ought to be specifically performed stands on a separate and independent footing from another part which cannot or ought not to be performed, the court:
aMay direct specific performance of the former (severable) part
bMust refuse specific performance of the whole
cMay direct performance only with the consent of both parties
dMay award damages but not specific performance
Answer: A
Section 12(4) permits the court to direct specific performance of a severable part that stands on a separate and independent footing from a non-enforceable part.
Q2Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Where a vendor sues for specific performance and the suit is dismissed on the ground of his want of title or imperfect title, Section 13(1)(d) gives the defendant purchaser a right to:
aSpecific performance of an alternative property of the vendor
bReturn of his deposit with interest, his costs of suit, and a lien for these on the vendor's interest in the property
cDouble the earnest money as penalty
dCompel the vendor to acquire and convey good title
Answer: B
Section 13(1)(d) entitles the defendant to a return of his deposit with interest, to his costs of suit, and to a lien for such deposit, interest and costs on the vendor's interest in the property.
Q3Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 13(1)(c), where a vendor professes to sell unencumbered property but it is in fact mortgaged for an amount not exceeding the purchase money, the purchaser may compel the vendor to:
aRefund the entire purchase money with penalty
bConvey only the equity of redemption to the purchaser
cRedeem the mortgage, obtain a valid discharge and, where necessary, a conveyance from the mortgagee
dProcure the concurrence of the mortgagee in the sale deed
Answer: C
Section 13(1)(c) allows the purchaser to compel the vendor to redeem the mortgage, obtain a valid discharge, and, where necessary, also a conveyance from the mortgagee.
Q4Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which of the following is NOT one of the four classes of contracts made not specifically enforceable by Section 14 as substituted by the 2018 amendment?
aA contract whose performance involves a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise
bA contract so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce its material terms
cA contract which is in its nature determinable
dA contract for which compensation in money is an adequate relief
Answer: D
Post-amendment Section 14 lists: (a) substituted performance obtained under Section 20, (b) continuous-duty/unsupervisable contracts, (c) personal-qualification contracts, and (d) determinable contracts. The old ground of 'adequate money compensation' was deleted.
Q5Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 14(a) (as amended in 2018), specific performance of a contract cannot be granted where a party to the contract has:
aObtained substituted performance of the contract in accordance with Section 20
bAlready filed for damages under Section 73 of the Contract Act
cDelayed filing the suit beyond three years
dFailed to plead readiness and willingness
Answer: A
Amended Section 14(a) bars specific performance where the party has obtained substituted performance of the contract in accordance with the provisions of Section 20.
Q6Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
In Indian Oil Corpn Ltd v Amritsar Gas Service, the Supreme Court set aside an arbitral award restoring a terminated gas distributorship, holding the contract could not be specifically enforced because it was, by its nature:
aDependent on personal qualifications of the parties
bDeterminable, attracting the bar in Section 14(1)(c) [now Section 14(d)]
cOne running into minute and numerous details
dA contract to lend money
Answer: B
The distributorship contract was terminable in accordance with its terms and hence determinable; specific enforcement (restoration) was barred by Section 14(1)(c), now renumbered Section 14(d), and only compensation could be granted.
Q7Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the enforcement of specific performance of a contract under the amended Section 10 is now made subject only to the provisions of which sections?
aSections 11(2), 14, 16 and 20
bThe whole of Chapter II of the Act
cSections 11(2), 14 and 16
dSections 14, 16 and 23
Answer: C
Amended Section 10 mandates that specific performance shall be enforced subject only to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, narrowing the earlier 'except as provided in this Chapter' formulation.
Q8Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which of the following best states the principal change brought about by the 2018 substitution of Section 10?
aSpecific performance became a discretionary equitable remedy for the first time
bSpecific performance was abolished for movable property contracts
cSpecific performance was made available only where compensation in money is inadequate
dSpecific performance was converted from a discretionary remedy into a remedy that the court shall enforce, subject to the statutory exceptions
Answer: D
The 2018 amendment recast specific performance as the normative/mandatory remedy ('shall be enforced'), removing the court's earlier discretion under the old Sections 10, 14 and 20 (Katta Sujatha Reddy line, (2023) 1 SCC 355).
Q9Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under the amended scheme, the earlier distinction between contracts to transfer movable and immovable property (and the Explanation's presumption about adequacy of money compensation) has been:
aDispensed with, the adequacy-of-compensation question being no longer relevant
bRetained only for immovable property
cStrengthened by making the presumption irrebuttable
dShifted into Section 14 as a new exception
Answer: A
The Explanation to old Section 10 was deleted by the 2018 amendment; after the amendment the question whether money compensation is adequate is no longer relevant to granting specific performance.
Q10Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
On the prospective vs retrospective operation of the 2018 amendment, the Supreme Court has held that:
aIt applies retrospectively to all pending suits
bIt applies prospectively and does not govern transactions that took place before 1 October 2018
cIt applies only to contracts for immovable property entered after 2018
dIts prospective or retrospective effect is left to the discretion of the trial court
Answer: B
The Supreme Court has held the 2018 amendment, being substantive and creating new rights, applies prospectively and not to transactions arising before its enforcement on 1 October 2018.
Q11Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
T, a trustee of land empowered to lease it for seven years, contracts with B to grant a lease of the land for seven years WITH a covenant to renew the lease at the end of the term. Can B obtain specific performance?
aYes, because the lease itself is within the seven-year power
bYes, since a renewal covenant is ancillary and severable
cNo, because the contract is in excess of the trustee's powers and cannot be specifically enforced under Section 11(2)
dNo, but only because trust property can never be specifically conveyed
Answer: C
Section 11(2) bars specific performance of a contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers; the renewal covenant takes the grant beyond the seven-year leasing power, so it cannot be enforced.
Q12Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Two trustees, A and B, are empowered to sell trust property worth about one lakh of rupees. They contract to sell it to C for ₹30,000. As regards C's claim for specific performance:
aIt can be enforced because trustees have full power of sale
bIt can be enforced subject to C paying the market value
cIt can be enforced only with the beneficiary's consent
dIt cannot be enforced as the sale is so disadvantageous as to be a breach of trust
Answer: D
Under Section 11(2), a contract made by a trustee in breach of trust cannot be specifically enforced; a sale at ₹30,000 of property worth a lakh is so disadvantageous as to amount to a breach of trust.
In Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, where the plaint was couched as a suit for mandatory injunction but in substance was a suit for possession, what did the Supreme Court hold?
aThe relief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a suit for a mandatory injunction
bThe relief must be denied because the plaint was wrongly framed as a mandatory injunction
cThe suit must be converted to one under section 6 before any relief can be granted
dA mandatory injunction can never be granted to recover possession in any circumstances
Answer: A
In Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh the Supreme Court held that where a suit is in effect one for possession, relief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a suit for mandatory injunction.
A municipal committee files a suit seeking demolition of an illegal construction. Which type of injunction is the maintainable relief in such a suit?
aA temporary injunction only
bA mandatory injunction
cA perpetual prohibitory injunction barring future construction only
dNo injunction; only damages can be claimed
Answer: B
A suit for mandatory injunction by a municipal committee seeking demolition of an illegal construction is maintainable (AIR 1999 MP 205), as it commands the positive act of removing the structure.
Section 41(a) bars an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit, EXCEPT in one situation. What is that exception?
aWhere the plaintiff is the true owner of the property
bWhere the proceeding sought to be restrained is criminal in nature
cWhere the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings
dWhere the defendant is a Government authority
Answer: C
Section 41(a) bars injunctions restraining the prosecution of a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings (see Lakhmi Chand v Sarla Devi).
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the newly inserted clause (ha) to section 41 bars the grant of an injunction in which situation?
aWhere the injunction would prejudice a private commercial competitor
bWhere the plaintiff has an adequate remedy in damages
cWhere the suit concerns a contract of personal service
dWhere the injunction would impede or delay the progress or completion of an infrastructure project, or interfere with continued provision of the relevant facility or services
Answer: D
Clause (ha) of section 41, added by the 2018 Amendment (alongside section 20A), bars an injunction that would impede or delay the progress/completion of an infrastructure project or interfere with the continued provision of the relevant facility or services.
Regarding the court's power to grant an injunction in matters that are merely criminal or immoral, which statement is correct?
aThe court will not interfere by injunction in matters merely criminal or immoral that do not affect any right in property, but may interfere where the criminal act also touches the enjoyment of property
bThe court freely grants injunctions to restrain any criminal or immoral act
cThe court can grant an injunction only if the criminal act is also punishable with imprisonment
dThe court can never grant an injunction where any criminal element is involved
Answer: A
The court will not interfere by injunction in matters merely criminal or immoral that do not affect any right in property; but where a criminal act also touches the enjoyment of property, the court has jurisdiction, founded solely on injury to property.
A trespasser who has been dispossessed approaches the court. Which relief is NOT available to him against the true owner?
aRestoration of possession by an appropriate remedy
bAn injunction restraining the true owner
cProtection while in settled possession against dispossession otherwise than by due process
dAdjudication of his possessory claim by a competent court
Answer: B
While an ousted trespasser may seek restoration of possession, he cannot seek an injunction against the true owner; judicial proceedings cannot be used to perpetuate a wrong (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable; Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke).
A person in settled possession of property, even assuming he has no right to remain, is sought to be ousted by the owner without recourse to law. What protection does the law of injunctions afford?
aNone; the owner may use self-help to evict him at once
bHe can be protected only if he has perfected title by adverse possession
cHis possession can be protected by means of an injunction, and he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except in due course of law
dHe can claim only damages, never an injunction
Answer: C
A person in settled possession (as against fugitive possession), even without a right to remain, cannot be dispossessed by the owner except in due course of law; his possession can be protected by an injunction (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandez; Xavier Thomas v K P Johnson).
In Ramesh Chand Ardwatiya v Anil Panjwani, where the plaintiff held an agreement to purchase the property and his peaceful possession was interfered with, what relief did the Supreme Court hold he was entitled to?
aOnly damages for the interference
bA decree of specific performance of the agreement to purchase
cRecovery of possession under section 6 only
dA declaration of peaceful possession together with mandatory and permanent preventive injunctions, with the defendant permanently restrained from interfering except by due process of law
Answer: D
In Ramesh Chand Ardwatiya v Anil Panjwani the plaintiff was held entitled to a declaration of peaceful possession and to mandatory and permanent preventive injunctions, the defendant being permanently restrained from interfering except by due process of law, and directed to remove any construction raised.
Where a suit originally filed for a permanent injunction was later converted by amendment into one for a mandatory injunction, what was held regarding the bar under section 6 and maintainability of appeal (HP Vedavyasachar v Shivashankara)?
aSection 6 did not apply, and the appeal was maintainable
bSection 6 applied, so no appeal was maintainable
cThe amendment itself was impermissible
dThe suit had to be dismissed as time-barred
Answer: A
Where a suit for permanent injunction was converted by amendment to one for mandatory injunction, section 6 (with its no-appeal bar) did not apply and the appeal was maintainable (HP Vedavyasachar v Shivashankara).
Pending a suit, to ensure the disputed property is not alienated, altered, demolished, removed or destroyed, which interlocutory measure may the court adopt in addition to or instead of an interim injunction?
aPass a final perpetual injunction at once without trial
bAppoint a receiver under Order XL rule 1 CPC, and in exceptional cases even order interim restoration of possession
cAward mesne profits as the only available interim relief
dRefer the dispute compulsorily to arbitration
Answer: B
Besides an interim injunction to prevent alienation/alteration/demolition pending suit, the court may appoint a receiver under Order XL rule 1 CPC, and in exceptional circumstances order interim restoration of possession to the plaintiff (Meera Chauhan v Harsh Bishnoi).
Q23Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A enters a contract with B which the parties expressly stipulate shall not be assigned by A. Without A having performed any part, A purports to assign his interest to C. Can C obtain specific performance under Section 15?
aYes, an assignee is a representative in interest and may always sue
bYes, because anti-assignment clauses are void in specific performance suits
cNo, because the contract provides that A's interest shall not be assigned, so the proviso to clause (b) bars C unless A had performed or C's performance was accepted
dNo, because only the principal, never the representative in interest, may sue
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 15(b) expressly excludes the representative in interest where the contract provides that the party's interest shall not be assigned, unless the party has already performed or the assignee's performance has been accepted by the other party.
Q24Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Which of the following is NOT, by itself, a category of person entitled to obtain specific performance under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aA reversioner in possession entitled to the benefit of a covenant entered into with his predecessor in title
bA remainderman, where the contract was entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power
cAny person beneficially entitled under a settlement on marriage or a compromise of doubtful rights between members of the same family
dA stranger to the contract for whose benefit a sum was stipulated to be paid
Answer: D
Section 15 lists parties, representatives/principals, marriage-settlement and family-compromise beneficiaries, remaindermen and reversioners, but not strangers; a third party for whose benefit money is stipulated cannot generally sue (MC Chacko v State Bank of Travancore; Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v Kiran Construction).
Q25Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
In Beswick v Beswick, A promised B (in return for B transferring his business) to pay an annuity to B and, after B's death, to B's widow. After B's death A refused to pay. On what basis did the House of Lords allow specific performance?
aThe widow, as administratrix/personal representative of B's estate, could specifically enforce the promise, damages being inadequate
bThe widow sued as a third-party beneficiary in her personal capacity
cPrivity was waived because the annuity was charitable
dA had repudiated, so the widow could claim as a stranger to the contract
Answer: A
Beswick v Beswick allowed specific performance because the widow sued as B's personal representative (a party's representative), with damages nominal, the promisor having received full consideration; she could not have succeeded merely as a third-party beneficiary.
Q26Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Where promoters of a company, before its incorporation, enter into a contract for the purposes of the company warranted by the terms of incorporation, when can the company obtain specific performance under Section 15(h)?
aAutomatically upon incorporation, without any further step
bProvided the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party
cOnly if the contract is registered with the Registrar of Companies
dOnly if the promoters remain directors of the company
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 15(h) requires that the company accept the pre-incorporation contract and communicate such acceptance to the other party before it may obtain specific performance.
Q27Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which of the following is expressly listed in Section 15 as a person who may obtain specific performance of a contract?
aA receiver appointed in insolvency of a contracting party
bA guarantor of the contracting party's obligations
cA new limited liability partnership arising out of the amalgamation of the contracting LLP with another LLP
dAn auction-purchaser of the contracting party's assets
Answer: C
Clause (fa), inserted by the 2018 Amendment, allows the new LLP arising from amalgamation to obtain specific performance of a contract of the merged LLP, mirroring clause (g) for amalgamated companies.
Q28Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Several intending purchasers under a single indivisible contract to convey land seek specific performance, but one of them refuses to join. According to the Supreme Court (Mukesh Kumar v Col Harbans Waraich) and the settled rule, what is the correct course?
aEach purchaser may independently obtain specific performance of his own share regardless of the others
bThe suit is not maintainable at all if even one purchaser refuses to participate
cThe court must first compel the unwilling purchaser to become a plaintiff before deciding
dThe willing purchasers cannot get specific performance of the whole; the unwilling co-contractor, if not a plaintiff, must be impleaded as a defendant so all parties are before the court
Answer: D
Where there is a single indivisible contract, some purchasers cannot obtain specific performance without the others; a co-contractor who will not join as plaintiff must be made a defendant so all parties are before the court (Mukesh Kumar v Col Harbans Waraich).
Q29Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, against which of the following can specific performance of a contract NOT be enforced?
aA person claiming under the contracting party by a subsequent title who took as a transferee for value, paid in good faith and without notice of the original contract
bEither party to the contract
cA person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant
dThe new company arising from the amalgamation of the contracting company
Answer: A
Section 19(b) expressly excepts a bona fide transferee for value who paid in good faith without notice of the original contract; against all the other categories listed, specific performance may be enforced.
Q30Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A contracts to sell land to B for Rs. 5,000. A afterwards conveys the same land for Rs. 6,000 to C, who has notice of the original contract, and the sale deed to C is registered and C obtains possession. Can B enforce specific performance against C?
aNo, because C's sale deed is registered and Section 48 of the Registration Act protects him
bYes, because C, having notice of the original contract, is a person claiming under A by a subsequent title and is not a protected transferee under Section 19(b)
cNo, because C paid a higher price and thereby acquired an equity
dYes, but only if B was also in possession before C
Answer: B
Under Section 19(b) the exception protects only a transferee for value without notice; C had notice, so B may enforce specific performance against C notwithstanding registration or higher price (Illustration to old s.27; Ghasiram v Shankarlal).
Q31Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Under s.18 (specific performance with a variation set up by the defendant, corresponding to s.26 of the repealed Act), a variation that the contract is different from what was agreed may now be founded on:
aOnly fraud or mutual mistake of fact
bThe defendant's own surprise or misapprehension
cFraud, mistake of fact, or misrepresentation
dAny unilateral mistake of law
Answer: C
The s.18(a) commentary (corresponding to s.26 of the repealed Act) notes the clause now equally applies to misrepresentation as well as fraud or mistake of fact, while a variation arising out of the defendant's surprise or misapprehension is no longer available.
Q32Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
After the present law, a defendant resisting specific performance can NO LONGER set up a variation arising on his part out of:
aFraud
bMistake of fact
cMisrepresentation
dSurprise or misapprehension
Answer: D
Per the s.18 commentary, a defendant is no longer entitled to set up a variation arising out of 'surprise' or 'misapprehension'; fraud, mistake of fact and misrepresentation remain available grounds.
Q33Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A, B and C sign a writing purporting to bind each separately to D for Rs.1,000; in D's suit to make each liable for Rs.1,000 they prove 'each' was inserted by mistake, the intention being a joint bond for Rs.1,000. What follows?
aD can obtain performance only with the variation set up, i.e. a joint bond for Rs.1,000
bD may enforce the writing as drawn, each liable for Rs.1,000
cThe writing is wholly void for mutual mistake
dD may sue any one of them, at his option, for the full Rs.1,000
Answer: A
The illustration to s.18(a) shows that where a term ('each') was inserted by mistake, the plaintiff can obtain the performance sought only with the variation set up, i.e. enforcement as a joint bond for Rs.1,000.
Q34Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Which statement best distinguishes clause (a) from clause (b) of s.18 (variation, formerly s.26)?
aClause (a) covers post-contract variation; clause (b) covers fraud at the time of contracting
bClause (a): terms embodied differ from those agreed; clause (b): terms are those agreed but in substance or import differ from what was intended
cClause (a) requires registration; clause (b) does not
dClause (a) is available to the plaintiff; clause (b) only to the defendant
Answer: B
The s.18 commentary explains clause (a) applies where the terms embodied differ from those agreed, while clause (b) applies where the terms are literally those agreed but in substance or actual import differ from what was intended.
Q35Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
In a case falling under clause (b) of s.18 (document does not produce the intended legal result), what is the position as to fault?
aThe plaintiff is presumed fraudulent
bThe defendant must have been negligent
cNeither party is blameworthy; they agreed on the purpose but the document fails to achieve the legal result
dBoth parties are presumed to be in bad faith
Answer: C
The commentary on s.18(b) states that in such a case neither party is blameworthy; the parties agreed on the purpose, but the document does not reflect it and fails to achieve the intended legal result.
Q36Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Where a written agreement of sale named the vendor company as 'Goldsmith Coaches (Sicklesmere) Ltd' instead of the true owner 'F Goldsmith (Sicklesmere) Ltd', the Court held that:
aThe misdescription voided the agreement for uncertainty
bSpecific performance was refused as the named company was a stranger to the contract
cThe buyer could rescind because the vendor's identity was misrepresented
dBy reference to surrounding circumstances the name was an accurate description of the plaintiff company, which obtained a decree for specific performance
Answer: D
In F Goldsmith (Sicklesmere) Ltd v Baxter (1969) 3 All ER 733, the Court held by reference to surrounding circumstances that the inserted name was an accurate description of the plaintiff company, which was entitled to a decree for specific performance.
Q37Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
X agreed, as B's guardian, to sell B's property to C for Rs.763 subject to the leave of the Court; the Court sanctioned the sale for Rs.800, not Rs.763. Is C entitled to a transfer on payment of Rs.763?
aNo, because the contract was contingent on the Court's permission, which did not extend to the whole contract between the parties
bYes, C may enforce the agreed price of Rs.763
cYes, but the excess Rs.37 must be borne by the guardian personally
dNo, the agreement is void for want of consideration
Answer: A
Following Narain Pattro v Aukhoy Narain Manna (1885) 12 Cal 152, the contract was contingent on the Court's permission, which (sanctioning Rs.800) did not extend to the whole contract, so C was not entitled to a transfer at Rs.763.
Q38Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
In Uttam Chand v Radhabai, where the plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement to sell and the defendant proved the document was really executed as collateral security for a loan, the Court, upholding the variation:
aDismissed the suit outright as the document was not a genuine sale agreement
bOrdered specific performance on the terms found, directing the plaintiff to repay the loan for which the document was security
cCancelled the instrument as a sham and restored the pre-contract position
dRectified the document into a mortgage by conditional sale and refused all further relief
Answer: B
In Uttam Chand v Radhabai, AIR 1991 MP 296, upholding the variation that the document was collateral security for a loan, the Court ordered specific performance in terms found on the variation and directed the plaintiff to repay the loan.
Q39Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A pledges jewels to B to secure a loan. B wrongfully disposes of them before he is entitled to do so. Without paying or tendering the loan amount, A sues B for possession of the jewels under Section 7. What is the outcome?
aThe suit succeeds, as B's wrongful disposal entitles A to immediate recovery of the jewels
bThe suit succeeds, because a pledgor always has a right to immediate possession of pledged goods
cThe suit is dismissed, as A is not entitled to possession until he pays or tenders the loan, whatever his right to their safe custody
dThe suit is converted into one for compensation, the jewels being no longer recoverable in specie
Answer: C
Per the illustration to old Section 10, A who has not paid or tendered the loan is not entitled to possession of the pledged jewels under Section 7, whatever his right to their safe custody (Donald v Suckling, (1866) LR 1 QB 585).
Q40Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in which of the following situations does the Explanation place the burden of proof on the defendant?
aWhere the thing is held by the defendant as agent or trustee of the plaintiff (clause a)
bWhere the possession of the thing was wrongfully transferred from the plaintiff (clause d)
cIn every case under Section 8, the burden is uniformly on the defendant
dWhere compensation in money would not afford adequate relief, or actual damage is difficult to ascertain (clauses b and c)
Answer: D
The Explanation to Section 8 raises a presumption in favour of the plaintiff under clauses (b) and (c), shifting the onus to the defendant to prove that money compensation is adequate or that damage is easily ascertainable; under clauses (a) and (d) the onus remains on the plaintiff (Section 8 Explanation; CJ Subbarayulu v ARMAN Annamalai Chettiar, AIR 1945 Mad 281).
Q41Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which statement correctly distinguishes the scope of suits under Section 7 and Section 8 for movable property?
aA suit under Section 8 will not lie against the owner of the movable, whereas under Section 7 a person with a temporary or special right to possession may sue even against the owner
bA suit under Section 8 lies against the owner of the property, whereas Section 7 lies only against non-owners
cSection 7 always decrees return of the specific article, whereas Section 8 only awards its money value
dSection 8 is available for any movable, whereas Section 7 is confined to articles of special or sentimental value
Answer: A
Section 8 (delivery by a person not the owner) does not lie against the owner, while under Section 7 a person with a special or temporary right to present possession (e.g., a bailee or pledgee, per Explanation 2) may sue even the owner; a Section 8 decree is for return of the specific article (Section 7 Explanation 2; Section 8).
Q42Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A is dispossessed of immovable property by B, the rightful owner, without A's consent and otherwise than in due course of law. A files a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 within six months. Which of the following best states the legal position?
aA must prove a title superior to that of B to succeed
bA is entitled to be restored to possession irrespective of how good B's title is, and B cannot raise the question of title
cThe court will first decide the question of title between A and B
dB can defeat the suit by proving that he is the true owner
Answer: B
Under Section 6, a person dispossessed without consent and otherwise than in due course of law within six months is restored to possession notwithstanding any title set up by the defendant; the court tries only possession, not title (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620).
Q43Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which of the following is NOT one of the two questions the court determines in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aWhether the plaintiff was dispossessed without consent, otherwise than in due course of law, within six months preceding the suit
bWhether the plaintiff was formerly in possession
cWhether the plaintiff has a better title to the property than the defendant
dWhether the dispossession was of immovable property
Answer: C
In a Section 6 suit the court does not try the question of title; it determines only prior possession and dispossession without consent, otherwise than in due course of law, within six months (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620).
Q44Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Regarding limitation under Section 6(2)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (suit within six months of dispossession), which statement is correct?
aThe six-month period is merely a condition precedent and delay can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
bThe period runs from the date of knowledge of dispossession
cThe period does not apply where the defendant is a private individual
dThe six-month period is a period of limitation, and delay cannot be condoned
Answer: D
The Specific Relief Act prescribes its own limitation; the six-month period under Section 6(2)(a) is a period of limitation, not a mere condition precedent, and Section 6 expressly bars a suit after six months, so delay cannot be condoned (Bai Dahi v Amalakhbai Gambhirbhai Barot, AIR 1974 Guj 106).
Q45Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A defendant unsuccessful in a summary possession proceeding under Section 6 wishes to vindicate his rights. Which remedy remains open to him?
aHe may sue for a declaration of his title and an injunction restraining interference with his possession
bHe is barred by res judicata from any further action
cHe may only file an appeal, never a fresh suit
dHe must first obtain leave of the High Court
Answer: A
A party against whom an order under S.6 is made can sue for a declaration of title and seek an injunction restraining the other party from interfering with his possession (Chunni v Suluthar, AIR 1972 All 418).
Q46Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff claims to be the true owner of property over which a possession decree under Section 6 has been passed against him, and sues for a declaration of title with a consequential injunction restraining execution of that decree. What is one recognised view as to such a suit?
aIt is always barred and liable to summary rejection
bSuch prayers for declaration of title and consequential injunction are maintainable
cOnly damages can be claimed, not a declaration
dIt can be entertained only by a writ court
Answer: B
One recognised view is that a true owner may sue for a declaration of title with a consequential injunction restraining execution of the S.6 possession decree, such prayers being maintainable (Chunni v Sullahar, AIR 1972 All 418).
Q47Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A purchaser in possession under an agreement of sale, who has been inducted into possession by the rightful owner, is disturbed by a trespasser. What can he obtain against the trespasser?
aA declaration of title, since possession implies ownership
bNeither possession nor any declaration
cPossession against the trespasser, though not a declaration of title
dOnly damages from the trespasser
Answer: C
Such a purchaser in possession has a better title than the trespasser and can seek possession against him, though not a declaration of title (Rai Kiran Chandra Roy v Prosanna Kumar Chakravarti, AIR 1934 Cal 561).
Q48Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff who has been dispossessed from immovable property files a suit praying only for a declaration that he is in possession of the property, without seeking recovery of possession. Which of the following best reflects the law?
aThe suit is maintainable because a declaration of possession is a recognised relief
bThe court must convert the prayer into one for damages
cThe suit lies only if the plaintiff also seeks a perpetual injunction
dThere is no scope for the relief of declaration of possession; the necessary prayer is one for recovery of possession
Answer: D
Once a person is dispossessed, a mere declaration of possession is not the appropriate relief; he must sue for recovery of possession (Gangadhar Somarath v Honu Majhi, AIR 1988 Ori 141).
Q49Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff who is NOT in possession of the suit property sues merely for a declaration of his title, omitting to claim the further relief of possession which he is able to seek. As per the proviso to the rule governing declaratory decrees, the suit is:
aNot maintainable, because he omitted to seek the further relief of possession he was able to claim
bMaintainable, since title can always be declared independently
cMaintainable, provided he files a separate possession suit later
dMaintainable only against a trespasser
Answer: A
A suit by a plaintiff not in possession seeking only a declaration without the further relief of possession is not maintainable (Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust v Chandran, (2017) 3 SCC 702), reflecting the proviso barring a bare declaration where consequential relief is omitted.
Q50Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
In a suit for possession of immovable property, the person in possession disputes the title on which the plaintiff bases his claim for recovery. In such a situation, the plaintiff:
aNeed only seek a permanent injunction
bMust seek declaratory relief as to title together with consequential relief of possession
cCannot seek a declaration at all
dMay rely solely on his prior possession
Answer: B
Where the person in possession disputes the plaintiff's title, a declaration of title plus consequential possession is mandatory (Shiv Kumar Sharma v Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600).
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