Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 7 — Questions & Solutions
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On disobedience of a temporary injunction granted under Order XXXIX Rule 1 or Rule 2, the court may, under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, order attachment of the property of the person guilty of such breach and may also order him to be detained in civil prison for a term not exceeding:
aone month
bone year
cthree months
dsix months
Answer: C
Order XXXIX Rule 2A empowers the court to attach the property of the person disobeying the injunction and to detain him in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months.
A suit for recovery of possession of a house situated within the local limits of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, must ordinarily be instituted in that court by virtue of:
aSection 16, which requires suits for recovery of immovable property to be instituted where the property is situate
bSection 15, relating only to the grade of court competent to try the suit
cSection 20, as a residuary provision applicable to all suits
dSection 19, relating to suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables
Answer: A
Section 16 requires that suits for recovery of immovable property (among other enumerated categories) be instituted in the court within whose local limits the property is situate; Section 20 is only the residuary provision for suits not covered by Sections 16-19.
A litigant approaches a Junior Civil Judge's Court contending that the civil court is barred from trying his dispute. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. This rule is contained in:
aSection 20
bSection 11
cSection 15
dSection 9
Answer: D
Section 9 CPC declares that courts shall (subject to the provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. The provision embodying this rule is:
aSection 15 read with Order VI
bSection 20 read with Order VII
cSection 26 read with Order IV
dSection 9 read with Order I
Answer: C
Section 26(1) CPC provides that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed; Order IV Rule 1 supplements it by requiring the plaint to be presented in duplicate.
A plaintiff intends to sue the State of Andhra Pradesh for recovery of possession of immovable property. Before instituting the suit, statutory notice must be served and the suit cannot be filed until the expiry of the notice period prescribed under Section 80 CPC, which is:
aSixty days from the cause of action
bTwo months
cThree months
dOne month
Answer: B
Section 80 CPC bars institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done in official capacity until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered.
Numerous persons having the same interest in one suit seek to sue on behalf of all so interested. The court may permit one or more of them to sue for the benefit of all under:
aOrder I Rule 10
bOrder I Rule 8
cOrder II Rule 3
dOrder VI Rule 17
Answer: B
Order I Rule 8 CPC permits a representative suit where numerous persons have the same interest in one suit, with the leave of the court and after notice to all interested persons.
A Senior Civil Judge wishes to add, on his own motion, a person whom he considers a necessary party to a pending suit, even though no party has applied for it. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
aThe court may suo motu order such a person to be added under Order I Rule 10(2)
bThe court may add a party only with the prior permission of the District Court
cThe court can never add a party except on the application of a party
dThe court may add a party only with the permission of the High Court
Answer: A
Order I Rule 10(2) CPC empowers the court, at any stage and either on application or of its own motion, to order the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to be added as a party.
A sole defendant dies during the pendency of a suit and the right to sue survives against his estate. The plaintiff fails to bring the legal representatives on record within the time allowed by law. The consequence under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC is that:
aThe court must appoint a guardian ad litem and proceed
bThe suit is dismissed for default of prosecution
cThe suit abates as against the deceased defendant
dThe suit automatically continues against the surviving heirs
Answer: C
Under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, where no application to substitute the legal representatives of a deceased defendant is made within the time limited by law, the suit abates as against the deceased defendant.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the power of a court to grant a temporary injunction, appoint a receiver, order arrest before judgment, or attach property before judgment is described as the exercise of:
aSupplemental proceedings under Section 94
bCaveat proceedings under Section 148-A
cInherent powers under Section 151
dIncidental proceedings under Section 75
Answer: A
Section 94 CPC, dealing with supplemental proceedings, enumerates the powers of the court to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, including arrest/attachment before judgment, temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers.
A temporary injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property pending disposal of the suit is granted under:
aOrder XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
bOrder XXXVIII Rules 1 and 5
cOrder XL Rule 1
dSection 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Answer: A
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC govern the grant of temporary injunctions, including where property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by a party to the suit.
Where a defendant has failed to file his written statement within thirty days of service of summons, the court may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow him to file it on a later day, but under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC such later day shall not be:
aLater than ninety days from the date of service of summons
bLater than sixty days from the date of service of summons
cLater than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons
dLater than forty-five days from the date of appearance
Answer: A
The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC permits filing of the written statement beyond thirty days for recorded reasons, but not later than ninety days from the date of service of summons (read down as directory by Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India).
A plaint is liable to be rejected, inter alia, where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The grounds for rejection of a plaint are enumerated in:
aOrder VII Rule 1
bOrder IX Rule 8
cOrder VI Rule 17
dOrder VII Rule 11
Answer: D
Order VII Rule 11 CPC sets out the grounds for rejection of a plaint, including where it does not disclose a cause of action, is undervalued, is insufficiently stamped, or appears to be barred by any law.
An ex parte decree has been passed against a defendant who was not duly served with summons. His proper remedy to have the decree set aside by the same court is an application under:
aOrder IX Rule 9
bOrder IX Rule 13
cSection 151
dOrder XXIII Rule 1
Answer: B
Order IX Rule 13 CPC allows a defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed to apply to set it aside on showing that summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing.
In execution of a decree, all questions arising between the parties to the suit (or their representatives) and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree are to be determined by the executing court and not by a separate suit. This bar is contained in:
aSection 38
bOrder XXI Rule 58
cSection 51
dSection 47
Answer: D
Section 47 CPC provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the executing court and not by a separate suit.
At a court auction of immovable property in execution proceedings, the highest bidder is declared the purchaser. Under Order XXI Rule 84 CPC, he must immediately deposit:
aThe entire purchase-money on the fall of the hammer
bTen per cent of the upset price fixed by the court
cTwenty-five per cent of the amount of his purchase-money
dFifty per cent of the decretal amount
Answer: C
Order XXI Rule 84 CPC mandatorily requires the auction-purchaser of immovable property to deposit twenty-five per cent of the purchase-money immediately on being declared purchaser, in default of which the property is to be re-sold.
An appeal is preferred to the High Court against a decree passed in first appeal by a District Court. Such a second appeal shall lie only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aAny question of fact wrongly decided
bA mixed question of fact and law
cAn error of jurisdiction alone
dA substantial question of law
Answer: D
Section 100 CPC provides that a second appeal to the High Court lies only where the case involves a substantial question of law, which the High Court must formulate.
An appeal from an original or appellate decree has been heard and decided by a single Judge of the High Court. The effect of Section 100A CPC is that:
aA further appeal lies only with the leave of the Supreme Court
bA review alone lies before the same single Judge
cA further appeal lies as a matter of right to a Division Bench
dNo further appeal (letters patent appeal) shall lie from such judgment and decree
Answer: D
Section 100A CPC bars any further appeal (including a letters patent appeal) from the judgment and decree of a single Judge of the High Court deciding an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order, notwithstanding any Letters Patent.
A Court trying a suit may exercise jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Which provision embodies this principle?
aSection 11
bSection 21
cSection 15
dSection 9
Answer: D
Section 9 CPC confers jurisdiction on civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred.
No suit shall lie against the Government or a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done in his official capacity until the expiration of how many months after notice in writing has been delivered?
aOne month
bSix months
cTwo months
dThree months
Answer: C
Section 80 CPC mandates a two months' prior notice in writing before instituting a suit against the Government or a public officer for acts done in official capacity.
Under Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding, or of both:
aTen thousand rupees
bOne lakh rupees
cTwenty-five thousand rupees
dFifty thousand rupees
Answer: D
Section 23(2) BNSS raises the fine ceiling for a Magistrate of the first class to fifty thousand rupees (up from ten thousand under Section 29 CrPC), and also empowers the imposition of community service.
Under Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the conduct of search and seizure, including the preparation of the list of seized property and signing of witnesses, shall be:
aConducted only between sunrise and sunset
bRecorded through audio-video electronic means, preferably on a mobile phone
cRecorded only in writing in the case diary
dDone exclusively in the presence of a Magistrate
Answer: B
Section 105 BNSS newly mandates audio-video recording (preferably on a mobile phone) of the entire search and seizure process, and the recording must be forwarded to the District/SDM or Judicial Magistrate of first class without delay.
Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, introduces, for the first time in Indian criminal procedure, the concept of:
aPlea bargaining
bTrial in absentia of a proclaimed offender
cCompounding of offences
dSummary trial
Answer: B
Section 356 BNSS empowers a court to conduct an inquiry or trial and pronounce judgment in the absence of a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial, a procedure not available under the CrPC.
Under the first proviso to Section 479(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a first-time offender (one who has never been convicted of any offence in the past) shall be released on bond by the Court if he has undergone detention up to:
aThe entire maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
bOne-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
cOne-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
dOne-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
Answer: C
The first proviso to Section 479(1) BNSS carves out first-time offenders, who are to be released on bond on completing one-third of the maximum sentence, as against the one-half rule for others.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under sentence of death may file a mercy petition before the President or the Governor within how many days of being informed by the Superintendent of jail of the dismissal of his appeal or the confirmation of his sentence?
aFifteen days
bSixty days
cThirty days
dNinety days
Answer: C
Section 472 BNSS prescribes a statutory thirty-day period for filing a mercy petition under Article 72 or 161 from the date the Superintendent of jail informs the convict of dismissal/confirmation; this time limit is a new feature absent in the CrPC.
Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, dealing with the recording of confessions and statements by a Magistrate, provides that the confession may be recorded:
aBy any means including audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the accused
bBy a police officer on whom Magisterial powers have been conferred
cOnly in writing in the presence of the police officer
dOnly by a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case
Answer: A
Section 183 BNSS expressly permits recording of confessions and statements by audio-video electronic means and in the presence of the advocate of the accused, modernising the corresponding Section 164 CrPC.
Section 398 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, casts an obligation upon every State Government to:
aEstablish a Directorate of Prosecution in every district
bConstitute special courts for economic offences
cPrepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme for the State
dMaintain a register of habitual offenders
Answer: C
Section 398 BNSS is a new provision mandating every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme to ensure the protection of witnesses; the CrPC had no such statutory mandate.
Under Section 173(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence may now be given to the officer in charge of a police station:
aOnly through a Magistrate
bIrrespective of the area where the offence is committed (Zero FIR), and also by electronic communication
cOnly in writing and signed by the informant in person
dOnly orally and in person at the police station
Answer: B
Section 173 BNSS statutorily recognises the 'Zero FIR' by allowing registration of an FIR irrespective of the area of commission of the offence, and permits information to be given by electronic communication.
Section 530 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, provides that all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including issuance and service of summons and warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence:
aShall be held in electronic mode only for offences punishable with death
bShall in every case be conducted only by physical presence
cMay be held electronically only with the consent of the accused
dMay be held or undertaken in electronic mode by use of audio-video electronic means
Answer: D
Section 530 BNSS is an enabling provision permitting all trials, inquiries and proceedings to be held in electronic mode through audio-video electronic means, a significant departure from the largely physical regime of the CrPC.
Under Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no person who is accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment of less than three years and who is infirm or above sixty years of age shall be arrested without:
aThe prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police
bThe order of the Court of Session
cA warrant from a Magistrate of the first class
dThe consent of the public prosecutor
Answer: A
Section 35(7) BNSS provides that for offences punishable with less than three years, an infirm person or one above sixty years shall not be arrested without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Under Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where the investigation relates to certain specified offences such as those under sections concerning sexual offences against women and children, the investigation must ordinarily be completed within:
aThree months from the date of recording the information
bFifteen days from the date of recording the information
cSix months from the date of recording the information
dTwo months from the date of recording the information
Answer: D
Section 193 BNSS provides that in respect of specified offences relating to sexual assault against women and children, the investigation shall be completed within two months from the date of recording of the information.
Under Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a person arrested without warrant shall not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under Section 187, be detained by a police officer for a period exceeding:
aSeventy-two hours exclusive of journey time
bTwenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey to the Magistrate's Court
cTwelve hours exclusive of journey time
dForty-eight hours exclusive of journey time
Answer: B
Section 58 BNSS (corresponding to Section 57 CrPC) caps detention of a person arrested without warrant at twenty-four hours, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court, absent a special order under Section 187.
Under Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding:
aTen thousand rupees
bFifty thousand rupees
cTwenty-five thousand rupees
dOne lakh rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(2) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to award up to three years' imprisonment, or fine up to fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. This is an enhancement over Section 29(2) CrPC, which capped the fine at ten thousand rupees.
The offence that replaced the colonial offence of sedition, recharacterised as an act endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, is found under which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 152
bSection 113
cSection 124A
dSection 150
Answer: A
Section 152 BNS penalises exciting secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, replacing the erstwhile sedition offence; the punishment may extend to imprisonment for life or seven years and fine.
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, this defence (Section 21) applies to a child:
aUnder eighteen years of age
bAbove seven and under twelve years of age
cAbove twelve and under sixteen years of age
dUnder seven years of age
Answer: B
Section 21 BNS exempts a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding; an absolute exemption for a child below seven is given separately under Section 20.
Under Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the minimum punishment for the offence of rape (in non-aggravated cases) is rigorous imprisonment of not less than:
aFive years
bSeven years
cThree years
dTen years
Answer: D
Section 64(1) BNS prescribes rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years, extendable to imprisonment for life, and fine.
A instigates B to commit suicide and B, acting on such instigation, commits suicide. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, A is liable under Section 108 with imprisonment which may extend to:
aImprisonment for life
bSeven years
cThree years
dTen years
Answer: D
Section 108 BNS punishes abetment of suicide with imprisonment of either description up to ten years and fine.
The offence of 'organised crime' committed by a crime syndicate has been introduced for the first time in the general penal law under which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 113
bSection 111
cSection 117
dSection 109
Answer: B
Section 111 BNS for the first time codifies 'organised crime'; Section 112 deals with petty organised crime and Section 113 with terrorist act.
When a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief (mob lynching), the relevant punishing provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is:
aSection 103(2)
bSection 117(2)
cSection 105
dSection 103(1)
Answer: A
Section 103(2) BNS specifically addresses mob lynching, punishing each member of such a group with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment of not less than seven years and fine.
Where culpable homicide does not amount to murder and the act is done with the intention of causing death, the punishment under Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not less than:
aTwo years extending to five years
bSeven years extending to fourteen years
cFive years extending to ten years
dThree years extending to seven years
Answer: C
Section 105 BNS prescribes imprisonment for life, or a term of not less than five years extending to ten years and fine, where death is caused with the intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
A man, by deceitfully making a false promise of marriage with no intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with a woman not amounting to rape. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, this is a distinct offence punishable under:
aSection 74
bSection 64
cSection 69
dSection 63
Answer: C
Section 69 BNS is a new provision penalising sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or a false promise of marriage with imprisonment up to ten years and fine.
A, while in a state of involuntary intoxication brought about against his will, commits an act which would otherwise be an offence, being incapable of knowing that the act was wrong. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, A's defence is recognised under:
aSection 22
bSection 23
cSection 24
dSection 20
Answer: B
Section 23 BNS provides that an act done by a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication administered without his knowledge or against his will is not an offence.
A inflicts a single spear-thrust into B's abdomen which is, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death, and B dies. The proposition that it is enough for the prosecution to prove that A intended that very injury (and the injury is objectively sufficient to cause death), without proving A intended death, was laid down in:
aK.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra
bBachan Singh v. State of Punjab
cReg v. Govinda
dVirsa Singh v. State of Punjab
Answer: D
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) explained clause 'thirdly' of murder (now Section 101(c) BNS): the inquiry into sufficiency of the injury to cause death is purely objective and independent of any intention to cause death.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which provision corresponds to the rule that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence?
aSection 27
bSection 24
cSection 22
dSection 23(1)
Answer: D
Section 23(1) of the BSA, 2023 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer against the accused, corresponding to the old Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 23(2) deals with confessions made while in police custody (with the discovery proviso).
In the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the doctrine of 'discovery of fact' (formerly Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872) now finds place as:
aAn Explanation to Section 22
bSection 24(2)
cThe proviso to Section 23(2)
dAn independent Section 27 dealing with custody
Answer: C
Under the BSA, 2023 the principle that so much of the information leading distinctly to a fact discovered may be proved is contained in the proviso to Section 23(2), absorbing the old Section 27 of the 1872 Act.
A statement made by a person, since deceased, as to the cause of his death (a dying declaration) is made relevant under which provision of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
aSection 26(a)
bSection 32(1)
cSection 27
dSection 6
Answer: A
Section 26 of the BSA, 2023 makes relevant statements of persons who are dead or cannot be found; clause (a) covers a statement as to the cause of death, i.e. the dying declaration (formerly Section 32(1) of the 1872 Act).
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the admissibility of electronic records, requiring fulfilment of statutory conditions and a certificate, is governed by:
aSection 61
bSection 63
cSection 62
dSection 85
Answer: B
Section 63 of the BSA, 2023 (replacing Section 65B of the 1872 Act) governs admissibility of electronic records; Section 62 merely provides that contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with Section 63.
Which of the following is NOT, by itself, treated as 'primary evidence' under the Explanations to Section 57 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
aAn electronic record produced from proper custody, unless disputed
bA copy of a common original, as to the contents of that original
cEach part of a document executed in several parts
dEach of several documents made by one uniform printing process, as to the contents of the rest
Answer: B
Explanation 3 to Section 57 BSA expressly states that where documents are copies of a common original they are NOT primary evidence of the contents of the original; the other three are deemed primary evidence.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, when a person is accused of an offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within a General Exception of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 lies on:
aThe accused, and the Court shall presume absence of such circumstances
bNeither party; the Court raises no presumption
cThe prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt
dThe investigating officer
Answer: A
Section 108 of the BSA, 2023 places the burden of proving General Exceptions on the accused and directs the Court to presume the absence of such circumstances, mirroring the old Section 105 of the 1872 Act but now referring to the BNS, 2023.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, 'when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him' is enacted in:
aSection 106
bSection 104
cSection 108
dSection 109
Answer: D
Section 109 of the BSA, 2023 (formerly Section 106 of the 1872 Act) places the burden of proving a fact especially within a person's knowledge upon that person.
Under Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, an accomplice:
aIs an incompetent witness against a co-accused
bShall be a competent witness against an accused person
cIs competent only in summons cases
dMay testify only after pardon is tendered
Answer: B
Section 138 of the BSA, 2023 (replacing Section 133 IEA) declares that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; the section as enacted further provides that a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice (read with the presumption under Section 119).
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the rule that 'no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact' is contained in:
aSection 119
bSection 134
cSection 139
dSection 138
Answer: C
Section 139 of the BSA, 2023 (formerly Section 134 of the 1872 Act) provides that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove any fact, embodying the maxim that evidence is to be weighed and not counted.
Under Section 146 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a leading question:
aMay freely be asked in examination-in-chief without leave
bIs one which does not suggest the answer the questioner expects
cMay be asked in cross-examination
dCan never be asked in re-examination even with the Court's permission
Answer: C
Under Section 146 BSA, leading questions may be asked in cross-examination, but must not (if objected to) be asked in examination-in-chief or re-examination except with the Court's permission; the definition is a question suggesting the expected answer.
Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, dealing with transfer by an ostensible owner, protects a transferee for consideration only where the transferee:
aIs a relation of the real owner
bHas taken reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer and has acted in good faith
cHas obtained the transfer gratuitously
dHas registered the transfer within four months
Answer: B
Section 41 protects a transfer for consideration by an ostensible owner (with the express or implied consent of the real owner) only if the transferee took reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power to transfer and acted in good faith.
Under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, a transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor is:
aVoid as against the creditors
bVoid ab initio for all purposes
cValid and not impeachable by creditors
dVoidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed
Answer: D
Section 53(1) makes a transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay creditors voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed; it is not automatically void.
The doctrine of part performance embodied in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act requires, among other conditions, that the transferee:
aHas taken possession (or continued in possession) in part performance of the contract and is willing to perform his part of the contract
bHas obtained a decree for specific performance
cHas paid the entire consideration in cash
dHas obtained a registered conveyance of the property
Answer: A
Section 53A applies where a written contract for transfer is signed, the transferee has in part performance taken or continued in possession and done some act in furtherance of the contract, and is willing to perform his part; the transferor is then barred from enforcing rights inconsistent with the contract.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the case of tangible immovable property, a sale can be made only by a registered instrument where the value of the property is:
aRupees one thousand and upwards
bRupees one hundred and upwards
cRupees five hundred and upwards
dRupees fifty and upwards
Answer: B
Section 54 provides that sale of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards can be made only by a registered instrument; below that value it may be made by registered instrument or by delivery of property.
A contract for the sale of immovable property, under the second part of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
aOf itself creates an interest in or charge on such property
bCreates a charge but not an interest in the property
cOperates as an equitable mortgage of the property
dDoes not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property
Answer: D
Section 54 expressly states that a contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property; it is merely an agreement that a sale shall take place on agreed terms.
Under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which of the following cannot be transferred?
aThe chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate
bA tangible immovable property in possession of the transferor
cAn actionable claim already accrued and due
dA vested remainder dependent on a prior life interest
Answer: A
Section 6(a) bars transfer of a mere chance or spes successionis, such as the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate or of a relation obtaining a legacy, being only a possibility of a like nature.
Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a right to future maintenance, in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined:
aCannot be transferred
bCan be transferred freely along with the corpus
cCan be transferred only with the consent of the court
dCan be transferred only after it has fallen due
Answer: A
Clause (dd) of Section 6 provides that a right to future maintenance, in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined, cannot be transferred, being personal to the holder.
Under Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when two or more heirs succeed together to the property of an intestate, they take the property:
aPer stirpes and as joint tenants
bAs joint tenants with right of survivorship
cPer stirpes and as tenants-in-common
dPer capita and as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants
Answer: D
Section 19 provides that heirs succeeding together take the property per capita (save as otherwise expressly provided) and as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, thereby abolishing the right of survivorship among such heirs.
Under Section 3 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, two persons are said to be related to each other by 'full blood' when they are descended from a common ancestor:
aBy different wives
bBy the same wife
cThrough adoption only
dWholly through males
Answer: B
Under Section 3(1)(e), persons are related by full blood when descended from a common ancestor by the same wife, and by half blood when descended from a common ancestor but by different wives. Relationship through one common ancestress by different husbands is uterine blood.
Under Section 3(f)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the sapinda relationship extends in the line of ascent:
aTo the third generation through the mother and the fifth generation through the father, inclusive
bTo the fifth generation through the mother and the third generation through the father, inclusive
cTo the fourth generation through both the mother and the father, inclusive
dTo the seventh generation through the father and the fifth generation through the mother, inclusive
Answer: A
Section 3(f)(i) traces sapinda relationship as far as the third generation (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the mother and the fifth generation (inclusive) through the father, the person concerned being counted as the first generation.
A marriage solemnised in contravention of the condition in clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (neither party having a living spouse) is:
aMerely irregular and curable by subsequent registration
bVoid ipso jure under Section 11
cVoidable at the option of the aggrieved party
dValid but the second spouse forfeits maintenance
Answer: B
Section 11 declares marriages in contravention of clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 to be null and void, so a bigamous marriage offending clause (i) is void ab initio.
Which of the following is NOT a ground on which a Hindu marriage is voidable under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
aThe parties being within the degrees of prohibited relationship
bConsent of the petitioner obtained by force or fraud
cThe respondent being pregnant by some person other than the petitioner at the time of marriage
dNon-consummation owing to the impotence of the respondent
Answer: A
Being within the degrees of prohibited relationship offends Section 5(iv) and renders the marriage void under Section 11, not merely voidable. The grounds in (a), (b) and (c) are those listed in Section 12.
After a decree for judicial separation, a petition for divorce under Section 13(1A)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 may be presented on the ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation for a period of:
aThree years or upwards
bTwo years or upwards
cSix months or upwards
dOne year or upwards
Answer: D
Section 13(1A)(i), as amended in 1976, fixes the period at one year or upwards of no resumption of cohabitation after a decree of judicial separation.
On a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the motion for a decree must be made by both parties not earlier than six months and not later than how long after the presentation of the petition?
aThirty-six months
bTwelve months
cEighteen months
dTwenty-four months
Answer: C
Section 13B(2) requires the motion to be made after six months but within eighteen months of the date of presentation of the petition, failing which the petition lapses.
A contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default is, under the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aA contract of bailment
bA contract of guarantee
cA wagering agreement
dA contract of indemnity
Answer: B
Section 126 defines a contract of guarantee as a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default, involving three parties: surety, principal debtor and creditor.
Agreements by way of wager are, under Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aIllegal and punishable as offences
bValid if the stake does not exceed a prescribed amount
cVoidable at the option of the loser
dVoid, and no suit lies to recover anything won upon a wager
Answer: D
Section 30 declares wagering agreements void and bars any suit for recovering anything alleged to be won on a wager; such agreements are void, not illegal in themselves.
Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an act, abstinence or promise amounts to consideration only when it is done or made:
aVoluntarily, without any desire being expressed
bAt the desire of the promisee
cAt the desire of a third party stranger to the contract
dAt the desire of the promisor
Answer: D
Section 2(d) requires that the act, abstinence or promise constituting consideration be done 'at the desire of the promisor'; an act done at the desire of a third party or voluntarily is not consideration.
A, a minor, mortgages his immovable property to secure a loan and later the property is sold to a transferee who sues to enforce the mortgage. On the principle laid down by the Privy Council, the agreement of the minor is:
aValid and enforceable against the minor
bVoidable at the option of the minor
cVoid ab initio
dValid only to the extent of the benefit received
Answer: C
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114, the Privy Council held that an agreement by a minor is void ab initio, the minor not being competent to contract under Section 11.
Under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, who among the following is NOT competent to contract:
aA person of sound mind
bA person who has attained the age of majority
cA person who is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject
dA person who has not attained the age of majority
Answer: D
Section 11 declares competent every person who is of the age of majority, of sound mind and not disqualified by law; a person who has not attained majority (a minor) is therefore not competent.
A promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law of limitation, is governed as an exception to want of consideration by:
aSection 25(3)
bSection 25(2)
cSection 26
dSection 25(1)
Answer: A
Section 25(3) treats a written, signed promise to pay a time-barred debt as a valid exception to the rule that an agreement without consideration is void.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the specific performance of a contract:
aShall be enforced only where monetary compensation would not afford adequate relief
bShall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16
cMay be enforced in the discretion of the court where there exists no standard for ascertaining damage
dMay be enforced where the act agreed to be done is in the performance of a trust
Answer: B
The 2018 Amendment substituted Section 10, making specific performance a rule rather than a discretionary remedy; it is now to be enforced subject only to S.11(2), S.14 and S.16. The earlier discretionary language ('in the discretion of the court') was deleted.
Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a suit by a person dispossessed of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law must be brought within:
aSix months from the date of dispossession
bThree years from the date of dispossession
cTwelve years from the date of dispossession
dOne year from the date of dispossession
Answer: A
Section 6(2)(a) bars a suit under that section after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession, and clause (b) bars such a suit against the Government.
Which of the following is NOT one of the categories of contracts that cannot be specifically enforced under the substituted Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (post-2018)?
aA contract where a party has obtained substituted performance under section 20
bA contract whose performance involves a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise
cA contract which is in its nature determinable
dA contract whose performance would consume a considerable lapse of time
Answer: D
Substituted Section 14 lists exactly four categories: substituted performance obtained under S.20, continuous duty the court cannot supervise, dependence on personal qualifications, and determinable contracts. 'Considerable lapse of time' is not a statutory category.
Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as inserted by the 2018 Amendment), substituted performance of a contract shall not be undertaken unless the party suffering the breach has given a notice in writing to the party in breach of not less than:
aNinety days
bSixty days
cThirty days
dFifteen days
Answer: C
Section 20(2) requires a written notice of not less than thirty days calling upon the party in breach to perform; only on his refusal or failure may the aggrieved party get it performed through a third party or his own agency.
Under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who:
aFails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him
bHas not registered the agreement under the Indian Registration Act, 1908
cHas failed to file the suit within twelve years of the breach
dHas not obtained the prior permission of the court before instituting the suit
Answer: A
Section 16(c) bars relief in favour of a person who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract on his part. The 2018 Amendment changed 'aver and prove' to 'prove'.
An instrument chargeable with duty, executed out of India and not being a bill of exchange or promissory note, may under Section 18 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 be stamped within:
aOne month after it has been first received in India
bSix months after it has been first received in India
cFour months after it has been first received in India
dThree months after it has been first received in India
Answer: D
Section 18 allows an instrument (other than a bill of exchange or promissory note) first executed out of India to be stamped within three months after it is first received in India.
Under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, an instrument chargeable with duty but not duly stamped:
aIs admissible in evidence but the executant alone is liable to penalty
bIs void and unenforceable for all purposes
cMay be admitted only with the prior sanction of the High Court
dShall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose by a person having authority to receive evidence, nor be acted upon, registered or authenticated, unless duly stamped
Answer: D
Section 35 bars an instrument not duly stamped from being admitted in evidence, acted upon, registered or authenticated. The bar is to admissibility and not to validity of the transaction, and the defect may be cured by payment of duty and penalty.
Once an instrument has been admitted in evidence, Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides that such admission shall not be called in question on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped:
aAt any stage of the same suit or proceeding, except as provided in Section 61
bOnly during the trial but it may be questioned in appeal
cUnless the Collector grants permission to reopen the question
dIn any subsequent suit between the same parties
Answer: A
Section 36 bars the admission of an instrument from being questioned at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground of insufficient stamping, except as provided in Section 61. The objection must be taken when the document is tendered.
Under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the duty to impound an instrument produced before a person having authority to receive evidence, and which appears to be not duly stamped, does NOT extend to:
aA person in charge of a public office
bA Collector
cAn officer of police
dA Judge of a Civil Court
Answer: C
Section 33 obliges every person having authority by law or consent of parties to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, to impound an instrument not duly stamped, but expressly excepts an officer of police.
Under Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the property over which an easement (such as a right of way) is claimed by prescription belongs to the Government, the required period of peaceable and open enjoyment as of right without interruption is:
aSixty years
bTwelve years
cThirty years
dTwenty years
Answer: C
The ordinary prescriptive period under Section 25 is twenty years, but where the servient property belongs to the Government, the words 'twenty years' are read as 'thirty years'.
For the acquisition of an easement by prescription under Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of enjoyment relied upon must be a period ending within:
aSix months next before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested
bOne year next before the institution of the suit
cTwo years next before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested
dThree years next before the institution of the suit
Answer: C
Section 25(3) requires that the prescriptive period of enjoyment be one ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim is contested.
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that at the determination of the period limited for a person to institute a suit for possession of any property:
aHis right merely becomes unenforceable but is not extinguished
bA fresh period of twelve years begins to run
cHis right to such property shall be extinguished
dHe may still recover possession with leave of the court
Answer: C
Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy; on expiry of the period to sue for possession, the right to the property itself is extinguished, enabling acquisition of title by adverse possession.
Under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title is:
aThree years
bTwelve years
cSix years
dThirty years
Answer: B
Article 65 prescribes twelve years for a suit for possession of immovable property based on title, the period running from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Where the property over which an easement is claimed by prescription under Section 15 belongs to the Government, the prescriptive period of twenty years is to be read as:
aforty years.
bthirty years;
ctwelve years;
dtwenty-five years;
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 15 substitutes 'thirty years' for 'twenty years' when the servient heritage belongs to the Government.
Under Section 15, each prescriptive period of enjoyment must be a period ending within how long next before the institution of the suit in which the claim is contested?
atwo years;
bsix months;
cone year;
dthree years.
Answer: A
Section 15 requires that each period of twenty (or thirty) years end 'within two years next before the institution of the suit' wherein the claim is contested.
No offence under Section 138 is committed where the drawer, on receipt of the demand notice, makes payment of the amount within:
aFifteen days of the receipt of the notice
bSeven days of the receipt of the notice
cThirty days of the receipt of the notice
dFifteen days of the dishonour of the cheque
Answer: A
Proviso (c) to Section 138 provides that the offence is not complete if the drawer makes payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the demand notice.
A 'cheque' is defined under Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as:
aA promissory note payable to a banker on demand
bA bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand
cAn order in writing to a banker payable after a fixed period
dAny bill of exchange payable on demand whether or not drawn on a banker
Answer: B
Section 6 defines a cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand, and includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the electronic form.
Under Section 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a 'holder in due course' is a person who has become the possessor of the instrument for consideration:
aEven without consideration, if he is the payee named therein
bBefore the amount mentioned therein became payable, and without notice of any defect in the title of the transferor
cOnly if the instrument was payable to bearer
dAfter the amount mentioned therein became payable, in good faith
Answer: B
Section 9 requires that a holder in due course took the instrument for consideration, became the possessor before maturity (if payable to order or bearer), and had no cause to believe any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived it.
In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, the Supreme Court, on the meaning of 'shared household' under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:
aHeld that the right of residence under the Act depends on the wife having a proprietary title in the household
bHeld that a daughter-in-law has no right of residence in property owned by the father-in-law
cOverruled S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra and held that a shared household may include premises belonging to relatives of the husband, such as the father-in-law
dAffirmed S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra and confined the shared household to property owned or tenanted by the husband alone
Answer: C
In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja the Supreme Court overruled S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra and held that the definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s) is not confined to property owned by the husband and can include a household belonging to relatives of the husband where the woman lived in a domestic relationship.
In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, the Supreme Court held that a live-in relationship, in order to fall within 'relationship in the nature of marriage' under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:
aCan never amount to a domestic relationship under the Act
bIs automatically a domestic relationship in every case of cohabitation
cMay qualify as a domestic relationship if it satisfies the tests of a relationship in the nature of marriage laid down by the Court
dIs a domestic relationship only if the parties have children
Answer: C
In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma the Supreme Court held that a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' under Section 2(f) covers qualifying live-in relationships, but laid down guidelines to distinguish such relationships from mere cohabitation, denying relief on the facts because the man was already married.
Under the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, an appeal from a decree or order of a Senior Civil Judge lies to the High Court instead of the District Court when:
athe amount or value of the subject matter of the suit or proceeding exceeds the limit prescribed for appeals to the District Court
bthe State Government is a party to the suit
cthe suit concerns immovable property in every case
dthe appeal is filed beyond ninety days
Answer: A
Section 17 routes appeals from a Senior Civil Judge to the District Court up to the prescribed value of the subject matter and to the High Court where that value is exceeded.
'A' owns a cycle which is stolen by 'T'. 'T' sells the cycle to 'B', who buys it in good faith and for value without knowledge of the theft. Applying the rule in Section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (nemo dat quod non habet), the legal position is that:
aB and A become joint owners of the cycle
bB acquires a good title because he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
cB acquires good title only after one year of continuous possession
dB acquires no better title to the cycle than the seller T had, and A may recover it
Answer: D
Section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 codifies the maxim nemo dat quod non habet: where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner and sells them without the owner's authority or consent, the buyer acquires no better title than the seller had, so the buyer's good faith does not defeat the true owner's claim.
An appeal under the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 against a decision or order of a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar lies to:
aThe Board of Revenue directly
bThe Collector
cThe District Court
dThe High Court
Answer: B
Under the appellate scheme of the Act, an appeal from a decision of a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar lies to the Collector; from a Collector's original order to the District Collector; and from a District Collector to the Board of Revenue.
Under Section 43 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, where an offence under Section 34, 35, 37 or 38 is committed by a person in the employment and acting on behalf of a licensee, the licensee:
aIs in no case liable, the servant alone being punishable
bIs liable only if he expressly authorised the servant's act
cIs also punishable as if he had himself committed the offence, unless he establishes that all due diligence was exercised to prevent it
dIs liable only to forfeiture of his licence and not to any criminal punishment
Answer: C
Section 43 fixes criminal liability on the licensee for acts of his servants done in his employment, unless he proves that all due diligence was exercised to prevent the offence.
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