Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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In a money decree, the decree-holder seeks to attach a debt due to the judgment-debtor from a third person. The third person from whom the debt is recovered through such garnishee proceedings is dealt with under:
aOrder XXXIX, Rule 1 C.P.C.
bOrder XXII, Rule 4 C.P.C.
cOrder XXI, Rules 46 to 46-I C.P.C.
dOrder XXXVIII, Rule 5 C.P.C.
Answer: C
Garnishee proceedings, by which a debt owed to the judgment-debtor by a third person (the garnishee) is attached and recovered, are governed by Order XXI, Rules 46 to 46-I C.P.C.
A representative suit on behalf of, or against, numerous persons having the same interest in one suit may be instituted, with the permission of the Court, under:
aOrder XXIII, Rule 3 C.P.C.
bOrder I, Rule 10 C.P.C.
cOrder II, Rule 2 C.P.C.
dOrder I, Rule 8 C.P.C.
Answer: D
Order I, Rule 8 permits one or more persons, with the permission of the Court, to sue or defend on behalf of all persons having the same interest, after notice to those interested.
Where, after the institution of a suit, a party to it dies and the right to sue survives, the proper course under Order XXII C.P.C. is that:
athe suit must be withdrawn and re-filed afresh
bthe suit abates automatically and irrevocably
cthe suit continues and the legal representatives of the deceased may be brought on record
dthe Court must refer the matter to arbitration
Answer: C
Under Order XXII, where the right to sue survives, the suit does not abate; the legal representatives of the deceased party are brought on record so that the proceeding may continue.
A defendant contends that the subject-matter of the present suit was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and finally decided by a competent Court. This plea, if made out, bars the present suit under the principle of:
ares judicata under Section 11 C.P.C.
bestoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act
cres sub judice under Section 10 C.P.C.
dconstructive res judicata under Order II, Rule 2 C.P.C.
Answer: A
Section 11 C.P.C. bars the trial of a matter directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction (res judicata).
The settlement of disputes outside the court, by reference to arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalat) or mediation, where the Court formulates the terms of a possible settlement, is provided for in:
aSection 80 C.P.C.
bSection 151 C.P.C.
cSection 89 C.P.C.
dSection 9 C.P.C.
Answer: C
Section 89 C.P.C. enables the Court, where it appears that elements of a settlement exist, to refer the dispute to arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement/Lok Adalat or mediation.
A 'decree' as defined in Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. is the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. Which of the following is NOT a decree?
aan order dismissing a suit for default of appearance under Order IX, Rule 8
ba rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11
can adjudication finally deciding the rights of the parties on the merits
dthe determination of a question within Section 144 (restitution)
Answer: A
Section 2(2) expressly excludes from the definition of decree any order of dismissal for default; rejection of a plaint and a Section 144 determination are, however, deemed decrees.
An attachment before judgment is effected in a suit which is thereafter dismissed for default and subsequently restored. With respect to the attachment, the correct position under the C.P.C. is that:
arestoration of the suit has no bearing on the attachment in any manner
bthe attachment revives automatically on restoration of the suit
cthe attachment continues uninterrupted irrespective of dismissal
dthe attachment, once it ceases on dismissal, does not revive automatically and a fresh order is required
Answer: D
An attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII ceases when the suit is dismissed; it does not revive automatically merely on restoration of the suit and requires a fresh order of attachment.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is:
aImpliedly barred only
bEither expressly or impliedly barred
cExpressly barred only
dBarred by any High Court rule
Answer: B
Section 9 confers plenary jurisdiction on civil courts over all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The word 'shall' makes entertaining such suits mandatory.
Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which embodies the doctrine of constructive res judicata, provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former suit:
aMay be raised afresh in a subsequent suit
bShall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit
cCan only be raised with the leave of the appellate court
dOperates as res judicata only in execution proceedings
Answer: B
Explanation IV deems any matter that might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former suit to have been directly and substantially in issue, thereby barring it in a later suit (constructive res judicata).
A plaintiff omits, without the leave of the court, to sue for a portion of his claim arising from one cause of action. Under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with respect to the omitted portion he:
aMay afterwards sue for the portion so omitted
bShall not afterwards sue for the portion so omitted
cMay sue only if the omitted portion exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the first court
dMay sue only after obtaining leave of the appellate court
Answer: B
Order II Rule 2 requires a plaintiff to include the whole of the claim arising from one cause of action; if he omits a part without leave, he is precluded from afterwards suing for the omitted portion.
Under the proviso to Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government or a public officer (in respect of an act purporting to be done in his official capacity) may be instituted without serving the two-month notice:
aOnly with the prior sanction of the State Government
bWith the leave of the court
cWithout notice and without leave of the court
dOnly after the expiration of two months from the notice
Answer: B
Section 80(2) permits a suit for urgent or immediate relief to be instituted with the leave of the court without serving the two-month notice under Section 80(1), though the court must not grant relief without giving the Government or officer a reasonable opportunity.
Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, empowering the court to refer a dispute for settlement outside the court, enumerates the following modes:
aArbitration and conciliation only
bMediation and judicial settlement only
cArbitration, negotiation, mediation and compromise
dArbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, and mediation
Answer: D
Section 89 provides four modes of alternative dispute resolution: arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including through Lok Adalat) and mediation. A court cannot refer parties to arbitration under Section 89 without the consent of all parties (Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction).
Under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the defendant fails to present his written statement within thirty days from the date of service of summons, the court may extend the time, but not later than:
aOne hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons
bThirty days from the first hearing
cNinety days from the date of service of summons
dSixty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: C
Order VIII Rule 1 fixes thirty days for filing the written statement, extendable for recorded reasons up to ninety days from service of summons. In ordinary suits this outer limit has been held directory (Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India).
A second appeal to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lies only:
aOn a mixed question of fact and law
bOn a question of fact
cIf the value of the subject-matter exceeds rupees one lakh
dIf the case involves a substantial question of law
Answer: D
After the 1976 amendment, a second appeal under Section 100 is entertainable only if the case involves a substantial question of law, which must be formulated by the High Court at the time of admission.
Where it is proved that an injunction was granted on insufficient grounds, or the suit of the plaintiff fails and the court is satisfied there was no reasonable ground for instituting it, the defendant's remedy of reasonable compensation is provided under:
aSection 95 of the Code
bOrder XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code
cSection 151 of the Code
dSection 94 of the Code
Answer: A
Section 95 empowers the court, on the defendant's application, to award reasonable compensation (not exceeding the pecuniary limit fixed) where an injunction, arrest or attachment was obtained on insufficient grounds or where the suit fails.
Under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an appeal from an original decree:
aLies only on a substantial question of law
bLies even from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties
cLies only with the leave of the High Court
dShall not lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties
Answer: D
Section 96(3) bars an appeal from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties (a consent decree), since the parties are deemed to have waived their right of appeal.
The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be exercised in respect of a case decided by a subordinate court where such subordinate court appears to have:
aReached an erroneous finding of fact
bMisappreciated the evidence on record
cExercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction
dDecided a substantial question of law erroneously
Answer: C
Section 115 confines revision to jurisdictional errors: where the subordinate court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise one vested, or acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction. It is not a re-hearing on facts.
Under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the power of the High Court or District Court to transfer and withdraw suits, appeals or other proceedings may be exercised:
aOnly with the consent of both parties
bOnly on the application of a party after notice to the parties
cOn the application of any of the parties and after notice, or by the court of its own motion, at any stage
dOnly before the framing of issues
Answer: C
Section 24 allows transfer or withdrawal of a suit, appeal or other proceeding either on the application of a party (after notice and hearing) or by the court suo motu, and this power may be exercised at any stage.
Where a decree is varied or reversed in appeal, the doctrine that the court shall cause restitution to be made so as to place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for the erroneous decree is contained in:
aOrder XXI Rule 90 of the Code
bSection 144 of the Code
cSection 47 of the Code
dSection 151 of the Code
Answer: B
Section 144 embodies the doctrine of restitution: on the variation or reversal of a decree, the court of first instance shall, on application, restore the parties to the position they held before the erroneous decree, including refund of costs and interest.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under a sentence of death, or his legal heir or relative, may submit a mercy petition to the Governor of the State within a period from the date on which the Superintendent of jail informs him of the dismissal of the appeal or confirmation of the sentence, of:
aForty-five days
bFifteen days
cThirty days
dSixty days
Answer: C
Section 472(1) BNSS, a wholly new provision, requires a mercy petition to the Governor to be filed within thirty days of the jail Superintendent's intimation; if rejected, a petition may be made to the President within sixty days thereafter.
Section 530 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides that all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including the issuance and service of summons and warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence, may be held in electronic mode. This provision is:
aApplicable only with the written consent of the accused
bApplicable generally to trials, inquiries and proceedings under the Sanhita
cRestricted to appellate proceedings before the High Court
dConfined to the Courts of Session only
Answer: B
Section 530 BNSS is a general enabling provision allowing trials, inquiries and proceedings, including service of summons, examination of witnesses, recording of evidence and appellate proceedings, to be conducted in electronic mode through audio-video electronic means.
Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 statutorily recognises the 'Zero FIR' by providing that information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence may be recorded:
aOnly at the office of the Superintendent of Police of the district
bBy any police officer irrespective of the area where the offence is committed
cOnly after obtaining the permission of the Magistrate concerned
dOnly by the police station within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed
Answer: B
Section 173(1) BNSS gives statutory recognition to the Zero FIR, allowing information about a cognizable offence to be recorded by any police officer irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, with subsequent transfer to the police station having jurisdiction.
Under Section 180 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the statement of a woman against whom an offence of sexual assault or attempt thereof is alleged to have been committed shall be recorded by:
aA Judicial Magistrate of the first class only
bA woman police officer or any woman officer
cAny police officer authorised by the station house officer
dA Medical Officer of a Government hospital
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 180 BNSS requires that the statement of a woman against whom sexual assault or an attempt thereof is alleged be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer, carrying forward the protection earlier found in Section 161 CrPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the codified concept of a 'Zero FIR' (registration of information relating to a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where the offence is committed) is traceable to:
aSection 190
bSection 200
cSection 173
dSection 154
Answer: C
Section 173(1) of the BNSS, 2023 obliges an officer in charge to register information of a cognizable offence 'irrespective of the area where the offence is committed', thereby statutorily codifying the Zero FIR concept which had no express place in the old CrPC.
Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces a fresh safeguard. Where the offence is punishable with imprisonment of less than three years and the person to be arrested is infirm or above sixty years of age, arrest may be made only:
aAfter issuing a notice of appearance and on its breach only
bWith the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police
cWith the prior sanction of the Superintendent of Police
dWith the prior written permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate
Answer: B
Section 35(7) BNSS, a provision absent in the CrPC, bars arrest in such cases without prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Following the substitution of Section 167(2) CrPC, the right to default bail is now governed by which provision of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 193(3)
bSection 480(3)
cSection 187(3)
dSection 167(3)
Answer: C
Section 187(3) BNSS, 2023 replaces the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC and confers the indefeasible right to default bail on failure to complete investigation within the prescribed period.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the maximum period of detention authorised by a Magistrate pending investigation, beyond which the accused becomes entitled to default bail, where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, is:
aNinety days
bSeventy-five days
cSixty days
dOne hundred and eighty days
Answer: A
Section 187(3) BNSS retains the ninety-day ceiling for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than ten years, and sixty days for all other offences, mirroring the old Section 167(2) CrPC scheme.
Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding:
aTwenty-five thousand rupees
bFifty thousand rupees
cTen thousand rupees
dOne lakh rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(2) BNSS raises the first-class Magistrate's fine power to fifty thousand rupees (up from ten thousand under Section 29 CrPC) and additionally empowers imposition of community service.
Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides for release of an undertrial prisoner who is a first-time offender (with no previous conviction) on bond, where he has undergone detention for a period extending up to:
aOne-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
bOne-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
cOne-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
dThe whole of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
Answer: C
The first proviso to Section 479(1) BNSS makes a first-time offender eligible for release on bond after one-third detention, whereas other undertrials are released on bail after one-half, a relaxation not found in the old Section 436A CrPC.
Under Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, it is mandatory for a forensic expert to visit the scene of crime to collect forensic evidence and to videograph the process where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of:
aSeven years or more
bTen years or more
cFive years or more
dThree years or more
Answer: A
Section 176(3) BNSS makes forensic investigation and videography of the crime scene compulsory for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, a new evidence-driven mandate absent from the CrPC.
Which provision of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for the first time in Indian procedural law, expressly enables inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial?
aSection 84
bSection 299
cSection 339
dSection 356
Answer: D
Section 356 BNSS introduces 'trial in absentia' for proclaimed offenders, permitting trial and judgment to proceed after the statutory safeguards (proclamation, attachment, appointment of an advocate) are met.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under sentence of death may file a mercy petition to the President or the Governor within a period of, counted from the date the Superintendent of jail informs him of the dismissal of his appeal/review/SLP or of confirmation of the sentence:
aFifteen days
bNinety days
cThirty days
dSixty days
Answer: C
Section 472(1) BNSS prescribes a thirty-day window for filing a mercy petition, a statutory time-frame newly inserted to streamline the post-confirmation process for death sentences.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, dacoity is constituted only when the number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery (including persons present and aiding) is:
aTwo or more
bFive or more
cFour or more
dThree or more
Answer: B
Section 310 of the BNS, 2023 provides that when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, the offence is dacoity; persons present and aiding are counted towards the number five.
The punishment for murder under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is provided under:
aSection 101
bSection 302
cSection 105
dSection 103
Answer: D
Murder is defined in Section 101 and its punishment (death, or imprisonment for life, and fine) is prescribed in Section 103 of the BNS, 2023; the old IPC Section 302 no longer applies.
X, a good swimmer, sees Y, a stranger, drowning in a tank. Though X could easily have saved Y without any risk to himself, he does nothing and Y drowns. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, X is guilty of:
aCulpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 105
bMurder under Section 103
cNo offence
dAbetment of suicide
Answer: C
A mere omission to save a stranger, in the absence of any legal duty to act, is not an offence; X had no legal duty towards Y and therefore commits no offence under the BNS, 2023.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the dishonest intention to take property must exist at the time of moving the property in the offence of:
aCriminal breach of trust (Section 316)
bCriminal misappropriation
cCheating
dTheft (Section 303)
Answer: D
In theft under Section 303 of the BNS, 2023, the dishonest intention (animus furandi) must precede or accompany the moving of the movable property out of the possession of another without consent.
Criminal breach of trust is defined under which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 316
bSection 405
cSection 303
dSection 309
Answer: A
Section 316 of the BNS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 405 of the old IPC) defines criminal breach of trust, where a person entrusted with property dishonestly misappropriates or converts it to his own use.
Under Section 45 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, a person abets the doing of a thing who:
aInstigates, or engages in conspiracy, or intentionally aids the doing of that thing
bOnly conspires with one or more persons
cOnly instigates another to do that thing
dMerely fails to prevent the commission of an offence
Answer: A
Section 45 of the BNS, 2023 defines abetment as instigating a person, engaging in a conspiracy for the doing of the thing, or intentionally aiding by an act or illegal omission the doing of that thing.
Defamation as a criminal offence is dealt with under which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with maximum imprisonment of:
aSection 354; one year
bSection 356; three years
cSection 499; two years
dSection 356; two years
Answer: D
Section 356 of the BNS, 2023 (corresponding to Sections 499/500 IPC) defines and punishes defamation with simple imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both, or community service.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the right of private defence of body extends to voluntarily causing the death of the assailant in the cases enumerated in:
aSection 34
bSection 100
cSection 35
dSection 38
Answer: D
Section 35 of the BNS, 2023 confers the general right of private defence of body and property, while Section 38 enumerates the circumstances (such as assault reasonably causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt) in which that right extends to causing death.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of 'murder' is defined under:
aSection 100
bSection 103
cSection 300
dSection 101
Answer: D
Section 101 of the BNS defines murder, corresponding to the erstwhile Section 300 IPC; Section 100 defines culpable homicide and Section 103 prescribes the punishment for murder.
Punishment for murder under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is provided in:
aSection 102
bSection 101
cSection 105
dSection 103
Answer: D
Section 103 BNS prescribes death or imprisonment for life and fine for murder; sub-section (2) provides for group/mob murder on grounds such as caste, race or community.
Under Section 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (mob lynching), a group of five or more persons acting in concert who commit murder on the ground of race, caste, sex, language or personal belief, each member shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than:
aThree years
bSeven years
cTen years
dFive years
Answer: B
Section 103(2) BNS punishes each member with death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not less than seven years, and fine.
An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the testimony of an accomplice. This is provided in:
aSection 119, Illustration (b)
bSection 124
cSection 139
dSection 138
Answer: D
Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 declares an accomplice a competent witness against an accused person and provides that a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice; the rule of prudence in Section 119, Illustration (b) lets the Court presume an accomplice unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.
No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. This principle is embodied in:
aSection 124
bSection 139
cSection 142
dSection 138
Answer: B
Section 139 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 enacts the maxim that evidence is to be weighed and not counted: no particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact.
Where the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death she had been subjected by him to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with a demand for dowry, the Court:
aShall presume that he has caused the dowry death
bShall take it as conclusive proof of dowry death
cCannot draw any presumption in the absence of direct evidence
dMay presume that he has caused the dowry death
Answer: A
Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 uses the mandatory expression 'shall presume' for dowry death, in contrast with Section 117 where the Court 'may presume' abetment of suicide. The presumption is rebuttable.
When the question is whether the suicide of a married woman within seven years of her marriage was abetted by her husband or his relative who had subjected her to cruelty, the Court under Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
aShall presume such abetment
bIs barred from drawing any presumption
cShall regard the cruelty as conclusive proof of abetment
dMay presume such abetment having regard to all the other circumstances
Answer: D
Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 employs the permissive 'may presume' for abetment of suicide by a married woman, unlike the mandatory 'shall presume' under Section 118 for dowry death.
When one fact is declared by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) to be conclusive proof of another, the Court, on proof of the one fact:
aShall regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it
bMay regard the other as proved but shall allow evidence in disproof
cShall presume the other but the presumption is rebuttable
dShall call upon the party to lead further evidence of the other fact
Answer: A
Under the definition of 'conclusive proof' in Section 2(1)(b) of the BSA, once the one fact is proved the Court shall regard the other as proved and shall not allow any evidence to disprove it; it is irrebuttable.
The burden of proving that the case of an accused person comes within any of the General Exceptions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, or within any special exception or proviso, under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), lies upon:
aThe prosecution, which must negative the exception
bThe complainant in a private complaint case
cWhichever party the Court directs in its discretion
dThe accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances
Answer: D
Section 105 of the BSA places the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within an exception upon the accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
Where the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) this rule is contained in:
aSection 104
bSection 94
cSection 95
dSection 56
Answer: B
Section 94 of the BSA requires that where the terms of a contract, grant or disposition have been reduced to writing, the document itself (or admissible secondary evidence) must be produced; Section 95 then excludes oral evidence to contradict or vary those written terms.
No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by the person to whom he is or has been married, nor permitted to disclose it (save in the exceptions). Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) this privilege is found in:
aSection 128
bSection 127
cSection 132
dSection 126
Answer: A
Section 128 of the BSA protects communications made during marriage between spouses; the maker's consent, suits between the spouses, or prosecution of one for a crime against the other are the recognised exceptions.
A question suggesting the answer which the person putting it wishes or expects to receive is, under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), called a:
aLeading question
bIndecent question
cMaterial question
dQuestion lawful in cross-examination only
Answer: A
Section 146 of the BSA defines a leading question as one suggesting the answer the questioner expects; such questions generally may not be asked in examination-in-chief or re-examination if objected to, but may be asked in cross-examination.
In order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, the Judge may ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant, and may order production of any document or thing. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) this wide power is conferred by:
aSection 168
bSection 142
cSection 162
dSection 157
Answer: A
Section 168 of the BSA confers on the Judge the widest power to put any question and order production of documents, subject to the safeguard that the judgment must be based upon facts relevant and duly proved.
Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by:
aAn unregistered instrument signed by the donor and the donee
bAn oral declaration before two witnesses
cA registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses
dDelivery of possession alone, as in the case of movable property
Answer: C
Section 123 provides that a gift of immovable property must be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses; gifts of movable property may be effected by registered instrument or by delivery.
The mere chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis) is rendered non-transferable under which clause of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
aSection 6(h)
bSection 6(d)
cSection 6(e)
dSection 6(a)
Answer: D
Section 6(a) expressly bars transfer of the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, or any other mere possibility of a like nature.
Under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the expression 'transfer of property' means an act by which a living person conveys property to one or more other living persons. The expression 'living person'-
ameans only a natural person who is a major
bincludes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not
cincludes only registered companies and societies
dexcludes a company, association or body of individuals
Answer: B
The Explanation to Section 5 provides that 'living person' includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
A transfers a house to B without expressing any intention as to the extent of interest passed. Under Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the transfer passes-
aforthwith all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing, together with the legal incidents thereof
bno interest at all until registration is completed
conly a life interest in the property to B
donly the right to possession but not ownership
Answer: A
Section 8 provides that unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest the transferor is capable of passing and the legal incidents of the property.
For a transferee to take the benefit of the doctrine of transfer by ostensible owner under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the transferee must, besides the transfer being with the express or implied consent of the real owner, establish that-
athe real owner had executed a registered power of attorney
bthe property was below rupees one hundred in value
cthe transfer was gratuitous and the transferee was a relative
dhe acted in good faith after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer
Answer: D
Section 41 protects a transferee for consideration only where he acted in good faith and took reasonable care to ascertain that the ostensible owner had power to transfer.
A, having no title, fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and transfers it to B for consideration. A later acquires that very property. Under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the doctrine that enables B to claim the property is known as-
adoctrine of part performance
bdoctrine of election
cdoctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel
ddoctrine of lis pendens
Answer: C
Section 43 embodies the rule of feeding the grant by estoppel: a transfer by an unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest operates, at the option of the transferee, on that after-acquired interest while the contract subsists.
As the law has been settled, a transfer of immovable property made during the pendency of a suit in which a right to that property is in question (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882) is-
avoidable at the option of the transferor
bvoid ab initio
cnot void, but the transferee is bound by the result of the suit and his right is subordinate to the decree
dvalid and wholly unaffected by the decree in the suit
Answer: C
Section 52 does not annul a pendente lite transfer; it only makes the transferee bound by the outcome of the litigation, rendering his right subservient to the rights declared by the decree.
Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enables a Hindu to dispose of by will:
aNo property, since intestate succession is mandatory for Hindus
bOnly ancestral property
cAny property capable of being so disposed of, including an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property
dOnly self-acquired separate property, but not any interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property
Answer: C
Section 30, as it stands, permits a Hindu to dispose of by will any property, including an undivided interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, that is capable of being so disposed of under the Act or any other applicable law.
Under Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, where the customary rites and ceremonies of a Hindu marriage include the saptapadi, the marriage becomes complete and binding:
aOn the pronouncement of the marriage by the officiating priest
bWhen the seventh step is taken jointly by the bridegroom and the bride before the sacred fire
cWhen the bride and bridegroom exchange garlands before the sacred fire
dOn registration of the marriage under Section 8
Answer: B
Section 7(2) provides that where saptapadi (the taking of seven steps jointly before the sacred fire) is part of the ceremonies, the marriage is complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. Registration under Section 8 is not essential to validity.
A petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be presented only where the parties have been living separately for a period of:
aOne year or more
bThree years or more
cSix months or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
dTwo years or more
Answer: A
Section 13-B(1) requires the parties to have been living separately for a period of one year or more before jointly presenting the petition for divorce by mutual consent. The six-month period in Section 13-B(2) is the interval between the first and second motion.
For the purpose of the sapinda relationship under Section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the relationship extends, so far as the line of ascent is concerned, as far as:
aThe third generation in the line of ascent through the mother and the fifth through the father
bThe fifth generation in the line of ascent through the mother and the third through the father
cThe third generation through both the mother and the father
dThe fifth generation through both the mother and the father
Answer: A
Section 3(f) provides that sapinda relationship extends as far as the third generation (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the mother, and the fifth (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the father, the line being traced upwards in each case from the person concerned.
Under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society of the other spouse, the burden of proving reasonable excuse lies on:
aThe person who has withdrawn from the society
bBoth parties equally
cThe petitioner seeking restitution
dThe court on the basis of the pleadings
Answer: A
The Explanation to Section 9 expressly places the burden of proving reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society of the other on the person who has so withdrawn.
A marriage solemnised in contravention of the condition that neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage (Section 5(i)) is:
aMerely irregular and curable by subsequent registration
bVoidable at the option of the aggrieved party under Section 12
cNull and void under Section 11 and liable to be so declared on a petition by either party
dValid until a decree of nullity is obtained
Answer: C
Section 11 renders a marriage null and void if it contravenes clause (i), (iv) or (v) of Section 5, including the monogamy condition. Such a marriage is void ab initio, and a decree of nullity may be obtained on a petition by either party.
Which of the following is a ground available exclusively to the wife for seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 13(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
aThat the other party has been incurably of unsound mind
bThat the husband has, since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality
cThat there has been no resumption of cohabitation for one year after a decree of judicial separation
dThat the other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion
Answer: B
Section 13(2)(ii) gives the wife an additional ground for divorce where the husband has, after the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. The other grounds listed are available to either spouse under Section 13(1).
Under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be:
aIllegal
bVoid
cUnlawful
dVoidable
Answer: B
Section 2(g) defines an agreement not enforceable by law as 'void'. By contrast, Section 2(i) defines a voidable contract as one enforceable at the option of one or more parties but not at the option of the other(s).
Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, consideration which has moved from a person other than the promisee:
aIs a good consideration, as consideration may move from the promisee or any other person
bRenders the agreement void for want of privity of consideration
cIs good only where the promisor expressly consents in writing
dIs good only in contracts of guarantee
Answer: A
Section 2(d) defines consideration as something done or promised by 'the promisee or any other person' at the desire of the promisor; thus Indian law permits consideration to move from a stranger to the contract.
A finds B's lost dog and returns it. Later, unaware that A had earlier searched for the dog without knowledge of any reward, B's general offer of a reward for the dog's return comes to light. On the principle laid down in Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt, A:
aIs not entitled to the reward, there being no knowledge of the offer when the act was performed
bIs entitled to the reward only if he completes the act after learning of the offer
cIs entitled to the reward, performance being sufficient acceptance
dIs entitled to half the reward on quantum meruit
Answer: A
In Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt the court held that knowledge of the offer is essential to its acceptance; a person who performs the act without knowledge of the offer cannot claim the reward.
Under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the acceptor:
aWhen the acceptor signs the acceptance
bWhen the proposer despatches his acceptance of the terms
cWhen it is put in a course of transmission to the proposer, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor
dWhen it comes to the knowledge of the proposer
Answer: D
Under Section 4, the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the acceptor when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer; it is complete as against the proposer when put in course of transmission.
On the authority of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, an agreement entered into by a minor is:
aValid but unenforceable until ratified on majority
bVoidable at the option of the minor
cVoidable at the option of the other party
dVoid ab initio
Answer: D
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114, the Privy Council held that an agreement by a minor is void ab initio, since under Section 11 a minor is incompetent to contract.
Under Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement made without consideration is valid where it:
aIs attested by two witnesses
bIs reduced to writing and signed, irrespective of relationship
cIs made before a notary public
dIs a promise, made in writing and registered, to compensate a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation
Answer: D
Section 25 lists the exceptions to the rule that agreements without consideration are void, including an agreement in writing and registered, made on account of natural love and affection between parties in near relation.
A and B make a contract for the sale of a specific cargo supposed to be on its way from England to Bombay. Unknown to both parties, the cargo had already perished at the time of the contract. The agreement is:
aValid, the seller being bound to procure substitute cargo
bVoidable at the option of the seller
cVoid, both parties being under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement
dVoidable at the option of the buyer
Answer: C
Under Section 20, where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.
A person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to property may sue for a declaration of his title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The proviso to Section 34 bars such a declaration where the plaintiff:
aBeing able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so
bHas already obtained an injunction in his favour
cIs a minor at the time of the suit
dSues a public officer in his official capacity
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 34 prohibits a court from making a mere declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a declaration of title, omits to do so.
A declaration made by a court under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in respect of declaration of status or right, is:
aBinding only on the parties to the suit and persons claiming through them (and, in the case of a trustee, persons for whom he is trustee)
bBinding in rem against the whole world
cNot binding on anyone, being merely advisory
dBinding only on the Government
Answer: A
Section 35 provides that a declaration under Chapter VI binds only the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any party is a trustee, the persons for whom he is trustee at the time of the declaration.
Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that it may cause him serious injury if left outstanding, may sue:
aTo have it adjudged void or voidable and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled
bOnly for damages and not for cancellation
cOnly for rectification of the instrument
dOnly for a perpetual injunction restraining its registration
Answer: A
Section 31 permits such a person to sue to have the instrument adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
Which Section of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enumerates the cases in which an injunction cannot be granted, such as restraining a person from prosecuting a pending judicial proceeding or from instituting proceedings in a criminal matter?
aSection 38
bSection 41
cSection 40
dSection 39
Answer: B
Section 41 lists the situations in which an injunction cannot be granted, including restraint of pending judicial proceedings, proceedings in a non-subordinate court, and criminal proceedings; Section 38 deals with grant of perpetual injunction and Section 39 with mandatory injunctions.
Under the Registration Act, 1908, the rule that a will may at any time be presented for registration is an exception to the general four-month limit because:
aA will is not a document within the meaning of the Act
bWills are governed exclusively by the Indian Succession Act and are outside the Registration Act
cSection 23 itself excepts a will, which speaks from the death of the testator and may be presented at any time
dSection 25 grants wills an extension of an additional four months
Answer: C
The opening words of Section 23 except a will from the four-month rule, and a will may at any time be presented for registration or deposited under the Act, since it operates only on the testator's death.
Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides that an instrument chargeable with duty which is not duly stamped:
aIs void ab initio and confers no rights
bIs admissible in civil but not in criminal proceedings
cShall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose, nor be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any person having authority to receive evidence or by any public officer
dMay be admitted in evidence but cannot be registered
Answer: C
Section 35 renders an instrument not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and bars it from being acted upon, registered or authenticated, subject to the proviso permitting admission on payment of duty and penalty.
Under the proviso to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, an instrument insufficiently stamped may be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficient duty together with a penalty of:
aAn amount equal to twice the deficient duty
bAn amount equal to ten times the deficient duty (or portion thereof)
cA flat sum of five rupees
dAn amount equal to five times the deficient duty
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 35 permits admission of an insufficiently stamped instrument on payment of the duty and a penalty equal to ten times the duty or the deficient portion thereof.
Where oral evidence of the date of an acknowledgment is sought to be given under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, such oral evidence of the time when a signed acknowledgment was made is:
aPermitted in all cases without restriction
bPermitted, but oral evidence of its contents shall not be received
cPermitted only if the acknowledgment is registered
dWholly inadmissible
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 18(2) allows oral evidence of the time when a signed acknowledgment was made, but expressly bars oral evidence of the contents of the writing where the writing is otherwise required to be in writing.
Under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on the determination of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession of any property, the consequence for the person who failed to sue is that:
aHis title is extinguished only on a declaration to that effect by a competent Court
bHe may still recover possession through execution proceedings
cHis right to such property is extinguished
dHis right of suit alone is barred, but his title to the property survives
Answer: C
Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy; at the determination of the period for a suit for possession, the right to the property itself stands extinguished, perfecting the adverse possessor's title.
Under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title is twelve years, computed from:
aThe date of registration of the plaintiff's title deed
bThe date of the plaintiff's purchase of the property
cThe date when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff
dThe date of the plaintiff's first demand for possession
Answer: C
Under Article 65 the twelve-year period for a title-based possession suit runs not from the plaintiff's dispossession but from the point at which the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
The period of limitation prescribed by Article 61(a) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged is:
aTwelve years
bThree years
cSixty years
dThirty years
Answer: D
Article 61(a) prescribes thirty years for a mortgagor's suit to redeem or recover possession of the mortgaged immovable property, running from the date the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.
Where a right of way or any other easement has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto, as an easement and as of right, without interruption, the right becomes absolute under Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 after a period of:
aSixty years
bThirty years
cTwelve years
dTwenty years
Answer: D
Section 15 fixes the prescriptive period for a right of way or other easement (and for light, air and support) at twenty years of peaceable enjoyment as of right without interruption.
Under Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, where the property over which the easement right is claimed by prescription belongs to the Government, the period of twenty years is to be read as:
aThirty years
bForty-five years
cTwelve years
dSixty years
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 15 substitutes 'thirty years' for 'twenty years' where the servient property over which the easement is claimed belongs to the Government.
A right acquired by virtue of a local custom, such as the right of the inhabitants of a village to bury their dead in a particular plot, is recognised under the Indian Easements Act, 1882 as a:
aQuasi-easement under Section 17
bCustomary easement under Section 18
cEasement of necessity under Section 13
dPrescriptive easement under Section 15
Answer: B
Section 18 recognises customary easements, that is, easements acquired in virtue of a local custom, the village burial-ground right being its classic illustration.
Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a presumption, until the contrary is proved, that:
aThe holder of every instrument is a holder for value but not a holder in due course
bEvery negotiable instrument was drawn without consideration
cEvery negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration
dEvery indorsement was made after the maturity of the instrument
Answer: C
Section 118(a) directs that, until the contrary is proved, every negotiable instrument is presumed to have been made or drawn for consideration; clause (g) further presumes that the holder is a holder in due course.
In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441, the Supreme Court held that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
aIs an irrebuttable presumption of law once the cheque is proved to be signed by the accused
bIs confined to the genuineness of the signature only and not to the existence of any debt or liability
cCan be rebutted only by proof beyond reasonable doubt by the accused
dIncludes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and is a rebuttable presumption
Answer: D
In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, the Supreme Court held that the Section 139 presumption extends to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, but it is rebuttable and the accused may discharge the onus on a preponderance of probabilities.
Under Section 31 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the drawer properly applicable to its payment, who defaults in paying the cheque when duly required, must:
aPay a statutory penalty equal to the amount of the cheque to the holder
bCompensate the drawer for any loss or damage caused by such default
cCompensate the payee for any loss or damage caused by such default
dBe liable to imprisonment which may extend to two years
Answer: B
Section 31 obliges the drawee banker who wrongfully dishonours a cheque despite sufficient funds to compensate the drawer (its customer) for any loss or damage caused by such default; the duty runs to the drawer, not the payee.
Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which Court is competent to grant a protection order and other orders and to try offences under the Act?
aThe Court of Session within whose jurisdiction the aggrieved person resides
bThe Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be
cThe Family Court within whose jurisdiction the respondent resides
dAny Magistrate of the second class within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose
Answer: B
Section 27 confers jurisdiction on the Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within whose local limits the aggrieved person or respondent resides, carries on business or is employed, or the cause of action arises.
Under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of:
aNinety days from the date of its first hearing
bSixty days from the date of receipt of the application
cThirty days from the date of receipt of the application
dSixty days from the date of its first hearing
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 12(5) requires the Magistrate to endeavour to dispose of every application under Section 12(1) within sixty days from the date of its first hearing.
A party aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 may seek revision before the:
aHigh Court, under Section 22 of the Act
bDistrict Court, under Section 115 CPC
cGovernment, under Section 20 of the Act
dSupreme Court directly, by special leave only
Answer: A
Section 22 confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the appellate authority or the Controller.
In Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court struck down clause (b) of Section 32 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (exempting buildings constructed on or after 26 August 1957) as violative of:
aArticle 19(1)(f) of the Constitution
bArticle 300A of the Constitution
cArticle 21 of the Constitution
dArticle 14 of the Constitution
Answer: D
In Motor General Traders v. State of A.P. (1984) 1 SCC 222, the Court held the perpetual exemption of post-1957 buildings had lost its rational nexus with the object and amounted to hostile discrimination violating Article 14.
Under Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961, where a person is disqualified from enrolment as an advocate on the ground of conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, the disqualification shall cease to have effect after the expiry of:
aA period of two years from his release or dismissal or removal
bSuch period as the Bar Council of India may by order specify
cA period of five years from his conviction
dA period of one year from his release
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 24A(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides that the disqualification for enrolment shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his release or dismissal or removal.
Under Section 5 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, in the case of unassessed Government land unauthorisedly occupied, the penalty leviable in addition to assessment may extend up to:
aTen rupees, or where twenty times the annual assessment exceeds ten rupees, twenty times such assessment
bOne hundred rupees fixed
cFive rupees or ten times the annual assessment
dTwenty rupees or five times the annual assessment
Answer: A
Section 5(ii) provides that for unassessed land the penalty may be a sum not exceeding ten rupees, or where twenty times the annual assessment exceeds ten rupees, a sum not exceeding twenty times such assessment.
For an offence under Section 34(1)(a) of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968 where the intoxicant involved is LESS than the quantity notified in that behalf, the prescribed punishment is:
aImprisonment up to one year and fine up to rupees ten thousand only
bImprisonment not less than six months extending up to three years and fine not less than rupees five thousand extending up to rupees twenty thousand
cImprisonment not less than one year extending up to five years and fine not less than rupees ten thousand extending up to rupees one lakh
dImprisonment up to six months and fine up to rupees five thousand
Answer: B
Under Section 34(1)(a)(i), where the intoxicant is less than the notified quantity, the punishment is imprisonment of six months to three years and fine of rupees five thousand to twenty thousand.
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