Andhra Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this prelims mock with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a subject-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
100
Questions
17
Subjects
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
A foreign judgment shall not be conclusive under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 where:
aIt has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
bIt is founded on a correct view of international law
cIt has been obtained by fraud
dThe proceedings were not opposed to natural justice
Answer: C
Section 13 makes a foreign judgment conclusive except in six enumerated situations; clause (e) provides that a judgment obtained by fraud is not conclusive. The other listed options describe situations in which the judgment remains conclusive.
Under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, after the trial has commenced, an application for amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed unless the court concludes that:
aThe opposite party consents to the amendment
bThe amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy and could not have been raised before the commencement of trial in spite of due diligence
cThe application is made within thirty days of the framing of issues
dThe amendment does not change the nature of the suit
Answer: B
The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 (inserted by the 2002 amendment) bars amendment after commencement of trial unless the court holds that, in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the trial began.
Under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court's power to add or strike out parties may be exercised:
aAt any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, on such terms as may appear just
bOnly on the application of the plaintiff
cOnly with the consent of the party sought to be added
dOnly before the settlement of issues
Answer: A
Order I Rule 10(2) empowers the court, at any stage of the proceedings and either on application or of its own motion, to strike out or add any party whose presence is necessary to effectually adjudicate the questions involved. Read with Section 99, no suit fails merely for misjoinder or non-joinder (except non-joinder of a necessary party).
A second appeal lies to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aA question of mixed law and fact of general importance
bAny error apparent on the face of the record
cA substantial question of law
dA substantial question of fact
Answer: C
Section 100 CPC, as substituted by the 1976 Amendment, confines a second appeal to the High Court strictly to cases involving a 'substantial question of law', which must be formulated by the High Court at the time of admission.
The constitutional validity of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, providing for settlement of disputes outside the court, was upheld by the Supreme Court in:
aIndian Bank v. Satyam Fibres
bAfcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co.
cHussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar
dSalem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India
Answer: D
In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 1999 and 2002 amendments to the CPC, including Section 89 dealing with alternative dispute resolution.
Where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree, an application by a person owning such property or holding an interest therein to set aside the sale on deposit, under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be made within:
aForty-five days from the date of sale
bSixty days from the date of sale
cNinety days from the date of confirmation of sale
dThirty days from the date of sale
Answer: B
Following the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002 and Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application under Order XXI Rule 89 to set aside an execution sale on deposit must be made within sixty days from the date of sale.
Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a plaint shall be rejected where:
aThe defendant fails to file a written statement within ninety days
bThe plaintiff fails to appear on the first date of hearing
cThe suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law
dThe Court lacks territorial jurisdiction over the cause of action
Answer: C
Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC mandates rejection of a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint itself to be barred by any law; want of jurisdiction leads to return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10, not rejection.
The doctrine of res judicata embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bars the trial of a suit or issue which:
aHas been compromised between strangers to the present suit
bIs pending decision in another court of concurrent jurisdiction
cCould and ought to have been raised but was not, in any earlier proceeding of any nature
dWas directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and finally decided by a competent court
Answer: D
Section 11 CPC bars the retrial of a matter directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, litigating under the same title, in a competent court, and heard and finally decided. A pending matter attracts res sub judice under Section 10, not res judicata.
A caveat lodged under Section 148A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, unless the application in respect of which it is lodged is made before its expiry, remain in force for:
aSixty days from the date on which it was lodged
bThirty days from the date on which it was lodged
cOne hundred and twenty days from the date on which it was lodged
dNinety days from the date on which it was lodged
Answer: D
Under Section 148A(5) CPC, a caveat remains in force for ninety days from the date on which it was lodged, unless the application apprehended is made before the expiry of that period.
Save with the leave of the court for urgent or immediate relief, no suit shall be instituted against the Government or a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done in his official capacity until the expiration of, after notice in writing under Section 80(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure:
aThree months
bOne month
cTwo months
dSix months
Answer: C
Section 80(1) CPC requires that a suit against the Government or a public officer not be instituted until the expiry of two months after delivery of the statutory notice in writing; Section 80(2) permits suit without notice, for urgent relief, with the leave of the court.
Under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for amendment of pleadings made after the commencement of trial:
aShall not be allowed unless the court concludes that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the trial commenced
bShall be referred to the High Court for sanction
cShall be allowed only with the consent of the opposite party
dShall be allowed in all cases as a matter of right
Answer: A
The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, inserted by the 2002 Amendment, bars amendment after the trial has commenced unless the court is satisfied that despite due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial.
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that:
aNo further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge
bA further appeal shall lie only with the certificate of the single Judge
cA further Letters Patent appeal shall lie to a Division Bench
dA further appeal shall lie directly to the Supreme Court
Answer: A
Section 100A CPC, with its non-obstante clause overriding any Letters Patent, bars any further (intra-court) appeal where an appeal has already been heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature:
aExcepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
bOnly those expressly conferred upon them by statute
cOnly with the prior sanction of the State Government
dExcepting suits relating to immovable property situate outside their local limits
Answer: A
Section 9 CPC confers jurisdiction on civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature, except suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred; the bar to jurisdiction must be clearly established by the party pleading it.
Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, a person claiming an interest in the property may apply under Order XXI, Rule 89 to have the sale set aside on depositing in Court, for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to:
atwenty-five per cent of the purchase-money
btwo per cent of the purchase-money
cten per cent of the purchase-money
dfive per cent of the purchase-money
Answer: D
Under Order XXI, Rule 89 CPC, the applicant must deposit a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money for payment to the purchaser, together with the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for payment to the decree-holder.
Under Section 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where a court orders a party to pay costs for causing delay, payment of such costs as a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit (or defence) must be made:
awithin such time as the party may choose, without any consequence
bwithin thirty days of the order
con the date next following the date of such order
dat the time of pronouncement of the final decree
Answer: C
Section 35B CPC makes payment of the costs for causing delay, on the date next following the date of such order, a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit by the plaintiff or the defence by the defendant.
A litigant proposes to institute a suit against the State of Andhra Pradesh for an act done by a public officer in his official capacity. Under Section 80 of the C.P.C., no such suit can be instituted until the expiration of:
aone month next after notice in writing has been delivered;
bsix months next after notice in writing has been delivered.
cthree months next after notice in writing has been delivered;
dtwo months next after notice in writing has been delivered;
Answer: D
Section 80(1) C.P.C. requires a written notice and bars institution of the suit against the Government or a public officer (for acts in official capacity) until the expiry of two months after the notice is delivered.
A Court of Junior Civil Judge tries all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. This basic principle is contained in:
aSection 15 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 9 of the C.P.C.;
cSection 16 of the C.P.C.
dSection 11 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: B
Section 9 C.P.C. provides that the courts shall (subject to the provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred.
A second appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. lies to the High Court from an appellate decree only:
awhere the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs. 1,00,000/-;
bif the case involves a substantial question of law;
con any question of fact arising in the case;
dwhere the first appellate court has reversed the trial court's finding.
Answer: B
After the 1976 amendment, Section 100 C.P.C. permits a second appeal only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, which must be formulated by the Court.
The doctrine that a matter already directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, finally decided by a competent court, cannot be re-tried, is embodied in:
aSection 12 of the C.P.C.;
bSection 47 of the C.P.C.
cSection 10 of the C.P.C.;
dSection 11 of the C.P.C.;
Answer: D
Section 11 C.P.C. embodies the doctrine of res judicata; Section 10 deals with stay of suit (res sub judice), and the two are commonly confused in prelims.
Recording of confessions and statements by a Magistrate, formerly governed by Section 164 of the CrPC, is now dealt with under which section of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which additionally permits recording by audio-video electronic means?
aSection 187
bSection 164
cSection 183
dSection 180
Answer: C
Section 183 BNSS corresponds to Section 164 CrPC and expressly allows recording of confessions/statements through audio-video electronic means, with safeguards including presence of the accused's advocate.
Section 530 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 provides that all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including issuance, service and execution of summons and warrants, examination of witnesses and recording of evidence, may be held:
aOnly in open court in physical presence of the accused
bIn electronic mode only at the appellate stage
cOnly with the prior consent of the accused and the prosecution
dIn electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or audio-video electronic means
Answer: D
Section 530 BNSS statutorily recognises conduct of the entire range of criminal proceedings in electronic mode through audio-video electronic means, a modernisation absent from the CrPC.
Under Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the process of search and seizure, including preparation and signing of the list of seized items, shall be recorded through audio-video electronic means (preferably mobile phone), and the recording shall be forwarded without delay to the:
aState Public Prosecutor
bDistrict Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class
cSuperintendent of Police of the district
dDirector of the Forensic Science Laboratory
Answer: B
Section 105 BNSS makes videography of search and seizure mandatory and requires the recording to be forwarded without delay to the District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class.
Under the proviso to Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the investigation in relation to an offence of rape and certain specified sexual offences against women and children must be completed within:
aTwo months from recording of the information
bThree months from recording of the information
cSix months from recording of the information
dOne month from recording of the information
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 193(3) BNSS requires completion of investigation within two months from the date of recording of information for specified sexual offences under the BNS and the POCSO Act.
Under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, before arresting a person in a case where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be up to seven years, a police officer shall ordinarily:
aProduce the person before the Magistrate within six hours
bRecord reasons in writing and obtain sanction of the Superintendent of Police
cObtain a warrant from the jurisdictional Magistrate
dIssue a notice directing the person to appear before him or at a specified place
Answer: D
Section 35(3) BNSS (carrying forward Section 41A CrPC) requires issuance of a notice of appearance instead of arrest where the offence is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, arrest being the exception.
Under Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a summons bearing the image of the court's seal or a digital signature may, where the rules so provide, be served:
aOnly by registered post with acknowledgement due
bOnly by affixation at the conspicuous part of the house
cOnly personally on the person summoned by a police officer
dBy electronic communication in such form and manner as prescribed
Answer: D
Section 64 BNSS expressly permits service of summons (validated by the court's seal image or digital signature) through electronic communication, a method newly recognised in place of the predominantly physical service under the CrPC.
Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a Court of Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding which amount, or of both, or of community service:
aTwenty-five thousand rupees
bFifty thousand rupees
cOne lakh rupees
dTen thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(2) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to impose imprisonment up to three years, fine up to fifty thousand rupees, or community service, raising the fine cap from the ten thousand rupees that applied under Section 29 CrPC.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the maximum total period of detention pending investigation, beyond which the accused becomes entitled to default bail, where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, is:
aSixty days
bNinety days
cOne hundred and eighty days
dSeventy-five days
Answer: B
Under Section 187(3) BNSS the cap is ninety days for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than ten years, and sixty days for any other offence; on expiry the accused is entitled to release on bail if he furnishes bail.
A notable departure of Section 187(3) BNSS from the position under the CrPC, as regards police custody of fifteen days, is that such custody may now be authorised:
aOnly continuously within the first fifteen days of arrest
bFor a maximum of thirty days at a stretch
cIn whole or in part at any time during the first forty or sixty days of the detention period
dOnly with the prior sanction of the Court of Session
Answer: C
Under Section 187(3) BNSS the fifteen days of police custody may be sought in whole or in part during the initial forty or sixty days of the overall detention period, unlike the CrPC where police custody had to be exhausted within the first fifteen days of arrest.
Under Section 173(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the statutory recognition of the 'Zero FIR' concept is achieved by the use of the expression:
a'Irrespective of the area where the offence is committed'
b'In the interest of justice'
c'Notwithstanding anything in any other law'
d'With the sanction of the Superintendent of Police'
Answer: A
Section 173(1) BNSS permits registration of an FIR 'irrespective of the area where the offence is committed,' thereby codifying the Zero FIR concept and removing jurisdictional barriers to registration.
Under the proviso to Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for a cognizable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of a police station may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, within:
aTwenty-one days
bThirty days
cFourteen days
dSeven days
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 173(3) BNSS allows a preliminary enquiry, with DSP-level permission, to be conducted within fourteen days for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years.
Under Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the mandatory visit of a forensic expert to the scene of crime to collect forensic evidence, with videography of the process, is required where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for:
aThree years or more
bFive years or more
cTen years or more
dSeven years or more
Answer: D
Section 176(3) BNSS mandates a forensic expert's visit to the crime scene and audio-video recording of the evidence-collection process for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more.
Under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which codifies the Arnesh Kumar principle, a notice of appearance in lieu of arrest is the default course where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term:
aWhich may extend to seven years or which is less than seven years
bOf life imprisonment
cExceeding seven years
dOf less than three years only
Answer: A
Section 35(3) BNSS (corresponding to Section 41A CrPC) requires the police to issue a notice of appearance instead of arresting, where the offence is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years; arrest is the exception, as reaffirmed in the Arnesh Kumar line of decisions.
Which of the following is NOT a punishment enumerated under Section 4 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aCommunity service
bFine
cSolitary confinement
dForfeiture of property
Answer: C
Section 4 BNS lists death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment (rigorous or simple), forfeiture of property, fine and community service. Solitary confinement is a mode of executing imprisonment, not a head of punishment under Section 4.
Under Section 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, an agreement (other than an agreement to commit an offence) amounts to criminal conspiracy only if:
aThe illegal act is actually completed
bTwo or more persons merely agree to do an illegal act
cThe agreement is reduced to writing
dSome act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties in pursuance of the agreement
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 61(2) BNS requires an overt act besides the agreement where the object is not itself an offence, mirroring the proviso to Section 120A IPC.
X, intending to murder Y, instigates Z, his six-year-old servant who is incapable of understanding the nature of the act, to do an act which causes Y's death. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
aNeither X nor Z is liable
bOnly Z is liable for culpable homicide
cX is liable for the abetment of murder as if he had committed the act himself
dZ is liable for murder as the doer of the act
Answer: C
Under the abetment provisions of the BNS, where the abetted act is done by a person legally incapable of committing the offence, the abettor is liable as if he had himself committed it; Z, being under seven, is protected and not liable.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, an assembly of five or more persons is designated an 'unlawful assembly' under:
aSection 141
bSection 190
cSection 189
dSection 191
Answer: C
Section 189 BNS defines unlawful assembly (five or more persons with a common object as specified), corresponding to Section 141 IPC; Section 190 fixes liability of every member for offences committed in prosecution of the common object.
Five persons went to A's house armed with sticks with the common object of beating A. One of them, X, secretly carrying a pistol, fired and killed A, an act the others did not know to be likely. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
aAll five are liable for murder under the common object rule
bA alone is liable
cOnly X is liable for causing death; the others are liable for the offence of beating
dNone of them is liable as it was a private quarrel
Answer: C
Under Section 190 BNS, members are liable only for offences committed in prosecution of the common object or which they knew to be likely; the concealed firing exceeded the common object, so only X is liable for the death.
The right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death of the assailant under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 by virtue of:
aSection 35
bSection 100
cSection 34
dSection 38
Answer: D
Section 38 BNS enumerates the situations (such as assault reasonably causing apprehension of death or grievous hurt, rape, or acid attack) in which the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death, corresponding to Section 100 IPC.
The offence of 'snatching', newly carved out as a distinct offence, is dealt with under which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 379
bSection 305
cSection 304
dSection 303
Answer: C
Section 304 BNS defines snatching as theft where the offender suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizes property, and prescribes imprisonment up to three years and fine; it has no equivalent in the IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India (the provision replacing 'sedition' under Section 124A IPC) are punishable under:
aSection 150
bSection 124A
cSection 152
dSection 151
Answer: C
Section 152 BNS penalises exciting secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with imprisonment for life or up to seven years and fine.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), a confession made by an accused to a police officer:
aShall not be proved as against the accused, irrespective of whether he was in custody at the time
bIs admissible only when made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate
cMay be proved if reduced into writing and signed by the accused
dIs admissible if the police officer is of a rank not below that of Inspector
Answer: A
Section 23(1) of the BSA bars proof of any confession made to a police officer against the accused, and the bar operates whether or not the maker was in police custody when it was made. Custody is the additional ingredient under Section 23(2) of the BSA, not Section 23(1).
A is on trial for the murder of his wife. Before her death she had written letters describing her husband's cruelty and her fear for her life. For these letters to be admissible as a dying declaration under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), it is necessary that:
aThe cause of the maker's death must come into question, and expectation of death is not required
bThe maker must have been under expectation of death when the statement was made
cThe statement must have been recorded by a Magistrate
dThe proceeding must be a criminal trial and not a civil suit
Answer: A
Under Section 26(a) of the BSA such statements are relevant whether or not the maker was under expectation of death and whatever the nature of the proceeding; the only requirement is that the cause of his death comes into question. This Indian position differs from English law.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) permits proof of so much of the information received from an accused in police custody as:
aIs corroborated by an independent witness
bIs voluntarily made before a Magistrate
cAmounts to a confession of guilt
dRelates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA makes admissible only so much of the information, whether or not it amounts to a confession, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in consequence of it. It is an exception to the bar in Section 23 (sub-sections (1) and (2)).
Where more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of them affecting himself and a co-accused is proved, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) provides that the Court:
aMay consider it only if the co-accused is absconding
bShall convict the co-accused on the basis of such confession
cMay take such confession into consideration against the co-accused as well as against the maker
dMust exclude the confession entirely as against the co-accused
Answer: C
Section 28 of the BSA allows the Court to take a co-accused's confession into consideration against the other accused jointly tried for the same offence. However, it is only a weak corroborative piece, not substantive evidence, and cannot found a conviction by itself.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the opinion of a person specially skilled is relevant upon a point of:
aIndian law or local usage only
bThe credibility of a witness
cForeign law, science, art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions
dThe genuineness of a stamp or seal exclusively
Answer: C
Section 39 of the BSA makes relevant the opinion of an expert upon a point of foreign law, science, art (or any other field), or as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions. The opinion on a point of Indian law is for the court itself.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) lays down that oral evidence must in all cases be direct. Accordingly, evidence of a fact which could be seen must be:
aThe evidence of a witness who says he saw it
bCorroborated by documentary evidence
cGiven only by an expert
dReduced to writing before it is given
Answer: A
Section 55 of the BSA requires that oral evidence of a fact capable of being seen must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw that fact. This embodies the rule against hearsay in the law of oral evidence.
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, the Supreme Court held with respect to secondary evidence of electronic records, a principle now embodied in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), that:
aA certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is a mandatory pre-condition for the admissibility of secondary evidence of an electronic record
bThe certificate requirement applies only to records produced before 2000
cElectronic records can never be proved by secondary evidence
dOral evidence is sufficient to prove the contents of an electronic record
Answer: A
Under Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (carrying forward the rule in Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar), secondary evidence of an electronic record is inadmissible without the accompanying certificate, which is a condition precedent to admissibility.
Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) provides that the fact that a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man shall be conclusive proof of legitimacy, unless it is shown that:
aThe parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten
bThe husband had no income to maintain the child
cThe child was registered under another man's name
dThe mother subsequently remarried
Answer: A
Section 116 of the BSA makes birth during a valid marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy, and the only way to rebut it is by showing non-access between the spouses at the relevant time of conception.
The presumption as to dowry death under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) is one which the Court:
aShall presume, once the foundational facts are established
bMay presume, having regard to the circumstances
cCannot draw unless death occurs within three years of marriage
dShall conclusively presume, admitting no rebuttal
Answer: A
Section 118 of the BSA uses 'shall presume': once it is shown that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry, the Court must presume dowry death. This contrasts with the discretionary 'may presume' for abetment of suicide under Section 117 of the BSA.
When a person is accused of an offence and pleads that his case falls within a General Exception in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) provides that:
aNo burden lies on the accused at any stage
bThe burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception is upon the accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances
cThe prosecution must disprove the exception beyond reasonable doubt
dThe accused must prove the exception beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of the prosecution
Answer: B
Section 109 of the BSA places on the accused the burden of proving circumstances bringing his case within an exception, and directs the Court to presume their absence. The standard of proof for the accused is the preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.
A transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor is, under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882-
avoidable only at the option of the transferor
bvoid as against all persons
cvalid and binding on all creditors
dvoidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed
Answer: D
Section 53(1) makes such a transfer voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed, while protecting a transferee in good faith and for consideration.
The right of a transferee in part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as a settled principle of Indian law, can be used-
aas a sword to recover possession from the transferor by filing a suit
bboth as a sword and a shield in all circumstances
conly as a shield to defend and protect possession already taken, not as a cause of action
dto claim ownership and compel execution of a sale deed
Answer: C
Section 53A confers only a passive equity; the transferee in possession may use it as a defence (shield) to protect his possession, but it gives no right of action (sword) against the transferor.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of tangible immovable property of a value of one hundred rupees or upwards can be made-
aonly by a registered instrument
beither by a registered instrument or by delivery of property
conly by a written but unregistered instrument
dby an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession
Answer: A
Section 54 mandates that for tangible immovable property of value rupees one hundred or more, a sale can be made only by a registered instrument; delivery of property suffices only where the value is less than one hundred rupees.
A contract for the sale of immovable property, as provided in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882-
aof itself creates an interest in or charge upon such property
boperates as a completed sale if part consideration is paid
ctransfers ownership immediately on its execution
ddoes not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property
Answer: D
Section 54 expressly states that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on the property; it only creates a right to obtain a conveyance on settled terms.
A person delivers to his creditor, in a notified town, the documents of title to his immovable property with intent to create a security thereon. Under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, this constitutes a-
amortgage by deposit of title-deeds
busufructuary mortgage
cEnglish mortgage
dsimple mortgage
Answer: A
Section 58(f) defines a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds (equitable mortgage), created when a person in a notified town delivers documents of title to a creditor with intent to create a security.
A stipulation in a mortgage deed which fetters or obstructs the mortgagor's statutory right of redemption under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is, in equity-
aenforceable only if registered
bvalid and binding on the mortgagor
cvoidable at the option of the mortgagee
dvoid as a clog on the equity of redemption
Answer: D
The right of redemption conferred by Section 60 cannot be defeated by contract; any term that clogs or obstructs it is void as a clog on the equity of redemption.
A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, be made-
aby an unregistered written instrument signed by the lessor
bonly by a registered instrument
cby oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession
deither by registered instrument or oral agreement with possession
Answer: B
Section 107 requires such leases to be made only by a registered instrument; all other leases may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Under Section 5(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, at the time of marriage the bridegroom and the bride must have completed, respectively, the age of:
aTwenty-one years and twenty-one years
bTwenty-one years and eighteen years
cEighteen years and sixteen years
dEighteen years and eighteen years
Answer: B
Section 5(iii) prescribes that the bridegroom must have completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride the age of eighteen years at the time of the marriage.
Under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as substituted by the 2005 Amendment), the daughter of a coparcener in a Mitakshara coparcenary:
aBecomes a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as the son
bBecomes a coparcener only if she is unmarried on the date of partition
cAcquires a coparcenary interest only on the death of her father
dIs entitled only to maintenance out of the coparcenary property
Answer: A
The substituted Section 6(1) makes the daughter of a coparcener a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property.
Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as:
aA co-owner along with the heirs of her father
bA full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
cA limited owner during her lifetime only
dA trustee for the heirs of her husband
Answer: B
Section 14(1) converts the limited estate of a female Hindu (the old 'woman's estate') into full ownership, declaring that she holds such property as a full owner and not as a limited owner. Section 14(2) is the exception for restricted grants.
Under Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, where she dies intestate leaving no son or daughter (including children of a predeceased son or daughter), devolves upon:
aThe heirs of the husband
bThe heirs of the father
cHer husband and his heirs equally
dThe State by escheat
Answer: B
Section 15(2)(a) carves out an exception: property inherited by a female from her father or mother devolves, in the absence of any son or daughter (including children of a predeceased child), upon the heirs of the father, not under the ordinary order in Section 15(1).
Under Section 16(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, where two or more heirs succeed together to the property of an intestate, they take the property:
aPer stirpes and as joint tenants
bPer capita and as tenants-in-common, and not as joint tenants
cAs joint tenants with a right of survivorship
dIn equal shares as joint tenants only if they belong to the same class
Answer: B
Rule prescribed under Section 16 read with Section 19 provides that, save as otherwise expressly provided, heirs succeeding together take per capita and as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants, abolishing survivorship in intestate succession.
Under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which of the following is NOT a Class I heir of a male Hindu dying intestate?
aSon of a predeceased son
bWidow
cFather
dMother
Answer: C
The father is a Class II heir, not a Class I heir, under the Schedule. The widow, mother and son of a predeceased son are all Class I heirs who succeed simultaneously to the exclusion of Class II heirs.
Under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder is disqualified from inheriting:
aOnly the coparcenary share of the person murdered
bProperty of the murdered person only if convicted of murder, not culpable homicide
cOnly the self-acquired property of the person murdered
dThe property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he committed or abetted the murder
Answer: D
Section 25 disqualifies a murderer (or abettor of murder) from inheriting the property of the person murdered or any other property in furtherance of succession to which he committed the murder, treating him as non-existent for succession.
Under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement by which a person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business is void:
aTo that extent, subject only to the exception relating to sale of goodwill
bOnly where it relates to the whole of India
cOnly if the restraint is unreasonable in extent
dOnly where the restraint is for an unlimited period
Answer: A
Section 27 makes every agreement in restraint of a lawful profession, trade or business void to that extent; the only statutory exception is the sale of goodwill (reasonableness is not the Indian test, unlike English law).
Under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement which absolutely restricts a party from enforcing his rights under a contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals is:
aValid, as parties are free to oust the jurisdiction of courts
bVoidable at the option of either party
cVoid to that extent
dValid if it merely shortens the limitation period
Answer: C
Section 28 renders void to that extent every agreement that absolutely restricts a party from enforcing his contractual rights through the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may enforce them.
A contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other person, is defined under Section 124 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as a:
aQuasi-contract
bContract of indemnity
cContract of bailment
dContract of guarantee
Answer: B
Section 124 defines a contract of indemnity as one to save the other party from loss caused by the conduct of the promisor himself or of any other person.
Under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a general lien for a general balance of account over goods bailed may be exercised by:
aAny bailee who is in possession of goods
bBankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers
cCarriers and innkeepers only
dPawnees and pledgees only
Answer: B
Section 171 confers a general lien only on bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers; other persons have only a particular lien unless an express contract provides otherwise.
An agent enters into a contract on behalf of a principal who is disclosed but who cannot be sued. Under Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the law presumes that:
aOnly the principal is bound, the agent being a mere conduit
bA contract to the contrary exists, so that the agent is personally bound
cNeither the agent nor the principal is bound
dThe contract is void for want of a competent principal
Answer: B
Section 230 presumes a contract to the contrary (rendering the agent personally liable) in three cases, including where the principal, though disclosed, cannot be sued.
A suit by a person dispossessed of immovable property without his consent otherwise than in due course of law, to recover possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, must be instituted within:
aOne year from the date of dispossession
bSix months from the date of dispossession
cThree years from the date of dispossession
dTwelve years from the date of dispossession
Answer: B
Section 6(2)(a) bars a suit thereunder after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; this period cannot be extended by condonation of delay.
With respect to a suit for recovery of possession instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which of the following is correct?
aReview of the decree is permissible
bAn appeal lies from a decree passed in the suit
cNo suit under the section shall be brought against the Government
dThe suit can be filed within three years of dispossession
Answer: C
Section 6(2)(b) bars any suit under the section against the Government, and Section 6(3) bars both appeal and review from any order or decree passed in such a suit.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the specific performance of a contract under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
aShall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions of Sections 11(2), 14 and 16
bCan never be refused on any ground
cIs available only where damages cannot be ascertained
dMay be enforced in the discretion of the court
Answer: A
The 2018 amendment substituted Section 10 to make specific performance mandatory ('shall be enforced'), subject only to the limited bars in Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, replacing the earlier discretionary 'may'.
Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as substituted by the 2018 Amendment), before opting for substituted performance of a broken contract through a third party or his own agency, the party suffering breach must give the defaulting party a written notice of not less than:
aFifteen days
bThirty days
cSixty days
dNinety days
Answer: B
Substituted Section 20 confers an option of substituted performance, exercisable only after giving the party in breach a written notice of not less than thirty days requiring performance.
The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that no court shall make a declaration of legal character or right where the plaintiff:
aBeing able to seek further relief than a mere declaration, omits to do so
bIs not in possession of the suit property
cHas filed the suit beyond the period of limitation
dHas no subsisting title to the property
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 34 bars a bare declaratory decree where the plaintiff, being able to seek further (consequential) relief, omits to claim it; this proviso is mandatory and prevents piecemeal litigation.
Under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, once an instrument has been admitted in evidence, the admission shall not (except as provided in Section 61) be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that:
aThe instrument has not been duly stamped
bThe instrument is not registered
cThe instrument is barred by limitation
dThe instrument is forged
Answer: A
Section 36 bars a subsequent objection to admissibility on the ground of insufficiency of stamp once the instrument has been admitted in evidence, save for the limited revisional power under Section 61.
Under Section 29 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the stamp duty on an instrument of lease or agreement to lease is payable by:
aThe lessor and lessee equally
bThe lessor
cThe Registrar before whom it is presented
dThe lessee or intended lessee
Answer: D
Section 29 fixes liability for duty on a lease or agreement to lease on the lessee or intended lessee; for a counterpart of a lease, however, the duty is payable by the lessor.
Under Section 29 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the duty chargeable on an instrument of partition is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, payable by:
aThe party in whose favour the largest share is allotted
bThe person who first presents the instrument for registration
cThe eldest coparcener alone
dThe parties thereto in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned
Answer: D
Section 29 provides that in the case of an instrument of partition the duty is payable by the parties in proportion to their respective shares, or, where made under an order of a Revenue-authority, Civil Court or arbitrator, in the proportion such authority directs.
Under Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, all documents (other than a Will) have to be presented for registration within a period of:
aOne month from the date of their execution
bFour months from the date of their execution
cThree months from the date of their execution
dSix months from the date of their execution
Answer: B
Section 23 requires every document other than a Will to be presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution; a Will may be presented at any time. The four-month period is the general rule subject to condonation of delay under Section 25.
Under Article 123 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte must be made within thirty days. Where the summons or notice was not duly served, that period of thirty days runs from:
aThe date when the applicant had knowledge of the decree
bThe date of the first execution application against the applicant
cThe date on which the applicant engaged an advocate
dThe date of the ex parte decree in every case
Answer: A
Article 123 ordinarily runs from the date of the decree, but where the summons or notice was not duly served, time runs from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, being the residuary entry for 'any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division', prescribes a period of:
aThree years from the time when the right to apply accrues
bThirty days from the date of knowledge
cOne year from the date of the order complained of
dNinety days from the date of the decree
Answer: A
Article 137 is the residuary article for applications, prescribing three years from the time when the right to apply accrues; the Supreme Court has held it is not confined to applications under the CPC.
Where the prescribed period for a suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made:
aOn the last working day before the Court closed
bOnly with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5
cOn the day when the Court reopens
dWithin thirty days of the reopening of the Court
Answer: C
Section 4 provides that where the prescribed period expires on a day the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day the Court reopens.
Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed:
aAlthough limitation has not been set up as a defence by the defendant
bOnly with the prior leave of the High Court
cOnly where the defendant specifically pleads limitation as a defence
dOnly if the plaintiff fails to show sufficient cause
Answer: A
Section 3 casts a mandatory duty on the court to dismiss a time-barred suit, appeal or application even though limitation has not been pleaded as a defence. The bar of limitation is to be applied suo motu by the court.
Under Section 33 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a suit for compensation for disturbance of an easement lies only where the disturbance has actually caused the plaintiff:
aSubstantial damage
bLoss of title to the dominant heritage
cMental anguish
dAny disturbance, whether or not damage results
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 33 requires that the disturbance must have actually caused substantial damage to the plaintiff before a suit for compensation can be maintained.
Under the Indian Easements Act, 1882, an easement of necessity is extinguished when:
aTwelve years elapse from its creation
bThe dominant owner dies
cThe servient owner objects in writing
dThe necessity comes to an end (Section 41)
Answer: D
Section 41 provides that an easement of necessity is extinguished when the necessity which created it comes to an end, for instance when the dominant owner acquires another access.
Under Section 47 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a continuous easement is extinguished when it totally ceases to be enjoyed as such for an unbroken period of:
aTwelve years
bTwenty years
cThirty years
dThree years
Answer: B
Section 47 provides that a continuous easement is extinguished by total non-enjoyment as such for an unbroken period of twenty years, and a discontinuous easement likewise for a like period.
Where no rate of interest is specified in a promissory note or bill of exchange, interest on the amount due is calculated under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 at the rate of:
aTwelve per cent per annum
bSix per cent per annum
cTwenty-four per cent per annum
dEighteen per cent per annum
Answer: D
Section 80 provides that where no rate of interest is specified, interest shall be calculated at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the date the sum ought to have been paid until tender or realisation.
Under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the effect of a material alteration of a negotiable instrument, made without the consent of a party liable at the time, is that the instrument is rendered:
aVoid only against the maker but enforceable against indorsers
bVoidable at the option of the holder in due course
cValid and enforceable against all prior parties
dVoid as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of the alteration and does not consent thereto
Answer: D
Section 87 provides that any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders it void as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and who does not consent to it, unless made to carry out the common intention of the original parties.
A 'holder in due course' under Section 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a person who became the possessor or payee of an instrument:
aGratuitously, but in good faith, even after the maturity of the instrument
bOnly if he is entitled in his own name and has actually recovered the amount
cFor consideration, before its maturity and without sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived title
dMerely by possession of a bearer instrument, irrespective of consideration
Answer: C
Section 9 defines a holder in due course as one who, for consideration, became the possessor (or payee/indorsee) of the instrument before its maturity and without sufficient cause to believe any defect existed in the transferor's title.
Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the first date of hearing fixed by the Magistrate shall not ordinarily be beyond:
aTwo days from the date of service of notice on the respondent
bSeven days from the date of receipt of the application by the Court
cThree days from the date of receipt of the application by the Court
dFifteen days from the date of filing of the domestic incident report
Answer: C
Section 12(4) provides that the Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the Court.
Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Protection Officers are appointed by notification by the:
aHigh Court on the recommendation of the State Government
bDistrict and Sessions Judge of each district
cCentral Government for each State
dState Government in each district, as it may consider necessary
Answer: D
Section 8(1) empowers the State Government, by notification, to appoint such number of Protection Officers in each district as it may consider necessary; under Section 8(2) they shall as far as possible be women.
Under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, a tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made is not entitled to contest the application unless he:
afirst obtains the leave of the High Court
bpays or deposits all arrears of rent due and continues to pay rent that subsequently becomes due
cvacates the building pending the proceeding
dfurnishes a bank guarantee equal to one year's rent
Answer: B
The Act requires a tenant resisting eviction to pay or deposit all arrears of rent up to date and to continue paying or depositing accruing rent until termination of the proceeding before the Controller.
Where a landlord obtains possession of a building under Section 10(3) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 for his own occupation, the evicted tenant may apply for restoration of possession if the landlord:
araises the rent on a fresh tenant within one year
bfails to whitewash the building before re-occupation
clets the building to a relative at any time
ddoes not occupy the building within one month, or vacates it without reasonable cause within six months
Answer: D
Section 10(3) entitles the evicted tenant to apply for restoration where the landlord, after obtaining possession for own occupation, fails to occupy within one month or vacates without reasonable cause within six months.
On a finding of professional or other misconduct, which of the following is NOT among the orders that the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council is empowered to pass under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961?
aImpose a fine and direct payment of compensation to the complainant
bRemove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates
cReprimand the advocate
dSuspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit
Answer: A
Section 35(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961 permits the disciplinary committee to dismiss the complaint, reprimand the advocate, suspend him from practice, or remove his name from the State roll; it does not empower the committee to impose a fine or award compensation.
Before proceeding against a person under Section 5 or Section 6 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, Section 7 requires that:
aSanction of the Board of Revenue be obtained
bA notice be served on the person reputed to be in unauthorised occupation, specifying the land and calling on him to show cause before a certain date
cA criminal complaint be filed before the Judicial Magistrate
dA civil suit for possession be instituted first
Answer: B
Section 7 mandates that, before action under Section 5 or 6, the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar must cause a notice to be served on the person reputed to be in unauthorised occupation, specifying the land and calling on him to show cause by a stated date why he should not be proceeded against.
Whoever commits an offence falling under a clause OTHER than clause (a) of Section 34 (such as tapping an excise tree, drawing toddy, or buying any intoxicant) of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, is punishable with:
aFine only, which may extend up to rupees five thousand
bImprisonment not less than six months extending up to one year and fine which may extend up to rupees ten thousand
cImprisonment not less than three years extending up to five years and fine up to rupees one lakh
dImprisonment which may extend to three months and fine of rupees five hundred
Answer: B
Section 34(2) provides that for offences other than those under clause (a), the punishment is imprisonment of not less than six months up to one year and fine which may extend up to rupees ten thousand.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
