Specific Relief Act, 1963 Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this subject test with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a topic-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
50
Questions
6
Topics
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
Q1Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 12(2), where a party is unable to perform the whole of his part of the contract, specific performance of the remaining part (with money compensation for the deficiency) may be directed at the suit of either party only where the unperformed part:
aBears only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money
bForms a considerable part of the whole but admits of compensation
cDoes not admit of compensation in money
dStands on a separate and independent footing
Answer: A
Section 12(2) applies where the unperformed part bears only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money; the court may then decree the rest and award compensation for the deficiency.
Q2Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Where a party is unable to perform a part of the contract which forms a CONSIDERABLE part of the whole though it admits of compensation in money, what must the OTHER party do to obtain specific performance of the performable part under Section 12(3)?
aPay the full consideration for the whole without abatement and claim compensation for the deficiency
bPay the agreed consideration reduced by the consideration for the unperformed part, and relinquish all claims to performance of the remaining part and to compensation
cPay the agreed consideration and reserve the right to later claim damages for the deficiency
dPay nothing until the defaulting party perfects the unperformed part
Answer: B
Under Section 12(3)(a) read with (i) and (ii), the other party must pay the agreed consideration reduced by the value of the unperformed part AND relinquish all claims to the remaining performance and to compensation.
Q3Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
For the purposes of Section 12, the Explanation provides that a party shall be DEEMED unable to perform the whole of his part of the contract if:
aHe has transferred a part of the property to a third person after the contract
bHe refuses to perform without lawful excuse
cA portion of the subject-matter existing at the date of the contract has ceased to exist at the time of performance
The Explanation to Section 12 deems a party unable to perform the whole where a portion of the subject-matter that existed at the date of the contract has ceased to exist at the time of its performance.
Q4Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A contracts to sell two distinct parcels of land standing on separate and independent footing; one part can and ought to be specifically performed while the other cannot. Which sub-section permits the court to decree specific performance of the performable part?
aSection 12(1)
bSection 12(2)
cSection 12(3)
dSection 12(4)
Answer: D
Section 12(4) allows the court to direct specific performance of a part which, taken by itself, can and ought to be performed where it stands on a separate and independent footing from another part that cannot or ought not to be performed.
Q5Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 13(1)(c), where a vendor professes to sell unencumbered property but it is in fact mortgaged for an amount NOT exceeding the purchase money and he has only a right to redeem, the purchaser may:
aCompel the vendor to redeem the mortgage, obtain a valid discharge and, where necessary, a conveyance from the mortgagee
bOnly claim damages for misrepresentation
cRescind the contract and recover the deposit
dCompel the mortgagee directly to convey title without involving the vendor
Answer: A
Section 13(1)(c) entitles the purchaser to compel the vendor to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge and, where necessary, a conveyance from the mortgagee, when the mortgage debt does not exceed the purchase money.
Q6Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under Section 13(1)(d), where a VENDOR or lessor sues for specific performance and the suit is dismissed on the ground of his want of, or imperfect, title, the defendant purchaser/lessee is entitled to:
aSpecific performance of any interest the vendor may later acquire
bReturn of his deposit with interest, his costs of the suit, and a lien for these on the vendor's interest in the property
cDouble the earnest money as liquidated damages
dNothing, as the dismissal of the vendor's suit ends all rights
Answer: B
Section 13(1)(d) gives the defendant a right to a return of his deposit with interest, to his costs of the suit, and to a lien for the deposit, interest and costs on the vendor's/lessor's interest in the property.
Q7Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under the amended Section 14, in which one of the following situations is specific performance expressly barred because the innocent party has already pursued a statutory alternative?
aWhere the contract is in its nature determinable
bWhere the contract involves a continuous duty the court cannot supervise
cWhere a party has obtained substituted performance of the contract under Section 20
dWhere the contract is dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties
Answer: C
Amended Section 14(a) bars specific performance where a party has obtained substituted performance of the contract in accordance with Section 20, replacing the old 'compensation is adequate' clause.
Q8Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
A and B agree to become partners in a business, the contract NOT specifying the duration of the proposed partnership. A suit for specific performance of this agreement will:
aSucceed, as partnership agreements are always specifically enforceable
bFail, only because partnership involves personal qualifications under Section 14(c)
cSucceed if accompanied by a claim for compensation
dFail, because the contract is in its nature determinable under Section 14(d), since either partner could at once dissolve it
Answer: D
A partnership at will, not specifying duration, is determinable at the option of a partner; under Section 14(d) such a determinable contract cannot be specifically enforced, as it would be idle to decree what could instantly be undone.
Q9Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Which of the following grounds for refusing specific performance, present in the PRE-2018 Section 14, was DELETED (i.e., is no longer an exception) by the amendment?
aA contract which runs into minute or numerous details
bA contract dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties
cA contract which is in its nature determinable
dA contract involving a continuous duty the court cannot supervise
Answer: A
Amended Section 14(c) retains only the 'personal qualifications' limb of the old 14(1)(b); the grounds of 'minute or numerous details', 'volition of parties' and 'nature such that the court cannot enforce material terms' were dropped.
Q10Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which of the following best describes the character of specific performance of contracts under section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aIt remains a purely equitable and discretionary remedy guided by section 20
bIt is now a general rule that courts shall enforce, subject only to sections 11(2), 14 and 16
cIt is a remedy available only where compensation in money would be inadequate
dIt is available only for contracts to transfer immovable property
Answer: B
Section 10 as substituted by Act 18 of 2018 mandates that courts 'shall' enforce specific performance, removing judicial discretion; the only exceptions are sections 11(2), 14 and 16.
Q11Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
Under the amended section 10, what is the present relevance of the question whether compensation in money would afford adequate relief for non-performance of a contract?
aIt is the decisive test the plaintiff must still satisfy
bIt remains relevant only for contracts relating to movable property
cIt is no longer relevant to the grant of specific performance
dIt is relevant only where the plaintiff cannot prove readiness and willingness
Answer: C
Post-2018, the distinction between movable and immovable property and the inquiry into adequacy of money compensation has been dispensed with; whether money is adequate relief is no longer relevant under amended section 10.
Q12Specific performance — general (S10–14, post-2018 amendment)
The Supreme Court has held that the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which made specific performance a general rule, operates:
aRetrospectively, governing all pending suits regardless of when the transaction arose
bOnly to contracts relating to infrastructure projects
cRetrospectively only insofar as it creates new substantive rights
dProspectively, and does not apply to transactions that took place before 1 October 2018
Answer: D
The Supreme Court held the 2018 amendment, creating new substantive rights, applies prospectively from 1 October 2018 and not to transactions arising before its enforcement (2023 SCC; 2025 INSC 1267).
Under the scheme of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction is best characterised as which kind of relief?
aA form of specific relief, being a preventive relief granted at the discretion of the court
bA substitutional remedy equivalent to damages
cA relief available strictly as of right once breach is shown
dA purely declaratory relief that settles title
Answer: A
Injunction is a form of specific relief — an order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing a specific act for a limited or unlimited period — granted at the court's discretion (Sections 36–37; commentary AIR 2007 SC 2563).
A defendant has agreed not to commit a particular act (a negative obligation) but is now threatening to commit it. Which mode of relief does the commentary identify as the appropriate way to compel observance of that obligation?
aA decree of specific performance compelling a positive act
bAn injunction restraining the breach of the negative obligation
cRecovery of possession under Part II
dOnly damages, as negative covenants are never enforceable
Answer: B
Performance of a contract may be compelled by an injunction rather than specific performance where the object is to restrain breach of a negative obligation, while specific performance is the proper method for compelling a positive obligation (commentary on Section 42 / Section 38).
An employee's service contract contains a covenant against accepting employment with a competitor. According to the commentary, why may an injunction issue to enforce this covenant even though specific performance is unavailable?
aBecause every employment contract is specifically enforceable after the 2018 amendment
bBecause injunctions and specific performance are interchangeable remedies
cBecause a contract of personal service is not directly enforceable by specific performance, but a covenant in it may be enforced by injunction
dBecause damages are always an adequate remedy in service contracts
Answer: C
An injunction may enforce covenants the court would not enforce by an order for specific performance, e.g. a covenant against working for a competitor, because the contract of personal service is not itself specifically enforceable (commentary AIR 2007 SC 2563).
A party to a sale agreement files suit for specific performance and seeks to restrain the vendor from disposing of the subject-matter pending trial. By which procedural provision is such a temporary injunction in aid of specific performance regulated?
aSection 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
bSection 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
cArticle 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963
dOrder XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
A temporary injunction in aid of specific performance, e.g. restraining removal or disposal of the subject-matter pending trial, is regulated by Order XXXIX of the CPC, 1908 (commentary; Rajeev Singh v Gurmeet Singh, AIR 1998 Del 384).
A licensor seeks to remove his licensee from the premises within a reasonable time after the licence has expired. What relief does the Supreme Court indicate the licensor should seek at that stage?
aA mandatory injunction to evict the licensee
bA perpetual injunction restraining the licensee from entering
cA suit under Section 6 for summary possession
dA bare declaration of his ownership
Answer: A
Where a licensor seeks to evict a licensee within reasonable time after the licence is over, he seeks a mandatory injunction; only thereafter must he sue for possession as the licensee then becomes a trespasser (Joseph Severance v Benny Mathew, (2005) 7 SCC 667).
A plaintiff in actual possession files a suit framed as one for mandatory injunction, though in substance it is a suit for possession. Following Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, how should the court treat the suit?
aDismiss it outright because the wrong relief was claimed
bNot deny relief merely because the plaint is couched as one for a mandatory injunction, since it is in effect a suit for possession
cConvert it into a suit under Section 6 of its own motion
dDirect the plaintiff to first obtain a declaration of title
Answer: B
Where a suit is in effect one for possession, relief should not be denied merely because the plaint is couched in terms of a suit for mandatory injunction (Sant Lal Jain v Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857).
A person wrongfully dispossessed has obtained a decree restoring possession under Section 6. The opposite party sues for a permanent injunction to restrain him from executing that decree. Why is such an injunction generally not maintainable?
aBecause Section 38 bars all permanent injunctions in possession matters
bBecause only the executing court can grant injunctions
cBecause it would render Section 6 nugatory and violate Section 41(a), which bars injunctions restraining the prosecution of a pending judicial proceeding
dBecause Section 39 mandatory injunctions are the exclusive remedy
Answer: C
Such an injunction would render Section 6 nugatory and would violate Section 41(a), which bars an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit, unless needed to prevent multiplicity (Lakhmi Chand v Sarla Devi, AIR 1988 P&H 146).
Section 41(a) bars an injunction restraining a person from prosecuting a pending judicial proceeding. What is the recognised exception to this bar?
aWhere the plaintiff offers to pay damages
bWhere the proceeding is before a court of small causes
cWhere the proceeding relates to an infrastructure project
dWhere such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings
Answer: D
Section 41(a) bars an injunction restraining prosecution of a proceeding pending at the institution of the suit, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings (Section 41(a); Lakhmi Chand v Sarla Devi, AIR 1988 P&H 146).
Following the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, a new clause was added to Section 41 barring injunctions in a particular class of cases. Which clause and class is this?
aClause (ha) — where the injunction would impede or delay the progress or completion of an infrastructure project
bClause (a) — restraining a pending criminal prosecution
cClause (e) — preventing breach of a contract not specifically enforceable
dClause (h) — where an equally efficacious relief is available
Answer: A
The 2018 amendment added clause (ha) to Section 41, barring an injunction that would impede or delay the progress or completion of any infrastructure project or interfere with the continued provision of the project's facility or services (Section 41(ha); read with Section 20A).
In a suit under the Specific Relief Act involving a contract for an infrastructure project, which provision directs that no injunction be granted if it would cause impediment or delay in the project's progress or completion?
aSection 39
bSection 20A
cSection 37
dSection 6(3)
Answer: B
Section 20A provides that no injunction shall be granted by a court in a suit under the Act involving a contract relating to an infrastructure project if the grant would cause impediment or delay in the progress or completion of the project (Section 20A, read with Section 41(ha)).
Q23Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Which proposition best states the law on impleading a stranger in a suit for specific performance, as settled in Kasturi v Iyyamperumal?
aAny person interested in the property may be impleaded as of right
bA stranger asserting adverse title must always be impleaded to avoid multiplicity
cA subsequent purchaser claiming title under the plaintiff's vendor may be impleaded, but a third party asserting a title independent of or adverse to the vendor cannot be added to convert the suit into one for title and possession
dNo subsequent purchaser may ever be impleaded in a specific performance suit
Answer: C
Section 19 is exhaustive; a subsequent purchaser claiming under the vendor may be joined, but a third party asserting an independent/adverse title cannot be impleaded to enlarge the suit into one for title and possession (Kasturi v Iyyamperumal).
Q24Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which of the following contracts is listed in Section 14 as one that cannot be specifically enforced?
aA contract for the sale of immovable property
bA contract which runs into minute or numerous details
cA contract for which compensation in money is an adequate relief
dA contract which is in its nature determinable
Answer: D
Amended Section 14(d) retains 'a contract which is in its nature determinable' as non-enforceable; the 'minute or numerous details' and 'compensation adequate' grounds were removed by the 2018 Amendment.
Q25Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under amended Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a contract is not specifically enforceable where its performance involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise. How has this exception been judicially understood?
aIt applies only where an indefinite succession of court rulings would be needed, not where mere constant physical supervision is involved
bIt bars every building or repair contract without exception
cIt requires an officer of the court to physically supervise performance in all cases
dIt has no application after the 2018 Amendment
Answer: A
The 'continuous duty the court cannot supervise' exception applies where an indefinite succession of rulings would be necessary, not to mean constant physical supervision; thus contracts to build or repair not warranting endless rulings remain enforceable.
Q26Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under amended Section 14(c), a contract cannot be specifically enforced if it is 'so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms.' Which ground, recognised under the pre-2018 provision, was OMITTED from this clause?
aDependence on the personal qualifications of the parties
bDependence on the volition of the parties
cContracts that are determinable in nature
dContracts where substituted performance has been availed
Answer: B
Amended clause (c) is confined to dependence on personal qualifications; the earlier ground of contracts 'so dependent on the volition of the parties' was omitted by the 2018 Amendment.
Q27Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specific performance cannot be enforced in favour of a person who:
ais a representative in interest of the original promisee
bseeks specific performance of only part of the contract
chas obtained substituted performance of the contract under Section 20, or has become incapable of performing or acts in fraud of the contract, or fails to prove that he has performed or was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms on his part
dhas merely failed to use the precise words of Forms 47 and 48 in the plaint
Answer: C
Section 16 bars relief where the plaintiff has obtained substituted performance under s.20, has become incapable/acts in fraud, or fails to prove readiness and willingness; after the 2018 Amendment mere absence of the Form 47/48 wording is not fatal if readiness can be gathered from the plaint (C. Haridasan v Vasudeva Kurup).
Q28Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 changed the language of Section 16(c) from 'who fails to aver and prove' to 'who fails to prove' readiness and willingness. What is the correct effect of this change?
aReadiness and willingness need no longer be proved at all
bThe plaintiff need not plead any facts, only lead evidence at trial
cThe defendant now bears the burden of disproving the plaintiff's readiness
dThe specific averment is dispensed with, but the plaintiff must still prove readiness and willingness, and no evidence can be led on a plea never raised in the pleadings
Answer: D
The amendment dispenses with the rigid requirement of formally averring readiness and willingness but retains the burden of proving it, and the rule that no evidence may be led on a plea not in the pleadings continues (C. Haridasan v Vasudeva Kurup).
Q29Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
A enters into a contract with C, ostensibly as agent for B, to buy C's house, but in reality A is acting on his own account and not as agent for B. With respect to A's claim for specific performance against C, which is correct?
aA cannot enforce specific performance of the contract
bA can enforce specific performance because he is a party to the contract under Section 15(a)
cOnly B, as the disclosed principal, can enforce the contract
dSpecific performance can be enforced jointly by A and B only
Answer: A
Under Section 16 (personal bars), where A purports to act as agent for B but is really acting on his own account, A cannot enforce specific performance, his conduct disentitling him to the equitable relief.
Q30Who may obtain / against whom; contracts not enforceable
Under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, against whom can specific performance of a contract NOT be enforced?
aA person claiming under the contracting party by a title arising subsequently to the contract
bA transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract
cA person claiming under a prior title known to the plaintiff which might have been displaced by the defendant
dThe new company arising out of amalgamation of the contracting company
Answer: B
Section 19(b) carves out a bona fide transferee for value who paid in good faith and without notice of the original contract; specific performance cannot be enforced against such a person.
Q31Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
May a plaintiff seeking specific performance himself claim performance with a variation he sets up, in a case covered by clause (a) or (b) of s.18?
aYes, plaintiff and defendant have an equal right to set up a variation
bYes, but only with the court's prior leave
cNo, because under s.16 that would show he was not ready and willing to perform the essential terms
dYes, provided the variation is reduced to writing
Answer: C
The s.18 commentary states the variation is one set up by the defendant; a plaintiff cannot claim performance with a variation set up by himself in clause (a)/(b) cases, as under s.16 that would show he was not ready and willing to perform the essential terms.
Q32Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Parties to a written contract may set up and prove a distinct subsequent oral agreement modifying it (s.18(c)). The correct limit on this rule is:
aOral variation can never modify a signed written contract
bOnly the original, never the varied, contract can be specifically enforced
cThe oral variation must always be registered to be admissible
dIt is permissible except where the variation is required by law to be in writing or registered, and then only the varied contract can be specifically enforced
Answer: D
Per the s.18(c) commentary, parties may prove a distinct subsequent oral agreement to modify a contract, except where the variation is required by law to be in writing or registered; where so varied, only the varied contract can be specifically enforced.
Q33Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A defendant in a specific-performance suit who has once admitted, in his written statement, the due execution of the agreement set up by the plaintiff:
aCannot be allowed to amend the written statement to allege the agreement stood cancelled and superseded by a subsequent agreement
bMay freely amend to allege the agreement stood cancelled and was superseded by a later agreement
cMust prove the subsequent agreement was registered before amending
dMay withdraw the admission only with the plaintiff's consent
Answer: A
Per Krishan Swarup Bhatnagar v Chander Mohan Rewal, AIR 2000 HP 53, a defendant who has admitted due execution cannot later amend the written statement to allege the agreement stood cancelled and was superseded by a subsequent agreement.
Q34Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Where the vendor, during the pendency of a specific-performance suit, sells the property to a third party and a decree is later passed, the leading view (Lala Durga Prasad v Lala Deep Chand) on cancelling that subsequent sale is:
aA separate prayer and decree for cancellation of the subsequent sale is a condition precedent to specific performance
bThe effect of the specific-performance decree is the cancellation of the subsequent sale, so cancellation need not be sought separately
cThe subsequent sale can never be affected by the decree
dOnly the registering authority can cancel the subsequent sale
Answer: B
In Lala Durga Prasad v Lala Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75, the effect of a specific-performance decree is the cancellation of the subsequent sale, so the relief of cancellation of the subsequent sale need not be sought separately.
Q35Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Words such as 'fraud', 'misrepresentation', 'mistake', 'void' and 'voidable' used in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (relevant to rectification, rescission and cancellation) carry:
aMeanings specially and exhaustively defined within the Specific Relief Act itself
bMeanings drawn solely from the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cThe meanings assigned to them under the Indian Contract Act, 1872
dWhatever meaning the court considers equitable in each case
Answer: C
Per the s.2 commentary, words like 'fraud', 'misrepresentation', 'mistake', 'void' and 'voidable' used in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 have the same meaning as defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Q36Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
In Soni Lalji Jetha v Soni Kalidas Devchand, a mortgagor sold the property to the mortgagee and handed over possession, while respondents had an earlier contract of sale of the same property with a right to specific performance. The Supreme Court held that:
aThe sale to the mortgagee was absolutely void from inception
bThe respondents lost all rights once possession passed to the mortgagee
cThe earlier contract of sale was unenforceable for want of registration
dThe sale was voidable at the respondents' instance, the mortgagee standing in a fiduciary character whose possession could not be adverse to them
Answer: D
In Soni Lalji Jetha v Soni Kalidas Devchand, AIR 1967 SC 978, the sale was voidable at the instance of the respondents (who had a right of specific performance), and the mortgagee-purchaser stood in a fiduciary character so his possession could not be adverse to them.
Q37Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property does not terminate the suit, and the court passing it retains control over the decree. By virtue of which provision can the court, even after passing such a decree, rescind it?
aSection 28
bSection 6
cSection 16
dSection 12
Answer: A
A decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the court retains control; it can execute the decree or rescind it under Section 28 of the Act.
Q38Rectification, rescission & cancellation of instruments
A contracts to sell certain land to B for Rs. 5,000. A afterwards conveys the land to C for Rs. 6,000, C having notice of the original contract; the sale deed to C is registered and C has obtained possession. B sues for specific performance. Which is correct regarding cancellation of C's registered sale deed?
aB must first obtain a separate decree cancelling C's sale deed before specific performance can be ordered against C
bB may enforce specific performance against C, and the relief of cancelling the subsequent sale need not be sought separately as the decree itself has that effect
cB cannot succeed because Section 48 of the Registration Act protects C's prior-registered conveyance
dB can only claim damages, since C has already obtained registration and possession
Answer: B
Per Lala Durga Prasad v Lala Deep Chand (AIR 1954 SC 75), since the effect of a decree for specific performance is the cancellation of the sale in favour of the subsequent purchaser, the relief of cancellation need not be sought separately; B's right is unaffected by C's registration or possession where C had notice.
Q39Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Under Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, what is the position regarding challenge to a decree passed in a Section 6 suit?
aAppeal is barred but review is allowed
bAppeal lies but review is barred
cBoth appeal and review are barred, but revision under Section 115 CPC may lie
dBoth appeal and review lie as of right
Answer: C
Section 6(3) bars both appeal and review against a decree in a Section 6 suit; however, the aggrieved party may seek revision by the High Court under Section 115 CPC in exceptional cases (Sanjay Kumar Pandey v Gulbahar Sheikh, AIR 2004 SC 3354).
Q40Recovery of possession (S5–8)
P, dispossessed of land otherwise than in due course of law, allows the six-month period under Section 6 to lapse. He then sues to recover possession on the strength of his previous possession alone, against a trespasser. Which view did the Supreme Court accept as correct?
aP cannot recover at all after six months, as Section 6 is the exclusive remedy
bP may recover only by proving at least 12 years' adverse possession
cP must always prove ownership title to succeed after six months
dP may recover within 12 years on prior possession alone, and need not prove title unless the defendant proves a better title
Answer: D
Prior possession is good title against a wrongdoer; a suit under Section 5 may be filed within 12 years on prior possession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant proves a better title (Nair Service Society Ltd v K C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165; Somnath Berman v S P Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846).
Q41Recovery of possession (S5–8)
What is the key distinction between a suit under Section 5 and a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 with respect to the defendant's defence?
aIn a Section 5 suit the defendant can defeat the suit by proving superior title, whereas in a Section 6 suit he cannot plead superior title
bIn a Section 5 suit the defendant cannot plead superior title, but in a Section 6 suit he can
cIn both suits the defendant may plead superior title
dIn neither suit may the defendant plead superior title
Answer: A
In a Section 5 suit a defendant can defeat the claim by proving a superior title, but in a Section 6 suit the question of title is irrelevant and the defendant cannot plead superior title (Nair Service Society Ltd v K C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165).
Q42Recovery of possession (S5–8)
A tenant continues in juridical possession after expiry of the lease term (holding over) and is forcibly dispossessed by his own landlord without recourse to law. Which is correct?
aThe tenant cannot sue the landlord under Section 6 because the landlord is the owner
bThe tenant may sue the landlord for possession under Section 6, and the landlord cannot plead that the tenant was merely holding over
cThe tenant's only remedy is to prove his title in a regular suit
dThe landlord's right of extra-judicial re-entry is recognised against a tenant holding over
Answer: B
A tenant holding over remains in juridical possession and may sue the landlord under Section 6 if forcibly dispossessed; Indian law does not recognise a landlord's right of extra-judicial re-entry (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620).
Q43Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Following the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 to Section 6(1), who, besides the dispossessed person, can now sue to recover possession?
aOnly a person claiming through the dispossessed person
bAny servant or caretaker of the dispossessed person
cAny person through whom the dispossessed person has been in possession, as well as any person claiming through him
dOnly the registered owner of the property
Answer: C
The 2018 amendment inserted 'through whom he has been in possession or any person', enabling the predecessor through whom the dispossessed person claims (e.g. a landlord whose tenant is dispossessed) to sue, in addition to a person claiming through him (Sadashiv Shyama Sawant v Anita Anant Sawant, (2010) 3 SCC 385).
Q44Recovery of possession (S5–8)
Which of the following defences IS permissible against a suit for ejectment based on title under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aJus tertii — that a third person, neither plaintiff nor defendant, is the true owner
bThat the plaintiff merely had prior possession
cThat the plaintiff was once a trespasser long ago
dThat the defendant has a better title than the plaintiff
Answer: D
A defendant is always at liberty to rebut the presumption of title from prior possession by proving a better title in himself; better title is a good defence in all suits, but the defence of jus tertii is not allowed (Nair Service Society Ltd v K C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165).
Q45Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
Regarding the relationship between a decree for declaration of title and a decree for possession, which statement is correct?
aA decree for possession does not automatically follow a decree for declaration of title; entitlement to possession must be separately established
bA decree for declaration of title automatically carries a decree for possession
cA decree for possession can never accompany a declaration of title
dPossession follows declaration only if the defendant is a trespasser
Answer: A
A decree for possession does not automatically follow a decree for declaration of title; entitlement to such possession must be established (Nazir Mohamed v J. Kamala, (2020) 19 SCC 57).
Q46Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff in possession of immovable property, whose title rests on documentary evidence, is sued by a trespasser who merely denies the plaintiff's title without setting up any apparent title of his own. The plaintiff:
aMust necessarily file a suit for declaration of title
bNeed not sue for declaration, since a mere denial without apparent title does not raise a cloud on his title
cLoses his title by reason of the trespasser's denial
dCan only seek damages
Answer: B
A bare denial of title by a trespasser without any apparent title does not raise a cloud, so the plaintiff need not sue for declaration (Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v Muddasani Sarojana, AIR 2016 SC 2250).
Q47Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
When is a 'cloud' said to be raised over a person's title, requiring him to seek a declaration?
aWhenever any defendant disputes the suit
bOnly when the defendant is in actual possession
cWhen some apparent defect in his title is made out or shown
dOnly when the plaintiff has no documentary evidence
Answer: C
A cloud is raised over title when some apparent defect in the title is made out or shown (Anathula Sudhakar v P Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594).
Q48Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A plaintiff sues for possession of immovable property on the strength of his title and not merely on prior possession. According to the Supreme Court, he need NOT additionally seek a declaration of title unless:
aThe defendant pleads adverse possession
bThe property exceeds a particular value
cThe suit is filed beyond limitation
dThere is a serious cloud on the plaintiff's title
Answer: D
In a suit for possession on the strength of title, the plaintiff need not seek a declaration unless there is a serious cloud on his title (Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288).
Q49Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A tenant against whom an eviction decree has been confirmed wishes to sue his landlord for a declaration of title to the tenanted premises. The Supreme Court directed that such a suit for declaration of title should:
aNot be entertained unless the tenant first vacates and hands over possession to the landlord
bBe entertained immediately as title is a substantial question
cBe transferred to the rent control authority
dBe entertained only after the landlord consents
Answer: A
A tenant's suit for declaration of title should not be entertained unless he first vacates and hands over possession to the landlord (State of AP v D Raghukul Pershad, (2012) 8 SCC 584).
Q50Declaratory decrees (S34–35)
A party against whom an order has been made in a summary possession proceeding under Section 6 wishes to assert his title. Which remedy is open to him?
aHe is barred forever from raising title once a Section 6 order is passed
bHe may sue for a declaration of title and seek an injunction restraining interference with his possession
cHe can only file an appeal against the Section 6 order
dHe must accept the order as res judicata on title
Answer: B
The party against whom a summary order is made can sue for declaration of title and seek an injunction restraining interference with possession (Chunni v Suluthar, AIR 1972 All 418; Mahommad Hussain Suleman Shaikh v Batkubhai Vaijibhai, AIR 1984 Guj 66).
Practiced enough reading? Attempt Specific Relief Act, 1963 mocks under real exam conditions and track your weak subjects.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
