Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 9 — Questions & Solutions
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An application to set aside a court sale of immovable property on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it lies under Order XXI Rule 90, but no sale shall be set aside unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant has:
aApplied within seven days of the sale
bDeposited the entire purchase money in court
cSustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud
dObtained the leave of the appellate court
Answer: C
Under the proviso to Order XXI Rule 90, no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of it.
A caveat lodged under Section 148-A C.P.C., where no application is made by the person at whose instance the suit is expected, shall remain in force for:
a90 days
b120 days
c60 days
d30 days
Answer: A
Under Section 148-A(5), a caveat remains in force for ninety days from the date on which it was lodged, unless the application in respect of which it is lodged is made before its expiry.
A foreign judgment shall NOT be conclusive under Section 13 C.P.C. in any of the following cases EXCEPT where:
aIt sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India
bIt has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction
cIt has been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
dIt has not been given on the merits of the case
Answer: C
Section 13 lists six grounds on which a foreign judgment is not conclusive; a judgment pronounced by a competent court on the merits, free of those defects, remains conclusive.
In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005), the Supreme Court, while upholding Section 89 C.P.C., held that recourse to one of the modes of alternative dispute resolution is:
aAvailable only after the trial has concluded
bA step the court must explore, the court formulating terms of settlement for reference to an ADR mode
cWholly at the option of the parties with no duty on the court
dPermissible only in commercial suits
Answer: B
In Salem Advocate Bar Association (2005), the Court read Section 89 with Order X Rule 1-A and held the court must explore the possibility of settlement and refer disputes to an ADR mode at an appropriate stage.
Under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. as amended, the outer limit of ninety days for filing a written statement in an ordinary civil suit was held to be directory, and not mandatory, in:
aDaryao v. State of U.P.
bSalem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India
cKailash v. Nanhku
dDhulabhai v. State of M.P.
Answer: C
In Kailash v. Nanhku (2005), the Supreme Court held that the time-limit under Order VIII Rule 1 is directory in ordinary civil suits, the court retaining discretion to extend it in exceptional cases.
All questions arising between the parties to the suit, or their representatives, relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree shall be determined by:
aThe District Court in revision
bThe Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit
cThe appellate court alone
dA separate suit
Answer: B
Section 47 C.P.C. confers exclusive jurisdiction on the executing court to determine all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, barring a separate suit.
Where a court, at any stage of the suit, finds that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint shall be:
aTransferred under Section 24 C.P.C.
bReturned to be presented to the proper court under Order VII Rule 10 C.P.C.
cRejected under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C.
dDismissed for default
Answer: B
Order VII Rule 10 C.P.C. provides for the return of the plaint, at any stage of the suit, to be presented to the court in which it should have been instituted, as distinct from rejection under Rule 11.
A suit, the cognizance of which is neither expressly nor impliedly barred, is one which a Civil Court:
aHas discretion to entertain or refuse
bMust refer to a Tribunal constituted under a special enactment
cHas jurisdiction to try under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
dCan try only with the prior sanction of the High Court
Answer: C
Section 9 of the CPC provides that the Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
For the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to apply, the former suit must have been decided by a Court:
aSuperior in rank to the Court trying the subsequent suit
bOf exclusively original civil jurisdiction
cCompetent to try the subsequent suit in which the issue is subsequently raised
dOf the same district as the subsequent Court
Answer: C
Section 11 requires that the Court which decided the former suit must have been competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.
The power of the High Court or the District Court to transfer and withdraw suits, appeals or other proceedings pending before a subordinate Court is contained in:
aSection 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure
bSection 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure
cSection 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
dSection 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Answer: B
Section 24 of the CPC empowers the High Court or the District Court, on application or suo motu, to transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in a subordinate Court.
A suit against the Government or a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done in his official capacity cannot ordinarily be instituted until the expiration, after a notice in writing, of:
aOne month
bSix months
cThree months
dTwo months
Answer: D
Section 80(1) of the CPC requires that no such suit be instituted until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the prescribed authority.
Where a suit has been dismissed, and the plaintiff later obtains an order setting aside the decree under which restitution had been made, an application for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be made to:
aEither the appellate Court or the High Court, at the option of the applicant
bThe High Court alone
cThe appellate Court which varied or reversed the decree
dThe Court of first instance which passed the decree or order
Answer: D
Section 144 provides that the application for restitution is to be made to the Court which passed the decree or order that has since been varied or reversed in appeal, revision or otherwise.
A second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court lies:
aOnly where the value of the subject-matter exceeds rupees one lakh
bOnly if the case involves a substantial question of law
cOn any question of fact or law
dOnly with the leave of the Supreme Court
Answer: B
After the 1976 amendment, Section 100 permits a second appeal to the High Court only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, a further intra-court appeal:
aLies as a Letters Patent Appeal as a matter of right
bDoes not lie, by virtue of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure
cLies only with a certificate of fitness from the single Judge
dLies only to the Supreme Court under Article 136
Answer: B
Section 100A, as substituted by the 2002 Amendment, provides that notwithstanding any Letters Patent, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of a single Judge of a High Court deciding an appeal.
The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised in respect of a case decided by a subordinate Court where such Court appears to have:
aPassed any interlocutory order, irrespective of its effect on the proceeding
bDelivered judgment beyond the period of limitation
cExercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity
dMerely committed an error of fact in appreciating evidence
Answer: C
Section 115 confines revision to jurisdictional errors, namely where the subordinate Court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise one vested in it, or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
A plaint shall be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure where:
aThe defendant fails to file a written statement within the prescribed time
bA counter-claim is barred by limitation
cThe plaintiff is unable to attend on the date of hearing
dIt does not disclose a cause of action
Answer: D
Order VII Rule 11(a) provides that the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action; the other clauses cover undervaluation, deficient stamp, and the suit being barred by law.
In the Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India case, the Supreme Court held that the time-limit of ninety days for filing a written statement under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is:
aApplicable only to commercial suits
bDirectory, and the Court retains power to extend the time in exceptionally hard cases
cCapable of being waived only by the plaintiff
dMandatory, so that the Court has no power to extend it
Answer: B
In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Supreme Court held that the ninety-day limit under Order VIII Rule 1 is directory and not mandatory, leaving the Court discretion to extend time in exceptional cases.
Section 530 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides that all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including issuance and service of summons and warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence, may be held in:
aOpen court only, with no electronic substitute permitted
bThe presence of the accused alone, in every case
cElectronic mode, by use of electronic communication or audio-video electronic means
dA camera proceeding requiring High Court sanction in each case
Answer: C
Section 530 BNSS is a new enabling provision permitting trials, inquiries and proceedings - including service of summons/warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence - to be conducted in electronic mode through electronic communication or audio-video electronic means.
Under Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding:
aTwenty-five thousand rupees
bFifty thousand rupees
cTen thousand rupees
dOne lakh rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(1) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to pass imprisonment up to three years or fine up to fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service. This raised the earlier CrPC ceiling of ten thousand rupees.
Where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, the maximum period for which a Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused under Section 187 of the BNSS before the accused becomes entitled to default bail is:
aOne hundred and eighty days
bNinety days
cSixty days
dOne hundred and twenty days
Answer: B
Under Section 187(3) BNSS the limit is ninety days for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than ten years, and sixty days for any other offence, after which the accused gets the indefeasible right to default bail.
A person can report information relating to a cognizable offence at any police station irrespective of the place where the offence is committed (a 'Zero FIR'). This is provided for under which provision of the BNSS, 2023?
aSection 173
bSection 190
cSection 154
dSection 175
Answer: A
Section 173(1) BNSS expressly permits registration of information relating to a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, statutorily recognising the 'Zero FIR'.
Under Section 173(3) of the BNSS, where information is received of a cognizable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of the police station may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain a prima facie case within a period of:
aFourteen days
bThirty days
cTwenty-one days
dSeven days
Answer: A
Section 173(3) BNSS allows a preliminary enquiry (with DSP-rank permission) for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to be completed within fourteen days.
Under the proviso to Section 35(7) of the BNSS, no arrest shall be made without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police where the offence is punishable with imprisonment of less than three years and the person to be arrested is:
aA first-time offender
bA juvenile in conflict with law
cInfirm or above sixty years of age
dA woman
Answer: C
Section 35(7) BNSS introduces a new safeguard: for offences punishable with less than three years, a person who is infirm or above sixty years of age shall not be arrested without prior permission of an officer not below DSP rank.
Under Section 176(3) of the BNSS, the collection of forensic evidence by a forensic expert at the crime scene, accompanied by videography of the process, is made mandatory for offences punishable with imprisonment for a term of:
aThree years or more
bFive years or more
cSeven years or more
dTen years or more
Answer: C
Section 176(3) BNSS mandates that for any offence punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, a forensic expert shall visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and the process shall be videographed.
Under Section 356 of the BNSS, before the Court proceeds with the inquiry or trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial, the trial shall not commence unless a period has lapsed from the date of framing of the charge of:
aNinety days
bThirty days
cOne hundred and twenty days
dSixty days
Answer: A
Section 356 BNSS introduces trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender; the Court shall not commence the trial unless ninety days have lapsed from the date of framing of the charge.
Under Section 105 of the BNSS, the process of search and seizure, including the preparation of the list of seized items and the signing of it by witnesses, is required to be recorded through:
aAudio-video electronic means
bA handwritten panchnama only
cA typed report countersigned by a Magistrate
dStenographic shorthand notes
Answer: A
Section 105 BNSS requires the entire search and seizure process to be recorded through audio-video electronic means (preferably mobile phone), and the recording to be forwarded to the Magistrate without delay.
Under the first proviso to Section 479(1) of the BNSS, a first-time offender (a person who has never been convicted of any offence in the past) shall be released on bond by the Court if he has undergone detention for the period extending up to of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence:
aOne-third
bOne-half
cOne-fourth
dTwo-thirds
Answer: A
Section 479(1) BNSS releases an undertrial on bond after one-half of the maximum sentence; the first proviso reduces this to one-third for a first-time offender who has never been convicted of any offence.
The provision for grant of anticipatory bail (direction for release on bail to a person apprehending arrest on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence) is now contained in which section of the BNSS, 2023?
aSection 482
bSection 480
cSection 478
dSection 483
Answer: A
Section 482 BNSS corresponds to Section 438 of the old CrPC and provides for anticipatory bail by the High Court or Court of Session for a person apprehending arrest for a non-bailable offence.
Under Section 193 of the BNSS, the investigation in relation to an offence under Sections 64 to 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (rape and connected offences) must be completed within:
aTwo months from the date of recording of information
bSix months from the date of recording of information
cOne month from the date of recording of information
dThree months from the date of recording of information
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 193(1) BNSS requires investigation of rape and connected offences under Sections 64 to 71 BNS (and certain POCSO offences) to be completed within two months from the date the information was recorded.
Under Section 193(3) of the BNSS, in respect of an offence under Sections 64 to 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the police officer is required to inform the informant or the victim of the progress of the investigation, by any means including electronic communication, within a period of:
aThirty days
bSixty days
cOne hundred and twenty days
dNinety days
Answer: D
Section 193(3)(ii) BNSS requires the police officer to keep the informant or victim informed of the progress of investigation within ninety days, including through electronic communication.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of dowry death (death of a woman within seven years of marriage in connection with demand for dowry) is dealt with under:
aSection 86
bSection 304B
cSection 80
dSection 85
Answer: C
Section 80 BNS deals with dowry death (corresponding to Section 304B IPC), punishable with imprisonment of not less than seven years which may extend to life.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which of the following is a form of punishment newly introduced under Section 4 that had no place in the corresponding provision of the repealed Indian Penal Code, 1860?
aCommunity service
bImprisonment for life
cSolitary confinement
dForfeiture of property
Answer: A
Section 4 of the BNS lists death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment, forfeiture of property, fine and, for the first time in Indian criminal law, community service. Forfeiture and life imprisonment already existed under the IPC.
A is convicted of committing murder under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The punishment for murder is prescribed under:
aSection 102
bSection 103
cSection 101
dSection 105
Answer: B
Section 101 BNS defines when culpable homicide amounts to murder, while Section 103 prescribes the punishment for murder, namely death or imprisonment for life and fine.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 introduced a distinct offence where a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief. This is dealt with under:
aSection 103(2)
bSection 117(4)
cSection 113
dSection 111
Answer: A
Section 103(2) BNS punishes so-called mob lynching, where a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on grounds such as race, caste, community, sex, language or personal belief.
Where a child, a person of unsound mind, a delirious person or a person in a state of intoxication commits suicide, abetment of such suicide is punishable, under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, under:
aSection 107
bSection 108
cSection 109
dSection 106
Answer: A
Section 107 BNS specifically covers abetment of suicide of a child or person of unsound mind (including delirious or intoxicated persons), punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment up to ten years; ordinary abetment of suicide falls under Section 108.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, abetment of suicide by any person (other than a child or person of unsound mind) who in fact commits suicide is punishable under:
aSection 106
bSection 110
cSection 108
dSection 107
Answer: C
Section 108 BNS punishes abetment of suicide of any person with imprisonment of either description up to ten years and fine; the special category of child/unsound-mind victims is dealt with separately under Section 107.
A drives his car rashly and causes the death of a pedestrian, then flees the spot without reporting the incident to the police or a Magistrate. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the enhanced punishment of imprisonment up to ten years for such hit-and-run conduct is found in:
aSection 106(1)
bSection 109
cSection 105
dSection 106(2)
Answer: D
Section 106(2) BNS provides enhanced punishment up to ten years where a person causing death by a rash or negligent act escapes from the scene or fails to report the incident soon after; ordinary rash/negligent death falls under Section 106(1).
The offence of 'snatching', newly defined as a species of theft where the offender suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizes movable property from a person or his possession, is contained in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 in:
aSection 304
bSection 309
cSection 303
dSection 305
Answer: A
Section 304 BNS for the first time defines and punishes snatching as a distinct form of theft, with imprisonment up to three years and fine; Section 303 deals with theft generally.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence which replaced the offence of sedition (formerly Section 124A IPC) and penalises acts exciting secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, or endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, is:
aSection 113
bSection 147
cSection 150
dSection 152
Answer: D
Section 152 BNS criminalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India and is the provision that replaced the repealed sedition offence under Section 124A of the IPC.
'Organised crime' and 'petty organised crime' are new offences introduced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Which pair of sections respectively deals with them?
aSections 113 and 114
bSections 111 and 112
cSections 110 and 111
dSections 112 and 113
Answer: B
Section 111 BNS deals with organised crime and Section 112 with petty organised crime; both are wholly new offences not present in the IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the general rule that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side is contained in:
aSection 101
bSection 105
cSection 106
dSection 104
Answer: D
Section 104 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 101 IEA) lays down the general rule on burden of proof. Section 105 deals with on whom the burden lies, and Section 106 with burden as to a particular fact.
Under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the fact that a child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days after its dissolution (the mother remaining unmarried), shall be:
aMerely a relevant fact requiring corroboration
bRebuttable by ordinary preponderance of probabilities
cConclusive proof that he is the legitimate child of that man, unless non-access is shown
dA fact which the Court may presume
Answer: C
Section 116 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 112 IEA) makes birth during a valid marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy, rebuttable only by showing non-access between the parties at the relevant time.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. This provision is found in:
aSection 138
bSection 143
cSection 139
dSection 133
Answer: A
Section 138 of the BSA, 2023 (replacing former Section 133 IEA) provides as enacted: 'An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice.' The BSA wording uses 'corroborated', departing from the old IEA s.133 'uncorroborated' phrasing.
Under Section 139 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, for proof of any fact, the number of witnesses required is:
aAt least two witnesses in all cases
bNo particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact
cAt least two witnesses in criminal cases and one in civil cases
dAt least three witnesses in cases triable by the Court of Session
Answer: B
Section 139 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 134 IEA) provides that no particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact; evidence is weighed, not counted.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, oral evidence in all cases must be direct. The provision requiring that the person who saw, heard or perceived a fact must himself depose to it is contained in:
aSection 57
bSection 54
cSection 55
dSection 60
Answer: C
Section 55 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 60 IEA) provides that oral evidence must be direct, i.e. of one who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the fact. Section 54 deals with proof of facts by oral evidence.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the provision dealing with primary evidence, and now expressly treating an electronic record produced from proper custody as primary evidence, is:
aSection 57
bSection 63
cSection 62
dSection 74
Answer: A
Section 57 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 62 IEA) defines primary evidence and, through its added Explanations, treats electronic and digital records produced from proper custody as primary evidence unless disputed.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, documents forming the acts or records of the acts of public officers, and public records kept of private documents, are classified as 'public documents' under:
aSection 84
bSection 74
cSection 63
dSection 75
Answer: B
Section 74 of the BSA, 2023 (same number as Section 74 IEA) defines public documents; all other documents are private under the succeeding section.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Court shall presume that a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or representative of the Central Government, was so executed and authenticated. This presumption is contained in:
aSection 116
bSection 85
cSection 84
dSection 90
Answer: C
Section 84 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 85 IEA) raises a presumption as to the due execution and authentication of powers-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the specified authorities.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant if it appears to have been caused by an inducement, threat, coercion or promise proceeding from a person in authority. The word 'coercion' is a fresh addition (over the former Section 24 IEA) and this provision is:
aSection 24
bSection 26
cSection 20
dSection 22
Answer: D
Section 22 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 24 IEA) renders a confession irrelevant if caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise from a person in authority; 'coercion' is a new term added in the BSA.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, where a woman has died within seven years of her marriage in connection with demand for dowry and was subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, the Court shall presume that such person caused the dowry death. This presumption is contained in:
aSection 118
bSection 120
cSection 116
dSection 113A
Answer: A
Section 118 of the BSA, 2023 (former Section 113B IEA) raises a mandatory presumption of dowry death where the statutory conditions of cruelty and proximate death are established.
Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes is deemed to be:
aA tenancy at will, terminable without notice
bA lease from month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice
cA lease in perpetuity, not terminable by notice
dA lease from year to year, terminable by six months' notice
Answer: D
Section 106 deems a lease for agricultural or manufacturing purposes to be from year to year, terminable by six months' notice; a lease for any other purpose is from month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice.
A lease of immovable property determines by 'forfeiture' under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in which of the following situations?
aWhere the interests of the lessee and lessor merge in one person
bOn mutual surrender of the lease by the parties
cWhere the lessee breaks an express condition providing that on breach the lessor may re-enter, and the lessor gives notice of his intention to determine the lease
dOn expiry of the period fixed in the lease
Answer: C
Under Section 111(g), forfeiture occurs where the lessee breaks an express condition with a re-entry clause, or sets up an adverse title, or is adjudicated insolvent (where the lease so provides), and the lessor gives written notice of his intention to determine the lease.
Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift of immovable property can be made only by:
aMere delivery of possession to the donee
bAn unregistered instrument signed by the donor alone
cAn oral declaration before a Sub-Registrar
dA registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses
Answer: D
Section 123 requires that a gift of immovable property be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses; movable property may be gifted by registered instrument or by delivery.
Under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor is:
aValid and binding on the donee
bVoidable at the option of the donee
cValid only if registered
dVoid
Answer: D
Section 126 provides that a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor is void; revocation is permitted only on the happening of a specified event not depending on the donor's will, or on grounds on which a contract may be rescinded.
Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transfer of immovable property made by a party to a suit, during the pendency of a suit in which a right to that property is directly and specifically in question, is:
avoidable at the option of the transferee
bvoid ab initio against the whole world
cvalid, but the transferee takes the property subject to the result of the suit and the rights of the other party under the decree
dvalid only if effected with prior notice to the opposite party
Answer: C
The doctrine of lis pendens in Section 52 does not make a pendente lite transfer void; the transfer is valid inter se but binds the transferee to the outcome of the suit, so he holds subject to the decree.
Which one of the following correctly states the rule contained in Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, regarding a mere chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis)?
aIt can be transferred for consideration but not by way of gift
bIt can be transferred only after the death of the present owner
cIt can be transferred only with the consent of the present owner
dIt cannot be transferred at all
Answer: D
Section 6(a) expressly declares that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, and other mere possibilities of a like nature cannot be transferred.
The doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel', under which a transferor who fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer property and later acquires interest in it may have that interest pass to the transferee, is contained in:
aSection 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: B
Section 43 embodies the rule of feeding the grant by estoppel; where the transferor later acquires interest in the property, the transferee may, at his option, claim that the transfer operates on that interest, provided the contract subsists and the property is available.
When two or more heirs succeed together to the property of an intestate under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 19 provides that they take the property:
aAs joint tenants with right of survivorship
bPer capita only if they belong to the same branch
cAs joint tenants, per stirpes
dAs tenants-in-common, and not as joint tenants
Answer: D
Section 19 provides that where two or more heirs succeed together, they take the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, and per capita and not per stirpes (save as otherwise expressly provided).
The right of a Hindu to dispose of his interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property by will is recognised by:
aSection 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
bSection 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 alone
cSection 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
dSection 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Answer: D
Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enables any Hindu to dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property capable of being so disposed of, including an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property.
Under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce by mutual consent can be presented only where the parties have been living separately for a period of:
aThree years or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
bTwo years or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
cOne year or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
dSix months or more immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
Answer: C
Section 13B(1) requires that the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or more before presenting a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent.
After the first motion under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the motion for a decree of divorce by mutual consent must be moved by both parties:
aNot earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the first motion
bNot earlier than three months and not later than one year after the first motion
cNot earlier than one year and not later than two years after the first motion
dAt any time after three months from the first motion
Answer: A
Under Section 13B(2), the second motion must be moved not earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the first motion, failing which the petition lapses.
Under Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, where the customary rites and ceremonies of a Hindu marriage include the saptapadi, the marriage becomes complete and binding when:
aThe garlands are exchanged before the sacred fire
bThe seventh step is taken before the sacred fire
cThe marriage is registered under Section 8
dThe kanyadan is performed by the bride's father
Answer: B
Section 7(2) provides that where the saptapadi (taking of seven steps jointly before the sacred fire) is part of the rites, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.
Under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage solemnised after the commencement of the Act is null and void only if it contravenes:
aClauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 5
bClause (iii) of Section 5 alone
cClauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5
dAll clauses (i) to (v) of Section 5
Answer: C
Section 11 declares a marriage void only for contravention of clauses (i) bigamy, (iv) degrees of prohibited relationship, and (v) sapinda relationship of Section 5; breach of clauses (ii) and (iii) does not make the marriage void.
Under Section 13(2)(iv) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a wife may present a petition for divorce on the ground that her marriage was solemnised before she attained the age of fifteen years and she repudiated the marriage:
aAfter attaining the age of fifteen years but before attaining the age of eighteen years
bBefore attaining the age of fifteen years through her guardian
cAt any time after attaining the age of fifteen years
dAfter attaining the age of eighteen years but before attaining twenty-one years
Answer: A
Section 13(2)(iv), the option of puberty, allows a wife whose marriage was solemnised before age fifteen to seek divorce if she repudiated the marriage after fifteen but before attaining eighteen years.
The bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt or performance of a promise is, under Section 172, called a:
aMortgage
bLien
cHypothecation
dPledge
Answer: D
Section 172 defines 'pledge' as the bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt or performance of a promise; the bailor is the 'pawnor' and the bailee the 'pawnee'.
In the absence of a contract to that effect, an agent who makes a contract on behalf of his principal:
aCan neither personally enforce it nor be personally bound by it
bCan personally enforce it and is personally bound by it
cIs always personally bound but cannot enforce it
dCan enforce it personally but is never personally bound
Answer: A
Section 230 lays down that, absent a contrary contract, an agent can neither personally enforce contracts entered into on behalf of his principal nor is he personally bound by them.
Where a sum is named in a contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach, the party complaining of the breach is, under Section 74, entitled to receive from the party in default:
aReasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named, whether or not actual damage is proved
bOnly the actual loss proved, with the named sum being ignored
cThe whole sum named, irrespective of loss
dDouble the actual loss as a penalty
Answer: A
Section 74 entitles the aggrieved party to reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named (or penalty stipulated), whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused.
Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, consideration for a promise may move from —
athe promisee alone
bthe promisor alone
ca person who is a party to the contract only
dthe promisee or any other person
Answer: D
Section 2(d) provides that the act, abstinence or promise constituting consideration may be done by 'the promisee or any other person', so consideration need not move only from the promisee. This is why the doctrine of privity of consideration is not recognised in India, as in Chinnaya v. Ramayya.
A minor mortgaged his property to secure a loan. In a suit to enforce the mortgage, the Privy Council held the agreement to be —
avalid but unenforceable until ratification on majority
bvoid ab initio
cvoidable at the option of the minor
denforceable to the extent of benefit received by the minor
Answer: B
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114, the Privy Council held that an agreement by a minor is void ab initio under Section 11, a minor being incompetent to contract. The contract is a nullity, not merely voidable.
An agreement to pay money to a public servant to procure a government appointment for the promisor is —
aenforceable only if the appointment is actually procured
bvalid, the consideration being lawful
cvoidable at the option of the promisor
dvoid, the object being opposed to public policy
Answer: D
Under Section 23, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful where the court regards it as opposed to public policy; an agreement to traffic in public office is illustratively void under that section. Such an agreement is void, not merely voidable.
Which of the following is a valid exception to the rule that an agreement made without consideration is void under Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
aAn oral promise to pay a debt barred by the law of limitation
bAn oral promise made out of natural love and affection between near relations
cAn unwritten promise to compensate a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor
dA written and registered promise made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other
Answer: D
Section 25(1) requires that a promise made on account of natural love and affection between parties in near relation be expressed in writing and registered. The exceptions for past voluntary service (Section 25(2)) and time-barred debt (Section 25(3)) require, respectively, a promise to compensate and a written promise signed by the promisor.
Under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction CANNOT be granted in which of the following situations?
aTo restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter
bAll of the above
cTo prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced
dTo restrain a person from a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced
Answer: B
Section 41 lists situations where an injunction cannot be granted, including restraining criminal proceedings (cl. d), continuing breach the plaintiff has acquiesced in (cl. g), and preventing breach of a contract not specifically enforceable (cl. e). Hence all are barred.
Under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement coupled with a negative agreement, the court's inability to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement:
aShall preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement
bRequires the matter to be referred to arbitration
cEntitles the plaintiff only to damages and not to any injunction
dShall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement, provided the plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is binding on him
Answer: D
Section 42 provides that, notwithstanding clause (e) of Section 41, inability to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement does not preclude an injunction to perform the negative agreement, provided the plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it binds him.
Section 14A, inserted into the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by the 2018 Amendment, empowers the court in a suit under the Act to:
aAppoint a receiver over the disputed property
bRefer the dispute to compulsory mediation before trial
cEngage one or more experts to assist it on any specific issue involved in the suit
dTransfer the suit to a commercial court
Answer: C
Section 14A empowers the court, where it considers it necessary, to engage one or more experts to report on a specific issue and to secure the expert's attendance; the report forms part of the record of the suit.
Under Section 20A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (inserted in 2018), in a suit involving a contract relating to an infrastructure project specified in the Schedule, the court:
aShall not grant an injunction where granting it would cause impediment or delay in the progress or completion of such infrastructure project
bMay grant an injunction only with the prior sanction of the State Government
cShall mandatorily decree specific performance within three months
dShall grant an injunction on the same principles as in any other suit
Answer: A
Section 20A bars the grant of an injunction in a suit involving a contract relating to an infrastructure project where the injunction would cause impediment or delay in the progress or completion of that project.
Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that the instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may:
aOnly claim damages for the loss likely to be caused by the instrument
bSue to have it adjudged void or voidable, and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled
cHave it cancelled only with the consent of all parties to the instrument
dApply only to the Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 for its cancellation
Answer: B
Section 31(1) allows such a person to sue to have the instrument adjudged void or voidable; the court may in its discretion so adjudge and order it delivered up and cancelled. If registered, the court sends a copy of the decree to the registering officer.
In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff seeks to rely upon an unregistered agreement of sale of immovable property worth above one hundred rupees to prove the contract. Which provision of the Registration Act, 1908, permits its reception in evidence for this purpose?
aSection 17(1)(b)
bThe proviso to Section 49
cSection 50
dSection 23-A
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 49 allows an unregistered document affecting immovable property to be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, or of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.
A document containing a contract to transfer immovable property for consideration, intended to be relied upon as part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is executed in 2010 but left unregistered. As per Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908, the consequence is that the document:
aRemains fully effective for Section 53-A despite non-registration
bCan be registered only with the sanction of the District Court
cShall have no effect for the purposes of Section 53-A
dIs automatically void as a conveyance of title
Answer: C
Section 17(1A), inserted by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 (w.e.f. 24-09-2001), makes such contracts compulsorily registrable, and if unregistered they shall have no effect for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.
A deed of exchange relates to two parcels of land, one situated wholly within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar X and another wholly within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar Y. Under Section 28 of the Registration Act, 1908, the document affecting immovable property must ordinarily be presented for registration in the office of a Sub-Registrar:
aWithin whose sub-district the parties ordinarily reside
bWithin whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property is situate
cWithin whose sub-district the document was executed, irrespective of where the land lies
dOnly at the office of the District Registrar of the district
Answer: B
Section 28 requires that documents relating to immovable property (other than those under Section 31, 88 or 89) be presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property is situate.
An instrument chargeable with duty under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and executed by a party in India, must be stamped:
aAt any time before it is presented for registration
bOnly at the time it is tendered in evidence
cBefore or at the time of execution
dWithin thirty days after execution
Answer: C
Section 17 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, requires that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in India be stamped before or at the time of execution.
In computing the period of limitation for an appeal under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which of the following is/are to be excluded?
aThe day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced
bBoth the day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree
cOnly the day from which the period is to be reckoned
dThe time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from
Answer: B
Section 12(2) requires exclusion of both the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from.
Under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where a person entitled to institute a suit is a minor, insane or an idiot at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, he may institute the suit:
aWithin the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified in the Schedule
bWithin one year of the cessation of the disability
cOnly within three years of attaining majority irrespective of the original period
dAt any time during his lifetime, the bar of limitation being wholly lifted
Answer: A
Section 6 allows such a person to sue within the same period after the disability ceases as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified in the third column of the Schedule. (Section 8 caps this extension at three years.)
The principle embodied in Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that:
aTime does not begin to run until the disability of the plaintiff ceases
bA subsequent disability arising before the suit suspends the running of time
cOnce time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it
dTime is suspended during every period of the plaintiff's inability to sue
Answer: C
Section 9 lays down that where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it, subject only to the proviso relating to letters of administration granted to a debtor of the creditor's estate.
Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for an acknowledgment of liability to give a fresh period of limitation, the acknowledgment must be:
aIn writing and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, made before the expiration of the prescribed period
bOral, and made before the expiry of the prescribed period
cIn writing, but may be made even after the prescribed period has expired
dIn writing, but need not be signed if its date is otherwise proved
Answer: A
Section 18 requires the acknowledgment to be in writing and signed by the party (or his agent), and made before the expiration of the prescribed period; a fresh period then runs from the time the acknowledgment was signed. An acknowledgment after the period has expired does not revive limitation.
A right granted to do upon the immovable property of the grantor something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and which does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, is called:
aa profit a prendre.
ban easement of necessity;
ca licence;
da customary easement;
Answer: C
Section 52 defines a licence as such a right which neither amounts to an easement nor to an interest in the property.
Under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licence is irrevocable where:
athe grantor has retained possession of the property.
bit is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force, or where the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution;
cit is granted for a fixed term of less than one year;
dit is granted gratuitously and orally;
Answer: B
Section 60 makes a licence irrevocable in two cases: where coupled with a transfer of property in force, and where the licensee has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses acting on the licence.
Under Section 8 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, an easement may be imposed by:
aany person, whether or not he has any interest in the servient land;
bonly the dominant owner.
conly the absolute owner of the servient heritage, never a lessee;
dany one in the circumstances and to the extent in and to which he may transfer his interest in the heritage on which the liability is imposed;
Answer: D
Section 8 permits the imposition of an easement only to the extent of the transferable interest the grantor holds in the servient heritage, so a lessee can impose only a temporary easement.
Under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit a minimum of:
aThe entire fine or compensation awarded by the trial court
bFifty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court
cTen per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court
dTwenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court
Answer: D
Section 148, inserted by the 2018 Amendment, empowers the Appellate Court to direct the appellant to deposit a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court.
Following the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, Section 142(2) fixes the territorial jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 138 in the court within whose local limits:
aThe drawer ordinarily resides or carries on business
bThe drawee bank on which the cheque was drawn is situated
cThe cheque was originally issued and handed over
dThe branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account (in which the cheque is delivered for collection) is situated
Answer: D
The 2015 Amendment inserted Section 142(2), fixing jurisdiction at the place where the payee's bank branch (to which the cheque is delivered for collection) is situated, thereby overriding Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014).
Under Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, offences under Chapter XVII are to be tried by:
aA Judicial Magistrate of the first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate, who may try the case summarily
bA Court of Session
cAn Executive Magistrate
dAny Judicial Magistrate of the second class
Answer: A
Section 143 provides that such offences shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or Metropolitan Magistrate, who may try them summarily, subject to the limit that a summary-trial sentence of imprisonment shall not exceed one year.
In Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, the Supreme Court, while interpreting the definition of "respondent" under Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, held that:
aA live-in partner cannot be a respondent under the Act
bOnly an adult male can be a respondent and the proviso permitting relatives is unconstitutional
cThe words "adult male" stand deleted as violative of Article 14, so that a complaint may lie even against female or minor respondents
dThe expression "adult male" must be read down to cover only the husband
Answer: C
The Supreme Court struck down the words "adult male" in Section 2(q) as contrary to Article 14, with the result that the respondent need not be an adult male and reliefs may be sought even against female respondents; the proviso to Section 2(q) was rendered otiose and also deleted.
Under Section 12(5) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1):
aWithin sixty days from the date of its first hearing
bWithin ninety days from the date of its institution
cWithin three months from the date of the first date of hearing
dWithin thirty days from the date of receipt of the domestic incident report
Answer: A
Section 12(5) directs the Magistrate to endeavour to dispose of every application under Section 12(1) within sixty days from the date of its first hearing; the first date of hearing under Section 12(4) shall ordinarily be within three days of receipt of the application.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, an appeal against an order of the Rent Controller in respect of a building situated in the city of Hyderabad lies to:
athe Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes
bthe District Judge having jurisdiction over the area
cthe High Court of Andhra Pradesh
dthe Principal Junior Civil Judge
Answer: A
Under Section 20, in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad the appellate authority is the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes; elsewhere it is the Subordinate (Senior Civil) Judge having original jurisdiction.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, on the death of a tenant the expression 'tenant' in Section 2(ix) continues to include:
aonly a nominee registered with the Rent Controller during the tenant's lifetime
bthe surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of the deceased tenant who was living with him in the building as a member of his family up to his death
cany sub-tenant inducted by the deceased tenant
dany legal heir of the deceased tenant whether or not residing in the building
Answer: B
The definition of 'tenant' expressly extends, after the tenant's death, to the surviving spouse, son or daughter who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of his family up to his death.
Under Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, an aggrieved woman is ordinarily required to make a complaint of sexual harassment to the Internal Committee or Local Committee within a period of:
aOne year from the date of the incident
bThree months from the date of the incident and, where the incident is a series, within three months from the date of the last incident
cSix months from the date of the incident, without any provision for extension
dOne month from the date of the incident
Answer: B
Section 9(1) of the SH Act, 2013 requires a complaint within three months from the date of the incident (or from the last incident, where there is a series); the proviso allows the Committee to extend the period by a further three months for recorded reasons.
Which of the following best states the effect of the bar of jurisdiction provision (Section 14) of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905?
aOnly the High Court in writ jurisdiction is barred
bA civil court may freely re-try the question of unauthorised occupation
cThe bar applies only to penalty orders, not to eviction orders
dNo decision or order passed by an officer or authority under the Act shall be questioned before a civil court, and no civil court shall grant an injunction against proceedings under the Act
Answer: D
The Act bars civil courts from calling in question decisions or orders made under it and prohibits the grant of injunctions to stay proceedings under the Act, channelling challenges into the Act's own appellate/revisional hierarchy.
Under Section 53 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, an officer of the Excise, Police or Revenue Department (subject to prescribed restrictions) may arrest WITHOUT warrant a person for an offence punishable under, among others:
aSection 13 of the Act
bSection 41 of the Act
cSection 28 of the Act
dSection 34 of the Act
Answer: D
Section 53(1)(a) empowers arrest without warrant for offences punishable under specified sections including Section 34 (and Sections 27, 35, 36, 37, 37A, 40A, 50, 50A). The residuary offence under Section 41 is not in that list.
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