Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 8 — Questions & Solutions
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All questions arising between the parties to the suit, or their representatives, relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by:
aThe Court which passed the decree, in every case, by a fresh plaint
bA separate suit instituted for that purpose
cThe High Court in its revisional jurisdiction only
dThe Court which executes the decree and not by a separate suit
Answer: D
Section 47 CPC requires all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree, between the parties or their representatives, to be decided by the executing court and not by a separate suit.
A second appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. shall lie to the High Court from a decree passed in first appeal only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aA mere question of fact wrongly decided
bAny question of law, whether substantial or not
cAn error of fact apparent on the record
dA substantial question of law
Answer: D
Section 100 CPC, as amended in 1976, restricts the second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law, which must be framed by the High Court.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, under Section 100A C.P.C.:
aNo further appeal shall lie from the judgment of such single Judge
bA further appeal shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as of right
cA further appeal shall lie to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent
dA further appeal shall lie only with the certificate of the single Judge
Answer: A
Section 100A CPC, notwithstanding the Letters Patent, bars any further appeal where a single Judge of a High Court has decided an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order.
The settlement of disputes outside the court through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, or mediation is provided for under:
aSection 94 C.P.C.
bSection 151 C.P.C.
cSection 80 C.P.C.
dSection 89 C.P.C.
Answer: D
Section 89 CPC empowers the court to refer disputes for settlement through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalat) or mediation.
Where a suit has been disposed of and a decree is subsequently varied or reversed in appeal, the Court of first instance, on the application of any party, shall cause restitution to be made under:
aSection 144
bSection 148
cSection 141
dSection 151
Answer: A
Section 144 CPC provides for restitution, restoring parties to the position they occupied before the decree that has been varied or reversed.
Nothing in the C.P.C. shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This is contained in:
aSection 148
bSection 153
cSection 151
dSection 149
Answer: C
Section 151 CPC preserves the inherent powers of the court to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process.
Under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C., a defendant who fails to file his written statement within thirty days of service of summons may be allowed to file it later, but not beyond a maximum period of:
aOne hundred and eighty days from the date of service of summons
bOne hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons
cNinety days from the date of service of summons
dSixty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: B
Order VIII Rule 1 CPC allows the written statement within 30 days, extendable for reasons recorded, but not beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons.
Where a defendant dies and the right to sue survives, and no application to bring the legal representative on record is made within the time limited by law, the suit, under Order XXII Rule 4 C.P.C.:
aStands dismissed in its entirety against all defendants
bContinues against the deceased's estate without abatement
cAbates as against the deceased defendant
dIs automatically transferred to the District Court
Answer: C
Under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, if no application to substitute the legal representative is made within the prescribed period, the suit abates as against the deceased defendant.
An application by a defendant to set aside an ex parte decree passed against him, on the ground that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing, is made under:
aOrder IX Rule 6
bOrder IX Rule 9
cOrder IX Rule 13
dOrder IX Rule 7
Answer: C
Order IX Rule 13 CPC enables a defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed to apply for its setting aside on grounds of non-service of summons or sufficient cause for non-appearance.
The appellate court may allow additional evidence to be produced at the appellate stage only in the special circumstances enumerated in:
aOrder XLI Rule 33
bOrder XLI Rule 23
cOrder XLI Rule 31
dOrder XLI Rule 27
Answer: D
Order XLI Rule 27 CPC permits the appellate court to take additional evidence only in the limited circumstances specified therein, such as where the lower court wrongly refused evidence or the appellate court requires it to pronounce judgment.
The High Court may call for the record of any case decided by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies, where such court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it, or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or acted with material irregularity. This revisional power is conferred by:
aSection 96
bSection 114
cSection 115
dSection 100
Answer: C
Section 115 CPC confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court to correct jurisdictional errors by subordinate courts in cases where no appeal lies.
Under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, an appeal from a decree of the Court of a Senior Civil Judge lies to the District Court only where the value of the subject-matter of the suit does not exceed:
aRupees five lakhs
bRupees twenty lakhs
cRupees one lakh
dRupees ten lakhs
Answer: A
Under Section 17 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, an appeal from a decree of the Senior Civil Judge lies to the District Court where the value does not exceed Rs.5 lakhs, and to the High Court in other cases.
Under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, an appeal from every decree or order of the Court of a Junior Civil Judge, when allowed by law, lies to:
aThe Senior Civil Judge
bThe High Court if the value exceeds rupees five lakhs
cThe High Court in all cases
dThe District Court irrespective of the value of the subject-matter
Answer: D
Under the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, appeals from the Junior Civil Judge's decrees and orders lie to the District Court regardless of the value of the subject-matter.
A suit to set aside a decree passed in a former suit, on the ground only of an objection as to the place of suing, is barred under:
aSection 21-A C.P.C.
bSection 22 C.P.C.
cSection 21 C.P.C.
dSection 24 C.P.C.
Answer: A
Section 21-A, inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976, bars a substantive suit challenging a decree of a former suit on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, a further appeal from that judgment is:
aAvailable as a Letters Patent Appeal in every case
bAvailable only with leave of the Supreme Court
cBarred by Section 100-A C.P.C., which has overriding effect over the Letters Patent
dAvailable only where a substantial question of law arises
Answer: C
Section 100-A C.P.C. begins with a non-obstante clause and bars any further appeal from the judgment of a single Judge who has decided an appeal, overriding the Letters Patent.
A defendant against whom an ex parte decree has been passed may apply to set it aside under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. by satisfying the Court that:
aHe has a good case on the merits and is ready to deposit the decretal amount
bThe summons was not duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing
cThe decree is erroneous on merits
dThe plaintiff suppressed material facts
Answer: B
Under Order IX Rule 13, the Court shall set aside an ex parte decree where the defendant shows the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing.
The doctrine of constructive res judicata, which bars a matter that 'might and ought' to have been raised in the former suit, is contained in:
aOrder II Rule 2 C.P.C.
bSection 12 C.P.C.
cExplanation VI to Section 11 C.P.C.
dExplanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C.
Answer: D
Explanation IV to Section 11 embodies constructive res judicata: a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue.
Under Section 23(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a Magistrate of the second class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or of fine not exceeding:
aTwenty-five thousand rupees
bTen thousand rupees
cFifty thousand rupees
dFive thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(3) BNSS authorises a Magistrate of the second class to impose imprisonment up to one year, or fine up to ten thousand rupees, or both, or community service.
Under the proviso to Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no arrest shall be made of a person who is infirm or above sixty years of age, in respect of an offence punishable with imprisonment of less than three years, without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aSuperintendent of Police
bInspector of Police
cStation House Officer
dDeputy Superintendent of Police
Answer: D
Section 35(7) BNSS introduces a fresh safeguard: where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for less than three years and the person is infirm or above sixty years of age, arrest requires prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Section 173(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits information relating to a cognizable offence to be given by electronic communication, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed. Such information, when given electronically, shall be taken on record on being signed by the person giving it within:
aFifteen days
bSeven days
cTwenty-four hours
dThree days
Answer: D
Section 173(1) BNSS statutorily recognises 'Zero FIR' (registration irrespective of area) and e-FIR; information given by electronic communication is taken on record only when signed by the informant within three days.
Under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for a cognizable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of a police station may, with prior permission of a senior officer, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, within a period of:
aThirty days
bFourteen days
cTwenty-one days
dSeven days
Answer: B
Section 173(3) BNSS is a new provision allowing, with prior permission of an officer not below DSP rank, a preliminary enquiry within fourteen days for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to decide whether to proceed.
Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 makes it mandatory for a forensic expert to visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and to videograph the process, in respect of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of:
aFive years or more
bTen years or more
cSeven years or more
dThree years or more
Answer: C
Section 176(3) BNSS introduces a mandatory forensic investigation requirement: for offences punishable with seven years' imprisonment or more, a forensic expert must visit the scene to collect evidence and record the process by videography.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an accused acquires an indefeasible right to default bail if the investigation is not completed within ninety days only where the offence is punishable with:
aImprisonment of three years or more
bDeath, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
cImprisonment of any term, in every case
dImprisonment of seven years or more
Answer: B
Under Section 187(3) BNSS (corresponding to Section 167(2) CrPC), the maximum custody period is ninety days only for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of ten years or more; for all other offences it is sixty days, after which the accused is entitled to default bail.
As interpreted in relation to Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, police custody (whole or in part, up to fifteen days) for an offence punishable with imprisonment up to ten years must be sought within the:
aFirst sixty days from arrest
bFirst forty days from arrest
cEntire ninety-day period from arrest
dFirst fifteen days from arrest
Answer: B
Unlike the CrPC's first-fifteen-days rule, Section 187 BNSS permits the fifteen days of police custody to be spread out; the Supreme Court (affirming the Karnataka High Court) clarified it must be sought within the first forty days for offences punishable up to ten years, and within the first sixty days for graver offences.
Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces a requirement that the process of search and seizure, including preparation of the list of seized articles, shall be recorded through:
aAudio-video electronic means, preferably mobile phone, forwarded to the Magistrate
bWritten panchnama signed by two independent witnesses only
cA stenographer in the presence of the accused
dPhotographs forwarded to the Director of Prosecution
Answer: A
Section 105 BNSS is a new provision mandating that search and seizure be recorded through audio-video electronic means (preferably a mobile phone), and the recording be forwarded without delay to the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class.
Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits an inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender. The Court shall NOT commence such trial unless a period has lapsed from the date of framing of the charge, of:
aSixty days
bOne hundred and eighty days
cThirty days
dNinety days
Answer: D
Section 356 BNSS introduces trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded with no immediate prospect of arrest; among its safeguards, the trial cannot commence until ninety days have elapsed from the date of framing of charge.
Under Section 398 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the obligation to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme for the State, to ensure protection of witnesses, is cast upon the:
aDirector General of Police
bHigh Court of the State
cEvery State Government
dNational Legal Services Authority
Answer: C
Section 398 BNSS, a new statutory provision, mandates that every State Government prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme with a view to ensuring the protection of witnesses.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under sentence of death may file a mercy petition within thirty days of being informed of the dismissal of appeal or confirmation of sentence. The petition is to be made first to the Governor, and on its rejection, thereafter to the President. The correct order is:
aFirst to the President, then to the Governor
bSimultaneously to both the Governor and the President
cFirst to the Governor, then to the President
dOnly to the President in every case
Answer: C
Section 472 BNSS, a new provision codifying mercy-petition procedure, requires the petition to be made first to the Governor under Article 161, and on its rejection or disposal, thereafter to the President under Article 72.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the power to grant anticipatory bail (direction for release of a person apprehending arrest on accusation of a non-bailable offence) is contained in:
aSection 484
bSection 480
cSection 482
dSection 438
Answer: C
Anticipatory bail, earlier under Section 438 CrPC, is now governed by Section 482 BNSS, which empowers the High Court or Court of Session to direct release on bail in the event of arrest for a non-bailable offence.
Section 63(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces a new mode for issuing summons. A summons may now also be served in:
aThe local newspaper having wide circulation
bEncrypted or other form of electronic communication bearing the image of the court's seal
cOral form attested by two witnesses
dRegistered post only, with acknowledgment due
Answer: B
Section 63(2) BNSS permits summons to be issued in encrypted or other form of electronic communication, bearing the image of the court's seal or the digital signature of the court, in addition to the traditional written duplicate form.
Five or more persons acting in concert commit murder on the ground of caste or community. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the punishment for such an act (so-called mob lynching) is provided in:
aSection 111
bSection 103(2)
cSection 101(2)
dSection 117(4)
Answer: B
Section 103(2) BNS specifically punishes murder committed by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on grounds such as race, caste, community, sex, language or personal belief, with death or imprisonment for life or not less than seven years.
Which of the following is a NEW offence introduced for the first time under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, having no distinct counterpart in the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
aDacoity
bRobbery
cExtortion
dSnatching
Answer: D
Snatching is a new, separately-defined offence under Section 304 BNS, punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine; robbery, dacoity and extortion existed under the IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, 'community service' is for the first time recognised as a form of punishment. It is enumerated as a kind of punishment under:
aSection 4 of the BNS
bSection 23 of the BNSS only, and not in the BNS
cSection 53 of the BNS
dSection 73 of the BNS
Answer: A
Section 4 BNS lists the kinds of punishment, including community service [clause (f)]; the manner of its performance is described in the BNSS, but it is enumerated as a punishment in Section 4 BNS.
X, on his first conviction, commits theft of property worth Rs. 3,000 and returns the value of the property. Under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the punishment that may be awarded is:
aImprisonment for life
bRigorous imprisonment up to three years
cCommunity service
dDeath or imprisonment for life
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 303(2) BNS provides that where the value of stolen property is less than five thousand rupees and the person is a first-time convict who restores the value, he shall be punished with community service.
The offence of 'organised crime', introduced for the first time in the principal penal code, is dealt with under which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 152
bSection 113
cSection 111
dSection 109
Answer: C
Section 111 BNS introduces 'organised crime' into the general penal code; Section 113 deals with 'terrorist act' and Section 152 with acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.
A, with intent to murder Z, instigates his servant B, a child of six years, to do an act which causes Z's death. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
aA is liable only for abetment, punishable with maximum of seven years
bNeither A nor B is liable, since B is below seven years
cB alone is liable, being the doer of the act
dA is liable for the abetment of murder as if he had committed the act himself
Answer: D
B is doli incapax under Section 20 BNS, but the abettor A is liable, by virtue of the rule on abetment by instigation, in the same manner as if he had done the act himself.
Where an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly is guilty of that offence. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, this constructive liability is provided in:
aSection 191
bSection 3(5)
cSection 189
dSection 190
Answer: D
Section 190 BNS (corresponding to Section 149 IPC) fixes vicarious liability of every member of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in prosecution of the common object; Section 189 defines unlawful assembly.
Acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention (corresponding to the former Section 34 IPC) are now dealt with under which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 34
bSection 3(5)
cSection 190
dSection 61
Answer: B
Section 3(5) BNS provides that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each is liable as if he did it alone, replacing Section 34 IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the right of private defence of the body extends to the voluntary causing of death of the assailant only in the cases enumerated under:
aSection 38
bSection 35
cSection 37
dSection 34
Answer: A
Section 38 BNS specifies the assaults (such as those reasonably causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt) in which the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death of the assailant.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, an attempt to commit suicide, when committed with the intent to compel or restrain a public servant from discharging his official duty, is:
aAn offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session
bAn offence punishable under Section 226 with simple imprisonment up to one year, or fine, or community service
cNot an offence, since attempt to suicide has been decriminalised entirely
dAn offence punishable with imprisonment for life
Answer: B
General attempt to suicide (old Section 309 IPC) is decriminalised, but Section 226 BNS retains it as an offence when done to compel or restrain a public servant in his duty, punishable with simple imprisonment up to one year, fine, both, or community service.
A confession is rendered irrelevant under Section 22 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 when it appears to have been caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise. Such inducement must proceed from:
aAny private individual interested in the case
bA person in authority, with reference to the charge
cOnly a police officer above the rank of Inspector
dOnly a Magistrate
Answer: B
Section 22 of the BSA, 2023 (formerly Section 24 of the 1872 Act) makes a confession irrelevant where the inducement, threat, coercion or promise has reference to the charge and proceeds from a person in authority, sufficient to give the accused reasonable grounds for supposing a temporal advantage.
The leading authority interpreting the scope of the 'fact discovered' (now the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA, 2023 / old Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), holding that the fact discovered embraces the place and the accused's knowledge of it, is:
aPulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor
bState (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu
cAghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar
dPakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor
Answer: A
Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, is the classic authority holding that the 'fact discovered' includes the object, the place from which it is produced, and the accused's knowledge of it, and only information distinctly relating thereto is admissible. In the BSA this principle is housed in the proviso to Section 23(2).
The Supreme Court decision holding that a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) is a condition precedent for admitting secondary electronic evidence is:
aState of Maharashtra v. Praful Desai
bRam Singh v. Col. Ram Singh
cAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer
dTomaso Bruno v. State of U.P.
Answer: C
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, the Supreme Court held that the Section 65B(4) certificate is mandatory and a condition precedent to admissibility of electronic records, overruling Navjot Sandhu; the requirement now appears in Section 63(4) BSA, 2023.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business, including those in electronic form (Section 28):
aAre conclusive proof of the liability of the person charged
bAre relevant only in criminal proceedings
cAre wholly irrelevant unless attested
dAre relevant, but shall not alone be sufficient to charge any person with liability
Answer: D
Section 28 of the BSA, 2023 (formerly Section 34 of the 1872 Act) makes regularly kept books of account relevant, but expressly provides that such entries alone are not sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.
Under Section 27 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, evidence given by a witness in an earlier judicial proceeding is relevant in a subsequent proceeding to prove the truth of the facts stated, provided, inter alia, that:
aThe witness is dead, cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, and the adverse party had the right and opportunity to cross-examine
bThe earlier proceeding was a criminal trial only
cBoth proceedings were before the same Judge
dThe witness has since become hostile
Answer: A
Section 27 of the BSA, 2023 (formerly Section 33 of the 1872 Act) admits former testimony where the witness is dead, cannot be found or is incapable of testifying, the proceedings are between the same parties, and the adverse party earlier had the right and opportunity to cross-examine on substantially the same issues.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the rule that no confession made by an accused person to a police officer shall be proved against him is contained in:
aSection 24
bSection 22
cSection 26
dSection 23
Answer: D
Section 23(1) of the BSA, 2023 (corresponding to Section 25 of the repealed Indian Evidence Act) bars proof of a confession made to a police officer against the accused. Section 22 deals with confessions caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise.
A, in police custody, states: 'I will produce the knife buried under the cot in my house with which I stabbed B.' Under the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, how much of this information is admissible when the knife is recovered?
aOnly so much as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, i.e. that the knife was concealed there to A's knowledge; the words 'with which I stabbed B' are inadmissible
bNothing, because the statement was made in police custody
cOnly the admission that A stabbed B
dThe whole statement including the words 'with which I stabbed B'
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 27 IEA) makes admissible only that part of the information distinctly relating to the fact discovered. Per Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, the words connecting the weapon to the crime ('with which I stabbed B') are not admissible.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a statement made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death (a 'dying declaration'), is relevant under:
aSection 32
bSection 39
cSection 30
dSection 26
Answer: D
Section 26 of the BSA, 2023 (corresponding to Section 32 of the repealed Indian Evidence Act) makes relevant statements of persons who are dead or who cannot be found, including dying declarations as to the cause of death.
When the Court has to form an opinion as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, or upon a point of science or art, the opinion of a person specially skilled therein is a relevant fact. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, this provision on opinions of experts is contained in:
aSection 39
bSection 45
cSection 26
dSection 51
Answer: A
Section 39 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 45 IEA) deals with opinions of experts and additionally treats the opinion of an examiner of electronic evidence as a relevant fact.
Under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the certificate required to be furnished along with an electronic record for its admissibility must be signed by:
aOnly the person in charge of the computer device
bThe person in charge of the computer or communication device and an expert, as set out in the Schedule
cOnly the Investigating Officer
dOnly a Magistrate of the first class
Answer: B
Section 63 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 65B IEA) requires the certificate in the form prescribed in the Schedule (referred to in Section 63(4)(c)), signed both by the person in charge of the device and by an expert.
The rule against perpetuity contained in Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, postpones the vesting of an interest to a maximum of:
aThe life or lives of persons living at the date of transfer plus the minority of a person in existence at the expiration of that period
bA fixed period of eighteen years from the date of transfer
cThe life or lives of persons living at the date of transfer only
dThe life of the transferor plus twenty-one years
Answer: A
Section 14 permits postponement of vesting only up to the lifetime of one or more living persons at the date of transfer plus the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period.
Where, on a transfer of property, an interest is created for the benefit of an unborn person subject to a prior interest, Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires that the interest of the unborn person:
aMust vest within eighteen years of the birth of the unborn person
bMust extend to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property
cMay be a limited life interest only
dTakes effect only if a guardian is appointed
Answer: B
Section 13 mandates that the interest created for the benefit of an unborn person shall not take effect unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor; a limited interest in favour of the unborn is void.
The doctrine of election under Section 35 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies where a person professes to transfer property he has no right to transfer and, as part of the same transaction:
aConfers a benefit on the owner of that property
bReserves a right of re-entry for himself
cPays consideration to a third party
dObtains the consent of a registering officer
Answer: A
Section 35 requires the owner, on whom a benefit is conferred as part of the same transaction by which his property is professedly transferred, to elect either to confirm the transfer or dissent from it; he cannot approbate and reprobate.
Under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transfer by an ostensible owner for consideration is not voidable on the ground of want of authority, provided the transferee:
aHas paid the full market value of the property
bHas obtained a registered sale deed only
cHas, after taking reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power to transfer, acted in good faith
dIs a bona fide relation of the ostensible owner
Answer: C
Section 41 protects a transferee who, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the ostensible owner had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith; it embodies the principle in Ramcoomar Koondoo v. McQueen.
The doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' is embodied in which provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
aSection 43
bSection 53A
cSection 41
dSection 52
Answer: A
Section 43 provides that where a person erroneously or fraudulently represents he is authorised to transfer property and transfers it for consideration, the transfer shall, at the transferee's option, operate on any interest the transferor subsequently acquires while the contract subsists.
The doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is founded primarily on the principle of:
aPublic policy and the necessity of final adjudication
bEstoppel by conduct
cPart performance of contracts
dBona fide purchase for value
Answer: A
Section 52 rests on the principle of necessity and public policy that the subject-matter of a pending suit relating to immovable property must not be transferred so as to affect the rights of any party under the eventual decree.
The doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires, among other conditions, that the contract to transfer immovable property for consideration must be:
aRegistered and attested by at least two witnesses
bIn writing signed by or on behalf of the transferor, from which the terms can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
cReduced to writing within a reasonable time after possession
dOral but supported by independent witnesses
Answer: B
Section 53A applies only where the transferee, under a contract in writing signed by or on behalf of the transferor (from which the terms can be ascertained with reasonable certainty), has taken or continued in possession in part performance.
Children of a marriage which is null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are, by virtue of Section 16(1):
aLegitimate only with respect to the mother's property
bLegitimate only if the marriage was annulled by a court decree
cIllegitimate and incapable of inheriting any property
dLegitimate as though the marriage had been valid
Answer: D
Section 16(1) deems children of a void marriage to be legitimate, whether or not a decree of nullity is passed, in the same manner as if the marriage had been valid.
Under Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a child legitimated by Section 16(1) or (2) acquires rights in the property of:
aAny coparcener of the joint family
bBoth parents and their collateral relations
cOnly the parents of such child, and no other person
dAny Hindu to whom the child would be related but for such marriage being void or voidable
Answer: C
Section 16(3) confines the property rights of such a child to the property of its parents and expressly excludes rights in the property of any other person.
A petition for restitution of conjugal rights under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lies on the ground that one spouse has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other. The provision is contained in:
aSection 23
bSection 10
cSection 13
dSection 9
Answer: D
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for restitution of conjugal rights where a spouse has withdrawn from the society of the other without reasonable excuse, the burden of proving reasonable excuse lying on the withdrawing party.
Permanent alimony and maintenance to a party at the time of, or subsequent to, the passing of any decree under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is governed by:
aSection 24
bSection 27
cSection 25
dSection 26
Answer: C
Section 25 empowers the court to order permanent alimony and maintenance, whereas Section 24 deals with maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings.
Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, one person is an 'agnate' of another if the two are related by blood or adoption:
aThrough males or females in any line
bWholly through females
cBut not wholly through males
dWholly through males
Answer: D
Section 3(1)(a) defines an agnate as one related to another by blood or adoption wholly through males; a cognate (Section 3(1)(c)) is one so related but not wholly through males.
Property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner. This is provided by:
aSection 15
bSection 8
cSection 14
dSection 30
Answer: C
Section 14(1) converts a Hindu female's limited estate into absolute ownership; the proviso in Section 14(2) preserves restricted estates created by gift, will, decree or award.
Where a female Hindu dies intestate, under Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 her property devolves firstly upon:
aThe sons and daughters (including children of a predeceased son or daughter) and the husband
bThe heirs of the father
cThe mother and father
dThe heirs of the husband
Answer: A
Under Section 15(1)(a), the first category of heirs of a female intestate comprises her sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and her husband.
Under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement by which a person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business is void, subject to the exception relating to:
aAn agreement to refer disputes to arbitration
bAn agreement in restraint of legal proceedings
cA promise to pay a time-barred debt
dSale of the goodwill of a business
Answer: D
Section 27 voids agreements in restraint of trade, but its sole statutory exception permits a seller of the goodwill of a business to agree to refrain from carrying on a similar business within specified local limits.
Where the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for the existing one, or to rescind or alter it, the effect is that the original contract:
aIs suspended but not discharged
bMust still be performed in part
cBecomes voidable at the option of either party
dNeed not be performed
Answer: D
Section 62 provides that if the parties agree to substitute (novation), rescind or alter a contract, the original contract need not be performed.
A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent becomes unlawful, becomes void under Section 56:
aOnly when a court so declares
bWhen such act becomes impossible or unlawful
cAt the option of the promisee
dFrom the date of the contract
Answer: B
Under the second paragraph of Section 56 (supervening impossibility/frustration), the contract becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
A contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other person, is defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as a contract of:
aBailment
bGuarantee
cAgency
dIndemnity
Answer: D
Section 124 defines a contract of indemnity as one by which a party promises to save the other from loss caused by the conduct of the promisor himself or of any other person.
In a contract of guarantee under Section 126, the person who gives the guarantee is called the:
aIndemnifier
bPrincipal debtor
cSurety
dCreditor
Answer: C
Section 126 defines the person who gives the guarantee as the 'surety', the person in respect of whose default it is given as the 'principal debtor', and the person to whom it is given as the 'creditor'.
Bailment under Section 148 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 involves the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that the goods shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be:
aReturned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them
bTransferred in ownership to the person to whom they are delivered
cSold and the proceeds divided
dRetained absolutely by the person to whom they are delivered
Answer: A
Section 148 defines bailment as delivery of goods for a purpose on a contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the bailor's directions; ownership is not transferred.
Under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a general lien for a general balance of account may be exercised by all of the following EXCEPT:
aOrdinary bailees of goods for repair
bWharfingers
cAttorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers
dBankers and factors
Answer: A
Section 171 confers a general lien only on bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers; other bailees have only a particular lien unless an express contract provides otherwise.
Under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a court shall NOT make a declaration of status or right where the plaintiff:
aIs not in actual possession of the property in dispute
bHas not paid the requisite court fee on the declaratory relief claimed
cBeing able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so
dSeeks the declaration against the Government without notice under Section 80 CPC
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 34 bars a declaratory decree where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. This prevents multiplicity of suits.
Under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an instrument may be rectified where, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, the instrument does not express their real intention. Rectification under this section may be claimed:
aOnly by the party who did not draft the instrument
bOnly where the instrument is registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908
cBy either party in a suit to have it rectified, or by the plaintiff or a defendant in any suit in which a right under the instrument is in issue
dOnly by the plaintiff in a fresh suit instituted solely for that purpose
Answer: C
Section 26(1) allows either party to sue for rectification, the plaintiff to claim it in any suit where a right under the instrument is in issue, and a defendant in such a suit to ask for it in addition to any other defence.
Under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in determining the amount of compensation awarded in a suit for specific performance, the court shall be guided by the principles specified in:
aSection 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
bOrder XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
Answer: D
Section 21(4) provides that compensation awarded in a suit for specific performance shall be determined in accordance with the principles specified in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Under Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, temporary injunctions are regulated by:
aThe Limitation Act, 1963
bThe Indian Evidence Act, 1872
cThe Specific Relief Act, 1963 itself
dThe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
Section 37(1) provides that temporary injunctions, which continue until a specific time or further order of the court, are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Order XXXIX).
The provision relating to a mandatory injunction is contained in which section of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aSection 40
bSection 39
cSection 41
dSection 38
Answer: B
Section 39 deals with mandatory injunctions: to prevent the breach of an obligation it may be necessary to compel performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, and the court may in its discretion grant such an injunction.
Whoever executes or signs (otherwise than as a witness) any instrument chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped is, under Section 62 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, punishable with fine which may extend to:
aFive hundred rupees
bTwo hundred rupees
cFive thousand rupees
dOne thousand rupees
Answer: A
Section 62 prescribes a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for executing or signing (otherwise than as a witness) an instrument chargeable with duty without its being duly stamped. Any penalty already paid under Sections 35, 40 or 61 is allowed in reduction of this fine.
In Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao (1971), the Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which permits an unstamped instrument to be admitted on payment of duty and penalty, applies:
aEqually to the original and to a certified copy produced as secondary evidence
bOnly to instruments executed outside India
cOnly when the original instrument is before the court, and not to secondary evidence such as a copy of the unstamped instrument
dOnly where the instrument is a bill of exchange or promissory note
Answer: C
In Jupudi Kesava Rao, the Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 35 contemplates only the original instrument; secondary evidence, including a copy of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document, cannot be validated by payment of duty and penalty.
A sale deed of immovable property is executed on 1st January but is presented for registration only on 20th June of the same year, when the executant appears before the Sub-Registrar. Apart from the time allowed under Section 23, by what maximum period can the Registrar condone the delay in presentation under Section 25 of the Registration Act, 1908, on payment of fine?
aA further period not exceeding two months
bA further period not exceeding four months
cA further period not exceeding one year
dA further period not exceeding eight months
Answer: B
Section 23 allows presentation within four months of execution; under Section 25, where this period has expired owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, the Registrar may, on payment of a fine up to ten times the proper registration fee, condone a delay not exceeding a further four months.
Two sale deeds are executed in respect of the same plot of agricultural land. Deed A is executed on 5th March but registered on 20th April; Deed B is executed on 1st April but registered on 10th April. By virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which deed prevails as having operated first?
aNeither; both are void for want of priority
bDeed B, because it was registered earlier
cDeed A, because it was executed earlier
dDeed A, because registration always relates to date of registration
Answer: C
Under Section 47, a registered document operates from the time it would have operated had no registration been required, i.e. from the date of execution, not the date of registration; the earlier-executed Deed A therefore takes priority.
Under Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for execution of a decree or order of a civil court (other than one granting a mandatory injunction) is:
aThree years from the date of the decree
bTwelve years from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable
cSix years from the date of the decree
dThirty years from the date of the decree
Answer: B
Article 136 prescribes twelve years for execution of a decree or order, computed from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable; a decree for mandatory injunction is the exception, governed by a three-year period.
Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, being the residuary article for applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere, prescribes a period of:
aOne year from when the right to apply accrues
bSix years from when the right to apply accrues
cTwelve years from when the right to apply accrues
dThree years from when the right to apply accrues
Answer: D
Article 137 is the residuary provision for 'any other application' and prescribes three years, the time running from when the right to apply accrues.
The benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (condonation of delay on sufficient cause) is available to:
aAppeals and applications, but not suits
bEvery suit, appeal and application
cApplications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure
dSuits and appeals only
Answer: A
Section 5 permits admission of an appeal or any application (other than an application under any provision of Order XXI CPC) after the prescribed period on proof of sufficient cause. It does not extend to suits.
Where the prescribed period for instituting a suit expires on a day when the Court is closed, under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the suit may be instituted:
aWithin three days of the reopening of the Court
bOn the last working day preceding the closure
cOnly with the leave of the Court after condonation of delay
dOn the day the Court reopens
Answer: D
Section 4 provides that where the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day the Court reopens.
Which one of the following CANNOT be acquired by prescription under Section 17 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882?
aa right of way;
ba right to underground water passing in a defined channel;
ca right to surface water not flowing in a stream and not permanently collected in a pool, tank or otherwise;
da right to the access of light to a building.
Answer: C
Section 17(c) bars prescriptive acquisition of a right to surface water not flowing in a stream and not permanently collected, and 17(d) bars underground water NOT passing in a defined channel.
An easement of necessity, within the meaning of Section 13 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, arises:
awhere, on transfer or bequest, the subject of the transfer cannot be enjoyed at all without such easement;
bonly by an express written grant.
conly by twenty years' prescription;
dwherever a way is merely convenient for the dominant owner;
Answer: A
Under Section 13, an easement of necessity arises only where the easement is absolutely necessary to enjoy the subject of the transfer or bequest; mere convenience gives only a quasi-easement, not necessity.
An easement of necessity is extinguished under the Indian Easements Act, 1882:
aonly after twenty years of non-user;
bwhen the necessity comes to an end (Section 41);
conly on unity of ownership of both heritages.
donly on destruction of the servient heritage;
Answer: B
Section 41 provides that an easement of necessity is extinguished when the necessity comes to an end, e.g. when the dominant owner acquires another means of access.
Under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the effect of any material alteration of a negotiable instrument is that it:
aRenders the instrument void as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of making the alteration and does not consent to it
bHas no effect on the validity of the instrument in any case
cRenders the instrument void as against all parties, including subsequent indorsees
dMerely entitles the holder to claim damages but keeps the instrument valid
Answer: A
Section 87 provides that a material alteration renders the instrument void as against anyone who was a party at the time of the alteration and did not consent to it, unless made to carry out the common intention of the original parties.
Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a presumption, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn:
aWithout consideration
bFor consideration
cFor an illegal consideration
dFor inadequate consideration
Answer: B
Section 118(a) presumes that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, until the contrary is proved.
Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (inserted by the 2018 Amendment) empowers the court trying an offence under Section 138 to order the drawer to pay interim compensation not exceeding:
aTwenty-five per cent of the amount of the cheque
bTwenty per cent of the amount of the cheque
cTen per cent of the amount of the cheque
dFifty per cent of the amount of the cheque
Answer: B
Section 143A allows the court to direct payment of interim compensation which shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque.
Section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provides that any relief available under Sections 18 to 22 may also be sought:
aOnly in proceedings instituted before the Magistrate under the Act
bIn any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or criminal court affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent
cOnly in a suit for divorce pending before a family court
dOnly before the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers
Answer: B
Section 26 enables any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 to be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or criminal court affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent, whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of the Act.
A breach of a protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is an offence punishable with:
aImprisonment which may extend to one year, or fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or both
bImprisonment which may extend to three years, or fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or both
cFine only, which may extend to fifty thousand rupees
dImprisonment which may extend to two years and fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees
Answer: A
Under Section 31(1) of the Act, breach of a protection order or interim protection order is punishable with imprisonment of either description up to one year, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
Under the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, where more than one Senior Civil Judge is appointed to a court, the Senior Civil Judge to act as the Principal Senior Civil Judge is designated by the:
aDistrict Collector
bBar Council of the district
cHigh Court
dState Government without consultation
Answer: C
Where a court has more than one Senior Civil Judge (or Junior Civil Judge), the High Court designates one as the Principal and the others as Additional Judges of that court.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, a person aggrieved by an order of the Rent Controller may prefer an appeal under Section 20 within:
afifteen days from the date of the order
bninety days from the date of communication of the order
cthirty days from the date of the order, excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy
dsixty days from the date of the order
Answer: C
Section 20 of the Act allows an appeal within thirty days of the Controller's order, and in computing that period the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order is excluded.
Under Section 64 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, in the case of a sale by auction, the sale is complete:
aWhen the buyer pays the full price to the auctioneer
bWhen the goods are physically delivered to the highest bidder
cWhen the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or in any other customary manner
dWhen the highest bid is recorded by the auctioneer in writing
Answer: C
Section 64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides that the sale is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or in any other customary manner, and until such announcement any bidder may retract his bid.
What is the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 against a decision or order, subject to the power to condone delay on sufficient cause?
aNinety days from the date of the decision or order
bSixty days from the date of the decision or order
cForty-five days from the date of the decision or order
dThirty days from the date of the decision or order
Answer: B
No appeal under the Act is to be admitted after the expiration of sixty days from the date of the decision or order appealed against, though a belated appeal may be admitted where sufficient cause for the delay is shown.
Where property liable to confiscation under Section 45 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968 is seized, the officer seizing it must, without unreasonable delay, produce it before which authority for an order of confiscation under Section 46?
aThe Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise having jurisdiction over the area
bThe jurisdictional Magistrate of the first class
cThe Court of Session
dThe Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise
Answer: A
Section 46(1) and (2) require the seized property to be produced before the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise having jurisdiction, who may order confiscation whether or not a prosecution is instituted.
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