Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 10 — Questions & Solutions
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Where a defendant claims to set-off against the plaintiff's demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable from the plaintiff, such claim is governed by:
aOrder II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
bOrder VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (legal set-off)
cOrder I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
dOrder VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Answer: B
Order VIII Rule 6 permits a defendant in a suit for recovery of money to claim a set-off of any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable from the plaintiff, not exceeding the pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction.
Where one of two or more plaintiffs or defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive to or against the surviving party alone, an application to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased must, under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure read with the Limitation Act, be made within:
a60 days of the death
b30 days of the death
c90 days of the death
d120 days of the death
Answer: C
Under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Order XXII Rule 3/4 CPC, the application to bring legal representatives on record is to be made within ninety days from the date of death of the party.
Under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person owning or holding an interest in immovable property sold in execution may apply to have the sale set aside on depositing, for payment to the auction-purchaser, a sum equal to:
aTen per cent of the purchase-money
bTwenty-five per cent of the purchase-money
cFive per cent of the purchase-money
dTwo per cent of the purchase-money
Answer: C
Order XXI Rule 89 requires deposit, for payment to the purchaser, of a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money, besides the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for the decree-holder.
Before granting a temporary injunction restraining the defendant, where the injunction is granted without notice to the opposite party, the Court is required under the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to:
aDirect the plaintiff to furnish security in cash only
bObtain the prior sanction of the District Judge
cRefer the matter to the High Court for confirmation
dRecord its reasons for the opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay
Answer: D
The proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 requires the Court, where it proposes to grant an injunction without notice, to record its reasons for the opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and to impose certain duties on the applicant.
A review of its own judgment by a Court under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be sought on the ground of:
aDiscovery of new and important matter or evidence not within the applicant's knowledge or which could not be produced despite due diligence, or a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason
bThe dissatisfaction of the unsuccessful party with the findings of fact
cA change in the law brought about by a subsequent statute only
dThe mere availability of a remedy of appeal
Answer: A
Order XLVII Rule 1 permits review on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence not earlier available despite due diligence, on account of a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason.
A civil court's jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature is conferred by Section 9 C.P.C. The cognizance of such a suit can be ousted only when it is -
abarred only by an order of the High Court.
bbarred impliedly alone by necessary implication;
cbarred either expressly or impliedly;
dbarred expressly alone by a statute;
Answer: C
Section 9 C.P.C. provides that courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
A plaintiff in Vijayawada wishes to sue for recovery of immovable property situated within the local limits of the District Court at Guntur. Under the C.P.C., the suit must ordinarily be instituted -
awhere the property is situate, under Section 16;
bat the option of the plaintiff, in either place.
cwhere the defendant resides;
dwhere the plaintiff resides, under Section 20;
Answer: A
Section 16 C.P.C. requires suits for recovery of, or determination of rights in, immovable property to be instituted in the court within whose local limits the property is situate; the specific rule prevails over the general rule in Section 20.
A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former suit, but was not so raised, when sought to be agitated in a subsequent suit, is barred by -
aconstructive res judicata under Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C.;
bSection 10 C.P.C. (stay of suit);
cOrder 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.;
dSection 80 C.P.C.
Answer: A
Explanation IV to Section 11 embodies constructive res judicata, barring grounds of attack or defence that ought to have been raised in the earlier suit but were not.
Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. is directed against the splitting up of -
aissues framed by the court;
bclaims and remedies arising from the same cause of action;
cgrounds of defence ought to have been raised;
dappeals against the same decree.
Answer: B
Order 2 Rule 2 obliges the plaintiff to include the whole claim and all reliefs arising from one cause of action in a single suit, guarding against splitting of claims and remedies; this is distinct from constructive res judicata, which concerns grounds of attack and defence.
Under Section 13 C.P.C., a foreign judgment shall NOT be conclusive in which one of the following situations?
awhere it has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction;
bwhere it has been given on the merits of the case;
cwhere it sustains a claim founded on a correct view of international law.
dwhere the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice;
Answer: D
Section 13(d) C.P.C. declares a foreign judgment not conclusive where the proceedings in which it was obtained are opposed to natural justice; clauses (a), (b) and (d) describe conditions under which it remains conclusive.
A second appeal to the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. shall lie from an appellate decree only if the case involves -
aan error in appreciation of evidence;
ba question of limitation alone.
cany question of fact or law;
da substantial question of law;
Answer: D
Section 100 C.P.C. permits a second appeal only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, unlike a first appeal under Section 96 which lies on both fact and law.
An appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. from an original decree, as distinguished from a second appeal, may be founded on -
aa substantial question of law only;
ba question of jurisdiction alone;
cno question, being a matter of right without grounds.
dquestions of fact as well as questions of law;
Answer: D
A first appeal under Section 96 lies against an original decree and can be agitated on questions of fact and of law, whereas a second appeal under Section 100 is confined to a substantial question of law.
Where urgent and immediate relief is sought against the Government, a suit may be instituted without serving the two months' notice under Section 80 C.P.C. provided that the plaintiff -
aobtains the previous leave of the court under Section 80(2);
bserves a shorter notice of fifteen days.
cdeposits the court fee in advance;
dfiles an affidavit of urgency only;
Answer: A
Section 80(2) C.P.C. permits a suit for urgent or immediate relief against the Government to be instituted without notice, but only with the leave of the court.
Under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C., the court may set aside an ex parte decree where the defendant satisfies the court that -
athe decree is against the weight of evidence;
bthe summons was duly served and he was negligent;
cthe summons was not duly served, or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing;
dthe plaintiff has not executed the decree.
Answer: C
Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. allows setting aside an ex parte decree on proof that the summons was not duly served or that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing.
Where a suit against the Government has been dismissed for default, and the suit is later restored, an attachment before judgment effected earlier -
ais converted into attachment in execution.
brevives only with the leave of the High Court;
crevives automatically on restoration of the suit;
ddoes not revive and a fresh attachment is necessary;
Answer: C
Where a suit dismissed for default or non-prosecution is restored, an attachment before judgment that was ordered earlier revives along with the restoration of the suit.
Under the proviso to Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. (non-commercial suits), where the defendant fails to file his written statement within thirty days of service of summons, the court may permit filing on recorded reasons up to a maximum, from the date of service of summons, of -
aone hundred and twenty days;
bsixty days;
cninety days;
done hundred and eighty days.
Answer: C
Under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C., the written statement is to be filed within thirty days, extendable for reasons recorded up to ninety days from the date of service of summons.
On the modification, variation or reversal of a decree in appeal, the restoration to a party of the benefit which he has lost is governed by -
aSection 47 C.P.C.
bSection 144 C.P.C. (restitution);
cSection 151 C.P.C. (inherent powers);
dSection 114 C.P.C. (review);
Answer: B
Section 144 C.P.C. embodies the doctrine of restitution, enabling the court to place parties in the position they occupied before the decree that has been varied or reversed.
The power of review conferred by Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. -
acannot be exercised as an inherent or appellate power and is confined to the grounds in Order 47;
bcan be exercised as an appellate power;
cis unavailable once a decree is drawn up.
dcan be exercised as an inherent power under Section 151;
Answer: A
Review under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 cannot be exercised as an inherent or appellate power; it is confined to grounds such as discovery of new evidence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason.
Under Section 187(2) of the BNSS, the total period for which a Magistrate may authorise detention of an accused in police custody (whether at once or in parts) cannot exceed:
aThirty days
bSeven days
cFifteen days
dTen days
Answer: C
Section 187(2) BNSS caps police custody at fifteen days in the whole, but unlike the old CrPC it permits that quantum to be sought in parts spread over the initial forty or sixty days of the investigation.
Under Section 398 of the BNSS, 2023, the duty to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme with a view to ensure protection of witnesses is cast upon:
aThe Central Government
bEvery State Government
cThe National Human Rights Commission
dThe concerned High Court
Answer: B
Section 398 BNSS, giving statutory effect to the Supreme Court's direction in Mahender Chawla v. Union of India, requires every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme.
Under Section 35(1)(b) of the BNSS, a police officer may arrest without a warrant a person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made of having committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, only where the officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary, among other grounds, to:
aPrevent the person from committing any further offence
bRecover the fine imposable for the offence
cCompel the person to confess
dCompensate the victim of the offence
Answer: A
Section 35(1)(b) BNSS permits arrest for offences punishable up to seven years only where necessary, inter alia, to prevent commission of further offences, for proper investigation, or to prevent tampering with or destruction of evidence.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of less than three years and the person to be arrested is infirm or is above sixty years of age, no such arrest shall be made except with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aInspector of Police
bSub-Divisional Magistrate
cSuperintendent of Police
dDeputy Superintendent of Police
Answer: D
Section 35(7) of the BNSS, 2023 bars arrest of an infirm person or a person above sixty years in offences punishable with less than three years' imprisonment without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Magistrate may authorise detention of an accused during investigation up to a maximum of ninety days only where the offence is:
aTriable exclusively by a Court of Session
bPunishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
cPunishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years
dA non-bailable offence of any description
Answer: B
Section 187(3) BNSS prescribes a ninety-day outer limit of detention only for offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; for all other offences the limit is sixty days, after which the indefeasible right to default bail accrues.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a Court of a Magistrate of the first class may, apart from imprisonment, pass a sentence of fine not exceeding:
aFifty thousand rupees
bTwenty-five thousand rupees
cOne lakh rupees
dTen thousand rupees
Answer: A
Section 23(2) of the BNSS, 2023 empowers a Magistrate of the first class to pass imprisonment up to three years, or fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service (the corresponding CrPC limit was ten thousand rupees).
Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces the concept of a 'Zero FIR'. Which of the following best states its effect?
aInformation relating to a cognizable offence may be given at any police station irrespective of the area where the offence is committed
bAn FIR may be registered only after preliminary inquiry in every case
cAn FIR can be registered only by the police station having territorial jurisdiction
dAn FIR can be registered only for offences punishable with seven years or more
Answer: A
Section 173(1) BNSS permits information about a cognizable offence to be given orally, in writing or by electronic communication, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, thereby statutorily recognising the 'Zero FIR'.
Under Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, it is mandatory for a forensic expert to visit the crime scene and collect forensic evidence (with the process video-recorded) where the offence is:
aTriable by a Magistrate of the first class
bPunishable with imprisonment for a term of three years or more
cPunishable with imprisonment for a term of seven years or more
dAny cognizable offence whatsoever
Answer: C
Section 176(3) BNSS makes forensic investigation mandatory for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, requiring a forensic expert to visit the scene and video-record the collection of evidence.
Under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a first-time offender (in an offence not punishable with death or life imprisonment) becomes entitled to release on bond once he has undergone detention extending up to:
aThe full maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence
bTwo-thirds of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence
cOne-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence
dOne-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence
Answer: D
The first proviso to Section 479(1) BNSS provides that a first-time offender shall be released on bond on having undergone detention up to one-third of the maximum sentence, whereas the general rule under Section 479(1) is one-half.
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces, for the first time in Indian procedural law, a complete mechanism for inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of an accused. This is contained in:
aSection 299
bSection 356
cSection 339
dSection 84
Answer: B
Section 356 BNSS empowers a Court to conduct inquiry, trial or pronounce judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial and whose immediate arrest is not possible.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under a sentence of death may file a mercy petition within a specified period from the date the jail Superintendent informs him of the dismissal of his appeal. That period is:
aFifteen days
bSeven days
cSixty days
dThirty days
Answer: D
Section 472(1) BNSS allows a death-sentence convict (or his legal heir/relative) to file a mercy petition before the President or Governor within thirty days of being informed by the jail Superintendent of the dismissal of the appeal or confirmation of the death sentence.
Under the proviso to Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a victim has a statutory right to appeal against an order of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation. Such an appeal:
aCan be filed only by the Public Prosecutor on the victim's behalf
bLies only with the special leave of the High Court
cLies only to the Supreme Court
dRequires no leave of the court and lies to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies from the order of conviction
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 413 BNSS (pari materia with the proviso to Section 372 CrPC) confers on the victim an independent right of appeal without any leave of the court, filed before the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction.
Under Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where the arrest of a person against whom a reasonable complaint or credible information exists of a cognizable offence is not required under sub-section (1), the police officer is, in the first instance, required to:
aRelease him on personal bond without any condition
bIssue a notice directing him to appear before the police officer
cObtain a warrant from the Magistrate before any further step
dForthwith produce him before the nearest Magistrate
Answer: B
Section 35(3) BNSS requires the police officer, where arrest is not warranted under sub-section (1), to issue a notice of appearance to the person; arrest may follow only if he fails to comply or where the officer records reasons that arrest is necessary.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of 'terrorist act', largely drawn from the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is incorporated into the general penal law under:
aSection 113
bSection 111
cSection 152
dSection 112
Answer: A
Section 113 BNS makes 'terrorist act' a substantive offence within the general criminal law for the first time, drawing heavily on the UAPA, 1967.
B, by falsely promising to marry C and with no intention of fulfilling that promise, has sexual intercourse with her, which does not amount to rape. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, B is liable under:
aSection 63
bSection 69
cSection 64
dSection 85
Answer: B
Section 69 BNS is a new offence punishing sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or a false promise to marry, where the act does not amount to rape, with imprisonment up to ten years and fine.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of rape is defined in Section 63, and the general punishment for rape (other than the aggravated forms) is prescribed under:
aSection 64
bSection 65
cSection 66
dSection 62
Answer: A
Section 63 BNS defines rape, while Section 64 prescribes the ordinary punishment, namely rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years extendable to imprisonment for life and fine.
Where the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury, or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and she was shown to have been subjected to cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry, the offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is 'dowry death' under:
aSection 86
bSection 80
cSection 85
dSection 79
Answer: B
Section 80 BNS defines and punishes dowry death (death within seven years of marriage linked to dowry-related cruelty), with imprisonment of not less than seven years extendable to life.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, cruelty by a husband or his relative towards a married woman is made punishable under Section 85, and the meaning of 'cruelty' for that purpose is supplied by:
aSection 87
bSection 84
cSection 86
dSection 80
Answer: C
Section 85 BNS creates the offence of cruelty by a husband or his relatives, while the Explanation/definition of 'cruelty' for that section is contained in Section 86.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where two or more persons agree to do an illegal act, the offence of 'criminal conspiracy' is dealt with under:
aSection 120
bSection 109
cSection 59
dSection 61
Answer: D
Section 61 BNS defines and punishes criminal conspiracy; an agreement other than one to commit an offence requires an overt act in pursuance of it to constitute the offence.
Under Section 11 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the total period of solitary confinement that may be imposed shall in no case exceed:
aThree months
bTwo months
cOne month
dSix months
Answer: A
Section 11 of the BNS, 2023 caps total solitary confinement at three months in the whole, on a graded scale tied to the term of imprisonment (one, two or three months). This corresponds to old Section 73 IPC.
The general provision declaring that 'nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence' is contained in which Section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 35
bSection 34
cSection 44
dSection 38
Answer: B
Section 34 of the BNS, 2023 is the foundational provision on private defence, declaring that nothing done in its exercise is an offence; it corresponds to old Section 96 IPC. Sections 35 to 44 elaborate the scope and limits.
For there to be a criminal conspiracy within the meaning of Section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the agreement must be between:
aExactly two persons
bThree or more persons
cTwo or more persons
dFive or more persons
Answer: C
Section 61 of the BNS, 2023 defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. It carries forward the definition from old Section 120A IPC.
The offence of wrongful confinement is defined and made punishable under which Section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 126
bSection 140
cSection 124
dSection 127
Answer: D
Section 127 of the BNS, 2023 deals with wrongful confinement, i.e. wrongfully restraining a person so as to prevent him from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits; it corresponds to old Sections 340 and 342 IPC. Section 126 covers wrongful restraint.
Under Exception 1 to Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is:
aA question of law
bA mixed question of fact and law
cAn irrebuttable presumption of law
dA question of fact
Answer: D
Exception 1 to Section 101 of the BNS, 2023 (murder) expressly provides that whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. This mirrors Exception 1 to old Section 300 IPC.
No confession made to a police-officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. This rule is contained in:
aSection 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 22 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 24 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 25 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: A
Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 categorically bars proof of any confession made to a police officer; Section 22 deals with confessions caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, while custodial confessions and the discovery proviso fall within Section 23(2).
Under the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), so much of the information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer as relates distinctly to a fact thereby discovered may be proved:
aOnly if it does not amount to a confession
bOnly after the accused is convicted
cOnly if it amounts to a confession
dWhether or not it amounts to a confession
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 permits proof of so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, 'whether it amounts to a confession or not'. It operates as an exception to the bar in Section 23(1) (confession to a police officer) and Section 23(2) (confession in police custody), corresponding to the old Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
A statement made by a deceased person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death is relevant under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
aWhether or not the maker was under any expectation of death when he made it
bOnly if the maker was under expectation of death when he made it
cOnly in proceedings where the cause of death is not in question
dOnly if reduced to writing and signed by a Magistrate
Answer: A
Unlike English law, Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the successor to s.32(1) IEA) does not require the declarant to be under expectation of death, as settled in Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47.
Where the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected by him to cruelty or harassment in connection with a demand for dowry, the Court under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
aMay presume that he caused the dowry death
bShall presume that he caused the dowry death
cShall conclusively presume that he caused the dowry death
dCannot draw any presumption against him
Answer: B
Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 uses the words 'shall presume', making the presumption of dowry death mandatory and rebuttable, in contrast to the discretionary 'may presume' of Section 117 BSA relating to abetment of suicide.
When a person accused of an offence claims the benefit of any of the General Exceptions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within such exception, under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), lies upon:
aThe accused
bThe Court of its own motion
cThe prosecution
dThe complainant
Answer: A
Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 places the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within a General Exception upon the accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
Under Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), an accomplice:
aIs not a competent witness against an accused person
bIs competent only after he is granted a pardon by the High Court
cIs competent only if his evidence is corroborated in every particular
dIs a competent witness, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice
Answer: D
Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 declares that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. (The enacted BSA text uses 'corroborated', departing from the 'uncorroborated' phrasing of the repealed Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.) The rule of prudence requiring corroboration in material particulars is reflected in illustration (b) to Section 119 BSA.
The opinion of a person specially skilled as to the identity of finger impressions is a relevant fact under which section of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)?
aSection 55
bSection 39
cSection 41
dSection 45
Answer: B
Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the successor to s.45 IEA) makes relevant the opinion of experts on a point of foreign law, science, art or any other field, or as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), to prove the contents of an electronic record by way of secondary evidence, a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is:
aOptional and may be dispensed with at the discretion of the trial court
bRequired only where the original device is destroyed
cRequired only in civil proceedings
dMandatory
Answer: D
Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (which re-enacts s.65B IEA) forms a complete code on electronic evidence, and a certificate under Section 63(4) is mandatory for admitting an electronic record by way of secondary evidence.
Oral evidence must in all cases be direct. This requirement is laid down in:
aSection 56 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 57 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 54 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: C
Section 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the successor to s.60 IEA) mandates that oral evidence must in all cases be direct, that is, the witness must depose to what he himself perceived, thereby excluding hearsay; Section 54 provides that all facts except the contents of documents and electronic records may be proved by oral evidence.
Under Section 142 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the examination of a witness by the party who calls him is called:
aExamination-in-chief
bCross-examination
cLeading examination
dRe-examination
Answer: A
Section 142 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (the successor to s.137 IEA) defines examination-in-chief as the examination of a witness by the party who calls him; examination by the adverse party is cross-examination, and subsequent examination by the party who called him is re-examination.
In Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah (AIR 1962 SC 847), the Supreme Court held that where a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest in it though he in fact has only a spes successionis, the transferee:
ais entitled to the benefit of Section 43 if he took the transfer in good faith, on the faith of that representation and for consideration
bgets no relief, as Section 6(a) overrides Section 43 in all cases
ccan claim only damages and not the property itself
dacquires a valid title only after the transferor's heirs ratify the transfer
Answer: A
The Court held there is no conflict between Sections 6(a) and 43; a transferee who acts in good faith on the representation and for consideration may invoke Section 43 even where the subject matter was, in truth, only a spes successionis.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees may be made:
aeither by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property
bonly by delivery of the property
conly by a registered instrument
donly by an attested instrument, whether registered or not
Answer: A
Under Section 54, tangible immovable property of value of Rs. 100 and upwards can be sold only by a registered instrument, but where the value is less than Rs. 100 the sale may be made either by registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
A enters into a written agreement to sell his land to B, puts B in possession in part performance, and B has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Later A sues to evict B, the document not being registered. The protection available to B against A is found in:
aSection 52 (lis pendens)
bSection 41 (transfer by ostensible owner)
cSection 54 (contract for sale)
dSection 53A (part performance)
Answer: D
Section 53A embodies the equitable doctrine of part performance: a transferee in possession under a written contract who has performed or is willing to perform his part is protected, and the transferor is barred from enforcing any right against him in respect of the property, other than a right expressly provided by the contract.
Under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (transfer by ostensible owner), a transfer by an ostensible owner is not voidable by the real owner merely on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it, provided that:
athe transfer was registered, irrespective of the transferee's good faith
bthe transfer was with the express or implied consent of the real owner, and the transferee, after taking reasonable care, acted in good faith and for consideration
cthe transferee is a relative of the real owner
dthe ostensible owner held possession for at least twelve years
Answer: B
Section 41 protects a transferee for consideration where the ostensible owner transferred with the express or implied consent of the persons interested, provided the transferee took reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power and acted in good faith.
Where a person, believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled to immovable property, makes improvements on it and is subsequently evicted by the true owner, his right to compensation or to require the owner to sell the land to him at market value (the rule as to bona fide holders under defective title) is governed by:
aSection 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 65 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: C
Section 51 protects a transferee who, believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled, makes improvements; on eviction by a person with a better title he may require the transferor to either pay the value of the improvements or sell his interest to the transferee at the then market value.
Under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where, during the lease, a material part of the property is wholly destroyed by fire, tempest or flood, or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the lease shall:
astand automatically terminated by operation of law
bbe void at the option of the lessor only
cbe void at the option of the lessee, unless the injury was caused by the lessee's own wrongful act or default
dcontinue, with the rent merely abated proportionately
Answer: C
Under Section 108(e), such destruction renders the lease void at the option of the lessee; but if the injury is occasioned by the wrongful act or default of the lessee, he cannot avail himself of this benefit.
Under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for a valid 'gift' the acceptance by or on behalf of the donee must be made:
awithin a reasonable time after the donor's death
bat any time, even after the death of the donor
conly after the gift deed is registered
dduring the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving
Answer: D
Section 122 defines gift as a transfer made voluntarily and without consideration, accepted by or on behalf of the donee; such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving, failing which the gift is void.
Under Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or father-in-law, where she dies leaving no son or daughter (or children of a predeceased son or daughter), devolves upon:
aThe heirs of the husband
bThe heirs of her own father
cHer mother and father equally
dThe general heirs specified in Section 15(1)
Answer: A
Section 15(2)(b) creates a source-based exception: property inherited from the husband or father-in-law, in the absence of her own issue, reverts to the heirs of the husband rather than to the ordinary order under Section 15(1).
Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves, in the absence of any Class I heir and any Class II heir, upon:
aThe heirs of his widow
bThe agnates of the deceased, and only failing them, upon the cognates
cThe cognates of the deceased, and only failing them, upon the agnates
dThe State by way of escheat
Answer: B
Section 8 prescribes the order: Class I heirs, then Class II heirs, then agnates, and lastly cognates of the deceased.
Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, is held by her as:
aA limited owner with a life interest only
bFull owner only if acquired after the commencement of the Act
cA trustee for her husband's heirs
dFull owner thereof and not as a limited owner
Answer: D
Section 14(1) converts a Hindu female's limited estate into absolute ownership; she holds the property possessed by her as full owner and not as a limited owner, subject to the exception in Section 14(2).
Which of the following changes was brought about by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005?
aSection 14 was omitted, abolishing the absolute estate of a female Hindu
bSection 23, restricting a female heir's right to claim partition of a dwelling-house, was omitted
cSection 30 was omitted, abolishing testamentary disposition by a coparcener
dSection 8 was omitted, abolishing the scheme of Class I and Class II heirs
Answer: B
The 2005 Amendment omitted Section 23 (and Section 24) and substituted Section 6; the omission of Section 23 removed the restriction on a female heir seeking partition of the dwelling-house.
A female Hindu inherits property from her husband. She later dies intestate leaving no son or daughter (nor children of any predeceased son or daughter). Under Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such property shall devolve upon:
aher mother and father in the ordinary order under Section 15(1)
bthe heirs of her own father
cthe heirs of the husband, and not on the general order of heirs in Section 15(1)
dthe heirs of her mother
Answer: C
Section 15(2)(b) carves out an exception to the general order in Section 15(1): property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or father-in-law, in the absence of her own son/daughter (or children of a predeceased son/daughter), devolves upon the heirs of the husband.
A petition to annul a voidable marriage under Section 12(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (respondent pregnant by another at the time of marriage) shall NOT be entertained under Section 12(2)(b) unless, besides the petitioner's ignorance of the fact at the time of marriage, it is shown that:
athe petition was presented within two years of the marriage
bthe petition was presented within one year of the marriage and no marital intercourse took place with the petitioner's consent after discovery of the ground
cthe petition was presented within one year of discovering the pregnancy, irrespective of marital intercourse thereafter
dthe petition was presented before the birth of the child
Answer: B
Section 12(2)(b) bars relief on the ground of pre-marriage pregnancy by another unless the petition is presented within one year of the marriage AND no marital intercourse has taken place with the petitioner's consent since discovery of the ground (in addition to the petitioner's ignorance at the time of marriage).
Under Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, where a person is disqualified from inheriting any property under the Act, the property shall devolve:
aequally among all other Class I heirs only
bas if such disqualified person had died before the intestate
cby escheat to the Government
dupon the disqualified person's own heirs as if he had survived the intestate
Answer: B
Section 27 provides that if any person is disqualified from inheriting under the Act, the property devolves as if such disqualified person had died before the intestate; his own descendants are therefore not excluded merely by his disqualification.
A proposes by post to sell his house to B, and B accepts by post. Under Sections 4 and 5, A may revoke his proposal —
aat any time before A signs the sale deed
bat any time before B posts the letter of acceptance
ceven after B has posted the letter of acceptance, until it is received by A
dat any time before the letter of acceptance reaches A
Answer: B
Under Section 5 read with Section 4, a proposal may be revoked before the communication of acceptance is complete as against the proposer, which occurs when the acceptance is put in course of transmission (posted) so as to be out of the acceptor's power. Hence A can revoke only before B posts the acceptance.
The doctrine of frustration of contract under Indian law is statutorily founded on —
aSection 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
bthe English common law of frustration applied independently of the Act
cSection 39 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
dSection 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
Answer: A
In Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of frustration is an aspect of Section 56, which is exhaustive on the subject; English doctrines cannot be imported when there is an express statutory provision.
Which of the following correctly distinguishes a contract of guarantee from a contract of indemnity under the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
aA contract of indemnity necessarily involves three parties, whereas a guarantee involves two
bA contract of guarantee involves three parties — principal debtor, creditor and surety — whereas an indemnity involves two parties
cA contract of indemnity is defined in Section 126 and a guarantee in Section 124
dBoth contracts require exactly two parties
Answer: B
Under Section 126, a contract of guarantee involves three parties — the principal debtor, the creditor and the surety. A contract of indemnity under Section 124 is between two parties, the indemnifier and the indemnified.
The general lien conferred on bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, is provided by —
aSection 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
bSection 170 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
cSection 168 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
dSection 148 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
Answer: A
Section 171 confers a general lien on bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Section 170 confers only a particular lien on a bailee for services involving labour or skill.
In which of the following cases does an agent become personally bound by contracts entered into by him on behalf of his principal, under Section 230 and its presumptions?
aWhere the contract is made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad
bWhere the principal is disclosed and resident within India
cWhere the agent expressly discloses the name of his principal at the time of contracting
dWhere the agent acts strictly within the scope of his authority
Answer: A
Section 230 lays down a general rule that an agent is not personally bound, but raises a presumption of personal liability in three cases, including where the contract is made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad. The other situations do not attract personal liability.
A finds goods belonging to another and takes them into his custody. His position under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is that of —
aan agent of the owner of the goods
ba trustee with no right to any reimbursement
ca pledgee entitled to sell the goods immediately
da bailee, with the responsibility provided in Section 71
Answer: D
Section 71 provides that a person who finds goods belonging to another and takes them into his custody is subject to the same responsibility as a bailee. This is one of the quasi-contractual relationships, and the finder enjoys correlative rights under Sections 168 and 169.
A owes B a debt the recovery of which is barred by the Limitation Act. A signs a written promise to pay B Rs. 5,000 on account of that debt. Under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, this agreement is:
aA valid contract, even though it is made without fresh consideration
bVoid, because a time-barred debt furnishes no consideration
cVoidable at the option of A
dValid only if it is also registered
Answer: A
Section 25(3) is an exception to the rule that an agreement without consideration is void: a promise in writing and signed by the debtor (or his authorised agent) to pay a wholly or partly time-barred debt is a valid contract even though made without fresh consideration.
Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person dispossessed of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law may file a suit for recovery of possession within:
aOne year from the date of dispossession
bThree months from the date of dispossession
cSix months from the date of dispossession
dTwelve years from the date of dispossession
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 6(2) bars a suit brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession, and also bars a suit against the Government.
With respect to an order or decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
aAn appeal lies but no review is allowed
bA review is allowed but no appeal lies
cNeither an appeal nor a review of such order or decree is allowed
dBoth appeal and review are available as a matter of right
Answer: C
Section 6(3) expressly provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in a Section 6 suit, nor shall any review of such order or decree be allowed; the remedy is a separate title suit.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, specific performance of a contract under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is:
aTo be enforced by the court in its discretion
bBarred unless the plaintiff first elects substituted performance
cAvailable only where compensation in money is not an adequate relief
dTo be enforced by the court, subject only to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16
Answer: D
The substituted Section 10 (w.e.f. 01.10.2018) provides that specific performance 'shall' be enforced by the court subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 16, removing the earlier element of judicial discretion.
Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as substituted in 2018), before availing substituted performance of a broken contract through a third party or his own agency, the party who suffers the breach must give the party in breach a prior notice in writing of not less than:
aFifteen days
bThirty days
cSixty days
dNinety days
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 20(1) requires a written notice of not less than thirty days to the party in breach, calling upon it to perform, before substituted performance may be undertaken; the cost is then recoverable from the defaulter.
Under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction cannot be granted:
aTo prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced only recently
bTo restrain the breach of an express trust
cTo restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter
dTo compel the performance of a contract which can be specifically enforced
Answer: C
Section 41(d) bars an injunction to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter; injunctions are not used to interfere with the criminal justice process.
During the trial of a civil suit a party tenders an insufficiently stamped conveyance. Under the proviso to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the document may be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficient duty together with a penalty which, where it exceeds five rupees, is:
aA sum equal to twice the deficient duty
bA flat sum of one hundred rupees
cA sum equal to ten times the deficient duty
dA sum equal to five times the deficient duty
Answer: C
The proviso (a) to Section 35 permits admission on payment of the duty (or the deficient amount) together with a penalty of five rupees, or, where ten times the proper or deficient duty exceeds five rupees, a sum equal to ten times such duty or deficient portion.
An unstamped agreement is marked and admitted in evidence as an exhibit by the trial court without objection. Later in the same proceeding the opposite party seeks to have it excluded on the ground that it was not duly stamped. Under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, such admission:
aCan be questioned only after the document is impounded under Section 33
bShall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding except as provided in Section 61
cMay be reopened at any later stage of the same suit at the court's discretion
dIs liable to be set aside the moment the deficiency is pointed out
Answer: B
Section 36 provides that once an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that it was not duly stamped.
A document not duly stamped, chargeable with duty, is produced before a civil court in the performance of its functions and the presiding judge is of opinion that it is insufficiently stamped. Under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the court is required to:
aIgnore the deficiency if neither party objects
bForward the instrument to the registering officer for re-stamping
cReturn the instrument forthwith to the party who produced it
dImpound the instrument
Answer: D
Section 33 casts a mandatory duty on every person (other than a police officer) authorised to receive evidence or in charge of a public office, before whom a chargeable instrument is produced, to impound it if it appears not to be duly stamped.
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, under Section 29 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the expense of providing the proper stamp in the case of a conveyance (including a reconveyance of mortgaged property) is borne by:
aThe grantor
bThe registering officer out of the registration fee
cBoth parties in equal shares
dThe grantee
Answer: D
Section 29 fixes liability for the stamp in the absence of contrary agreement; in the case of a conveyance (including a reconveyance of mortgaged property) the duty is payable by the grantee.
Where, after the institution of a suit, a new defendant is added, then under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the suit, as regards that defendant, shall be deemed to have been instituted:
aWhen he was so made a party, unless the Court is satisfied the omission was due to a mistake in good faith
bOn the date the cause of action first arose against him
cOn the date of the original institution of the suit in every case
dOn the date the plaint was presented, provided the Court grants leave
Answer: A
Section 21(1) provides that the suit shall, as regards a newly added or substituted party, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party; the proviso allows the Court, where the omission was due to a mistake made in good faith, to direct that it be deemed instituted on an earlier date.
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is regarded as an exception to the general rule of limitation because, at the determination of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession of property:
aThe right to such property is itself extinguished
bA fresh period of limitation begins to run in favour of the true owner
cThe suit may still be entertained with the leave of the High Court
dOnly the remedy is barred, the right remaining intact
Answer: A
While the general rule is that limitation bars only the remedy and not the right, Section 27 provides that at the determination of the period limited to a person for a suit for possession of any property, his right to that property is extinguished, enabling the adverse possessor to perfect title.
Where a special or local law prescribes for a suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from that in the Schedule, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that:
aOnly Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to such proceedings
bThe Limitation Act has no application whatsoever to such proceedings
cThe special or local law period applies, and Sections 4 to 24 apply only so far as not expressly excluded by such law
dThe Schedule period prevails over the special or local law in all cases
Answer: C
Section 29(2) makes the period under a special or local law operate as if it were prescribed by the Schedule for the purpose of Section 3, and applies Sections 4 to 24 only in so far as, and to the extent that, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
Under the Explanation appended to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (exclusion of time spent prosecuting bona fide in a court without jurisdiction), which of the following is expressly deemed to be "a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction"?
aDismissal of the earlier suit for default of appearance
bAbatement of the earlier suit on death of a party
cFailure to pay the requisite court-fee in the earlier suit
dMisjoinder of parties or of causes of action
Answer: D
Explanation (c) to Section 14 expressly provides that misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction, so the time so spent in good faith can be excluded.
Under Section 35 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, an injunction to restrain the disturbance of an easement may be granted:
aonly after the disturbance has continued for twenty years.
babsolutely, irrespective of any other enactment;
csubject to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act relating to injunctions;
donly by the High Court;
Answer: C
Section 35 grants the injunction to restrain disturbance of an easement 'subject to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act' relating to injunctions.
Under Section 28 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the extent of an easement of necessity is:
afixed by the accustomed user during the prescriptive period;
bco-extensive with the necessity as it existed when the easement was imposed;
cdetermined solely by the width of the existing pathway;
dalways the widest way available over the servient heritage.
Answer: B
Section 28 provides that an easement of necessity is co-extensive with the necessity as it existed when the easement was imposed; prescriptive easements are measured by accustomed user.
Under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a license is irrevocable by the grantor in which of the following cases?
aWhere the license has been enjoyed for an uninterrupted period of twenty years
bWhere the license has been granted in writing and registered
cWhere the license is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force, or the licensee acting upon the license has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution
dWhere the license is granted to the licensee as holding a particular office or employment
Answer: C
Section 60 makes a license generally revocable, except in the two cases stated in clauses (a) and (b): where it is coupled with a transfer of property still in force, or where the licensee, acting on the license, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses. Option (d) is a ground on which a license is deemed revoked under Section 62(g).
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 deals with offences by companies. Where an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, the person primarily deemed guilty along with the company is:
aOnly the company, and no individual
bOnly the signatory of the cheque, to the exclusion of the company
cEvery person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business
dOnly the managing director, in every case
Answer: C
Section 141 deems every person who was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offence to be guilty, along with the company, subject to the proviso for lack of knowledge or due diligence.
Under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a 'promissory note' is an instrument in writing containing:
aA conditional order to a banker to pay a sum of money on demand
bAn unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument
cAn undertaking to deliver goods of a specified value to the bearer
dAn unconditional order, signed by the maker, directing a third person to pay money
Answer: B
Section 4 defines a promissory note as a written instrument (not being a bank-note or currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.
Under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, every offence punishable under the Act is:
aNon-compoundable but bailable
bNon-compoundable and cognizable
cCompoundable only with the prior sanction of the High Court
dCompoundable
Answer: D
Section 147, which begins with a non-obstante clause overriding the Code of Criminal Procedure, makes every offence punishable under the Act compoundable.
With respect to procedure under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which of the following is correct?
aProceedings under the Act are governed only by rules framed by the High Court and not by any procedural Code
bAll proceedings under the Act are governed exclusively by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cAll proceedings under Sections 12 and 18 to 23 and offences under Section 31 are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but the court may lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or sub-section (2) of Section 23
dThe Magistrate has no power to pass any ex parte order under the Act
Answer: C
Section 28(1) provides that proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 are governed by the CrPC, 1973, while Section 28(2) preserves the court's power to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2).
Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, an "aggrieved person" as defined in Section 2(a) means:
aAny woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent
bAny person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and alleges domestic violence
cOnly a married woman residing with her husband in a shared household
dAny woman or child below eighteen years subjected to domestic violence by an adult male
Answer: A
Section 2(a) defines an "aggrieved person" as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent; only a woman can be an aggrieved person.
Under the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, the residuary class of civil court whose pecuniary jurisdiction extends to suits and proceedings 'not otherwise exempted from his cognizance' of the lowest value is the Court of the:
aAdditional District Judge
bJunior Civil Judge
cSenior Civil Judge
dDistrict Judge
Answer: B
Under Section 16 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, the Junior Civil Judge is the court of lowest pecuniary jurisdiction, taking cognizance of all suits not otherwise exempted, while the Senior Civil Judge and District Judge take the higher value brackets.
Under Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, the Presiding Officer of the Internal Committee constituted by an employer shall be:
aAny senior officer of the workplace, whether male or female
bA woman employed at a senior level at the workplace from amongst the employees
cA person nominated by the District Officer in every case
dAn advocate enrolled with the State Bar Council
Answer: B
Section 4(2)(a) of the SH Act, 2013 requires the Presiding Officer of the Internal Committee to be a woman employed at a senior level at the workplace from amongst the employees, and where no such senior woman is available, she may be nominated from another office or unit of the employer.
In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao (AIR 1982 SC 1081), the Supreme Court held that the summary eviction power under Section 6 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905:
aRequires prior sanction of the High Court in every case
bIs available only against persons in occupation for less than one year
cCan always be exercised even where a bona fide dispute of title exists between the Government and the occupier
dCannot be resorted to where there is a bona fide dispute as to title; such a dispute must be resolved by a regular civil suit
Answer: D
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot unilaterally decide a bona fide question of title and then invoke the summary remedy of eviction under Section 6; where a genuine dispute of title arises, it must be adjudicated by a regular civil court.
Under Section 54 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, a Magistrate who has reason to believe that an offence under Section 34, 35, 36 or 37 has been, is being, or is likely to be committed, may issue a warrant for:
aCompounding of the offence with the consent of the Collector
bThe confiscation of the intoxicant without any enquiry
cThe search of the place only, but not the arrest of any person
dThe search of the place and the arrest of the person concerned
Answer: D
Section 54 empowers the Magistrate, on such belief, to issue a warrant both for the search of the place where the offending articles are kept and for the arrest of the person engaged in the commission of the offence.
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