Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
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The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of a Junior Civil Judge and a Senior Civil Judge in the State is conferred by:
athe Civil Rules of Practice
bthe A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972
cthe A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956
dthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: B
Pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil courts in Andhra Pradesh is fixed by the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Section 16), not by the CPC; the CPC only regulates procedure. Court-fee valuation is separately governed by the 1956 Act.
Under Section 9 of the C.P.C., a suit in which the right to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature -
aonly where some fees are attached to the office
bonly where the office is attached to a particular place
cnotwithstanding that the right may depend entirely on a decision as to religious rites or ceremonies
donly where the office is a secular office unconnected with religion
Answer: C
Explanation I to Section 9 makes a suit contesting a right to property or office a suit of civil nature even though the right depends on questions of religious rites; Explanation II makes it immaterial whether fees attach or the office is attached to a place.
Power of the Supreme Court to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or other civil court in one State to a like court in another State is contained in -
aSection 25
bSection 22
cSection 24
dSection 23
Answer: A
Section 25 vests exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of inter-State transfer; Section 24 confers the general power of transfer/withdrawal on the High Court and District Court within a State.
The doctrine of constructive res judicata is engrafted in which part of Section 11 of the C.P.C.?
aExplanation I
bExplanation VIII
cExplanation VI
dExplanation IV
Answer: D
Explanation IV to Section 11 embodies constructive res judicata: a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue.
Where a sole defendant against whom a decree has been passed ex parte applies under Order 9 Rule 13 to set it aside, the Court shall set the decree aside if it is satisfied that -
athe decree was passed without framing issues
bthe plaintiff has consented to the setting aside
cthe summons was not duly served or the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing
dthe defendant has a good defence on merits, irrespective of service
Answer: C
Order 9 Rule 13 permits setting aside an ex parte decree where the defendant shows that summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing.
In an ordinary civil suit, the maximum period up to which a Court may, for reasons recorded in writing, allow a defendant to file his written statement beyond the initial 30 days under Order 8 Rule 1 is -
a60 days from the date of service of summons
bno outer limit is prescribed
c120 days from the date of service of summons
d90 days from the date of service of summons
Answer: D
Order 8 Rule 1 requires the written statement within 30 days, extendable for recorded reasons but not later than 90 days from service of summons. (The 120-day forfeiture applies only to commercial suits.)
The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17, C.P.C., bars amendment of pleadings after the commencement of trial unless -
athe opposite party consents in writing
bthe Court finds that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial
cthe amendment is sought within 14 days of the order
dthe suit is one for specific performance
Answer: B
The proviso (inserted by the 2002 Amendment) prohibits amendment after the trial has commenced unless the Court concludes that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
Under Section 80(2), C.P.C., a suit against the Government or a public officer may be instituted without serving the two months' notice -
aonly with the prior sanction of the Advocate General
bin every suit, the notice having been wholly abolished
conly where the suit value does not exceed Rs. 1,000
dwith the leave of the Court, where urgent or immediate relief is sought
Answer: D
Section 80(2) allows a suit seeking urgent or immediate relief to be instituted with the leave of the Court without prior notice, but the Court shall not grant relief without giving the Government/public officer a reasonable opportunity.
da decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties
Answer: D
Section 96(3) bars an appeal from a decree passed with the consent of parties, the parties being estopped from challenging a decree they themselves agreed to.
A second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C., to the High Court lies only where the case involves -
aa misreading of oral evidence
ba question of fact wrongly decided by the first appellate court
ca substantial question of law
dany error apparent on the face of the record
Answer: C
After the 1976 Amendment, a second appeal under Section 100 is maintainable only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, which must be precisely stated in the memorandum.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, the effect of Section 100A, C.P.C., is that -
aa Letters Patent Appeal lies to a Division Bench
ba further appeal lies only with a certificate of fitness
cthe matter is remitted to the District Court
dno further appeal lies, notwithstanding anything in the Letters Patent
Answer: D
Section 100A, beginning with a non-obstante clause, bars any further appeal (including a Letters Patent Appeal) from the judgment and decree of a single Judge of a High Court who has decided an appeal.
An application for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C., is competent only where -
aan interim injunction has been vacated
bthe suit has been dismissed for default
ca decree or order has been varied or reversed in appeal, revision or other proceeding
dthe decree-holder has obtained possession
Answer: C
Section 144 is attracted only where a decree or order is varied, reversed, set aside or modified; restitution then restores the parties to the position they would have occupied but for that decree. It is not attracted where there is no such variation or reversal.
In execution, a third person who owes a debt to the judgment-debtor and is called upon by notice to pay that debt into Court towards satisfaction of the decree is known as a -
adecree-holder
bsurety
cclaimant objector
dgarnishee
Answer: D
Under Order 21 Rule 46A, the debtor of the judgment-debtor against whom a garnishee notice is issued is the garnishee; on failure to pay or show cause, the Court may order execution against him as if the order were a decree.
All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, are to be determined by -
athe appellate Court under Section 96
bthe High Court under Section 115
ca separate suit
dthe executing Court under Section 47
Answer: D
Section 47 requires all such questions to be determined by the Court executing the decree, and not by a separate suit, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
Where a person aggrieved by a decree from which an appeal is allowed has not preferred an appeal, an application for review under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C., -
alies only to the High Court
blies only where the appeal period has expired
cis maintainable, including on the ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence not within his knowledge or producible earlier despite due diligence
dis not maintainable in any circumstance
Answer: C
Order 47 Rule 1 permits review by a party who, though an appeal is allowed, has not appealed, on grounds such as discovery of new and important evidence not earlier within knowledge despite due diligence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason.
Where it appears to the Court that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to refer the dispute to:
aArbitration and conciliation only
bArbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, or mediation
cLok Adalat and mediation only, arbitration being excluded after a suit is filed
dOnly such mode of dispute resolution as the parties had agreed upon in writing before the suit
Answer: B
Section 89(1) lists four modes for reference of a dispute to outside settlement: arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (which includes settlement through a Lok Adalat) and mediation.
Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, an application to set aside the sale on deposit under Order XXI Rule 89 requires the applicant to deposit, for payment to the auction-purchaser, a sum equal to:
aFive per cent of the purchase-money
bTen per cent of the purchase-money
cThe whole of the purchase-money together with interest
dTwenty-five per cent of the purchase-money
Answer: A
Order XXI Rule 89 requires the applicant to deposit 5 per cent of the purchase-money for payment to the purchaser, plus the amount specified in the proclamation of sale (less amounts already received by the decree-holder) for the decree-holder.
Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, as substituted by the Amendment Act of 2002, provides that where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court:
aA further appeal shall lie only with the certificate of the Single Judge
bNo further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge
cA further appeal shall lie only on a substantial question of law
dA further appeal (including a Letters Patent appeal) shall lie to a Division Bench
Answer: B
Section 100A bars any further appeal, notwithstanding the Letters Patent, where a Single Judge of a High Court has heard and decided an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order.
Under Section 96(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in a suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes where the value of the subject-matter does not exceed ten thousand rupees, an appeal from the decree shall lie:
aOn a question of law only
bOn a question of fact only
cOn both questions of fact and law
dNot at all, in any circumstance
Answer: A
Section 96(4) bars an appeal except on a question of law from a decree in a Small Cause-type suit where the value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 10,000.
Under Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding, or of both, or of community service, of:
aTwenty-five thousand rupees
bTen thousand rupees
cOne lakh rupees
dFifty thousand rupees
Answer: D
Section 23(1) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to award up to three years' imprisonment or fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. The fine limit was raised from Rs. 10,000 under the old CrPC.
Where information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but less than seven years is received, Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, permits the officer in charge, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, to conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain a prima facie case. Such enquiry must be completed within:
aSeven days
bFourteen days
cThirty days
dTwenty-one days
Answer: B
Section 173(3) BNSS allows a preliminary enquiry, with prior permission of an officer not below DSP rank, for offences punishable with 3 to less than 7 years' imprisonment, and requires it to be completed within fourteen days.
Under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the maximum total period for which a Magistrate may authorise detention of an accused (police plus judicial custody), where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten years or more, life imprisonment or death, is:
aOne hundred and twenty days
bNinety days
cSixty days
dOne hundred and eighty days
Answer: B
Section 187 BNSS caps total authorised detention at ninety days for offences punishable with death, life or imprisonment of ten years or more, and sixty days for any other offence; on expiry, the accused is entitled to default bail.
Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, introduces a safeguard for certain persons. No arrest shall be made of a person who is infirm or above sixty years of age, in respect of an offence punishable with imprisonment for less than three years, without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aDeputy Superintendent of Police
bSuperintendent of Police
cSub-Inspector
dInspector
Answer: A
Section 35(7) BNSS bars arrest of an infirm person or one above sixty years for an offence punishable with less than three years' imprisonment except with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, regarding recording of confessions and statements, which of the following is correct?
aOnly a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the case may record a confession
bA confession may be recorded by a police officer on whom magisterial powers have been conferred
cA confession or statement may be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the accused
dA confession can only be recorded after the trial has commenced
Answer: C
Section 183 BNSS expressly permits recording of confessions or statements by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the accused's advocate, and allows any Magistrate of the district to record them whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case.
Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, introduces a new requirement regarding the conduct of search and seizure. It provides that the process of conducting a search, taking possession of property and preparing the list of seized things shall be:
aConducted only in the presence of a Judicial Magistrate
bReduced to writing and attested by two gazetted officers
cCarried out only after obtaining a search warrant from the Sessions Court
dRecorded through any audio-video electronic means, preferably a mobile phone
Answer: D
Section 105 BNSS mandates that search, seizure and preparation of the list of seized items be recorded through audio-video electronic means (preferably mobile phone), and the recording forwarded without delay to the concerned Magistrate.
Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, makes visit of forensic experts to the scene of crime to collect forensic evidence mandatory where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of:
aFive years or more
bSeven years or more
cThree years or more
dTen years or more
Answer: B
Section 176(3) BNSS requires forensic experts to visit the crime scene and collect forensic evidence (with the process video-recorded) where the offence is punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more.
Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, introduces the concept of trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender. The Court shall not commence such trial unless a period has elapsed from the date of framing of the charge, of:
aSixty days
bNinety days
cThirty days
dOne hundred and twenty days
Answer: B
Section 356 BNSS permits trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded, but the Court, after recording reasons in writing, may commence the trial only after ninety days have elapsed from the date of framing of the charge.
Under the proviso to Section 479(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a person who is a first-time offender (never previously convicted of any offence) shall be released on bond by the Court if he has undergone detention, during investigation, inquiry or trial, up to a period of:
aOne-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
bOne-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
cThe full maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
dOne-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
Answer: D
While Section 479(1) BNSS generally entitles an undertrial to release after detention of one-half of the maximum sentence, the first proviso provides that a first-time offender is to be released on bond after detention of up to one-third of that maximum period.
Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for the first time prescribes a statutory time-limit for filing a mercy petition by a convict under sentence of death. Such petition may be made to the President under Article 72 or the Governor under Article 161, within a period of, from the date the Superintendent of jail informs him of the disposal of his appeal/petition:
aNinety days
bThirty days
cFifteen days
dSixty days
Answer: B
Section 472 BNSS prescribes that a convict under sentence of death, his legal heir or relative may file a mercy petition within thirty days of being informed by the jail Superintendent of the dismissal/confirmation, a time-limit not present in the old CrPC.
Under Section 290 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an accused may apply for plea bargaining within a period from the date of framing of the charge, of:
aFifteen days
bThirty days
cSixty days
dForty-five days
Answer: B
Section 290 BNSS requires the application for plea bargaining to be filed within thirty days from the date of framing of charge in the court where the offence is pending trial; plea bargaining is unavailable for offences punishable with death, life or imprisonment exceeding seven years.
Under Section 514 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence punishable with fine only is:
aThree months
bOne year
cThree years
dSix months
Answer: D
Section 514 BNSS bars cognizance after six months where the offence is punishable with fine only, one year where punishable with imprisonment up to one year, and three years where punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, casts a duty on the police officer to inform the informant or victim about the progress of the investigation, including by electronic communication, within a period of:
aOne hundred and eighty days
bSixty days
cNinety days
dThirty days
Answer: C
Section 193 BNSS introduces a victim-centric duty requiring the police officer to inform the informant/victim about the progress of investigation within ninety days, including through electronic communication.
Under Section 73 of the Indian Penal Code, where the term of imprisonment awarded exceeds one year, the maximum period for which a Court may order solitary confinement, taken together in the whole, is:
aThree months
bSix months
cOne month
dTwo months
Answer: A
Section 73 fixes the outer limit of solitary confinement at three months in the whole, available only where the sentence of imprisonment exceeds one year. Section 74 separately caps any single spell at fourteen days.
The five kinds of punishment enumerated in Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code do NOT include:
aSolitary confinement
bFine
cForfeiture of property
dImprisonment for life
Answer: A
Section 53 lists death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment (rigorous or simple), forfeiture of property and fine. Solitary confinement is only a mode of executing rigorous imprisonment under Section 73, not an independent kind of punishment.
X attempts to commit an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for life. There being no express provision for the attempt, the maximum imprisonment that may be awarded under Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code is:
aImprisonment for life
bOne-half of the longest term provided, that is, imprisonment which may extend to one-half of imprisonment for life
cSeven years
dTen years
Answer: B
Section 511 provides that an attempt, where no special provision exists, is punishable with up to one-half of the imprisonment for life, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence.
In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, the Supreme Court laid down the ingredients to be proved for attracting which clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code?
aClause 'Firstly'
bClause 'Secondly'
cClause 'Thirdly'
dClause 'Fourthly'
Answer: C
Virsa Singh interpreted clause 'Thirdly' of Section 300, holding the prosecution must prove the bodily injury, its objective sufficiency in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and the intention to inflict that particular injury.
In Reg v. Govinda (1876) ILR 1 Bom 342, Melvill J. illustrated the distinction between culpable homicide and murder by observing that the difference often turns upon:
aWhether the act was done in the heat of passion
bWhether a deadly weapon was used
cWhether the deceased was a woman
dThe degree of probability of death resulting from the act
Answer: D
In Reg v. Govinda, Melvill J. explained that where death is a likely result the offence is culpable homicide, whereas where death is the most probable result the offence is murder, the distinction lying in the degree of probability.
A child above seven and under twelve years of age who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on a given occasion is protected by which provision of the Indian Penal Code?
aSection 84
bSection 82
cSection 83
dSection 85
Answer: C
Section 83 grants qualified immunity to a child above seven and under twelve, subject to proof of immature understanding. Section 82 alone gives absolute immunity to a child under seven.
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, which embodies the defence of unsoundness of mind, is essentially a statutory recognition of:
aThe irresistible impulse test
bThe doctrine of diminished responsibility
cThe Durham product test
dThe M'Naghten Rules on legal insanity
Answer: D
Section 84 codifies the M'Naghten test, exempting a person who, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law. It deals with legal, not medical, insanity.
Which of the following most accurately states a distinction between Section 34 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code?
aSection 34 requires five or more persons, whereas Section 149 requires only two
bSection 34 creates a substantive offence, whereas Section 149 only lays down a rule of evidence
cSection 34 requires participation in furtherance of a common intention, whereas Section 149 fixes liability for the common object of an unlawful assembly of five or more
dBoth sections require a prior meeting of minds and active participation by every member
Answer: C
Section 34 is a rule of evidence requiring participation in furtherance of a common intention by two or more persons, while Section 149 fixes constructive liability on every member of an unlawful assembly of five or more for the common object.
The mere agreement of two or more persons to commit an offence is itself sufficient to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy, even without any overt act, under:
aSection 121A
bSection 107
cSection 120B
dSection 120A
Answer: D
Section 120A defines criminal conspiracy; where the agreement is to commit an offence, the agreement itself completes the offence with no need for an overt act. Section 120B only prescribes the punishment.
Robbery, as defined in Section 390 of the Indian Penal Code, is correctly described as:
aTheft committed only by five or more persons
bExtortion committed without putting any person in fear
cAn aggravated form of theft or extortion, or of both
dA distinct offence having no element of theft or extortion
Answer: C
Section 390 states that in all robbery there is either theft or extortion; robbery is an aggravated form of one or both, the aggravation lying in the use or threat of force or instant fear.
Under Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code, taking or enticing a minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian without consent amounts to kidnapping from lawful guardianship where the minor is:
aUnder twelve years of age if a male, or under sixteen years of age if a female
bUnder fourteen years of age irrespective of sex
cUnder sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female
dUnder eighteen years of age irrespective of sex
Answer: C
Section 361 prescribes the age thresholds as under sixteen for a male and under eighteen for a female; the consent of the minor is immaterial, only the guardian's consent is relevant.
Under Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), a confession made to a police officer:
aMay be proved against the accused if it leads to discovery of a fact
bShall not be proved as against a person accused of any offence
cMay be proved if made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate
dMay be proved only in proceedings before a Court of Session
Answer: B
Section 23(1) of the BSA imposes an absolute bar: no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence, the object being to prevent confessions extorted through coercion during interrogation.
When a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused in police custody, the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) permits proof of:
aThe information only if the accused was first cautioned by a Magistrate
bOnly that part of the information which does not amount to a confession
cOnly so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
dThe entire information, whether or not it amounts to a confession
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA is an exception to the bar in Section 23(1) and (2); it lets in only so much of the information, whether amounting to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered.
A statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death is relevant under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
aOnly if the person was under expectation of death when he made it
bOnly in proceedings for an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment
cWhether or not the person was, at the time, under expectation of death, and whatever the nature of the proceeding
dOnly if reduced to writing and signed by the declarant
Answer: C
Under Section 26(a) of the BSA (and its Explanation), such statements are relevant whether or not the declarant was under expectation of death and whatever the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of death comes into question; unlike English law, Indian law requires no expectation of death.
The view that the expression 'circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death' in Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) (corresponding to the old dying-declaration provision) does not require the statement to be made under expectation of death was authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in:
aEmperor v. Mt. Gulabi, AIR 1926 Bom 442
bQueen-Empress v. Abdullah, ILR 7 All 385
cRatten v. The Queen, [1971] 3 All ER 801
dPakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47
Answer: D
In Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47) the Privy Council, per Lord Atkin, held that a statement as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death is admissible (now under Section 26(a) of the BSA) even though made with no expectation of death.
When a person is accused of an offence and pleads that his case falls within a General Exception in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) provides that:
aNo burden arises until the prosecution has closed its evidence
bThe burden of proving the existence of such circumstances is upon him, and the Court shall presume their absence
cThe burden is on the prosecution, but the standard is only preponderance of probabilities
dThe prosecution must disprove the exception beyond reasonable doubt at the outset
Answer: B
Section 108 of the BSA casts the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within a General or special exception in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita upon the accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
Under Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when a fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is:
aOn the person within whose special knowledge the fact lies
bOn the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue
cAlways on the prosecution in a criminal case
dOn whichever party would fail if no evidence were given
Answer: A
Section 109 of the BSA is an exception to the general rule in Section 104; where a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving it is upon that person.
The presumption that 'a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession' is found in:
aSection 117, presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman
bSection 2, definition of 'may presume'
cSection 113, burden of proof as to ownership
dSection 119, Illustration (a)
Answer: D
This is Illustration (a) to Section 119 of the BSA, which permits the Court to presume the existence of facts likely to have happened having regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct.
Under Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the opinion of a person specially skilled in a relevant field is a relevant fact on a question as to:
aForeign law, science or art, or identity of handwriting or finger impressions
bThe credibility of an interested witness
cThe genuineness of an oral agreement between two parties
dWhether a confession was voluntary
Answer: A
Section 39 of the BSA makes the opinion of an expert relevant on points of foreign law, science or art, and as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions; such persons are called experts.
Section 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) lays down the rule that oral evidence:
aMust in all cases be direct
bIs excluded whenever documentary evidence of the same fact exists
cIs admissible only if reduced to writing and signed
dMay be hearsay if corroborated by a document
Answer: A
Section 55 of the BSA enacts that oral evidence must in all cases be direct, i.e. given by the person who saw, heard or perceived the fact, thereby excluding hearsay.
The general rule under Section 124 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) regarding competency of witnesses is that:
aAll persons are competent to testify unless prevented from understanding the questions or giving rational answers
bA person of unsound mind can never testify
cA child below twelve years is incompetent in all circumstances
dOnly persons above eighteen years of age are competent to testify
Answer: A
Section 124 of the BSA makes all persons competent to testify unless the Court considers that, by reason of tender years, extreme old age, disease or the like, they are prevented from understanding the questions or giving rational answers.
Under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the expression "living person" by whom or to whom property may be transferred:
aMeans only a natural human being and excludes any artificial entity
bIncludes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not
cIncludes only the Central or State Government and not private associations
dIncludes a company only if it is incorporated under the Companies Act
Answer: B
Section 5 defines "transfer of property" as an act by which a living person conveys property to one or more other living persons, and expressly provides that "living person" includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature:
aCannot be transferred under Section 6(a) of the Act
bMay be transferred only with the consent of the Court
cMay be transferred for consideration but not by way of gift
dMay be transferred only after the death of the propositus
Answer: A
Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 expressly declares that the chance of an heir-apparent (spes successionis) and similar mere possibilities cannot be transferred; such a transfer is void.
In Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, the Supreme Court held that where a transferor, having only a spes successionis, erroneously represents that he has a present transferable interest and a transferee takes for consideration on the faith of that representation:
aThe transfer is valid only if the heir-apparent ratifies it after succession opens
bThe transferee is entitled to the benefit of Section 43 (feeding the grant by estoppel) on the transferor subsequently acquiring the interest
cThe transfer is wholly void as it offends Section 6(a) and the transferee gets nothing
dThe transferee can claim only damages but not the property
Answer: B
In Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847, the Supreme Court held that a transferee acting in good faith on a representation of present title gets the protection of Section 43, which operates by estoppel and is distinct from the substantive bar of Section 6(a).
The rule against perpetuity embodied in Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that no transfer can create an interest to take effect after the lifetime of one or more persons living at the date of the transfer and:
aThe minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period and to whom the interest is to belong if he attains full age
bA perpetual period at the option of the transferor
cA further period of twelve years from the date of vesting
dA further fixed period of eighteen years in all cases
Answer: A
Section 14 fixes the maximum remoteness of vesting at the life or lives in being plus the minority of a person in existence at the close of that period; the interest must vest, if at all, within that life/lives and the subsequent minority.
Where a person professes to transfer property which he has no right to transfer, and as part of the same transaction confers a benefit on the owner of that property, the owner:
aTakes both the benefit and retains the property without any obligation
bMust elect either to confirm the transfer or to dissent from it under the doctrine of election in Section 35
cIs bound to confirm the transfer in every case
dMay only dissent from the transfer and forfeit the benefit
Answer: B
Section 35 enacts the doctrine of election: a person taking a benefit under an instrument that also professes to transfer his own property must choose to confirm the entire transaction or reject it; he cannot both take the benefit and keep his property.
Under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where with the consent (express or implied) of the persons interested an ostensible owner transfers immovable property for consideration, the transfer is not voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it, provided that:
aThe transferee was a relation of the ostensible owner
bThe transfer was registered within four months
cThe real owner had no knowledge of the transaction at any time
dThe transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, acted in good faith
Answer: D
Section 41 protects a transferee from an ostensible owner only if the transferee took reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power to transfer and acted in good faith; it is an exception based on estoppel by conduct of the real owner.
The doctrine of lis pendens contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that during the pendency of a suit in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property:
aVests automatically in the plaintiff pending decision
bCannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party so as to affect the rights of any other party under the decree, except under the authority of the Court
cMay be freely transferred provided the transferee has no notice of the suit
dBecomes the property of the Court until the suit is decided
Answer: B
Section 52 does not make a transfer pendente lite void but renders it subject to the rights of the parties as determined by the decree; a party may not transfer the suit property to defeat those rights except with the Court's leave.
Under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the motion for a decree of divorce by mutual consent must be made by both parties:
aAt any time after the date of presentation of the petition
bNot earlier than three months and not later than one year after the date of presentation of the petition
cNot earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the date of presentation of the petition
dNot earlier than one year after the date of presentation of the petition
Answer: C
Section 13B(2) requires the second motion to be moved not earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months from the date of presentation of the petition, failing which the petition lapses.
In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017), the Supreme Court held that the six-month waiting period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is:
aWholly discretionary and of no binding force
bDirectory, and may be waived by the court in appropriate cases
cMandatory and can never be waived
dMandatory but waivable only by the High Court
Answer: B
In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) the Supreme Court held that the cooling-off period under Section 13B(2) is directory and not mandatory, and can be waived by the court where the conditions it laid down are satisfied.
A marriage solemnised in contravention of the age condition in clause (iii) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (bridegroom under 21 or bride under 18) is:
aVoid ab initio
bVoid only if the bride was below 15 years of age
cNeither void nor voidable, though it attracts penal consequences under Section 18
dVoidable at the option of the aggrieved party
Answer: C
Contravention of the age requirement in Section 5(iii) does not render the marriage void or voidable under Sections 11 or 12; it only attracts penal liability under Section 18 of the Act.
Under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage solemnised after the commencement of the Act is null and void if it contravenes which clauses of Section 5?
aClauses (i), (ii) and (iii)
bClauses (ii) and (iii)
cClauses (i), (iv) and (v)
dClauses (iii), (iv) and (v)
Answer: C
Section 11 declares a marriage void only where it contravenes clause (i) (bigamy), clause (iv) (degrees of prohibited relationship) or clause (v) (sapinda relationship) of Section 5.
Where the customary rites of a Hindu marriage include the saptapadi, the marriage under Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 becomes complete and binding when:
aThe kanyadaan ceremony is performed
bThe seventh step is taken before the sacred fire
cThe marriage is registered under Section 8
dThe bride and bridegroom exchange garlands
Answer: B
Section 7(2) provides that where the saptapadi is part of the rites, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken jointly by the bride and bridegroom before the sacred fire.
A petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lies when one spouse has, without reasonable excuse:
aConverted to another religion
bRefused to maintain the other
cCommitted adultery
dWithdrawn from the society of the other
Answer: D
Section 9 permits the aggrieved party to seek restitution of conjugal rights where the other spouse has withdrawn from his or her society without reasonable excuse; the burden of proving reasonable excuse lies on the withdrawing party.
Which of the following is a ground for divorce available ONLY to the wife under Section 13(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
aCruelty by the husband
bThat the husband has, since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality
cDesertion for two years
dConversion of the husband to another religion
Answer: B
Section 13(2)(ii) provides a wife-specific ground that the husband has since the marriage been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality; the other options are general grounds under Section 13(1).
Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, consideration may be furnished:
aOnly by the promisee himself
bBy the promisee or any other person, at the desire of the promisor
cOnly by a person who is a party to the agreement
dBy a stranger to the contract acting without the promisor's desire
Answer: B
Section 2(d) provides that consideration moves 'at the desire of the promisor' from 'the promisee or any other person', so consideration may proceed from a third party. The requirement is that it be at the promisor's desire.
A promise made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other is enforceable without consideration under Section 25 only if it is:
aActed upon by the promisee within a reasonable time
bSupported by adequate past consideration
cMade orally before two witnesses
dExpressed in writing and registered under the law for the registration of documents
Answer: D
Under the first exception to Section 25, an agreement made out of natural love and affection between near relations is valid only if it is in writing and registered. Mere oral promise or part performance does not satisfy this requirement.
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903), the Privy Council held that an agreement entered into by a minor is:
aVoid ab initio
bValid but unenforceable against the minor
cBinding to the extent the minor received benefit
dVoidable at the option of the minor
Answer: A
The Privy Council held that a minor's agreement is void ab initio, as a minor is incompetent to contract under Section 11. Sections 64 and 65 did not apply since there was no valid agreement in the first place.
Where necessaries suited to his condition in life are supplied to a minor, the supplier under Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is entitled to:
aDamages for breach of contract from the minor's guardian personally
bA personal decree against the minor
cNothing, as the minor's agreement is void
dReimbursement from the property of the minor
Answer: D
Section 68 creates a quasi-contractual obligation: the supplier of necessaries to an incapable person, including a minor, is entitled to be reimbursed from that person's property, not by a personal action against the minor.
An agreement by which a person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business is, under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aValid if the restraint is reasonable
bVoidable at the option of the restrained party
cValid only if limited to a period of three years
dVoid to that extent, save for the statutory exception relating to sale of goodwill
Answer: D
Section 27 makes every agreement in restraint of trade void to that extent, regardless of reasonableness. The only statutory exception is the seller of goodwill agreeing not to carry on a similar business within reasonable local limits.
Under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is:
aVoidable at the option of the promisor
bValid but discharged on performance becoming impossible
cVoid
dEnforceable subject to payment of compensation
Answer: C
The first paragraph of Section 56 declares that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void, that is, void from the inception. Subsequent impossibility, by contrast, renders a contract void when the act becomes impossible.
Under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to receive:
aThe whole sum named, irrespective of actual loss
bReasonable compensation not exceeding the sum so named, whether or not actual damage is proved
cDouble the sum named as penalty
dOnly the actual loss strictly proved, and nothing more
Answer: B
Section 74 entitles the party complaining of breach to reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or stipulated as penalty. The named sum operates as a ceiling and proof of actual loss is not a precondition to claiming reasonable compensation.
A person dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law may file a suit to recover possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provided the suit is brought within:
aSix months from the date of dispossession
bThree years from the date of dispossession
cOne year from the date of dispossession
dTwelve years from the date of dispossession
Answer: A
Section 6(2)(a) bars a suit brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; clause (b) additionally bars any such suit against the Government.
With respect to a decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (suit by a person dispossessed of immovable property):
aAn appeal lies but no review is allowed
bBoth appeal and review are allowed
cNo appeal lies and no review of the order or decree is allowed
dOnly a review is allowed, but no appeal
Answer: C
Section 6(3) expressly provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in a suit under Section 6, nor shall any review of such order or decree be allowed; the remedy is a separate suit on title.
Under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it:
aOnly through proceedings under the Indian Penal Code
bBy summary eviction without any suit
cOnly by an application to the Collector
dIn the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
Section 5 provides that recovery of specific immovable property by a person entitled to its possession is to be made in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the suit being founded on title.
Specific delivery of a particular article of movable property may be compelled under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, against a person who is not the owner, inter alia, where:
aThe thing claimed is held by the defendant as agent or trustee of the plaintiff
bThe defendant is the absolute owner of the thing
cThe actual damage can be easily ascertained
dThe plaintiff has an adequate money remedy in every case
Answer: A
Section 8 allows specific delivery where, among other cases, the thing claimed is held by the defendant as agent or trustee of the plaintiff, or where compensation in money would not be adequate, or the damage is difficult to ascertain.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the position regarding specific performance of a contract under Section 10 is that specific performance:
aContinues to be a purely discretionary remedy of the court
bIs available only where damages cannot be quantified at all
cShall be enforced by the court subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, the discretion having been done away with
dCan never be granted in respect of immovable property
Answer: C
The 2018 Amendment substituted Section 10 to make specific performance enforceable as a general rule, subject only to the limited bars in Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, replacing the earlier discretionary scheme.
Under Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, the time limit for presenting a document (other than a will) for registration from the date of its execution is:
aSix months
bEight months
cThree months
dFour months
Answer: D
Section 23 requires every document other than a will to be presented for registration within four months from its execution. A will, by contrast, may be presented at any time.
Where, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, a document is not presented within the prescribed time, Section 25 of the Registration Act, 1908 empowers the Registrar to accept it for registration, where the delay does not exceed four months, on payment of a fine not exceeding:
aTwice the amount of the proper registration-fee
bFive times the amount of the proper registration-fee
cTen times the amount of the proper registration-fee
dThe amount of the proper registration-fee
Answer: C
Under Section 25, where the delay does not exceed four months the Registrar may, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the proper registration-fee, direct that the document be accepted for registration.
A non-testamentary instrument which purports to create a right, title or interest in immovable property requires compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908 only where the value of such right or interest is:
aOne hundred rupees and upwards
bFive hundred rupees and upwards
cOne thousand rupees and upwards
dAny value whatsoever
Answer: A
Section 17(1)(b) makes compulsorily registrable non-testamentary instruments creating, assigning, declaring, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
Under the Registration Act, 1908, a lease of immovable property requires compulsory registration where it is:
aFor any term exceeding three years only
bOf any term, irrespective of duration or rent
cFor any term exceeding five years only
dFrom year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent
Answer: D
By virtue of Section 17(1)(d), leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, must be compulsorily registered.
Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where a suit is instituted after the prescribed period of limitation, the Court:
aShall dismiss the suit even though limitation has not been set up as a defence
bMay dismiss the suit only if the defendant pleads the bar of limitation
cShall return the plaint for presentation before the proper Court
dMay condone the delay on its own motion if satisfied of bona fides
Answer: A
Section 3(1) makes the bar of limitation mandatory: every suit, appeal or application instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The Court is bound to take note of limitation suo motu.
The benefit of condonation of delay on proof of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available to:
aAppeals and applications, but not to suits
bSuits only, and not to appeals or applications
cSuits and appeals only
dSuits, appeals and all applications
Answer: A
Section 5 extends only to any appeal or any application (other than an application under any provisions of Order XXI CPC), and never to suits, since the limitation bar on suits is treated as absolute.
An application under any provision of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (execution of decrees) is, with respect to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
aEntitled to condonation of delay like any other application
bExpressly excluded from the benefit of Section 5
cEntitled to condonation only with the leave of the High Court
dGoverned by a separate condonation provision in Order XXI
Answer: B
Section 5 itself carves out applications under any provision of Order XXI CPC; delay in such execution applications cannot be condoned under Section 5.
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Supreme Court, while condoning a four-day delay in a State appeal, held that the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5:
aHas no application where the litigant is a Government department
bIs adequately elastic to enable Courts to do substantial justice on merits
cMust be construed strictly so that every day's delay is rigidly explained
dPermits condonation only where the delay does not exceed thirty days
Answer: B
In Katiji the Supreme Court adopted a liberal, justice-oriented construction, holding that 'sufficient cause' is elastic enough to advance substantial justice and that 'every day's delay must be explained' is to be applied rationally, not pedantically.
Under Section 4 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the easement right exists is called the:
aDominant heritage
bSubordinate heritage
cServient heritage
dBurdened heritage
Answer: A
Section 4 defines the land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists as the dominant heritage (and its owner the dominant owner), while the land on which the liability is imposed is the servient heritage.
A right of way annexed to A's house over B's land is, under Section 5 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, an easement which is:
aContinuous
bApparent and continuous
cDiscontinuous
dNon-apparent and continuous
Answer: C
Under Section 5, a discontinuous easement is one that needs the act of man for its enjoyment; a right of way is the textbook illustration of a discontinuous easement, whereas a right to light is continuous.
Under Section 5 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, an easement the existence of which is shown by some permanent sign which, on careful inspection by a competent person, would be visible, is called:
aAn apparent easement
bA non-apparent easement
cA continuous easement
dA quasi-easement
Answer: A
Section 5 defines an apparent easement as one whose existence is shown by a permanent sign visible on careful inspection by a competent person; a non-apparent easement has no such sign.
Under Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a 'cheque' is defined as:
aA promissory note drawn on a specified banker payable on demand
bA bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand
cAn unconditional undertaking by a banker to pay a certain sum on demand
dAn order in writing addressed to any person to pay money at a determinable future time
Answer: B
Section 6 defines a cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand; the Explanation also includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in electronic form.
A 'promissory note' under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 essentially contains:
aAn unconditional order signed by the maker directing a certain person to pay
bAn order drawn on a specified banker payable only on demand
cAn unconditional undertaking in writing, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer
dA conditional promise to pay money on the happening of a contingent event
Answer: C
Section 4 defines a promissory note as a written instrument containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. A promise (not an order) distinguishes it from a bill of exchange.
For an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to be complete, the payee must make a demand in writing on the drawer for payment of the cheque amount within:
aFifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque
bOne month from the date the cheque was drawn
cThirty days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque
dForty-five days of return of the cheque as unpaid
Answer: C
Under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138, the payee or holder in due course must, within thirty days of receiving information from the bank about the dishonour, make a demand for payment by giving notice in writing to the drawer.
Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the breach of a protection order by the respondent is punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to:
aOne year, or fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or both
bSix months, or fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or both
cTwo years, or fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or both
dThree years, or fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or both
Answer: A
Section 31(1) of the Act makes breach of a protection order or interim protection order punishable with imprisonment of either description up to one year, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both.
An appeal against an order made by the Magistrate under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 lies to the Court of Session within:
aNinety days from the date on which the order is served
bThirty days from the date on which the order is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, whichever is later
cSixty days from the date on which the order is made
dThirty days from the date on which the order is made by the Magistrate
Answer: D
Section 29 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, whichever is later. The period runs as stated in the section and the correct figure is thirty days.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of:
aSection 10 or Sections 12 and 13 of the Act
bany decree obtained from a regular civil court
cthe Transfer of Property Act, 1882 alone
dSection 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Answer: A
Section 10(1) bars eviction of a tenant except in accordance with Section 10 or Sections 12 and 13, thereby ousting the ordinary civil remedy of ejectment.
Which of the following is NOT, by itself, a ground available to a landlord for eviction of a tenant under Section 10(2) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960?
aThe landlord bona fide requires the building for the occupation of himself or his family
bThe tenant has committed acts of waste likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building
cThe tenant has sub-let the building without the landlord's written consent
dThe tenant has denied the title of the landlord and such denial was not bona fide
Answer: A
Bona fide requirement for the landlord's own occupation falls under Section 10(3), a distinct head; Section 10(2) covers tenant misconduct grounds such as wilful default, sub-letting, change of user, acts of waste, nuisance and bona fide denial of title.
Under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961, an advocate may, with his consent, be designated as a senior advocate by the Supreme Court or a High Court on the ground that, by virtue of his ability, standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law, he is deserving of such distinction. The classes of advocates recognised by Section 16 are:
aSenior advocates and other advocates
bAdvocates-on-record and senior advocates only
cVakils, pleaders and senior advocates
dSenior advocates, junior advocates and apprentices
Answer: A
Section 16(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides that there shall be two classes of advocates, namely, senior advocates and other advocates, with senior designation conferred under Section 16(2) by the Supreme Court or a High Court with the advocate's consent.
Under Section 2 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, which of the following is declared to be the property of the Government, subject to certain exceptions?
aAll public roads, streets, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, dikes, fences, tanks, rivers and the beds of the sea below high-water mark
bOnly agricultural lands assessed to land revenue
cOnly forest lands notified under the Forest Act
dOnly lands held under a registered ryotwari patta
Answer: A
Section 2 declares that all public roads, streets, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, dikes, fences, tanks, rivers, streams and the beds of the sea below high-water mark are, with stated exceptions, the property of the Government. This declaration underpins the summary remedies in the Act.
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