Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of a portion of his claim arising from the same cause of action, he shall afterwards:
abe entitled to sue for the omitted portion only with leave of the appellate court;
bbe entitled to sue for the omitted portion within three years of the first decree.
cnot afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted;
dbe entitled to sue for the omitted portion in a fresh suit as of right;
Answer: C
Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. requires the whole claim arising from one cause of action to be included; a plaintiff who omits a portion (without leave) cannot afterwards sue for the omitted portion.
An ex parte decree was passed against a defendant. Under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C., the Court shall set aside the decree if it is satisfied that:
athe plaintiff consents to setting aside the decree.
bthe summons was not duly served, OR the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing;
cthe decretal amount has been deposited in court within thirty days;
dthe defendant has a good case on merits, irrespective of service of summons;
Answer: B
Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. empowers the court to set aside an ex parte decree where the summons was not duly served, or the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing.
A temporary injunction restraining a defendant from alienating the suit property pending disposal of the suit is granted by the Court of Junior Civil Judge under:
aSection 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963;
bOrder XXXVIII Rule 5 of the C.P.C.;
cOrder XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C.;
dOrder XL Rule 1 of the C.P.C.
Answer: C
Temporary injunctions in pending suits are governed by Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C.; Order XXXVIII Rule 5 deals with attachment before judgment and Order XL with appointment of a receiver.
Settlement of disputes outside the court through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including Lok Adalat, or mediation, where the court finds elements of a settlement, is provided for in:
aSection 89 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 80 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 100 of the C.P.C.
dSection 96 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: A
Section 89 C.P.C. (inserted by the 1999 Amendment, upheld in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India) provides for reference of disputes to ADR mechanisms.
The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. fixes an outer limit, beyond thirty days from service of summons, within which a defendant should ordinarily file his written statement, namely:
aforty-five days;
bone hundred and twenty days.
cninety days;
dsixty days;
Answer: C
The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. allows the written statement to be filed up to ninety days from service of summons; in ordinary civil suits this limit has been held directory (Salem Advocate Bar Assn. and Kailash v. Nanhku).
The High Court or the District Court may, of its own motion or on application, transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before a subordinate court to another competent subordinate court. This general power of transfer is conferred by:
aSection 23 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 24 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 25 of the C.P.C.
dSection 22 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: B
Section 24 C.P.C. confers the general power on the High Court and District Court to transfer or withdraw suits, appeals and proceedings; Section 25 deals with transfer from one State's court to another.
On reversal of a decree in appeal, the party who was dispossessed in execution of the reversed decree seeks to be placed back in the position he occupied before. This relief of restitution is granted under:
aSection 144 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 151 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 47 of the C.P.C.;
dSection 114 of the C.P.C.
Answer: A
Section 144 C.P.C. provides for restitution on variation, reversal or modification of a decree; the court restores parties to the position they would have occupied but for the reversed decree.
Under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., a plaint shall be rejected, among other grounds, where:
athe suit is valued at less than Rs. 10,000/-.
bthe plaintiff has filed it through a power-of-attorney holder;
cthe defendant denies the plaintiff's claim in his written statement;
dit does not disclose a cause of action;
Answer: D
Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. lists the grounds for rejection of a plaint, the first being that it does not disclose a cause of action; others include under-valuation, insufficient stamp, and the suit appearing barred by law.
The inherent power of a civil court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court is preserved by:
aSection 153 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 151 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 141 of the C.P.C.
dSection 148 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: B
Section 151 C.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the court to pass orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
A first appeal from an original decree passed by a Court of Senior Civil Judge in a suit of civil nature lies under:
aSection 96 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 100 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 115 of the C.P.C.
dSection 104 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: A
Section 96 C.P.C. provides for a first appeal from an original decree; Section 100 governs second appeals, Section 104 appeals from orders, and Section 115 revision.
The High Court's power to call for the record of a case decided by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies, where the subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, is contained in:
aSection 100 of the C.P.C.
bSection 113 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 115 of the C.P.C.;
dSection 114 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: C
Section 115 C.P.C. confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court in cases decided where no appeal lies; Section 114 deals with review and Section 113 with reference.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature:
aOnly when no alternative remedy is available to the plaintiff
bExcepting suits in which a question of title to property is involved
cOnly when such jurisdiction is expressly conferred by a statute
dExcepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
Answer: D
Section 9 provides that Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Jurisdiction is presumed; the bar must be shown.
The doctrine of res judicata embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operates to bar a subsequent suit where the matter in issue:
aWas decided by a Court having no jurisdiction over the subject-matter
bHas been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and finally decided by a competent Court
cCould possibly have arisen in any pending suit irrespective of the parties
dWas merely collaterally or incidentally in issue in the former suit
Answer: B
Section 11 bars re-trial of a matter directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, litigating under the same title, which has been heard and finally decided by a competent Court.
Under Section 96(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal shall lie except on a question of law from a decree in a suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed:
aThree thousand rupees
bTen thousand rupees
cTwenty thousand rupees
dFive thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 96(4) bars an appeal, except on a question of law, from a decree in a Small Cause nature suit where the value of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.
Under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed after the trial has commenced unless:
aThe Court concludes that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial
bThe amount of court fee already paid is enhanced
cThe opposite party consents to the amendment in writing
dThe amendment is confined to a question of law only
Answer: A
The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 (inserted by the 2002 Amendment) bars amendment after commencement of trial unless the Court finds that despite due diligence the party could not have raised the matter earlier.
The constitutional validity of the amendments made to the Code of Civil Procedure by the Amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002 was upheld by the Supreme Court in:
aHussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar
bAnil Rai v. State of Bihar
cSalem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India
dAll India Judges Association v. Union of India
Answer: C
In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 1999 and 2002 CPC amendments and laid down guidelines, including on Section 89.
Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowers the Court, where it appears that there exist elements of a settlement, to refer the dispute for:
aTrial before a Commissioner appointed by the Court
bReference to the High Court for opinion
cCompulsory arbitration only
dArbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, or mediation
Answer: D
Section 89 enables the Court to formulate terms of settlement and refer the matter to arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalat) or mediation where elements of a settlement appear to exist.
Under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the defendant fails to present his written statement within thirty days, the Court may permit him to file it on a later day, but not later than:
aSixty days from the date of service of summons
bNinety days from the date of service of summons
cForty-five days from the date of service of summons
dOne hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: B
Order VIII Rule 1 requires the written statement within thirty days, extendable for recorded reasons but not beyond ninety days from the date of service of summons; for ordinary suits this outer limit has been held directory.
Which of the following is NOT a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
aWhere the plaint does not disclose a cause of action
bWhere the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law
cWhere the plaint is not filed in duplicate
dWhere the defendant has filed a counter-claim of higher value
Answer: D
Order VII Rule 11 lists grounds such as no cause of action, undervaluation, insufficient stamp, suit barred by law, non-filing in duplicate and non-compliance with Rule 9. A counter-claim of higher value is not a listed ground.
Under Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no arrest may be made of a person who is infirm or above sixty-five years of age, in an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years, except with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aDeputy Superintendent of Police
bSuperintendent of Police
cSub-Inspector
dAssistant Sub-Inspector
Answer: A
Section 35(7) BNSS introduces a safeguard requiring prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police before arresting an infirm person or one above sixty-five years for an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years.
Under Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, providing for trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender, the Court shall not commence such trial until a period has elapsed after framing of the charge of:
aOne hundred and eighty days
bSixty days
cThirty days
dNinety days
Answer: D
Section 356 BNSS permits inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender, but the trial shall not commence until ninety days have elapsed from the framing of the charge.
Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for the first time prescribes a time limit for a mercy petition in a death sentence case. A convict, or his legal heir or relative, may submit a mercy petition to the Governor within how many days of being informed by the jail Superintendent of the dismissal of appeal or confirmation of sentence:
aFifteen days
bSixty days
cThirty days
dNinety days
Answer: C
Section 472(1) BNSS requires a mercy petition to the Governor to be filed within thirty days of the jail Superintendent's intimation; if rejected, a petition to the President must be filed within sixty days of that rejection.
The provision corresponding to Section 125 CrPC (order for maintenance of wives, children and parents) in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is:
aSection 164
bSection 173
cSection 144
dSection 125
Answer: C
Section 144 BNSS re-enacts the summary maintenance provision formerly contained in Section 125 CrPC, empowering a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to order monthly maintenance and interim maintenance to wives, children and parents unable to maintain themselves.
Under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which governs recording of confessions and statements, the recording of a confession by a Magistrate:
aMay be done by a police officer on whom Magisterial powers have been conferred
bMay be done by audio-video electronic means, but never by a police officer even one having Magisterial powers
cCan only be recorded after commencement of the trial
dMust always be done in the presence of the investigating officer
Answer: B
Section 183 BNSS permits recording of a confession through audio-video electronic means, but expressly bars any police officer, even one on whom Magisterial powers have been conferred, from recording it.
Under Section 398 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the obligation to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme for the State is cast upon the:
aCentral Government
bDirector General of Police
cHigh Court of the State
dState Government
Answer: D
Section 398 BNSS, a new provision, mandates that every State Government shall prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme to ensure protection of witnesses.
Under the proviso to Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a summons bearing the image of the court's seal:
aCan only be served personally by a police officer
bMust be served only through registered post
cMay also be served by electronic communication in the form and manner prescribed by State rules
dCannot be served outside the local jurisdiction of the court
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 64(2) BNSS provides that a summons bearing the image of the court's seal may also be served by electronic communication, in the form and manner prescribed by rules framed by the State Government.
The provision in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, that permits all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including the issue and service of summons and examination of witnesses, to be held in electronic mode through audio-video electronic means, is:
aSection 472
bSection 532
cSection 187
dSection 398
Answer: B
Section 532 BNSS provides that all trials, inquiries and proceedings under the Sanhita, including the issuance, service and execution of summons and warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence, may be held in electronic mode by use of electronic communication or audio-video electronic means.
Under Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding which amount, or of both, or of community service:
aTen thousand rupees
bTwenty-five thousand rupees
cFifty thousand rupees
dOne lakh rupees
Answer: C
Section 23(1) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to impose imprisonment up to three years or fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service, raising the earlier ceiling under the 1973 Code.
For an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, the maximum total period for which a Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused otherwise than in police custody before completion of investigation under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is:
aSeventy-five days
bSixty days
cNinety days
dOne hundred and eighty days
Answer: C
Section 187(3) BNSS fixes the outer detention limit at ninety days for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of ten years or more, and sixty days for other offences, after which the accused is entitled to default bail.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the provision empowering registration of a 'Zero FIR', that is, information relating to a cognizable offence may be given at any police station irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, is contained in:
aSection 173
bSection 154
cSection 190
dSection 175
Answer: A
Section 173 BNSS, which replaces Section 154 CrPC, gives statutory recognition to the Zero FIR by permitting information of a cognizable offence to be given orally, in writing or by electronic communication at any police station irrespective of jurisdiction.
Under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where information is received of a cognizable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of a police station may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, within a period of:
aThirty days
bFourteen days
cSeven days
dTwenty-one days
Answer: B
Section 173(3) BNSS introduces a preliminary enquiry, with prior DSP permission, for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to be completed within fourteen days.
The general provision relating to arrest by a police officer without a warrant, corresponding to Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is now found in which section of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023:
aSection 35
bSection 47
cSection 43
dSection 41
Answer: A
Section 35 BNSS reproduces and re-numbers the arrest-without-warrant provision of Section 41 CrPC, also incorporating the Section 41A notice of appearance into its sub-sections.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the punishment for 'dowry death' is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than:
aTen years
bThree years
cSeven years
dFive years
Answer: C
Section 80 BNS punishes dowry death with imprisonment for not less than seven years which may extend to imprisonment for life, retaining the rigour of Section 304B IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of murder is punishable under which section, the corresponding definition of murder being contained in the section immediately preceding it?
aSection 105, murder being defined in Section 103
bSection 302, murder being defined in Section 300
cSection 103, murder being defined in Section 101
dSection 101, murder being defined in Section 100
Answer: C
Under the BNS, 2023, culpable homicide is defined in Section 100, murder in Section 101, and the punishment for murder is provided in Section 103.
A new offence, in the nature of mob lynching, has been introduced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, providing that where a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on a ground such as race, caste, community, sex, place of birth or language, each member shall be liable. The minimum imprisonment prescribed (where death or life imprisonment is not awarded) is:
aThree years
bFive years
cTen years
dSeven years
Answer: D
Section 103(2) of the BNS, 2023 punishes such group murder with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than seven years, and also a fine.
Which of the following kinds of punishment, not found in the Indian Penal Code, 1860, has been newly introduced by Section 4 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aCommunity service
bSolitary confinement
cRigorous imprisonment with hard labour
dForfeiture of property
Answer: A
Section 4(f) of the BNS, 2023 adds 'community service' as a new form of punishment, which was not one of the punishments enumerated under the IPC.
X above seven years of age and under twelve years of age does an act, but at the time he had not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
aX is liable, as the absolute exemption ends at seven years
bX is granted no offence under Section 21, the immunity being conditional on want of maturity
cX is granted absolute immunity under Section 20 regardless of maturity
dX is liable only if the act amounts to a felony
Answer: B
Section 21 of the BNS, 2023 grants a child above seven and under twelve conditional immunity, available only where he has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding; Section 20 gives absolute immunity below seven.
The offence which broadly corresponds to sedition under the erstwhile Section 124A IPC, now styled as an act endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, is dealt with under which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 124A
bSection 151
cSection 150
dSection 152
Answer: D
Section 152 of the BNS, 2023 criminalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; the IPC offence of sedition (Section 124A) was not retained as such.
Whoever commits snatching, in order to commit theft by suddenly or quickly or forcibly seizing or grabbing movable property from a person or his possession, is punishable under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 with imprisonment which may extend to:
aOne year
bThree years
cSeven years
dTwo years
Answer: B
Snatching is a new, distinct offence under Section 304 of the BNS, 2023, punishable with imprisonment of either description up to three years and fine.
A, by a false promise of marriage made with no intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with a woman, such intercourse not amounting to rape. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, A is guilty of an offence under:
aSection 69 (sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means)
bSection 84 (enticing a married woman)
cSection 64 (punishment for rape)
dSection 63 (rape)
Answer: A
Section 69 of the BNS, 2023 is a new provision punishing sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means, including a false promise of marriage, where the act does not amount to rape, with imprisonment up to ten years and fine.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating are respectively dealt with under:
aSection 316 and Section 318
bSection 405 and Section 415
cSection 318 and Section 316
dSection 406 and Section 420
Answer: A
The BNS, 2023 consolidates criminal breach of trust under Section 316 and cheating under Section 318; the IPC numbering (405/415, 406/420) no longer applies.
Where two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated as criminal conspiracy. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, this is defined in:
aSection 120B
bSection 61
cSection 120A
dSection 62
Answer: B
Section 61 of the BNS, 2023 defines and punishes criminal conspiracy, corresponding to the erstwhile Sections 120A and 120B of the IPC.
The offence of abetment of suicide under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to:
aLife imprisonment
bSeven years
cFourteen years
dTen years
Answer: D
Section 108 of the BNS, 2023 punishes abetment of suicide with imprisonment of either description up to ten years and fine.
Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which makes relevant facts forming part of the same transaction as the fact in issue, embodies the doctrine of:
aRes gestae
bEstoppel
cAutrefois acquit
dRes judicata
Answer: A
Section 4 of the BSA gives statutory recognition to the doctrine of res gestae, under which facts so connected with the fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant even though they are not in issue themselves.
Under Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on the person:
aWho is the defendant in every case
bWho would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side
cWho first leads evidence
dAgainst whom the judgment is ultimately delivered
Answer: B
Section 104 of the BSA fixes the burden of proof on the party who would fail if no evidence were given on either side, i.e. the person asserting the affirmative of the issue. This burden, unlike the onus, never shifts.
Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which prevents a person who has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused another to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief from denying its truth, deals with:
aEstoppel
bAccomplice evidence
cPrivileged communications
dRes gestae
Answer: A
Section 121 of the BSA is the provision on estoppel. A person who by his representation induces another to alter his position cannot afterwards be allowed to resile and deny the truth of that representation.
Reading Section 138 with the illustration to Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) on the credit of an accomplice, the correct position regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that:
aAn accomplice is not a competent witness against the accused
bA conviction based solely on accomplice testimony is always illegal
cAn accomplice is a competent witness and, in the enacted words of Section 138, a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice, the rule of prudence in Section 119 also requiring corroboration in material particulars
dAccomplice testimony is conclusive proof of guilt
Answer: C
As enacted, Section 138 of the BSA provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and that a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. This differs from the repealed Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (which spoke of 'uncorroborated' testimony). Read with the illustration to Section 119 of the BSA (the Court may presume an accomplice unworthy of credit unless corroborated), corroboration in material particulars is required.
The five golden principles, often called the 'panchsheel' of proof in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, were enunciated by the Supreme Court in:
aSharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
bAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473
cAghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119
dPakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47
Answer: A
In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, the Supreme Court laid down the five golden principles ('panchsheel') governing conviction on circumstantial evidence, requiring the chain to be complete and to exclude every hypothesis except guilt; these principles continue to apply under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
Under the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered:
aCannot be proved in any circumstance
bMay be proved only if it does not amount to a confession
cMay be proved, whether or not it amounts to a confession
dMay be proved only with the prior sanction of a Magistrate
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA is an exception to the bar on confessions to police and in police custody; so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact discovered is provable, whether or not it amounts to a confession.
A confession made to a police officer is dealt with under which provision of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), and what is its evidentiary effect?
aProviso to Section 23(2); it is admissible to the extent it relates to a fact discovered
bSection 23(2); it is admissible if made in the presence of a witness
cSection 22; it is admissible if voluntary
dSection 23(1); it cannot be proved against a person accused of any offence
Answer: D
Section 23(1) of the BSA bars proof of a confession made to a police officer against the accused, irrespective of whether it was made voluntarily.
A confession made by a person while in the custody of a police officer is inadmissible under Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), except when it is made:
aIn the presence of the officer in charge of the police station
bAfter the accused has been informed of his right to silence
cIn the presence of two independent witnesses
dIn the immediate presence of a Magistrate
Answer: D
Section 23(2) of the BSA bars confessions made in police custody unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), a statement made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is relevant:
aIn cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, whether or not the person was under expectation of death
bOnly if the person was under expectation of death when the statement was made
cOnly in proceedings under the law of homicide and not otherwise
dOnly if the statement was recorded by a Magistrate
Answer: A
Under Section 26(a) BSA, a dying declaration is relevant whenever the cause of the maker's death comes into question, and such statements are relevant whether or not the maker was, at the time, under expectation of death and whatever the nature of the proceeding; this preserves the Indian position which, unlike English law, requires no expectation of death.
Under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the fact that a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage, or within 280 days after its dissolution (the mother remaining unmarried), is conclusive proof of legitimacy unless it is shown that:
aThe husband was impotent at the relevant time
bA DNA test excludes paternity
cThe mother admits the child is illegitimate
dThe parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten
Answer: D
Section 116 BSA makes birth during the continuance of a valid marriage (or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried) conclusive proof of legitimacy, rebuttable only by proof that the parties had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten.
A lessee renounces his character as lessee by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. Under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, this is a ground for determination of the lease by-
aefflux of time limited by the lease
bforfeiture
cnotice to quit
dexpress surrender
Answer: B
Section 111(g) provides that a lease determines by forfeiture, inter alia, where the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself.
A gift of immovable property under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, must be effected by-
aan unregistered instrument signed by the donor
bdelivery of possession alone
can oral declaration before two witnesses
da registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses
Answer: D
Section 123 requires that a gift of immovable property be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses.
The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis) is dealt with under the Transfer of Property Act as:
aA contingent interest which is transferable under Section 21
bAn actionable claim transferable under Section 130
cA vested interest transferable under Section 19
dA mere possibility of a like nature which cannot be transferred under Section 6(a)
Answer: D
Section 6(a) expressly bars transfer of the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, or any other mere possibility of a like nature. Such expectancy is not 'property' capable of transfer.
Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer it for consideration, and later acquires an interest in that property, the transfer:
aIs absolutely void for want of title at the date of transfer
bAt the option of the transferee, operates on the interest the transferor subsequently acquires, so long as the contract subsists
cOperates automatically in favour of the transferor's heirs only
dCan be enforced only against a gratuitous transferee with notice
Answer: B
Section 43 embodies the rule of 'feeding the grant by estoppel'; the after-acquired interest may, at the option of the transferee, be made to feed the earlier transfer, provided the contract of transfer subsists. The Supreme Court in Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah held Sections 6(a) and 43 operate in different spheres.
Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the doctrine of lis pendens renders a transfer of immovable property made during the pendency of a suit:
aAbsolutely void and of no effect whatsoever
bValid but subject to the result of the suit and binding on the transferee
cIllegal and punishable as contempt of court
dVoidable at the option of the transferor
Answer: B
Section 52 does not make the transfer void; it makes the transferee bound by the decree as if no transfer had taken place. The pendente lite purchaser takes the property subject to the outcome of the litigation.
In the case of tangible immovable property of a value of one hundred rupees and upwards, a sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act can be made only by:
aEither a registered instrument or delivery of possession
bA registered instrument
cDelivery of possession
dAn oral agreement followed by payment of price
Answer: B
Under Section 54, tangible immovable property worth Rs 100 or more (and reversions or other intangible things) can be sold only by a registered instrument; only property worth less than Rs 100 may be transferred either by registered instrument or by delivery.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for the sale of immovable property:
aOperates as an equitable mortgage of the property
bBy itself creates a charge on the property
cBy itself creates an interest in or charge on the property
dDoes not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property
Answer: D
The last paragraph of Section 54 provides that a contract for sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. It merely creates a right to obtain a conveyance.
Under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005), a Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition:
aCoparcenary property only with the consent of all other coparceners
bOnly his separate or self-acquired property, but not any interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property
cAny property capable of being disposed of by him, including his interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property
dOnly property inherited from his father
Answer: C
Section 30 permits any Hindu to dispose of by will any property capable of being so disposed of, and the Explanation makes clear that the interest of a male (and, after 2005, a female) Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary is deemed property capable of testamentary disposition.
Under clause (iii) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the minimum age at the time of marriage prescribed for the bridegroom and the bride respectively is:
a21 years and 21 years
b18 years and 21 years
c21 years and 18 years
d18 years and 18 years
Answer: C
Section 5(iii) requires the bridegroom to have completed 21 years and the bride 18 years at the time of the marriage. A contravention is punishable under Section 18(a) but does not by itself make the marriage void or voidable.
A marriage solemnised in contravention only of the age condition in clause (iii) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is:
aVoid ab initio and also punishable
bVoidable under Section 12
cNeither void nor voidable, but the offender is punishable under Section 18
dVoid under Section 11
Answer: C
Section 11 makes a marriage void only for contravention of clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5; breach of clause (iii) is not listed. Such a marriage remains valid, though the offender is punishable under Section 18(a).
Which one of the following grounds renders a Hindu marriage VOID under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
aThe parties are within the degrees of prohibited relationship, there being no custom permitting such marriage
bEither party was impotent at the time of marriage
cConsent of the petitioner was obtained by fraud
dThe respondent was pregnant by some other person at the time of marriage
Answer: A
Section 11 makes a marriage void for contravention of clauses (i) bigamy, (iv) prohibited relationship and (v) sapinda relationship of Section 5. Impotence, fraud and pre-marriage pregnancy are grounds making a marriage voidable under Section 12, not void.
Where a Hindu marriage has been solemnised before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 with the customary ceremonies, a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B requires that the parties have been living separately for a period of:
aThree years or more immediately preceding the petition
bTwo years or more immediately preceding the petition
cSix months or more immediately preceding the petition
dOne year or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
Answer: D
Section 13B(1) requires that the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or more immediately before presenting the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent. The six-month period in Section 13B(2) is the interval between the first and second motions.
The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is provided in:
aSection 10
bSection 9
cSection 12
dSection 13
Answer: B
Section 9 provides that where either spouse has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. Section 10 deals with judicial separation and Section 13 with divorce.
Under Section 13(1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a party may seek divorce on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties after a decree for restitution, for a period of:
aThree years or upwards
bTwo years or upwards
cSix months or upwards
dOne year or upwards after passing of the decree
Answer: D
Section 13(1A)(ii) allows either spouse to seek divorce where there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution in a proceeding to which they were parties.
Where a contract contains a stipulation by way of penalty for breach, the party complaining of breach is entitled, under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, to receive:
aNo compensation, since penalty clauses are void
bThe whole sum named, irrespective of actual loss
cReasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named, whether or not actual damage is proved to have been caused
dOnly the actual loss proved, the named amount being wholly disregarded
Answer: C
Section 74 entitles the aggrieved party to reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty named, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved; the named sum is the ceiling, not an automatic entitlement.
An agreement made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other is enforceable as a contract without consideration only if it is:
aMade before a Notary Public
bExpressed in writing and registered under the law for the registration of documents
cReduced to writing, whether or not registered
dOral, but witnessed by two attesting witnesses
Answer: B
Section 25(1) exempts such an agreement from the requirement of consideration only where it is expressed in writing and registered under the law relating to registration of documents and is made on account of natural love and affection between parties in near relation.
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, the Privy Council held that an agreement entered into by a minor is:
aValid but unenforceable until the minor attains majority
bVoidable at the option of the other party
cVoid ab initio
dVoidable at the option of the minor
Answer: C
The Privy Council (1903) held that a minor is not competent to contract under Section 11, and therefore an agreement by a minor is void ab initio, not merely voidable.
Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a contract in which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person, is a:
aQuasi-contract under Section 68
bContract of bailment under Section 148
cContract of guarantee under Section 126
dContract of indemnity under Section 124
Answer: D
Section 124 defines a contract of indemnity as one where one party promises to save the other from loss caused by the conduct of the promisor himself or of any other person.
In a contract of guarantee under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the:
aPrincipal debtor
bSurety
cCreditor
dIndemnifier
Answer: A
Under Section 126, the person who gives the guarantee is the surety, the person to whom it is given is the creditor, and the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is the principal debtor.
Every agreement by which any person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is, under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aValid if the restraint is reasonable
bTo that extent void
cValid only if the restraint operates for a limited time
dVoidable at the option of the restrained party
Answer: B
Section 27 declares every agreement in restraint of trade void to that extent; unlike English law, the test of reasonableness does not save it, save for the statutory exception relating to sale of goodwill.
The sole exception expressly attached to Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 permitting a restraint of trade relates to an agreement:
aBy the seller of the goodwill of a business not to carry on a similar business within specified local limits
bRestraining an employee from competing after termination of service
cRestraining a person from instituting legal proceedings
dBetween partners not to carry on business after dissolution
Answer: A
The exception to Section 27 permits one who sells the goodwill of a business to agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within specified local limits, so long as those limits appear reasonable.
The provision relating to the grant of a mandatory injunction is contained in which section of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aSection 39
bSection 41
cSection 38
dSection 42
Answer: A
Section 39 deals with mandatory injunctions, empowering the court to compel performance of certain acts necessary to prevent the breach of an obligation; Section 38 deals with perpetual injunctions.
Under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction to restrain a person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit may nevertheless be granted where:
aThe proceeding has been instituted against a public officer
bThe proceeding is pending in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought
cSuch restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings
dThe plaintiff offers to pay damages
Answer: C
Clause (b) of Section 41 bars injunctions staying a pending judicial proceeding, but expressly carves out the exception where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings.
Section 20A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, inserted by the 2018 Amendment, provides that in a suit relating to a contract for an infrastructure project specified in the Schedule, the court:
aShall mandatorily grant an interim injunction to protect the contractor
bHas no jurisdiction to entertain the suit
cMust refer the dispute compulsorily to arbitration
dShall not grant an injunction which would cause impediment or delay in the progress or completion of the project
Answer: D
Section 20A bars courts from granting any injunction in suits relating to scheduled infrastructure projects where the injunction would impede or delay the progress or completion of the project.
Section 14A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, introduced by the 2018 Amendment, empowers the court to:
aTransfer the suit to a Special Court at any stage
bEngage one or more experts to assist it on any specific issue involved in the suit
cAppoint a receiver over the suit property
dAward exemplary damages in addition to specific performance
Answer: B
Section 14A enables the court, where it considers it necessary, to engage one or more experts to obtain their opinion and assistance on any specific issue in the suit.
After the 2018 Amendment, Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requires a plaintiff seeking specific performance to:
aProve that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract
bObtain substituted performance before instituting the suit
cDeposit the entire consideration in court before filing the suit
dAver in the plaint his readiness and willingness, failing which the suit is liable to be dismissed
Answer: A
The 2018 amendment substituted the requirement to 'aver' with a requirement to 'prove' readiness and willingness; the plaintiff must now prove, not merely plead, that he has performed or has always been ready and willing.
Where, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, a document is not presented for registration within the prescribed time, the Registrar may, under Section 25 of the Registration Act, 1908, accept it where the delay does not exceed four months, on payment of a fine not exceeding:
aFive times the amount of the proper registration fee
bTwice the amount of the proper registration fee
cThe amount of the proper registration fee
dTen times the amount of the proper registration fee
Answer: D
Section 25 empowers the Registrar to condone a delay not exceeding four months on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration fee. The power to condone such delay vests in the Registrar, not the Sub-Registrar.
Under Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, a registered document operates:
aFrom the date of its registration in all cases
bFrom the date on which it is entered in the register book
cFrom the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration had been required, and not from the time of its registration
dFrom the date on which the registering officer endorses his certificate under Section 60
Answer: C
Section 47 provides that a registered document operates from the time it would have commenced to operate had no registration been required or made, not from the time of registration. Registration thus relates back to the date of execution.
Which of the following documents is NOT compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908?
aA lease of immovable property for a term not exceeding one year
bA gift of immovable property
cAn instrument of partition of immovable property worth one hundred rupees and upwards
dA non-testamentary instrument creating a right in immovable property worth one hundred rupees or more
Answer: A
Section 17 mandates registration of gifts of immovable property, non-testamentary instruments dealing with immovable property of value one hundred rupees and upwards, and partitions. A lease for a term not exceeding one year is not compulsorily registrable; only leases from year to year or exceeding one year fall within Section 17.
A document required to be registered under Section 17 but not registered is, by virtue of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, NEVERTHELESS admissible:
aFor all purposes, since non-registration is a mere irregularity
bOnly as evidence affecting the immovable property comprised therein
cOnly after the deficient stamp duty has been paid to the Collector
dAs evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, or as evidence of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, or of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument
Answer: D
Under the proviso to Section 49, an unregistered document may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, as evidence of part performance under Section 53A T.P. Act, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. It cannot, however, affect the immovable property or be received as evidence of any transaction required to be registered.
The benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (extension of prescribed period on sufficient cause) is available to:
aApplications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure only
bSuits and appeals only
cAny appeal or application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSuits, appeals and all applications without exception
Answer: C
Section 5 permits condonation of delay only for an appeal or an application, expressly excluding applications under Order XXI CPC; it does not apply to suits at all.
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the proceeding may be instituted:
aOn the day the court reopens
bOnly with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5
cAt any time within the next limitation period
dWithin thirty days of the reopening of the court
Answer: A
Section 4 allows the suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made on the day the court reopens when the last day of the prescribed period falls on a day the court is closed.
Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 extends the time for instituting a suit or making an application for execution of a decree where, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, the person entitled is:
aProsecuting another civil proceeding bona fide
bA pauper unable to pay court fee
cAbsent from India
dA minor, or insane, or an idiot
Answer: D
Section 6 protects a person under legal disability, namely a minor, insane person or idiot, allowing the suit or execution application within the same period after the disability ceases.
Which proposition correctly reflects Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
aSubsequent disability extends the period by the duration of such disability
bWhere once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application can stop it
cTime never begins to run until the disability of the plaintiff ceases
dTime once begun to run is suspended by any subsequent disability of the plaintiff
Answer: B
Section 9 embodies the rule of continuous running of time: once limitation begins to run, no subsequent disability or inability stops it, the only statutory exception being the proviso as to administration of an estate.
A licence, as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, where it does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, is essentially a right which is:
aA personal right (in personam) which is not transferable
bAn easement appurtenant to the dominant heritage
cA right in rem running with the land
dA heritable and transferable interest in the servient land
Answer: A
Section 52 defines a licence as a grant of a right to do something in or upon the grantor's immovable property which would otherwise be unlawful, and which does not amount to an easement or interest in the property; it is a purely personal right and is not transferable.
Under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licence becomes irrevocable where the licensee, acting upon the licence, has:
aExecuted a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in its execution
bPaid consideration for the licence
cMerely entered upon the licensor's land
dContinued enjoyment for twelve years
Answer: A
Section 60(b) makes a licence irrevocable where the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in its execution; clause (a) covers a licence coupled with a transfer of property in force.
An easement, being a right which the owner or occupier of the dominant heritage possesses against the land of another, is in its essential character a right:
aPurely contractual and personal between the parties
bIn personam only
cIn rem, that is, appurtenant to and exercisable for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage
dOf a transferable personal nature independent of any land
Answer: C
An easement under the Act is a right annexed to the dominant heritage and runs with the land; it is a right in rem for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage, and is distinct from a licence which is a personal right in personam.
In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510, the Supreme Court held that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is constituted by how many distinct components or acts?
aSix
bFour
cThree
dFive
Answer: D
In K. Bhaskaran, the Supreme Court identified five acts comprising the offence: drawing of the cheque, presentation to the bank, return of the cheque unpaid, giving notice demanding payment, and failure of the drawer to pay within fifteen days of the notice.
Section 108 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides that acceptance of a bill of exchange for honour may be made, after the bill has been noted or protested for non-acceptance or for better security, by:
aThe notary public who noted the bill, on behalf of the drawer
bThe drawee alone, on a fresh demand by the holder
cAny person not being a party already liable thereon, with the consent of the holder, by writing on the bill
dAny party already liable on the bill, without the consent of the holder
Answer: C
Section 108 permits any person who is not already a party liable on the bill, with the consent of the holder and by writing on the bill, to accept it for the honour of any party, once the bill has been noted or protested for non-acceptance or better security.
On a conviction in a summary trial under Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and an amount of fine:
aEqual to the amount of the cheque only
bExceeding five thousand rupees
cNot exceeding five thousand rupees
dNot exceeding ten thousand rupees
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 143(1) empowers the Magistrate, on conviction in a summary trial, to pass a sentence of imprisonment up to one year and a fine exceeding five thousand rupees, notwithstanding the limits in the summary-trial provisions of the Code.
Under Section 2 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, an 'aggrieved person' means:
aAny person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and alleges domestic violence
bAny woman who is married to the respondent and resides in the matrimonial home
cAny woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent
dAny female relative of the respondent who is dependent on him
Answer: C
Section 2(a) defines 'aggrieved person' as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
In Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, the Supreme Court, dealing with the definition of 'respondent' under Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:
aUpheld the validity of the words 'adult male' in their entirety
bStruck down the words 'adult male' occurring in Section 2(q) as violative of Article 14
cHeld that only the husband can be a respondent under the Act
dRead down Section 2(q) to exclude female relatives of the husband
Answer: B
In Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora the Supreme Court struck down the words 'adult male' in Section 2(q), so that a complaint may now lie against female respondents as well; the rest of the Act was held severable and intact.
Whether a tenant's default in payment of rent is 'wilful default' within the meaning of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 depends upon:
awhether the non-payment was deliberate, intentional and conscious, judged from the surrounding circumstances
bthe mere arithmetical fact that any amount remained unpaid on the due date
cthe landlord having issued a registered legal notice in every case
dwhether the arrears exceed three months' rent in every case
Answer: A
Default is 'wilful' only where it is deliberate, intentional and conscious without just cause; the Controller must examine the surrounding circumstances rather than treat any non-payment as automatically wilful.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, when a building becomes vacant, the landlord is required to:
adeposit one month's rent with the Municipal Commissioner
bgive intimation of the vacancy to the Rent Controller
cpublish the vacancy in two local newspapers
dregister the vacancy with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances
Answer: B
Section 3 obliges the landlord to intimate the vacancy to the Controller, enabling regulation of allotment and protecting the rights of intending lessees.
Under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, where under a contract of sale the transfer of property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is termed:
aAn executed contract of sale
bA sale
cA hire-purchase agreement
dAn agreement to sell
Answer: D
Section 4(3) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides that where the transfer of property in goods is to take place at a future time or subject to a condition to be fulfilled, the contract is an agreement to sell; it becomes a sale when the time elapses or the condition is fulfilled.
Under Section 6 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, which of the following correctly describes the consequence for crops or other products raised on the land unauthorisedly occupied?
aThey must be auctioned and the proceeds paid to the occupier
bThey are exempt from any action by the authorities
cThey vest in the occupier as compensation for improvements
dThey are liable to forfeiture
Answer: D
Section 6 empowers the authorities to summarily evict the unauthorised occupier and provides that any crop or other product raised on the land shall be liable to forfeiture; buildings or other constructions are removable after written notice.
Section 41 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, which penalises acts in contravention of the Act 'not otherwise provided for', prescribes a maximum punishment of:
aImprisonment up to six months and fine up to rupees five thousand
bImprisonment up to one year and fine up to rupees ten thousand
cFine up to rupees five hundred only
dImprisonment up to two years and fine up to rupees one thousand
Answer: A
Section 41 is the residuary penal provision; contraventions not otherwise provided for are punishable with imprisonment which may extend up to six months and fine which may extend up to rupees five thousand.
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